Verint Systems Inc. et al v. Red Box Recorders LTD.
Filing
34
OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the Substantial Terms do not require construction and the following claims are invalid for indefiniteness. Patent No. 7,203,285: claims 13, 14, and 16. Patent No. 8,189,763: claim s 1, 2-5, 7, 8, 14, and 15. Patent No. 7,774,854: claims 17, 22, and 23. Patent No. RE43,324: claim 39. Patent No. RE43,386: claim 18. I also adopt the following constructions which are stipulated to or uncontested. A conference is scheduled for January 28, 2016 at 4pm. (As further set forth in this Order) (Status Conference set for 1/28/2016 at 04:00 PM before Judge Shira A. Scheindlin.) (Signed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin on 1/4/2016) (kl)
for example, a call center using Verint’s products to capture, secure, and analyze
large amounts of data for quality assurance purposes and integrate what is
happening on a particular employee’s computer with what is occurring on the
phone. The allegedly infringing products, various “Quantify” brand products, are
Red Box products that perform similar functions for call centers.3
The present dispute centers on the construction of twelve claim terms
across all seven patents.4 Verint proposes constructions for each of the twelve
terms. Red Box proposes no constructions and instead argues that all twelve claim
terms are invalid for indefiniteness. For eleven of these terms, Red Box argues that
they are found in means-plus-function (“MPF”) claims, and these claims are
invalid for failing to disclose an adequate structure.
II.
BACKGROUND
Verint seeks a declaration of infringement under Section 27 of Article
3
See id. ¶¶ 23-24.
4
At the Markman Hearing, the parties agreed to the construction of one
term. This construction and the agreed upon constructions are appended to this
Opinion. See 11/11/15 Transcript of Markman Hearing (“Markman Tr.”) at 12829. In addition, Red Box concedes that the term “data analysis engine,” which
appears in claim 18 of the ’324 patent, “was inadvertently included” in the parties’
Joint Claim Construction Chart. Red Box Recorders Ltd.’s Responsive Claim
Construction Brief (“Red Box Br.”) at 4 n. 5. I therefore adopt Verint’s proposed
construction which is uncontested.
2
35 of the United States Code.5 In response, Red Box asserts two counterclaims
seeking (1) a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and (2) a declaratory
judgment of invalidity of the Patents-in-Suit.6
On November 11, 2015, this Court held a Markman Hearing on the
construction of the disputed claim terms. Below are excerpts of the relevant claims
with the disputed terms highlighted.
A.
The ’798 Patent: “Method and Apparatus for Simultaneously
Monitoring Computer User Screen and Telephone Activity from a
Remote Location”
This patent describes an invention that allows for, in relevant part, the
“simultaneous[] monitoring [of] the on-screen and telephone activities of an
employee’s workstation.”7 Such a device may allow for easier “training and
assistance to those using such workstations” by creating a synchronous record of
the on-screen and telephone activity.8 Red Box argues that the use of terms of
degree – “substantial” and “substantially” – as modifiers for the synchronization of
these activities make claims 2 and 3 indefinite.9
5
See Complaint ¶¶ 30-43.
6
See Answer, Red Box’s Counterclaims ¶¶ 11-16.
7
’798 patent, col. 3, ll. 20-22.
8
Id. at col. 1, ll. 12-13.
9
See Red Box Br. at 20-24.
3
2. A method of monitoring, on a monitoring workstation, on-screen
activities of a monitored computer workstation having a display screen
and a telephone extension, said method comprising:
A) determining sequential localized changed screen regions which
correspond to at least two sequential screen changes;
B) recording a telephone conversation occurring during said
screen changes; and
C) playing back said telephone conversation recording in
substantial synchronization with said sequential screen changes
substantially as they both happened in real time, to allow one at
said monitoring workstation to simultaneously view on-screen
activities and listen to telephone conversations substantially as
they occurred at said monitored workstation.
3. A method of monitoring, on a monitoring workstation, sequential onscreen activities of a monitored computer workstation. having a display
screen and a telephone extension, said method comprising:
(A) recording data corresponding to two actual sequential screen
changes occurring at said monitored workstation and storing said
screen change-related data;
(B) recording data corresponding to audio telephone conversation
occurring at said monitored workstation during said two actual
sequential screen changes and storing said audio telephone
conversation-related data; and
(C) subsequent to steps “A” and “B”, playing back, with the use
of said screen change-related data and said audio telephone
conversation-related data, said audio telephone conversation in
substantial synchronization with said sequential screen changes
as they both happened in real time at said monitored workstation,
to allow one at said monitoring workstation to simultaneously
view and hear on-screen and telephone activities substantially as
they occurred at said monitored workstation.10
B.
The ’220 Patent: “Method and Apparatus for Simultaneously
Monitoring Computer User Screen and Telephone Activity from a
Remote Location”
10
’798 patent, col. 18, ll. 16-56.
4
The ’220 patent shares the same specification as the ’798 patent and
provides the same synching functionality although the language of the relevant
claims differs slightly. Red Box again argues that “substantial” and “substantially”
as modifiers for the synchronization make the claims indefinite.11
2. A method of monitoring, on a monitoring workstation, sequential
on-screen activities of a monitored computer workstation having a
display screen, its own operating system, and a telephone extension, said
method comprising:
...
(C) playing back said telephone conversation recording in
substantial synchronization with said at least two sequential
screen changes substantially as they both happened in real time,
to allow one at said monitoring computer workstation to
simultaneously view on-screen activities and listen to telephone
conversations substantially as they occurred at said monitored
computer workstation.
