Iocovello v. City of New York et al
Filing
62
OPINION AND ORDER re: 52 MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by Erica Francis, City of New York. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Iocovello's false-arrest claims a re DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and his negligence claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to permit refiling in state court. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining dates, and close this case. (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 12/13/2016) (cla)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
JOSEPH IOCOVELLO,
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
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v.
:
:
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal
:
entity, and POLICE OFFICER ERICA
:
FRANCIS,
:
:
Defendants. :
:
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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: December 13, 2016
______________
14 Civ. 4949 (KPF)
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
On April 8, 2013, two New York City Department of Sanitation (“DSNY”)
employees, Plaintiff Joseph Iocovello and Walter King, got into a fight on the
job. Police arrived on the scene and separately interviewed Iocovello and King.
And although Iocovello insisted that King was the lone aggressor, New York
City Police Department (“NYPD”) Officer Erica Francis arrested both men.
On July 1, 2014, Iocovello sued the City of New York (the “City”) and
Officer Francis (together, “Defendants”). He brings three claims. First,
Iocovello argues that Officer Francis falsely arrested him, and he seeks recovery
under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law. Second, Iocovello argues
that the City negligently hired, retained, and supervised King — alleged to have
episodes of violence in his past — in violation of New York state law.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Defendants argue that Iocovello’s false-arrest claims are untenable, because
Officer Francis had probable cause to arrest him. And even if Officer Francis
lacked probable cause, Defendants insist, she is nonetheless entitled to
qualified immunity. As for Iocovello’s negligence claim, Defendants argue that
the City had no notice of King’s allegedly violent propensities.
Defendants have the better arguments. The Court agrees with
Defendants that Officer Francis is entitled to qualified immunity and that
Iocovello’s false-arrest claims must be dismissed. That conclusion eliminates
Iocovello’s lone federal claim in this suit, and the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law negligence claim. Thus, for the
reasons set forth in the remainder of this Opinion, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted as to Iocovello’s false-arrest claims, and
Iocovello’s negligence claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND 1
A.
Factual Background
There is a gulf between the parties’ accounts of what they each consider
to be the operative facts of this case. They agree that Iocovello and King had a
1
This Opinion draws on facts from Iocovello’s Complaint (“Compl.” (Dkt. #2)) and the
parties’ submissions in connection with the instant motion. Defendants’ submissions
include the Declaration of Peter J. Fogarty (“Fogarty Decl.” (Dkt. #53)); an affidavit from
Walter King (“King Aff.” (Dkt. #53-10)); Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.
56.1” (Dkt. #54)); a reply declaration from Peter J. Fogarty (“Second Fogarty Decl.” (Dkt.
#59)); affidavits from three DSNY sanitation workers who witnessed the fight between
Iocovello and King (“Fiore Aff.” (Dkt. #59-2); “Gerri Aff.” (Dkt. #59-2); “Alvarado Aff.”
(Dkt. #59-2)); and Defendants’ objections to Iocovello’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.
56.1 Objs.” (Dkt. #60)). Iocovello’s filings include the Declaration of Christopher H.
Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald Decl.” (Dkt. #56)), handwritten statements from four DSNY
employees who witnessed the altercation between King and Iocovello (“Statements” (Dkt.
#56-6)), and Iocovello’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1” (Dkt. #57)). For ease of
reference, the Court refers to Defendants’ opening brief as “Def. Br.,” Iocovello’s
response as “Pl. Opp.,” and Defendants’ reply as “Def. Reply.”
2
physical altercation, that Officer Francis separately interviewed both men, and
that she then arrested them both. But the parties part ways over what
information Officer Francis learned prior to her decision to arrest Iocovello and
King, and whether that information supplied Officer Francis with probable
cause to arrest Iocovello. And although the Court ultimately concludes that
these factual disputes are immaterial, they merit examination here because
they bear on the Court’s resolution of Defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.
The Court begins with the undisputed facts. Iocovello was a DSNY
Supervisor; King worked under Iocovello’s charge. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-21). Both
men worked at DSNY Bronx Garage 9 (“Bronx Garage 9”), located at 850 Zerega
Avenue in the Bronx, New York. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1).
On April 8, 2013, Iocovello and King got into an argument at Bronx
Garage 9. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1). When that verbal altercation turned physical, DSNY
Supervisor Jaime Alvarado called 911. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 14). Sprint
telephone records of the “radio run” issued after that call indicate that Alvarado
reported that a sanitation worker had assaulted his supervisor. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1;
Fitzgerald Decl. Ex. A). At least four DSNY employees witnessed the incident
between Iocovello and King: Alvarado, Robert Gazzola, James Gerri, and
Gerard Fiore. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 5).
