Strougo v. Barclays PLC et al
Filing
78
OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED. The following Class is certified pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3): All purchasers of Barclays American Depositary Shares during the period from August 2, 2011 thr ough and including June 25, 2014, excluding Defendants, officers and directors of Barclays, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controllin g interest. Lead Plaintiffs Mohit Sahni and Joseph Waggoner are appointed as Class Representatives, and Pomerantz LLP is appointed as Lead Counsel. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket Nos. 50 and 55). (As further set forth in this Order) (Signed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin on 2/2/2016) (kl)
Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “April 2015 Order”).2 While I denied defendants’ motion
to dismiss the section 10(b) claims, I deemed two of the three categories of
statements to be inactionable.3
The misstatements remaining in the case concern the operation of
Barclays’ “dark pool,” known as Barclays’ Liquidity Cross or LX, a private trading
venue where investors can trade stocks with near anonymity. For example, “White
attributed [LX’s] growth to Barclays’ commitment to being transparent about how
Barclays operates, how Barclays routes client orders, and the kinds of
counterparties traders can expect to deal with when trading in the dark pool.”4
According to plaintiffs, however, Barclays both concealed the amount of
aggressive high-frequency trading in LX, and inappropriately over-routed client
orders into LX, making White’s statement false.5 On June 25, 2014, the New York
State Office of the Attorney General (“NYAG”) brought a lawsuit against Barclays
under New York’s Martin Act, alleging that Barclays concealed information about
2
See Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
For purposes of this Opinion and Order, familiarity with the April 2015 Order —
including the general background and facts alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint (“Complaint”) — is assumed.
3
See id. at 336.
4
See Complaint ¶ 61.
5
See id. ¶¶ 85-88, 104-112.
2
the operation of LX.6 On news of the lawsuit, Barclays PLC’s American
Depositary Shares (“Barclays ADS”) fell 7.38 percent on heavy volume.7
The putative class consists of all persons and entities who purchased
Barclays ADS between August 2, 2011 and June 25, 2014 and were allegedly
damaged thereby. To be certified, a putative class must demonstrate that it
satisfies all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the categories of
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, plaintiffs seek
certification based on Rule 23(b)(3). For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification is GRANTED.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD8
“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking
class certification must affirmatively demonstrate [its] compliance with the Rule —
that is, [it] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
6
See id. ¶ 5.
7
See id. ¶ 6.
8
Rule 23(a) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. There is no dispute that plaintiffs have satisfied
these requirements, and after careful review of the record I find that each has been
satisfied. Thus, under Rule 23(a)(4), Lead Plaintiffs Mohit Sahni and Joseph
Waggoner are appointed as Class Representatives.
3
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”9 Under Rule 23(b)(3), certification
is appropriate where “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and class
litigation “is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.”
The matters pertinent to these findings include the class members’
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class members; the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and the likely difficulties in
managing a class action.10
The predominance inquiry focuses on whether “a proposed class is
‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’”11 It is akin to,
but ultimately “a more demanding criterion than,” the “commonality inquiry under
Rule 23(a).”12 Class-wide issues predominate “if resolution of some of the legal or
factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy
9
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)
(emphasis in original).
10
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
11
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1196 (2013) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)).
12
In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24).
4
can be achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more
substantial than the issues subject only to individualized proof.”13 The Second
Circuit has emphasized that “Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions
predominate, not that the action include only common questions.”14
“Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying
cause of action.”15 To sustain a claim for securities fraud under section 10(b), “a
plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”16
Defendants opposing class certification often challenge a plaintiff’s
13
Catholic Healthcare W. v. U.S. Foodservice Inc. (In re U.S.
Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig.), 729 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
14
Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 484 (2d Cir. 2010).
15
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184
(2011) (“Halliburton I”).
16
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008).