3. A method of monitoring, on a monitoring workstation, sequential
on-screen activities of a monitored computer workstation having display
screen, its own operating system, and a telephone extension, said method
comprising:
...
(C) subsequent to steps “A” and “B”, playing back, with the use
of said screen change-related data and said audio telephone
conversation-related data, said audio telephone conversation in
substantial synchronization with said two actual sequential screen
changes as they both happened in real time at said monitored
workstation, to allow one at said monitoring workstation to
simultaneously view and hear on-screen and telephone activities
substantially as they occurred at said monitored workstation.12
11
See Red Box Br. at 20-24.
12
’220 patent, col. 18, ll. 11-56.
5
C.
The ’285 Patent: “System and Method for Recording Voice and
the Data Entered by a Call Center Agent and Retrieval of These
Communication Streams for Analysis or Correction”
The ’285 patent describes a system for improving the “recording and
analysis” of call center communications.13 The system scores parts of calls
“automatically” to provide “better statistical significance with less manpower,” as
well as providing a graphical user interface to assist in manual review.14 In part,
this system is comprised of a “recorder” for collecting the relevant
communications and a “first computer application” that reconstructs these
communications for review.15 Red Box asserts that the terms “at least one recorder
operative” and “a first computer application operative” as used in claim 13 are
nonce terms invoking means-plus-function claiming and that claim 13 is therefore
invalid because the specification does not provide sufficient structure for the
terms.16
13. A communications recording and analysis system comprising:
at least one recorder operative to record voice information
associated with a communication, screen content information
13
’285 patent, col. 4, ll. 23-24.
14
Id. at col. 5, ll. 33-34; col. 6, ll. 37-46.
15
Id. at col. 14, ll. 31-49.
16
Red Box Br. at 8-10.
6
associated with the communication, and input/output information
associated with the communication and with a computer from
which the screen content was acquired; and
a first computer application operative to access the voice
information, the screen content and the input/output information
and to construct an integrated real-time data stream comprising
the voice information, the screen content information and the
input/output information;
wherein the integrated real-time data stream is configured to
enable progress of the communication to be reconstructed such
that screen content information and input/output information is
correlated with the voice information of the communication.17
D.
The ’763 Patent: “System and Method for Recording Voice and
the Data Entered by a Call Center Agent and Retrieval of These
Communication Streams for Analysis or Correction”
The ’763 patent shares an identical specification with the ’285 patent.
In addition to challenging the terms “a recorder operative” and “a first computer
application operative” as indefinite, Red Box also argues that claims 6 and 7 which
refer to a “second computer application operative” to score the communications
also invoke means-plus-function claiming and are likewise indefinite.18
1. A communications system comprising:
a recorder operative to record information associated with a
communication;
a first computer application operative to provide a graphical user
interface configured to present an integrated view of a portion of
the communication recorded by the recorder, the first computer
application being further operative to construct an integrated data
17
’285 patent, col. 14, ll. 31-49.
18
See Red Box Br. at 10-12.
7
stream comprising voice information and state information
corresponding to events that occurred during the communication;
wherein the voice information and state information forming the
integrated data stream are presented in the graphical user interface
as the integrated view containing a first visualization of the
portion of the communication and a second visualization of at
least one event that occurred during the communication, the
second visualization overlaying on the first visualization.
6. The system of claim 1, further comprising:
a second computer application operative to automatically score at
least a portion of the communication that was recorded.
7. The system of claim 1, wherein at least a portion of the information
recorded is voice information corresponding to the communication, and
the system further comprises a second computer application operative
to automatically and selectively perform voice recognition analysis on
at least a portion of the voice information.19
E.
The ’854 Patent: “Systems and Methods for Protecting
Information”
The ’854 patent describes a system for “prevent[ing] unathorized
access to information” such as a customer’s social security and credit card
numbers.20 This is accomplished by “selectively terminating recording” or
“deleting, obfuscating, masking and/or encrypting” the sensitive information.21
Red Box challenges the terms “monitoring system operative” and “recording
19
’763 patent, col. 13, ll. 28-44; col. 14, ll. 6-16.
20
’854 patent, col. 2, ll. 40-41.
21
Id. at col. 2, ll. 43, 51-52.
8
device operative” as used in claim 17 as means-plus-function claims and asserts
they are invalid as indefinite.22
17. A system for protecting information provided to an agent via a
communication network, said system comprising:
a communication monitoring system operative to monitor an
interactive communication responsive to an agent request via a
communication network and electronically identify information
contained in the communication that is to be protected; and
a recording device operative to record at least a portion of the
communication;
wherein the communication monitoring system is further
operative to provide instructions to the recording device
responsive to electronically identifying the information that is to
be protected such that unauthorized access to the information is
prevented.23
F.
The ’324 Patent: “VOIP Voice Interaction Monitor”
The ’324 patent describes a system for monitoring and reviewing call
center communications similar to the ’285 and ’763 patents. For example, the
system “by analysing a range of parameters of the signals representing traffic such
as speech, data or video, patterns, trends and anomalies . . . can be readily
identified” for quality assurance purposes.24 Red Box challenges three terms used
in claim 39 as nonce terms invoking means-plus-function claiming and indefinite
22
See Red Box Br. at 12-15.
23
’854 patent, col. 10, ll. 49-62.
24
’324 patent, col. 2, ll. 51-54.