NYPD officers, including Officer Francis, arrived on the scene and
interviewed Iocovello and King in separate rooms. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 3-5). Officer
Francis spoke with Iocovello in a Bronx Garage 9 office; about eight to ten other
people (presumably DSNY employees) sat in on the interview. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 4).
3
Officer Francis observed a scrape on Iocovello’s leg and red marks on his face.
(Pl. 56.1 ¶ 2; Def. 56.1 Objs. ¶ 2). Iocovello told Officer Francis that King had
assaulted him. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7).
King’s account of the incident was more equivocal. 2 King told Officer
Francis that he and Iocovello had gotten into a fight, during which both men
“grabbed each other.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 8-9). And although Officer Francis did not
see any signs of physical injury on King, King complained that his back hurt as
a result of his altercation with Iocovello. (Id. at ¶ 10; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 3). Iocovello
did not overhear any part of Officer Francis’s interview of King. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 6).
Here is where the parties’ accounts diverge. The four witnesses to the
fight between Iocovello and King (Alvarado, Gazzola, Gerri, and Fiore) drafted
handwritten statements describing that incident. (See Statements). All four of
those statements convey a similar narrative — King attacked Iocovello in a
pique of anger. (Id.). But the statements also raise a question that the parties
dispute: Did Officer Francis read the statements before she arrested Iocovello
and King?
2
On February 12, 2016, King executed an affidavit (the “King Affidavit”) in which he
averred: “To the best of my recollection, I did not tell the police officers that Mr.
Iocovello intentionally hit me or attacked me.” (King Aff. ¶ 6). Iocovello, however, does
not rely on the King Affidavit in opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Indeed, Iocovello does not even mention the substance of this affidavit in his briefing.
Rather, Defendants included this affidavit in their opening summary judgment papers
in an apparent attempt to discredit it. (Id.; see Def. Br. 7-8). The Court agrees with
Defendants that the timing of the King Affidavit is suspect; King signed it just ten days
before Iocovello voluntarily dismissed King from this lawsuit. (Def. Br. 7; see Dkt. #46).
More importantly, the King Affidavit fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether Officer Francis is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court explores this
issue more fully infra.
4
Although all four statements are dated “4-8-13” (Statements), it is
unclear if they were drafted before or after Officer Francis arrived at Bronx
Garage 9. Iocovello argues that Gazzola handed all four statements to Officer
Francis. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 17). What is more, Iocovello maintains that Gazzola and
Alvarado both told Officer Francis that King attacked Iocovello. (Id. at ¶ 16).
Defendants offer a competing sequence of events. They assert that Fiore,
Gerri, and Alvarado “all filled out the[ir] handwritten statements at the behest
of the [DSNY] after NYPD officers had left the scene.” (Def. 56.1 Objs. ¶ 17).
Defendants have submitted affidavits from Fiore, Gerri, and Alvarado that
purport to corroborate this timeline. (Gerri Aff.; Fiore Aff.; Alvarado Aff.). It is
true that, in their affidavits, all three men aver that they did not show their
handwritten statements to Officer Francis on April 8. (Fiore Aff. ¶¶ 4, 7; Gerri
Aff. ¶¶ 5, 9; Alvarado Aff. ¶¶ 2, 5). But only Alvarado and Gerri state explicitly
that they drafted their affidavits after Officer Francis departed Bronx Garage 9.
(Alvarado Aff. ¶ 4; Gerri Aff. ¶ 8). And Defendants have not submitted an
affidavit from Gazzola — who, by Iocovello’s account, gave all four handwritten
statements to Officer Francis before she arrested Iocovello. In any event,
Defendants insist that Officer Francis did not see Fiore’s, Gerri’s, or Alvarado’s
handwritten statements during her time at Bronx Garage 9. (Def. 56.1 Objs.
¶ 17).
Officer Francis arrested Iocovello and King. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11). At his
arraignment on April 9, 2013, Iocovello was charged with, among other things,
5
third-degree assault and third-degree menacing. (Compl. ¶ 40). 3 The Bronx
County District Attorney’s Office dismissed all counts against Iocovello on
October 31, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 43).
B.