5
claim of reliance.17 By the same token, it is well settled that if proof of individual
reliance were required, it would be impossible to meet the predominance
requirement.18 The predominance requirement is typically met in securities fraud
class actions by plaintiffs’ invocation of one of two presumptions developed by the
Supreme Court that obviate the need to prove reliance on an individual basis.19
These are the “Basic presumption” of reliance in fraudulent misrepresentation
cases, and the “Affiliated Ute presumption” of reliance in fraudulent omission
cases.
Issues and facts surrounding damages have rarely been an obstacle to
17
Reliance is typically the only ground on which to challenge
predominance because section 10(b) claims will almost always arise from a
common nucleus of facts surrounding the fraudulent misrepresentation of material
facts and the causal relationship between the correction of that misrepresentation
and the price of the security.
18
See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (“Requiring proof of
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class
effectively would prevent such plaintiffs from proceeding with a class action, since
individual issues would overwhelm the common ones.”) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
19
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988) (establishing
rebuttable presumption of reliance in fraudulent misrepresentation cases);
Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154
(1972) (establishing presumption of reliance in fraudulent omission cases).
6
establishing predominance in section 10(b) cases.20 In Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend,21 the Supreme Court held, in the context of an antitrust claim, that class
certification is appropriate only when class-wide damages may be measured based
on the theory of injury asserted by the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit has rejected a
broad reading of Comcast:
Comcast [ ] did not hold that a class cannot be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) simply because damages cannot be measured on a
classwide basis. Comcast’s holding was narrower. Comcast held
that a model for determining classwide damages relied upon to
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) must actually measure damages
that result from the class’s asserted theory of injury; but the Court
did not hold that proponents of class certification must rely upon
a classwide damages model to demonstrate predominance. . . . .
To be sure, Comcast reiterated that damages
questions should be considered at the certification stage when
weighing predominance issues, but this requirement is entirely
consistent with our prior holding that “the fact that damages may
have to be ascertained on an individual basis is . . . a factor that we
must consider in deciding whether issues susceptible to
generalized proof ‘outweigh’ individual issues.” McLaughlin [v.
American Tobacco Co.], 522 F.3d [215,] 231 [2d Cir. 2008]. The
Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility of class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in cases involving individualized
20
See, e.g., In re Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 263 F.R.D. 90, 109
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“‘[T]he fact that damages must be calculated on an individual
basis is no impediment to class certification.’”) (quoting Klay v. Humana, 382 F.3d
1241, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2004)) (citing Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348
F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 2003)) (“The possibility that individualized inquiry into
Plaintiffs’ damages claims will be required does not defeat the class action because
common issues nevertheless predominate.”)).
21
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
7
damages calculations.22
Thus, “[p]redominance is satisfied if resolution of some of the legal or factual
questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy can be
achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more
substantial than the issues subject only to individualized proof.”23 And “the fact
that damages may have to be ascertained on an individual basis is not sufficient to
defeat class certification.”24
III.
APPLICABLE LAW25
22
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407-08 (2d Cir. 2015)
(internal citations omitted) (citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817
(5th Cir. 2014) (construing the “principal holding of Comcast [as being] that a
‘model purporting to serve as evidence of damages . . . must measure only those
damages attributable to th[e] theory’ of liability on which the class action is
premised” (ellipsis and second alteration in original) (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct.
at 1433)); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013)
(construing Comcast as holding only “that a damages suit cannot be certified to
proceed as a class action unless the damages sought are the result of the class-wide
injury that the suit alleges” (emphasis in original)); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.,
716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Comcast to hold that class-action
plaintiffs “must be able to show that their damages stemmed from the defendant’s
actions that created the legal liability”); In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig.,
729 F.3d at 123 n.8 (stating that “[p]laintiffs’ proposed measure for damages is
thus directly linked with their underlying theory of classwide liability . . . and is
therefore in accord with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Comcast”)).
23
Id. at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
In this section, I incorporate without citation large portions of my
opinion in Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 310
8
A.