9
for failing to disclose adequate corresponding structure: “data switch operable,”
“monitoring device operable,” and “data store operable.”25
39. A recording system for capturing and recording audio data packets
transmitted across a data network, comprising:
a data switch operable to receive a plurality of call setup requests,
requesting to establish a voice data session between a calling party
and a called party, the voice data session comprising audio data
packets communicated between a calling party and a called party
via a data network;
a monitoring device operable to capture the audio data packets
received by the data switch, wherein the monitor is operable to
identify a call to which the audio data packets belong, and to
associate the audio data packets to a voice interaction session; and
a data store operable to interface with the monitor and to record
at least a portion of the received audio data packets to a record
associated with the voice interaction session.26
G.
The ’386 Patent: “Communication Management System for
Network-Based Telephones”
The ’386 patent shares much of the same specification and purpose as
the ’324 patent, although the claim language differs. Red Box argues the terms
“monitoring device” and “analysis module” as used in claim 18 invoke meansplus-function claiming and are indefinite.27
18. A system to manage communications over a communications
network that includes an exchange, the system comprising:
25
See Red Box Br. at 15-17.
26
’324 patent, col. 12, ll. 44-60.
27
See Red Box Br. at 17-18.
10
a monitoring device configured to connect the system to the
communications network and to receive data packets from the
communications network;
an analysis module configured to receive an identifier tagged onto
the data packets so as to identify the data packets, such that the
identified data packets form at least a portion of the traffic stream
and that data packets are selected data packets;
a recorder configured to receive the selected data packets and to
store the selected data packets, such that the selected data packets
are stored data packets; a data store configured to receive and to
store the stored data packets from the recorder, such that said at
least a portion of the traffic stream is stored; a link between the
exchange and the recorder configured to transfer information
related to the data packets from the exchange to the recorder.28
III.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Claim Construction
Claim construction is a question of law, the purpose of which is to
determine what is covered by the patent’s claims.29 “‘[T]he construction of claims
is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language[] in order to
understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.’”30 The
ultimate inquiry is how a “person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time
28
’386 patent, col. 10, l. 65 - col. 11, l. 25.
29
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384, 390-
91 (1996).
30
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (quoting Scripps Clinic v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
11
of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application,” would
understand the claim term.31
There are two types of evidence to be considered during claim
construction: intrinsic and extrinsic.32 First, claims are to be construed in light of
the intrinsic record which includes the claim language itself, the specification, and
prosecution history. Courts first consider the “words of the claims themselves . . .
to define the scope of the patented invention.”33 A claim term is presumed to
possess its ordinary and customary meaning in view of both the temporal and
technological context in which it arose unless the patent indicates otherwise.34
Second, a court may also consider extrinsic evidence, “which consists
of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”35 In particular, technical
dictionaries may help “a court to better understand the underlying technology and
31
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
32
See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
33
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
34
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
35
Id. at 1317.
12
the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.”36 However,
“[e]xtrinsic evidence may not be used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is
unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’”37
B.
Means-Plus-Function Claims
Means-plus-function claiming “occurs when a claim term is drafted in
a manner that invokes 35 U.S.C. section 112, para. 6.”38 This provision allows
“patentees to express a claim limitation by reciting a function to be performed
rather than by reciting structure for performing that function.”39 The ambiguity
comes at the cost of constraining the reach of the claim. The “scope of coverage
[is restricted] to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification
as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.”40 “Whether
certain claim language invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is an exercise in claim
construction” and is therefore appropriately considered at this stage.41
36
Id. at 1318.
37
Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317).
38
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1348.
41
Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. International Trade Comm’n,
161 F.3d 696, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
13
In determining whether a claim is an MPF claim, a court first looks at
the language of the claim to see whether the term “means” is actually used. Failure
to use the word “means” – as is the case with all of the terms at issue here – creates
a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Importantly, Williamson v.
Citrix Online, LLC weakened this presumption. The presumption was formerly
“strong and not readily overcome.”42 The Williamson court discarded this
heightened presumption standard because it shifted the balance struck by Congress
in passing section 112.43
“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by
persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the
name for structure.”44 The presumption may be overcome “if the challenger
42
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
43
See id. at 1347.
44
Id. (citing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The qualifier “sufficiently” is important for this case as
Verint frequently argues with reference to the old presumption standard – that the
claim limitation must be “essentially [] devoid of anything that can be construed as
structure.” Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2012). Under the newly articulated standard, the limitation may reference a
tangible object or concept but still be expressed in functional language without
sufficient structure to prevent the presumption from being overcome. See Media
Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding the term “compliance mechanism” had corresponding structure but
that “the description of the structure to which Media Rights points is far less
detailed” than required to prevent the court from construing the claim as MPF).
14
demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or
else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that
function.’”45 “The limitation need not connote a single, specific structure; rather, it
may describe a class of structures.”46
The Federal Circuit has made clear that even though a claim may not
use the traditional “means for” construction, certain “[g]eneric terms such as
‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more
than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to
using the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite
45
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d
877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The parties dispute whether every word in the phrases
at issue should be construed by this Court. For example, Verint contends that for
the term phrase “recording device operative” only “recording device” requires
construction. Verint Systems Inc.’s and Verint Americas Inc.’s Opening Claim
Construction Brief (“Verint Br.”) at 4. Red Box argues that the entirety of the
claim language should be construed. See Red Box Br. at 4 n. 4. The parties are
talking past each other on this point. For the initial issue of whether means-plusfunction claiming applies, the claim element is viewed in its entirety beyond just
the relevant phrase. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (“We begin with the
observation that the claim limitation in question is not merely the introductory
phrase ‘distributed learning control module,’ but the entire passage.”). However, if
this Court determines that means-plus-function claiming does not apply, then it
should only construe the terms that require elaboration. See Boss Control, Inc. v.