Procedural Background
On July 1, 2014, Iocovello sued Officer Francis, the City, the NYPD, the
DSNY, and King. (Dkt. #2). The Complaint brought thirteen claims for relief.
(Id.). At a pretrial conference on November 10, 2015, Iocovello consented to
removing the NYPD and the DSNY as defendants. (Dkt. #37 at 23). Iocovello
also agreed to strike several of his causes of action. (Id. at 24-26). On
February 22, 2016, Iocovello voluntarily dismissed King from his suit. (Dkt.
#46).
On May 23, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
Iocovello’s three remaining claims: (i) false arrest under federal and state law
(against Defendants) and (ii) negligent hiring, retention, and/or supervision
under state law (against the City). (Dkt. #55). Iocovello responded on June 22,
2016 (Dkt. #58), and Defendants replied on July 6, 2016 (Dkt. #61).
DISCUSSION
A.
Applicable Law
Two well-settled legal standards guide the Court’s analysis. First, the
standard of review for a motion for summary judgment. Second, the standard
3
In his Complaint, Iocovello alleges that he was arraigned on April 9, 2014. (Compl.
¶ 40). The Court assumes that this was a typographical error.
6
for establishing qualified immunity in a false-arrest case. The Court addresses
each in turn.
1.
Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Motions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that “[s]ummary judgment
must be granted where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a)). A summary-judgment movant’s “burden has two distinct
components: [i] an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving
party if satisfied by the moving party; and [ii] an ultimate burden of
persuasion, which always remains on the moving party.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986).
To satisfy this first component, a movant must “demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. “[A] fact is
material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”
Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y.,
746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). And a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence would permit
a reasonable juror to find for the party opposing the motion.” Figueroa v.
Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
If the movant makes this showing, “[t]he nonmoving party must ‘set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Rubens v. Mason,
7
527 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
nonmoving party cannot meet this burden by “rest[ing] upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but … must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Parks Real Estate
Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.
2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
“A court reviewing a motion for summary judgment must ‘construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.’” Beyer v.
Cty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Dallas Aerospace,
Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003)).
2.
Standard for Establishing Qualified Immunity in False-Arrest
Cases
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards,
132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). “Put simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)). “In the context of § 1983 actions predicated on allegations of false
arrest, … an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity so long as
‘arguable probable cause’ was present when the arrest was made.” Figueroa,
825 F.3d at 100 (quoting Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir.
8
2013)). The same is true of false-arrest claims brought under New York state
law. Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
Arguable probable cause is an objective standard. It “exists if either (a) it
was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed,
or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable
cause test was met.” Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 390). “[W]hether an officer’s conduct was objectively
reasonable” depends on “the information possessed by the officer at the time of
the arrest,” not “the subjective intent, motives, or beliefs of the officer.” Id.
(quoting Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Put another
way, an arresting officer will find protection under the defense of qualified
immunity unless ‘no reasonably competent officer’ could have concluded,
based on the facts known at the time of arrest, that probable cause existed.”
Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). “Therefore, in
situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that
probable cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified
immunity.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
Determining whether an officer had arguable probable cause to effect an
arrest requires the Court to consider factors that tend to establish or diminish
probable cause. “Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances
that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Figueroa,
9
825 F.3d at 99 (quoting Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004)).
“Probable cause is a ‘fluid’ standard that ‘does not demand hard certainties or
mechanistic inquiries’; nor does it ‘demand that an officer’s good-faith belief
that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime be correct or more likely
true than false.’” Id. (quoting Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 389-90). Rather, “[a] court
deciding whether probable cause existed must ‘examine the events leading up
to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable
cause.’” Mitchell v. City of N.Y., 841 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). These principles make plain
that “[t]he requirement of probable cause does not create a high bar for law
enforcement.” Sforza v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 6122 (DLC), 2009 WL 857496,
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009).
When an arresting officer raises qualified immunity as a defense to a
false-arrest claim on summary judgment, “summary judgment dismissing [the]
plaintiff’s false arrest claim is appropriate if the undisputed facts indicate that
the arresting officer’s probable cause determination was objectively
reasonable.” Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 88. “If, however, on the undisputed facts
the officer would be unreasonable in concluding probable cause existed, or if
the officer’s reasonableness depends on material issues of fact, then summary
judgment is inappropriate[.]” Id.
10
B.