The Presumption of Reliance for Omissions
The Supreme Court has held that a presumption of reliance may apply
in section 10(b) cases in which plaintiffs have alleged that defendants failed to
disclose information. In Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United
States, the Court held that where a plaintiff’s fraud claims are based on omissions,
reliance may be satisfied so long as the plaintiff shows that defendants had an
obligation to disclose the information and the information withheld is material.26
This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that even if the material facts had
been disclosed, a plaintiff’s decision to enter into the transaction would have been
the same.27
B.
The Presumption of Reliance for Misrepresentations
1.
The Basic Presumption
The Supreme Court has also held that a presumption of reliance may
apply in section 10(b) cases in which plaintiffs have alleged that defendants made
fraudulent misrepresentations. In Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court recognized
that plaintiffs are typically entitled to a rebuttable presumption based on the
F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
26
See 406 U.S. at 154.
27
See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 93
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9
“fraud-on-the-market” theory.28 Under this theory, “‘the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflect all publicly available information, and,
hence, any material misrepresentations.’”29 To invoke the Basic presumption, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known,
(2) they were material, (3) the stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) the
plaintiff traded the stock between when the misrepresentations were made and
when the truth was revealed.30
2.
The Basic Presumption at Class Certification
The Basic presumption does not relieve plaintiffs of the burden of
proving predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).31 Plaintiffs can establish
predominance at the class certification stage by satisfying the prerequisites of the
Basic presumption.32 The first three prerequisites — publicity, materiality, and
market efficiency — are directed at “price impact” — “whether the alleged
28
See 485 U.S. at 241.
29
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413
(2014) (“Halliburton II”) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246).
30
See id. (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248, n.27).
31
See id. at 2412.
32
See id. However, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and
Trust Funds, the Supreme Court held that materiality does not need to be proven
before a class can be certified, but is instead left to be addressed at the merits stage.
See 133 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
10
misrepresentation affected the market price in the first place.”33 “In the absence of
price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reliance
collapse.”34 Significantly, however, the Supreme Court made clear in Halliburton
II that plaintiffs are not required to prove price impact directly to invoke the Basic
presumption. Rather, market efficiency, publicity, and materiality serve as a proxy
for price impact.35 Furthermore, in Halliburton I the Supreme Court held that a
securities fraud plaintiff need not establish loss causation — i.e., that plaintiffs’
damages were caused by the fraud and nothing else — in order to certify a class.
In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that loss causation was not an element
of reliance.36
Halliburton II held that defendants may submit price impact evidence
prior to class certification for the purpose of rebutting the Basic presumption. This
is because “an indirect proxy should not preclude direct evidence when such
evidence is available.”37 Thus, “any showing that severs the link between the
alleged misrepresentation and the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff will be
33
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34
Id. (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
35
See id. at 2414-15.
36
See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
37
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
11
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance because the basis for finding that the
fraud had been transmitted through market price would be gone.”38
3.
Market Efficiency
Under Basic and its progeny, a market is efficient when the prices of
securities incorporate most public information such that they respond reasonably
promptly to new material information.39 As clarified in Halliburton II, the Basic
court did not adopt any particular theory of market efficiency.40 Instead, the Basic
38
Id. at 2415-16 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
39
See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410 (“Debates about the degree to
which stock prices accurately reflect public information” are “largely beside the
point.”). The “debates” referred to in Halliburton II were “among economists
about the degree to which the market price of a company’s stock reflects public
information about the company — and thus the degree to which an investor can
earn an abnormal, above-market return by trading on such information.” Id. (citing
Brief for Financial Economists as Amici Curiae (“Amici Br.”), at 4-10 (describing
the debate)). As explained by the Financial Economists, “while the proposition
that market prices respond relatively promptly to material information about a
stock is true if the [“semi-strong” version of the efficient markets hypothesis
(“SSEMH”)] is true, it does not depend on the SSEMH being true. The SSEMH
entails that the market price instantly (or at least very quickly) and fully
incorporates all publicly available information about a stock. It does not even
tolerate modest lags or other anomalies.” See Amici Br. at 5.
40
See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410. Halliburton had argued that the
Supreme Court should overrule Basic in part because “overwhelming empirical
evidence now suggests that capital markets are not fundamentally efficient”
because “public information is often not incorporated immediately (much less
rationally) into market prices.” Id. at 2409 (internal quotation marks omitted).