Bombardier Inc., 410 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing whether the
term “interrupt” requires construction or whether it was given its ordinary
meaning).
46
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(overruled on strength of presumption grounds by Williamson).
15
structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.”47 At the same time, it has
made clear that simply because a term is defined functionally does not necessarily
mean it is devoid of structure because many terms take their name from their
function, e.g., “brake, clamp, screwdriver, and lock.”48
If a court determines that the claims at issue are MPF claims, a court
must then inquire whether these claims “satisfy the definiteness requirement of §
112 ¶ 2.”49 Contrary to Verint’s assertion that Red Box inappropriately attempts to
“bootstrap an indefiniteness challenge onto this claim construction proceeding,”50
“a court’s determination of the structure that corresponds to a particular
means-plus-function limitation is indeed a matter of claim construction.”51
47
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Massachusetts Inst. of Tech. &
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
48
Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583.
49
EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616,
621 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
50
Verint Br. at 1.
51
Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Accord ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509,
517 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“indefiniteness [under § 112] is a question of law and in
effect part of claim construction”); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“if the only claim construction that is consistent with the claim’s
language and the written description renders the claim invalid, then . . . the claim is
simply invalid”).
16
The definiteness determination requires a court “‘to construe the
disputed claim term by identifying the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification to which the claim term will be limited.’”52 The
specification “must disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the
claimed functions.”53 If a court is unable to identify structure sufficient to perform
every function claimed, the claim is indefinite.54 Finally, indefiniteness must be
proven by “clear and convincing evidence” because patents are entitled to a
presumption of validity that is not readily overcome.55
In the case of computer-implemented MPF claims, a court must first
determine whether the functions claimed can be performed by “‘any general
purpose computer without special programming.’”56 Any general purpose
computer programmed with a particular algorithm for performing a function
becomes a special purpose computer when it invokes “any functionality that is not
52
Media Rights, 800 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Robert Bosch, LLC v.
Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
53
Id. (citing Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1318-19 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
54
Noah, 675 F.3d at 1318.
55
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011)
(citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)).
56
EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 623 (quoting In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
17
‘coextensive’ with a microprocessor.”57
When the function claimed may not be performed by any
microprocessor, the structure disclosed may not be just a “general purpose
computer” or “software” writ large.58 The Federal Circuit has made clear that
“when a patentee invokes means-plus-function claiming to recite a software
function, it accedes to the reciprocal obligation of disclosing a sufficient algorithm
as corresponding structure.”59 An algorithm may be disclosed “in many forms,
including flow charts, a series of specific steps, mathematical formula, prose, and
so on.”60 Regardless of how the algorithm is conveyed, it must be “a step-by-step
procedure [] for performing the claimed function.”61 If the specification “discloses
no algorithm, the skilled artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant.”62 However, “[w]here
the specification discloses an algorithm that the accused infringer contends is
57
Id.
58
Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2008)).
59
EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 623.
60
Triton Tech of Texas, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 1375,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
61
Id. at 1379.
62
EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 624 (citing Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313).
18
inadequate, we judge the disclosure’s sufficiency based on the skilled artisan’s
perspective.”63 Importantly, “the fact that one of skill in the art could program a
computer to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where none
otherwise is disclosed.”64
C.
Definiteness of Claim Terms
As noted, Red Box also challenges claims 2 and 3 of the ’798 and
’220 patents as indefinite – despite not invoking MPF claiming – because they use
terms of degree. The definiteness determination in this context differs. “When a
‘word of degree’ is used, the court must determine whether the patent provides
‘some standard for measuring that degree.’”65 In this context, the Supreme Court
recently clarified in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. that to be sufficiently
definite under section 112, para. 2 “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the
specification and prosecution history, [must] inform those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”66 The Federal Circuit has
63
Id.
64
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351.
65
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (quoting Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731
F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
66
134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).
19
since elaborated that this standard requires that there be “objective boundaries for
those of skill in the art,” “[a]lthough absolute or mathematical precision is not
required.”67 As with the definiteness inquiry for MPF claims, invalidity must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.68
IV.
DISCUSSION
I begin by noting that all of the claim terms discussed below refer to
computer-implemented functions that require special purpose computers. The
functions claimed are plainly not of the sort allowed by the “narrow” exception for
general purpose computers, and Verint does not contest this point in its briefs.69
Verint does contend, however, that Red Box is incapable of proving
invalidity because it did not define who a person of ordinary skill is or present
expert testimony in the context of the at-issue patents.70 This argument misstates
the applicable law. While the Federal Circuit has admonished that defining a
67
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 59 (2015) (finding the phrase “unobtrusive
manner” to be indefinite).
68
See Microsoft Corp, 131 S. Ct. at 2246.
69
EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 621 (noting that the exception to the
algorithm requirement is limited to the “basic ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing’” functions performed by all computers).
70
Verint Systems Inc.’s and Verint Americas Inc’s Claim Construction
Reply Brief (“Verint Repl.”) at 3, 5.