Analysis
To review, Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Iocovello’s
false-arrest claims against both Defendants and his negligence claim against
the City. Defendants argue that Officer Francis had probable cause to arrest
Iocovello or, at minimum, arguable probable cause sufficient to confer qualified
immunity. Iocovello retorts that based on the evidence Officer Francis gathered
during her time at Bronx Garage 9, she should have realized that King attacked
Iocovello, and not the other way around. As for Iocovello’s negligence claim,
Defendants insist that the City was not on notice that King was prone to
violence (if, indeed, he had violent proclivities in the first place), a contention
Iocovello disputes.
The Court concludes that Officer Francis is entitled to qualified immunity
from Iocovello’s false-arrest claims, because she had arguable probable cause
to arrest Iocovello. In light of that conclusion, Iocovello’s only remaining claim
is his state-law negligence claim against the City — and the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted as to Iocovello’s false-arrest claims, and his
negligence claim is dismissed without prejudice so that it may be refiled in
state court.
1.
Officer Francis Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity from
Iocovello’s False-Arrest Claims
Iocovello argues that Officer Francis violated his rights under New York
and federal law because she arrested him without probable cause. Whether
Officer Francis enjoys qualified immunity from a false-arrest claim hinges on
11
whether she had arguable probable cause to arrest Iocovello. Jenkins, 478
F.3d at 88 (“under both New York and federal law, summary judgment
dismissing a plaintiff’s false arrest claim is appropriate if the undisputed facts
indicate that the arresting officer[]” had arguable probable cause). That distills
the dispositive merits question the Court must answer here: Do the
undisputed facts of this case establish that Officer Francis’s “probable cause
determination was objectively reasonable[?]” Id. Because the Court concludes
that the answer is “yes,” it must enter summary judgment against Iocovello on
his false-arrest claim.
“Allegations of unconstitutional false arrest are analyzed by ‘look[ing] to
the law of the state in which the arrest occurred” — here, New York. Sforza,
2009 WL 857496, at *13 (quoting Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir.
2006)); see also Simpson v. City of N.Y., 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (“A
section 1983 claim for false arrest is substantially the same as a claim for false
arrest under New York law.” (quoting Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 84)). “Under New
York law, an action for false arrest requires that the plaintiff show that ‘[i] the
defendant intended to confine him, [ii] the plaintiff was conscious of the
confinement, [ii] the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and [iv] the
confinement was not otherwise privileged.’” Ackerson v. City of White Plains,
702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir.), as amended (Dec. 4, 2012) (citation omitted). “To
avoid liability for a claim of false arrest, an arresting officer may demonstrate
that either [i] he had probable cause for the arrest, or [ii] he is protected from
liability because he has qualified immunity.” Simpson, 793 F.3d at 265. And
12
to establish that she had arguable probable cause sufficient to confer qualified
immunity, Officer Francis must demonstrate that “either (a) it was objectively
reasonable for [her] to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of
reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was
met.” Garcia, 779 F.3d at 92 (quoting Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 390).
Officer Francis has met this standard: She had arguable probable cause
to arrest Iocovello. Before explaining why, the Court addresses one
conspicuous gap in the parties’ briefs. Neither party discloses the offense (or
offenses) for which Officer Francis arrested Iocovello. True, “a claim for false
arrest turns only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a defendant,
and … it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect to … any
charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Jaegly,
439 F.3d at 154. Nonetheless, “the elements of the offense[s] for which” Officer
Francis arrested Iocovello bear on “the objective reasonableness of [her] belief
that probable cause existed.” Dancy v. McGinley, Lead Docket No. 15-140cv (L), 2016 WL 7118403, at *12 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2016) (quoting Lennon v.
Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995)). Defendants insist that Officer Francis
had arguable probable cause to arrest Iocovello. But that just begs the
question: for what crime?
In his Complaint, however, Iocovello recounts that he was charged with
third-degree menacing and third-degree assault. (Compl. ¶ 40). And although
it is certainly possible that Officer Francis arrested Iocovello on lesser charges,
13
the Court will proceed on the assumption that Officer Francis arrested Iocovello
for one or both of these two crimes.