While Halliburton did not argue that capital markets are always inefficient, “in its
view, Basic’s fundamental error was to ignore the fact that efficiency is not a
binary, yes or no question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
presumption is based “on the fairly modest premise that ‘market professionals
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies,
thereby affecting stock market prices.’”41 Thus, a finding of market efficiency
does not “always require[] proof that the alleged misrepresentations had an
immediate effect on the stock price.”42 Likewise, “[t]hat the price of a stock may
be inaccurate does not detract from the fact that false statements affect it, and cause
loss, which is all that Basic requires.”43 In short, the fact that Basic does not
require that stocks reflect all public information within a specific time-frame —
except that most information must be assimilated reasonably promptly — affects
the required proof of the relationship between stock price movement and
unexpected news.
4.
Proving Market Efficiency
In an efficient market there are “[l]arge numbers of rational and
intelligent investors,” and “[i]mportant current information” that is “almost freely
41
Id. at 2410 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 247, n.24).
42
Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions
Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014).
43
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
13
available to all participants . . . .”44 Because it is difficult to test for these
requirements directly, courts use a variety of factors to evaluate whether a market
for securities is efficient.
In Cammer v. Bloom, the court enumerated five factors that are
frequently used to determine whether a market is efficient.45 These factors are (1)
the average weekly trading volume; (2) the number of analysts who follow the
stock; (3) the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) the ability of the
company to file Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Form S-3;46 and (5)
evidence of share price response to unexpected news. In Krogman v. Sterritt, the
court added three factors. First, the court noted that investors tend to be more
interested in companies with higher market capitalizations, thus leading to more
44
Paolo Cioppa, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis Revisited:
Implications of the Economic Model for the United States Regulator, 5 Global
Jurist Advances 1, 5-6 (2005). The first component does not require that all
investors be rational and intelligent, merely that there be enough rational,
intelligent investors to outweigh any irrational actions. See id. at 5.
45
See 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1283-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
46
See generally Cioppa, 5 Global Jurist Advances at 28 (“The SEC’s
three tiered system recognized that markets for different securities in the United
States are efficient to different degrees. Essentially, moving from the S1 filers to
the S3 filers, the more widely traded and followed the issuing company and the
longer it has traded, the more efficient the market for it and the less information it
must disclose in its registration statements.”).
14
efficiency.47 Second, the court determined that a small bid-ask spread indicated
that trading in the stock was inexpensive, suggesting efficiency.48 Third, the court
looked to the percentage of shares that were available to the public. Because
insiders are more likely to have private information, if substantial portions of
shares are held by insiders, the price is less likely to reflect only the total of all
public information.49
a.
Average Weekly Trading Volume
High volume suggests efficiency “because it implies significant
investor interest in the company. Such interest, in turn, implies a likelihood that
many investors are executing trades on the basis of newly available or
disseminated corporate information.”50 Cammer supposes that turnover of two
percent or more of outstanding shares would justify a strong presumption of
efficiency, while turnover of one percent would justify a substantial presumption.51
b.
Number of Securities Analysts
47
See 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286.
51
See id. (citing Bromberg & Lowenfels, 4 Securities Fraud and
Commodities Fraud § 8.6 (Aug. 1988)).
15
Cammer recognizes that a stock covered by a “significant number of
analysts” is more likely to be efficient because such coverage implies that
investment professionals are following the company and making buy/sell
recommendations to investors.52
c.
Existence of Market Makers and Arbitrageurs
Cammer explained that “[t]he existence of market makers and
arbitrageurs would ensure completion of the market mechanism; these individuals
would react swiftly to company news and reported financial results by buying or
selling stock and driving it to a changed price level.”53 Krogman further explained
that the mere number of market makers, without more, is essentially meaningless;
“what is important is ‘the volume of shares that they committed to trade, the
volume of shares they actually traded, and the prices at which they did so.’”54 One
study has found that the number of market makers is not correlated with the
efficiency of the market.55 Nevertheless, this factor can provide reasonable
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1286-87.