20
person of ordinary skill in the art is typically necessary to administer the
definiteness test because terms are construed from the skilled artist’s perspective,71
it has also made clear that expert testimony is not a per se requirement and that
when a specification is devoid of structure – as Red Box contends – the skilled
artisan is unnecessary to find the claim indefinite.72 As noted, for computerimplemented MPF claims the Federal Circuit has outlined two distinct situations:
first, there may be an algorithm disclosed but challenged as insufficient to perform
all of the functions or second, there may be no algorithm disclosed at all.73 In the
former case, a person of ordinary skill in the art is needed to determine sufficiency
of the structure, but in the latter case expert testimony is unnecessary.74
71
See AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d
1236, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that “the district court did not specify the
proficiency of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art that is essential to
administering the definiteness test”).
72
See Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“We do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is required to prove
infringement when the art is complex.”); EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 623 (“[W]e have
repeatedly and unequivocally rejected this argument: a person of ordinary skill in
the art plays no role whatsoever in determining whether an algorithm must be
disclosed as structure for a functional claim element.” (citing Noah, 675 F.3d at
1313)).
73
See Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313.
74
See id. It also logically follows from this that a person of ordinary
skill in the art is not needed to determine whether a computer-implemented
function refers to a general purpose computer or a specific purpose computer as
21
Here, Verint has provided a chart that purports to show the algorithm
that performs each function of each claim.75 As such, the dichotomous algorithm
analysis is not necessary for testing the sufficiency of one algorithm against many
functions because Verint takes the position that each function is performed by a
distinct algorithm. Whether an algorithm is disclosed may be analyzed separately
for each claimed function.
A.
Claim 13 of the ’285 Patent: “A First Computer Application
Operative”
Red Box contends claim 13 invokes MPF claiming because the term
“computer application” does not provide sufficiently definite structure to limit the
claim in any meaningful way.76 Verint argues not that the claim provides structure
but rather the term “computer application” itself connotes structure to a skilled
artist. Verint refers to the IBM Dictionary of Computing 3 (10th Ed. 1994) which
defines an “application” as “[a] collection of software components used to perform
Verint contends. See Markman Tr. at 94-96.
75
See Exhibit 1 (“Algorithm Chart”) to Second Declaration of Ryan N.
Miller, plaintiffs’ counsel, in Support of Verint Systems Inc. and Verint Americas
Inc.
76
Red Box Br. at 10.
22
specific types of user-oriented work on a computer.”77
This argument is unavailing. Claim 13 follows the pattern of MPF
claims but provides insufficient structure to limit the claim meaningfully. The
“first computer application” is “operative” to perform two functions: (1) “to access
the voice information, the screen content and the input/output information” and (2)
“to construct an integrated real-time data stream comprising the voice information,
the screen content information and the input/output information.”78 The claim then
elaborates that this data stream is “configured to enable progress of the
communication to be reconstructed such that screen content information and
input/output information is correlated with the voice information of the
communication.”79 No additional structural cues are provided.
The term “computer application,” while defined in a technical
dictionary as a “collection of software components used to perform specific types
of user-oriented work on a computer,” fails to provide sufficient additional
77
Exhibit 4 (“IBM Dictionary”) to Declaration of Ryan N. Miller in
Support of Verint Systems Inc. and Verint Americas Inc. at 3. Verint chooses to
quote the second definition of “application” while the first – “[t]he use to which an
information processing system is put; for example, a payroll application, an airline
reservation application, a network application” – makes clear that applications
typically refer to “special purpose computers.”
78
’285 patent, col. 14, ll. 31-44 (emphasis added).
79
Id., col. 14, ll. 45-49 (emphasis added).
23
structure that would not otherwise be implicitly understood if the claim were
defined as “means for performing” the aforementioned computer-implemented
functions.80 Indeed, in many of the Federal Circuit cases interpreting
“computer-implemented means-plus-function claims” the court understood the
means claimed to be software executed by a computer.81 The fact that the “means
for” language was already understood by the court to implicitly refer to a sub-class
of MPF claims composed of two structural elements – programs executed by a
microprocessor – makes clear that explicitly claiming a “computer application”
does not add sufficiently definite structure.
Having determined that claim 13 is an MPF claim, I now turn to
whether the patent discloses an algorithm to perform each of the claimed functions.
I find that the specifications of the ’285 patent fail to disclose any type of step-by-
80
While not dispositive, the Federal Circuit has endorsed this type of
counterfactual reasoning. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (“Here, the word
‘module’ does not provide any indication of structure because it sets forth the same
black box recitation of structure for providing the same specified function as if the
term ‘means’ had been used.”).
81
See, e.g., Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (noting that “‘module’ is
simply a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified
function”); Finisar Corp., 523 F.3d at 1340 (“Simply reciting ‘software’ without
providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function is not enough.”);
Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1383 (noting that “the access control manager, according
to Blackboard, is any computer-related device or program that performs the
function of access control”).
24
step procedure.
Analysis of the single function “construct an integrated real-time data
stream” suffices to make this point because “where a disclosed algorithm supports
some, but not all, of the functions associated with a means-plus-function limitation,
we treat the specification as if no algorithm has been disclosed at all.”82 Verint
argues that the part of the specification for “Call Flow Recordings” provides an
algorithm83 and attempts to highlight the “algorithmic structure”84 despite the lack
of an explicit step-by-step procedure in the specification. This portion of the
specification assumes the existence of “real-time data stream[s]” and describes the
characteristics of such streams that might make the construction of an integrated
stream possible but contains no such step-by-step procedure for doing so.85
Independent claim 13 and dependent claims 14 and 1686 of the ’285 patent are
82
Noah, 675 F.3d at 1318.
83
See Algorithm Chart at 5.
84
85
Markman Tr. at 57.
’285 patent, col. 9, l. 33 - col. 10, l. 3.