The elements of those two offenses are as follows. “A person is guilty of
assault in the third degree when: [i] With intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
[ii] He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or [iii] With criminal
negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument.” N.Y. Penal Law. § 120.00. “A person is
guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical menace, he or she
intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death,
imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.” Id. § 120.15. Both
crimes refer to “physical injury,” which “means impairment of physical
condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 10.00. “‘[S]ubstantial pain’ cannot be
defined precisely, but ... it is more than slight or trivial pain and need not ... be
severe or intense to be substantial.” People v. Monserrate, 90 A.D.3d 785, 787
(2d Dep’t 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
With all of these principles in mind, the undisputed facts of this case
establish that Officer Francis’s “probable cause determination was objectively
reasonable.” Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 88. Consider the facts that Officer Francis
knew when she arrested Iocovello and King on April 8, 2013. Prior to arriving
at Bronx Garage 9, she received a “radio run” indicating that a sanitation
worker had assaulted his supervisor. But the information Officer Francis
learned during her investigation at Bronx Garage 9 did not clearly establish
14
that that is what happened. Officer Francis interviewed Iocovello, who told her
that King attacked him. Iocovello had a scrape on his leg and red marks on his
face. Officer Francis also interviewed King, who recounted that he and King
had gotten into a fight during which they “grabbed each other.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 9).
And King added that he was experiencing back pain as a result of his
altercation with Iocovello.
The undisputed facts of this case — as they appeared at the time Officer
Francis arrested Iocovello and King — established that two men had gotten into
a fight. They established that two men had grappled with each other. And they
established that two men displayed physical injuries as a result of that
altercation. Based on these facts, the Court cannot conclude that “no
reasonably competent officer” would have determined that Officer Francis had
probable cause to arrest Iocovello for third-degree assault or third-degree
menacing. Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100. Officer Francis is thus immune from
Iocovello’s false-arrest claim.
Iocovello tries to counter this conclusion in three ways. And although
his brief elides the distinction between these arguments, to the extent the
Court can extricate them, all three fail.
Iocovello first faults Officer Francis for not conducting a more searching
investigation. Officer Francis, Iocovello argues, should have rigorously
interrogated King’s story of what transpired on April 8. If she had, Iocovello
claims, she would have determined that King’s account was false and that
Iocovello was the victim of King’s attack. (Pl. Opp. 7).
15
Officer Francis was under no obligation to conduct Iocovello’s desired
investigation. “Once an officer has probable cause, he or she is neither
required nor allowed to continue investigating, sifting and weighing
information.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[i]t is well-established that a law
enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information
from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness, … unless the
circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Id. at 395 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Just so here. King told Officer Francis
that he and Iocovello fought each other. Iocovello gives no reason for this
Court to conclude that Officer Francis should have doubted the veracity of
King’s statement. And the information King conveyed to Officer Francis
constituted sufficient evidence to establish arguable probable cause to arrest
Iocovello, because it suggested that Iocovello fought with King and caused him
to suffer injury.
Second, Iocovello argues that Officer Francis lacked probable cause to
arrest him, because multiple eyewitnesses told Officer Francis that King was
the lone aggressor. (Pl. Opp. 8). Even resolving the ambiguities of this case in
the light most favorable to Iocovello, see Beyer, 524 F.3d at 163, this argument
fails. Assuming that (i) Officer Francis read the four handwritten statements
from Alvarado, Gazzola, Gerri, and Fiore before she arrested Iocovello, and
(ii) Gazzola and Alvardo both told Officer Francis that King attacked Iocovello,
16
does not change the Court’s conclusion that Officer Francis had arguable
probable cause.
“The Second Circuit has held consistently that conflicting accounts of a
crime do not vitiate the probable cause established by an eyewitness
identification or alleged victim of a crime.” Crews v. Cty. of Nassau, 996 F.
Supp. 2d 186, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Again, “[o]nce a police officer has a
reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to
explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before
making an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.
1997); see, e.g., Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2001)
(officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff bar owner for third-degree
assault, even though plaintiff alleged that he had tried to break up bar fight
involving unruly patron, where unruly patron alleged that plaintiff assaulted
him). After all, “[a] story is never a single chapter, it is the experience of the
entire tale; the same is true of probable cause.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721
F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2013). And although parts of the story before Officer
Francis appeared to establish that King attacked Iocovello, other parts
suggested that both men had attacked each other.
Iocovello’s final argument springs from his second: He maintains that
Officer Francis “ignor[ed] plainly exculpatory evidence.” (Pl. Opp. 8). Certainly,
“an officer” who wishes to avail herself of qualified immunity “may not
disregard plainly exculpatory evidence.” Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395. But there is
no indication that Officer Francis did so. Officer Francis heard two accounts of
17
what transpired between Iocovello and King: (i) King attacked Iocovello (the
account that Iocovello, Alvarado, Gazzola, Gerri, and Fiore proffered); and
(ii) King and Iocovello fought each other (King’s take). Iocovello appears to
claim that this first account was “exculpatory.” Officer Francis, however, did
not ignore that account: She arrested King. The information she learned from
her on-the-scene interviews established that two DSNY sanitation workers
fought each other. She determined that there was probable cause to arrest
both of them. That was objectively reasonable.