54
Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 476 (quoting O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D.
479, 501-02 (W.D. Mich. 1996)).
55
See Dr. Allen Michel et al., 24 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 58, 60 (2005)
(citing Brad Barber et al., The Fraud–on–the–Market Theory and the Indicators of
Common Stocks’ Efficiency, 19 J. Corp. L. 285, 286 (1994)).
16
guidance in determining whether the Basic presumption applies.
d.
Eligibility to File Form S-3
The SEC permits a company to file Form S-3 when, in the SEC’s
judgment, the market for shares in the company is reasonably efficient at
processing information.56 Cammer emphasized the SEC’s statement that the Form
S-3 is “‘predicated on the Commission’s belief that the market operates efficiently
for these companies [that file Form S-3s], i.e., that the disclosure in Exchange Act
reports and other communications by the registrant, such as press releases, has
already been disseminated and accounted for by the market place.’”57 Deferring to
the SEC’s expertise in this area, I agree that this factor provides a strong indication
of efficiency.
e.
Cammer 5
Cammer 5 — empirical evidence of price changes in response to
56
See Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284 (observing that the SEC permits
seasoned issuers to incorporate by reference because “‘[t]o the extent that the
market accordingly acts efficiently, and this information is adequately reflected in
the price of a registrant’s outstanding securities, there seems little need to reiterate
this information in a prospectus in the context of a distribution’”) (quoting SEC
Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980)).
57
Id. (quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg.
41,902 (1981) (emphasis in original).
17
unexpected information — is often highly probative of efficiency.58 However,
there is no consensus as to how quickly share prices must change to justify a
finding of efficiency.
Cammer 5 is often proven with an event study. An event study is “a
statistical regression analysis that examines the effect of an event . . . on a
dependent variable, such as a company’s stock price.”59 An event study has four
parts: defining the event (e.g., an earnings announcement), establishing the
announcement window (i.e., the period over which stock price changes are
calculated), measuring the expected return of the stock, and computing the
abnormal return (which is the actual return minus the expected return).
Performing the third step, “requires the expert to isolate the effect of
the event from other market, industry, or company-specific factors simultaneously
affecting the company’s stock price.”60 “A large abnormal stock price movement
occurring at the same time the market receives news about an event suggests that
58
See id. at 1287 (stating that “it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking
to allege an efficient market to allege empirical facts showing a cause and effect
relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an
immediate response in the stock price” and noting that this factor is “the essence of
an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory”).
59
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The
Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15
Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 183, 190 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Id. at 192.
18
the event caused the abnormal price movement.”61
In sum:
[A]n event study is similar to a medical experiment in which there
is a control group and a treatment group. The control group
provides the benchmark against which the treatment group is
compared to determine if the event being studied had any effect.
In a securities setting, the control group is established by
modeling the normal relationship of a stock’s price movements to
movements of a market and/or industry index. The difference
between the stock price movement we actually observe and the
movement we expected to observe (i.e. the difference between the
treatment and the control group) that occurs upon the release of a
particular piece of information is called the excess price
movement of the stock at the time of the event. This excess price
movement is tested for statistical significance to see whether the
result is unusual or unlikely to be explained by the normal random
variations of the stock price.62
In most scientific work, the level needed to obtain a statistically significant result is
set at a five percent level of confidence, which means that there is no more than a
five percent chance that the observed relationship is purely random.
61
Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62
Id. at 193-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord In re
Federal Home Mortg. Corp. (Freddie Mac) Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 174, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining, in a case that pre-dates Halliburton II, that in an
event study “[t]he actual price of the security during the event is compared against
the expected price, which is calculated based on the security’s historical
relationship to a market index. This historical relationship is measured over a
‘control period.’ The difference between the stock’s actual price and the expected
price is defined as an ‘abnormal return.’ A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in
Economics and Finance, 35 J. Econ. Lit. 13, 14-16 (1997). In an efficient market,
stock prices should show statistically significant abnormal returns on days in which
unexpected, material information is released into the market.”).