86
Although dependent claims may still be valid despite a finding that
the independent claim is indefinite, see Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (d/b/a The Home Depot), 412 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2005), the dependent claims here require use of the indefinite “first computer
application” and are invalid as well. See, e.g., National Recovery Techs., Inc. v.
Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Because
dependent claims 2–8 and 10 stand or fall with independent claim 1, we affirm the
25
invalid for indefiniteness.87
B.
Claim 1 of the ’763 Patent: “First Computer Application
Operative”
The ’763 and ’285 patents share identical specifications, but tellingly
claim different, albeit similar, functions for the “first computer application.” In the
’763 patent, the “first computer application” is “operative” to perform two
functions: (1) “to provide a graphical user interface configured to present an
integrated view of a portion of the communication recorded by the recorder” and (2)
“to construct an integrated data stream comprising voice information and state
information corresponding to events that occurred during the communication.”88 The
small difference in wording for the second function does nothing to change the
above analysis, particularly when Verint once again cites to the identical language
of the specification for “Call Flow Recordings.”89 Independent claim 1 and
district court’s judgment that these claims are also invalid.”); Energizer Holdings,
Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The
Commission held invalid independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–7, for the
claims all contain the usage to which the Commission objected.”).
87
Where, as here, one of the challenged terms within the claim renders
the claim invalid, I decline to analyze the other challenged terms. While claim 15
also depends on claim 13, Red Box only asserts that these particular dependent
claims are invalid. See Red Box Br. at 10.
88
’763 patent, col. 13, ll. 28-37 (emphasis added).
89
See Algorithm Chart at 11-12.
26
dependent claims 2-5, 7, 8, 14, and 15 of the ’763 patent are invalid for
indefiniteness.90
C.
Claim 17 of the ’854 Patent: “Monitoring System Operative”
The “monitoring system” at-issue in the ’854 patent does not recite
sufficient structure to avoid MPF claiming. This system, described fully as a
“communication monitoring system,” is “operative” to perform three functions
described in claim 17: (1) “to monitor an interactive communication responsive to
an agent request via a communication network,” (2) “[to] electronically identify
information contained in the communication that is to be protected,” and (3) “to
provide instructions to the recording device responsive to electronically identifying
the information that is to be protected such that unauthorized access to the
information is prevented.”91 The classic MPF claiming pattern is present. A nonstructural “means” – the “communication monitoring system” – is claimed as
“operative” for performing associated functions.
90
Red Box only asserts that these particular dependent claims are
invalid. See Red Box Br. at 12.
91
’854 patent, col. 10, ll. 51-62 (emphasis added).
27
The term “system,” although qualified as a “communication
monitoring system,” does not impart a sufficient structure.92 “System” standing
alone is a nonce word that does not describe a structure that could perform the
listed functions and the modifier “communication monitoring” provides a
functional description of the system but no structure. Neither does the description
of the “monitoring system” in the specification point to a sufficiently definite
structure to save claim 17 from being construed as MPF. Figure 4 of the
specification shows the “monitoring system” as a box within the memory of a
computer alongside the computer’s operating system. Reference to the
specification reveals that the “monitoring system” is stored here because the
monitoring system is software executing on the computer.93
92
See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (noting that “[t]he prefix
‘distributed learning control’ does not impart structure into the term ‘module’”).
93
See ’854 patent, col. 7, ll. 30-33. (“FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram
illustrating an embodiment of a computing device that is configured to perform the
functionality associated with an embodiment of a monitoring system.”).
28
Once again the “monitoring system” refers to a computerimplemented MPF yet the specification provides no algorithm for performing the
claimed functions. The specification only attempts to explain what the
“monitoring system” does at a high level – analyzes communications to detect
certain events and prevents the recording of confidential information.94
A close analysis of the claimed algorithm for performing the
“electronically identify information” function fails to reveal a sufficiently detailed
step-by-step procedure. Verint contends that “analyzing the communication” is a
step taken in the algorithm for performing this function and the specification
vaguely gestures to “various methodologies” such as an undisclosed “voice
94
See id. col. 4, l. 24 - col. 5, l. 36.
29
recognition algorithm.”95 The cited portion of the specification also outlines
various “events” that may serve as “triggers” and “based upon the occurrence of
one or more triggers . . . at least a portion of the information that is to be protected
will not be available for accessing because that information is not retained in a long
term storage memory device.”96
Such description amounts to nothing more than a basic explanation of
what the “monitoring system” could do. Section 112 para. 2 exists “to ensure that
‘the claims, as interpreted in view of the written description, adequately perform
their function of notifying the public of the scope of the patentee’s right to
exclude.’”97 To hold that this high level of abstraction suffices to describe a stepby-step procedure would undermine the purpose of the definiteness requirement.
A skilled artisan may be able to program the monitoring system given the
specification, “[b]ut the fact that one of skill in the art could program a computer to
perform the recited functions cannot create structure where none otherwise is
95
Algorithm Chart at 15 (citing ’854 patent, col. 4, l. 33).
96
’854 patent, col. 5, ll. 8-12.
97
Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d
1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. International Trade
Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
30
disclosed.”98 Independent claim 17 and dependent claims 22 and 23, which rely on
the functions of claim 17, are invalid for indefiniteness.99
D.