One last point on this score: Although Iocovello does not cite the King
Affidavit in his summary judgment papers, the Court has nonetheless reviewed
the affidavit and concludes that it does not change the Court’s probable-cause
calculus. Putting aside the suspicious timing of the affidavit, none of the
information therein mitigates the Court’s conclusion that Officer Francis had
arguable probable cause to arrest Iocovello. In his affidavit, King avers, “To the
best of my recollection, I did not tell the police officers that Mr. Iocovello
intentionally hit me or attacked me.” (King Aff. ¶ 6). But that just gives ice to
winter. The King Affidavit is not inconsistent with the (undisputed) account
that King relayed to Officer Francis on April 8 — that King and Iocovello both
fought each other. Nor does the King Affidavit suggest that King told Officer
Francis that Iocovello was the victim of the altercation at Bronx Garage 9.
In sum, the undisputed facts of this case establish that it was objectively
reasonable for Officer Francis to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest
Iocovello, and that she is thus entitled to qualified immunity. Summary
18
judgment is therefore warranted as to Iocovello’s false-arrest claims under state
and federal law. 4
2.
The Court Declines to Exercise Jurisdiction over Iocovello’s
State-Law Negligence Claim
Iocovello’s only remaining claim is that the City negligently hired,
retained, and supervised Iocovello. That claim arises under New York state
law, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over it.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court has discretion to “decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” pendent state-law claims “if … the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), teaches that
“[o]nce a district court’s discretion is triggered under § 1367(c)(3), it balances
the traditional ‘values of [i] judicial economy, [ii] convenience, [iii] fairness, and
[iv] comity,’ in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.” Kolari v. N.Y.Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)); see Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27; cf.
Benjamin v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health, 144 F. App’x 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2005)
(summary order) (“In assessing whether § 1367(c)(3) discretion has been
4
See Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal footnotes
omitted):
“Qualified immunity” protects an official from liability under federal
causes of action but is not generally understood to protect officials
from claims based on state law. Nevertheless, a similar doctrine
exists under New York common-law. If the detective defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity under federal law, summary
judgment would be similarly appropriate on Jenkins’ state law false
arrest claim.
19
appropriately exercised, this Court looks mainly to whether a District Court
reached unsettled issues of state law and to whether disposition was supported
by significant considerations of judicial economy.” (emphasis added)). Those
factors generally tilt toward dismissing state-law claims: “[I]n the usual case in
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to
be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine … will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Cohill,
484 U.S. at 350 n.7; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d
Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur Court has held, as a general proposition, that ‘if [all] federal
claims are dismissed before trial ..., the state claims should be dismissed as
well.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Castellano v. Bd. of Trustees, 937 F.2d
752, 758 (2d Cir. 1991)); see generally Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack Courier Servs.,
Inc., 771 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).
Such is the case here. None of the Gibbs factors suggests that exercising
pendent jurisdiction over Iocovello’s negligence claim is appropriate. Judicial
economy counsels in favor of dismissal, given the narrowness of Iocovello’s
negligence claim and the thin record in this case. See Chenensky v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). For similar reasons,
combined with the fact that the parties in this case are all from New York, the
Court perceives nothing notably inconvenient about requiring Iocovello to
litigate this claim in state court. Just so for fairness, because the Court cannot
see how “declining jurisdiction [would] prejudice the parties.” Id. And the
comity interests here militate strongly in favor of dismissal. Iocovello’s
20
negligence claim raises a basic issue of state law, one which pits a municipal
employee against a municipal entity. Put simply, Iocovello’s negligence “claim[]
solely sound[s] in state law.” Baptiste v. W Hotel, No. 04 Civ. 5544 (DLC), 2005
WL 1020779, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005). It belongs in state court.
“When the balance of [the Gibbs] factors indicates that a case properly
belongs in state court, … the federal court should decline the exercise of
jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350.
Iocovello’s negligence claim against the City is accordingly dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, and without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Iocovello’s false-arrest claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, and his negligence claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to permit refiling in state court. The Clerk of Court is directed to
terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining dates, and close this
case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
December 13, 2016
New York, New York
__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
21
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