19
f.
Other Factors
The markets for companies with higher market capitalizations and
shares with a smaller bid-ask spread are more likely to be efficient.63 The
percentage of shares available to the public generally bears a direct relationship to
efficiency.64 A put-call parity relationship between the share price and the prices
of the put and call options written on the share indicates that the market for the
stock and the options written on the stock are efficient.65 In an efficient market,
stock returns follow what is known as a “random walk,” meaning that investors
cannot use past stock price movements to predict the next day’s stock price
movement.66
In addition, some courts have held that if “‘a security is listed on the
NYSE . . . or a similar national market, the market for that security is [often]
63
See Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 478.
64
See id.
65
Arbitrageurs correct put-call disparities by engaging in short-sales.
When short-selling bans restrict an arbitrageur’s ability to exploit put-call
disparities, these constraints may cause the stock to be overpriced. Thus, shortselling constraints may result in inefficiency.
66
See generally Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, Permanent
and Temporary Components of Stock Prices, 96 Journal of Political Economy 2
(1988).
20
presumed to be efficient.’”67 While other courts have been reluctant to conclude
that a stock was traded efficiently solely because it was traded on the NYSE or
NASDAQ, most courts in this Circuit agree that such listing is a good indicator of
efficiency.68 Courts in other circuits have reached the same conclusion.69
67
Wagner v. Barrick Gold Corp., 251 F.R.D. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(quoting Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No.
05 Civ. 1898, 2006 WL 2161887, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)). Accord
Stevelman v. Alias Research, No. 91 Civ. 682, 2000 WL 888385, at *4 (D. Conn.
June 22, 2000) (“For stocks . . . that trade on a listed exchange such as NASDAQ,
[the] reliance element of a 10b-5 cause of action is presumed.”).
68
See Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[N]o argument can be made that the [NYSE] is not an efficient market.”);
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 544 F. Supp. 2d 277, 296 n.133 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[T]he federal courts are unanimous in their agreement that a listing on the
NASDAQ or a similar national market is a good indicator of efficiency”); RMED
Int’l v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, 185 F. Supp. 2d 389, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“Indeed, research has failed to reveal any case where a stock traded on the AMEX
was found not to have been traded in an open and efficient market. . . . Rather, to
the contrary, numerous courts have held that stocks trading on the AMEX are
almost always entitled to the presumption.”) (citations omitted).
69
See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 634 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he listing of a security on a major exchange such as the NYSE or the
NASDAQ weighs in favor of a finding of market efficiency.”); In re Merck &
Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2013 WL 396117, at *11 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,
2013) (finding efficiency where stock traded on the NYSE, without employing a
Cammer analysis, because the NYSE is “consistently recognized by courts ––
including the Third Circuit and other United States Court of Appeals –– as . . . well
suited for application of the fraud on the market theory”); In re Diamond Foods,
Inc., Sec. Litig., 295 F.R.D. 240, 250 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[D]efendant [has not]
identified any authority, binding or otherwise, that has held that common shares
traded on the NASDAQ are not traded in an efficient market.”); Lumen v.
Anderson, 280 F.R.D. 451, 459 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (noting that Basic itself
recognized the NYSE was an efficient market”); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213
21
In unusual circumstances, courts in this Circuit have found that
securities traded on major exchanges are not traded on an efficient market.70 In
IBEW Local 90 Pension Fund v. Deutsche Bank AG, the stock at issue was a global
registered share, which unlike common stock or ADS, trade globally on various
markets, and only a small percentage of those shares traded on the NYSE.71 And in
In re Federal Home Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) Securities Litigation,
the securities were “a limited series of preferred shares, which are traded in
patterns significantly different from the trading patterns typical of common
shares.”72
F.R.D. 484, 498 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“NASDAQ . . . is more likely than not to be
considered an efficiently traded market”); Levine v. SkyMall, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 166,
2002 WL 31056919, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2002) (“Although not dispositive, the
fact that SkyMall stock is traded on the NASDAQ stock market’s National Market
System also contributes to finding that the market is efficient.”); Appel, 165 F.R.D.
at 504 (stating that “[t]he market system upon which a particular stock trades
provides some insight as to the likelihood that the market for that stock is
efficient”).