Claim 39 of the ’324 Patent: “Monitoring Device Operable”
The term “monitoring device” invokes MPF claiming because it uses
the nonce term “device” without providing sufficient additional structure.100 Once
more the claim limitation is structured as a nonce term – “monitoring device” –
“operable” to perform three functions: (1) “to capture the audio data packets
received by the data switch,” (2) “to identify a call to which the audio data packets
belong,” and (3) “to associate the audio data packets to a voice interaction
session.”101
Verint argues that “[t]he monitoring device is defined in the claim” as
performing the three functions listed and these functions in turn “are performed
98
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351 (citing Function Media, L.L.C. v.
Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
99
Once more, Red Box only asserts that these particular dependent
claims are invalid. See Red Box Br. at 14.
100
See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (noting the term “device” is
typically a nonce word).
101
’324 patent, col. 12, ll. 52-56 (emphasis added).
31
using the defined structure of data switched packets.”102 Once again, this argument
is not persuasive. That the “monitoring device” performs functions by interacting
with data packets that have a defined structure does not provide a structure to the
“monitoring device” where none is otherwise disclosed.103 Verint’s proposed
construction concedes as much, redefining the term “monitoring device” as a
“device that observes and records activities within a data processing system for
analysis.”104 Both the claim itself and Verint’s construction follow the format of
MPF claims – the nonce term “device” followed by functions.
The claim clearly refers to computer-implemented functions but again
the specification does not provide an algorithm for performing the claimed
functions. Indeed, the term “monitoring device” does not appear anywhere in the
specification much less with an associated algorithm. The failure to even reference
this device in the specification raises enough doubt about whether a person of
102
Verint Repl. at 9.
103
See Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1319 (“But the issue is not whether
the ’045 patent discloses a physical structure over which the PGP transmits, it is
whether the patent discloses the algorithm by which the PGP performs the
transmission function.”).
104
Verint Br. at 14.
32
ordinary skill in the art could “‘understand what structure corresponds to the means
limitation.’”105
Nonetheless, for the “identify” function Verint claims there is an
algorithm disclosed in the “Summary of the Invention” which states in a
conclusory manner that “the present invention advantageously allows for the
improved monitoring of traffic so as to identify which one(s) of a possible plurality
of data or voice interactions might warrant further investigation.”106 Verint then
cites irrelevant portions of the specification discussing parameters that may be
measured yet fails to explain how identification of packets might occur.107 Setting
aside the fact that these portions of the specification are pages apart, no algorithm
is revealed even when pasting them together. Driving home this point, Verint cites
to the identical portions of the specification for the “associate” function, yet there
is no description of how the device performs such an association.108 Claim 39 of
the ’324 patent is invalid for indefiniteness.
105
Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Typhoon Touch Techs.,
Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
106
Algorithm Chart at 30 (citing ’324 patent, col. 2, ll. 43-45).
107
See id. at 30-31.
108
See id. at 31-32.
33
E.
Claim 18 of the ’386 Patent: “An Analysis Module Configured to”
This claim invokes MPF claiming as well. “Module” is the exact
nonce word at issue in Williamson, and adding the term “analysis” imparts no
structure just as adding “distributed learning control” failed to do so in
Williamson.109 The “analysis module” is “configured to” perform a single
function: “receive an identifier tagged onto the data packets so as to identify the
data packets, such that the identified data packets form at least a portion of the
traffic stream and that data packets are selected data packets.”110 The module is a
black box nonce term that performs a function consistent with the format of MPF
claiming.
Verint contends that the “analysis module” contains inherent structure
because the term “data analysis” is defined in a technical dictionary as the
“systematic investigation of the data and their flow in a real or planned system.”111
Verint’s immediate resort to a technical dictionary for an entirely different term
reveals the lack of structure in the specification. Indeed, the term “analysis
module” does not appear at all in the specification which instead variously refers to
109
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351.
110
’386 patent, col. 11, ll. 4-8 (emphasis added).
111
IBM Dictionary at 5.
34
a “recording and analysis system”112 and an “analysis engine.”113 Crediting the
definition of “data analysis” as the definition for the added term “analysis” still
only describes the claimed function at a high level but fails to offer corresponding
structure sufficient to take claim 18 out of the ambit of section 112, para. 6.
The specification does not provide an algorithm for performing the
claimed function. Verint points to the identical specification language analyzed in
claim 39 of the ’324 patent.114 All that can be gleaned is the existence of
parameters that “can be combined” and that the “monitored data may be ‘tagged’
with additional information.”115 No algorithm exists, pertinent or otherwise.
Claim 18 of the ’386 patent is invalid for indefiniteness.116
F.
The ’798 and ’220 Patents: “Substantial” Terms
112
’386 patent, col. 6, ll. 21-22.
113
Id. at col. 7, l. 39.
114
See Algorithm Chart at 36-37. In addition Verint quotes portions of
the “Summary of the Invention” that provide no algorithm but refer vaguely to
“means for identifying the source of the two-way traffic includes means for
receiving an identifier tagged on to the traffic so as to identify its source . . .
Alternatively, means can be provided within the telecommunications monitoring
apparatus for determining the terminal number.” ’386 patent, col. 4, ll. 37-46.
115
‘386 patent, col. 4, l. 4; col. 7, ll. 57-58.
116
Red Box does not challenge the dependent claims as indefinite. See
Red Box Br. at 18.