70
See generally IBEW Local 90 Pension Fund v. Deutsche Bank AG,
No. 11 Civ. 4209, 2013 WL 5815472 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2013) (holding that
market efficiency had not been established in a case in which the security at issue
traded on the NYSE); Freddie Mac, 281 F.R.D. 174 (same).
71
See 2013 WL 5815472, at *3-4 (noting that only two percent of the
global registered shares traded on the NYSE).
72
In re Computer Sci. Corp. Sec. Litig., 288 F.R.D. 112, 120 (E.D. Va.
2012). In addition, the Freddie Mac court explicitly required proof of efficiency at
the semi-strong level. See 281 F.R.D. at 177 (“The fraud on the market theory is
based on the semi-strong form of market efficiency.”).
22
IV.
DISCUSSION
In order to meet the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that common issues
predominate, plaintiffs must establish reliance on a class-wide basis.73 Plaintiffs
argue that they are entitled to both the Affiliated Ute and Basic presumptions of
reliance. I consider the applicability of each presumption in turn. I then address
defendants’ arguments regarding damages and the scope of the Class. I conclude
with the appointment of Class Counsel.
A.
The Affiliated Ute Presumption of Reliance Applies
Plaintiffs are entitled to the Affiliated Ute presumption. Defendants
contend that the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance only applies to cases
“primarily involving omissions.”74 They argue that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs allege that
Barclays made a number of affirmative misstatements concerning LX and the
Bank’s commitment to restoring its integrity, the Affiliated Ute presumption does
not apply.”75
However, a case could be made that it is the material omissions, not
73
See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
74
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Class Certification (“Def. Opp.”), at 7 n.8 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at
153-54 (“Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.”).
75
Id.
23
the affirmative statements, that are the heart of this case.76 In the April 2015 Order
I explained that the Complaint’s materiality allegations were sufficient because
“the specific misstatements about LX — which include touting its safety while
secretly encouraging predatory behavior — call into question the integrity of the
company as a whole.”77 As discussed in the April 2015 Order, the revenue of LX
relative to Barclays’ overall business is fractional.78 While that fact makes it
debatable whether investors would have considered affirmative statements about
LX material, it appears far more likely that investors would have found the omitted
conduct material. Thus, the existence of “affirmative misrepresentations does not
at this stage in the litigation preclude [plaintiffs] from relying on the Affiliated Ute
presumption.”79
76
Under Rule 10b-5 it is unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Thus, omissions cases include
statements.
77
Strougo, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 349. The concealed conduct includes
“Barclays giving perks and other systemic advantages to high-frequency traders,
and Barclays’ failure to apply the protections of Liquidity Profiling to a significant
portion of the trading in its dark pool.” Reply Memorandum of Law in Further
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Reply Mem.”), at 3 n.3.
78
See Strougo, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 349 n.119.
79
Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 270
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). Accord City of Livonia Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Wyeth, 284 F.R.D.
173, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that both the Affiliated Ute and Basic
24
Defendants argue that the Affiliated Ute presumption does not apply
for the additional reason that defendants did not have a duty to disclose that they
“were engaged in illegal conduct.”80 While it is true that there is no general duty to
disclose illegal conduct, “a duty to disclose uncharged criminal conduct does arise
if it is necessary to ensure that a corporation’s statements are not misleading.”81
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to the Affiliated Ute presumption to establish
reliance for purposes of class certification.
B.
Plaintiffs Are Entitled to the Basic Presumption of Reliance
1.
The Market for Barclays ADS Was Efficient
Of the four requisites to invoking the Basic presumption — publicity,
materiality, market efficiency, and market timing — only market efficiency is at
issue. Defendants concede that plaintiffs have established four of the five Cammer
factors and all three Krogman factors. According to defendants, however,
presumptions applied in case “primarily about omissions”).