35
I now turn to the only claims not challenged as MPF claims.117 Red
Box challenges the use of the phrases “substantial synchronization,” “substantially
as they both happened,” and “substantially as they occurred” (collectively the
“Substantial Terms”) as indefinite because the patents do not draw a temporal
bright line between what is “non-substantial versus substantial synchronization.”118
Here, the relevant synchronization is between the telephone conversation audio and
the computer screen display of the monitored workstation.119 Verint argues that
these claims are clearly limited by the purpose of the specification which is to
allow for “close enough synchronization that a viewer would process playback of
the combination as synchronized.”120
Red Box’s quest for absolute certainty must fail. The Supreme Court
has made clear that “the definiteness requirement must take into account the
inherent limitations of language,” so understood, definiteness “mandates clarity,
117
The ’798 and ’220 patents are appropriately discussed together
because they use nearly identical language in the relevant claims and
corresponding specifications at issue.
118
Red Box Br. at 22.
119
See ’798 patent, col. 2, ll. 22-32; ’220 patent, col. 2, ll. 30-40.
120
Verint Br. at 17.
36
while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable.”121 At the Markman
Hearing, Red Box suggested that the term “completely synched” would provide
sufficient precision, but at the linguistic depths that Red Box attempts to parse the
Substantial Terms even that construction would fail.122 In its brief, Red Box
suggests that the synchronization requirement must be parsed down to milliseconds
(0.001 seconds) – an imperceptible amount of time.123 In this case, Red Box
demands unreasonable certainty.
Pre-Nautilus, the Federal Circuit made clear that there is no per se rule
regarding terms of degree because “[e]xpressions such as ‘substantially’ are used
in patent documents when warranted by the nature of the invention, in order to
accommodate the minor variations that may be appropriate to secure the
invention.”124 Post-Nautilus, courts have construed claims using the term
121
Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
122
Markman Tr. at 116.
123
Red Box Br. at 22.
124
Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
37
“substantially” as both definite125 and indefinite126 depending on the boundaries
provided by the specification.
Terms of degree may be used “to describe the invention with precision
appropriate to the technology.”127 The use of the Substantial Terms is warranted
here to account for latency between the data to be synched, system lag, or other
potential variance inherent in applying the claimed invention on different
computing systems and across telecommunications layouts.
This imprecision is not unbounded. The patents provide a clear
functional scope to the term: “to allow one at the monitoring workstation to
simultaneously monitor on-screen and telephone conversations occurring at the
125
See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1002-03
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding the term “substantially centered” – referencing a phone
feature which would cause portions of a document “to be enlarged and
‘substantially centered’ on the display” – sufficiently definite); Advanced
Aerospace Techs., Inc. v. United States, No. 12-85 C, 2015 WL 7690024, at *10
(Ct. Cl. Nov. 24, 2015) (finding “substantially arrested” – referring to the
movement of an aircraft – to be definite because the “purpose of the invention, . . .
i.e., to capture an unmanned aircraft,” provided reasonable certainty).
126
See, e.g., Fairfield Indus., Inc. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 14 Civ.
2972, 2015 WL 1034275, at *14-16 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (finding the term
“substantially prevent communication interference between the first and second
pairs” – referencing electrical interference – indefinite because it did not have a
boundary in the specification and did not refer to a physical impossibility).
127
Verve, 311 F.3d at 1120.
38
monitored workstation.”128 The modifier “substantial” indicates that the system
may not be perfect but usefully analogizes that “these activities may be played
back much as one would play back the video tape of a television program, that is
the on-screen and synchronized voice activities” to indicate the synchronous goal
of the claimed invention.129 In much the same way a dubbed movie may not be
perfectly synched, so long as it is “substantially synched,” the viewer can still
determine how the audio and video should match.
Having determined that the Substantial Terms are not indefinite, I now
conclude that the terms do not require construction. Verint’s proposed
construction proves this. Verint does little but reword the Substantial Terms to
define them as “audio and video plays substantially as they occur in real-time.”130
The terms as used in the claims take their ordinary meaning and do not use
otherwise terse language that would not be readily understood by a lay person.
V.
CONCLUSION
128
’798 patent, col. 3, ll. 5-9; ’220 patent, col. 3, ll. 12-15.
129
’798 patent, col. 4, ll. 41-44; ’220 col. 4, ll. 50-53.
130
Verint Br. at 16.
39
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the Substantial Terms do
not require construction and the following claims are invalid for indefiniteness.
•
Patent No. 7,203,285: claims 13, 14, and 16.
•
Patent No. 8,189,763: claims 1, 2-5, 7, 8, 14, and 15.
•
Patent No. 7,774,854: claims 17, 22, and 23.
•
Patent No. RE43,324: claim 39.
•
Patent No. RE43,386: claim 18.
I also adopt the following constructions which are stipulated to or
uncontested.
Claim Term
Patent(s)
Stipulated Construction
“localized changed
screen regions”
’798 and ’220 patents
screen updates which
occur within a bounded
region sized less than the
full display screen
“by use of said
monitored workstation
operating system”
’220 patent
by use of said monitored
workstation operating
system such as OS/2 or
Windows131
131
The parties agreed to this construction during the Markman Hearing.
See Markman Tr. at 128-29.
40
- Appearances Counsel for Verint Systems Inc. and Verint Americas Inc.:
Ernest E. Badway, Esq.
Ryan N. Miller, Esq.
Fox Rothschild LLP
100 Park Avenue - Suite 1500
New York, New York 10017
(212) 878-7900
Counsel for Red Box Recorders LTD.:
Deepro R. Mukerjee, Esq.
Christopher L. McArdle, Esq.
Lance A. Soderstrom, Esq.
Alston & Bird LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016
(212) 210-9400
Christopher B. Prescott, Esq.
252 Buttery Road
New Canaan, Connecticut 06840
(917) 755-7643
42
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?