80
Tr. at 14:13-20 [Jeffrey T. Scott, defendants’ attorney] (“With respect
to this duty of disclosure, there is no such thing. We addressed this in Carpenters.
In that case, they argued we had a duty to disclose that we were engaged in LIBOR
manipulation and tell the world we were engaged in illegal conduct. Second
Circuit precedent says a bank doesn’t — or a company doesn’t have an obligation
to disclose it’s engaged in wrongful conduct. So that is not a claim that is in the
case.”).
81
In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 9624, 2016 WL 93866, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2016) (citing cases).
25
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate Cammer 5, and without Cammer 5, plaintiffs
cannot meet their burden of proving market efficiency by a preponderance of the
evidence.82 Defendants recognize that I rejected the same argument — that
establishing Cammer 5 was necessary to demonstrate efficiency — with respect to
the same stock in Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC.83
My view has not changed,84 and in the interim additional courts have reached the
82
See, e.g., Def. Opp. at 17-20; 11/5/15 Hearing Transcript (“Tr.”) at
23:8-17 [Jeffrey T. Scott, defendants’ attorney] (“[Defendants’] arguments on
efficiency are based on the fact that [plaintiffs] haven’t shown cause and effect. If
you don’t show cause and effect, it is really hard to show that for that particular
stock, new material information was impounded into the stock price. And [the]
report [of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Zachary Nye, Ph.D.,] is flawed from top to bottom.
It is not consistent with the standards used in the field of economics. It wouldn’t
be accepted in a peer-reviewed journal. Frankly, that evidence shouldn’t even
come in with respect to efficiency. That is why we argue there is no evidence of
cause and effect here.”). Although defendants argue that Dr. Nye’s report should
not come in as evidence, defendants have not made a motion to exclude his report
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
83
See Def. Opp. at 18 (“Although this Court found in Carpenters that, in
the ordinary case of a high volume stock followed by a large number of analysts
and traded on a national exchange, Cammer factor five is not dispositive, Barclays
respectfully submits that proof of a cause and effect relationship between
unexpected, material disclosures and changes in a defendant’s stock price is
necessary to prove market efficiency, and that, for the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). While Carpenters also concerned Barclays ADS, the class period in that
case was from July 10, 2007 to June 27, 2012, as compared with the minimally
overlapping period of August 2, 2011 through June 25, 2014 in the present case.
84
See Carpenters, 310 F.R.D. at 83-86. Following the issuance of the
Carpenters decision, Barclays petitioned the Second Circuit for review pursuant to
26
same conclusion.85
As a threshold matter, the Second Circuit has never adopted a
definitive test for market efficiency and explicitly declined to do so in Teamsters
Local 445 Fright Division Pension Fund v. Bombardier.86 While the Second
Circuit endorsed the use of the Cammer factors in Bombardier, it has not required
their use or held that any one of them is dispositive. A substantially similar
approach has been taken by the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth,
Rule 23(f). While the petition was pending, the parties reached a settlement, and
jointly requested a stay of the petition, which was granted. A fairness hearing
relating to the settlement is scheduled for March 14, 2016. Accordingly, the
Carpenters opinion has not been subjected to appellate review.
85
See Forsta AP-Fonden v. St. Jude Med., Inc., --- F.R.D. ----, No. Civ.
12-3070, 2015 WL 9308224, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2015) (“There is no doubt
that empirical evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship is helpful for a finding of
market efficiency, but Defendants’ arguments go too far. ‘[H]elpful’ does not mean
“determinative.” A plaintiff’s shortfall on the fifth Cammer factor alone does not
outweigh, as here, showings on many other relevant factors.”) (collecting cases); In
re NII Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., --- F.R.D. ----, No. 14 Civ. 227, 2015 WL
7283110, at *9 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2015) (holding that because defendants had
neither rebutted plaintiff’s expert’s findings nor offered evidence that the market
was not efficient, that “even if the fifth Cammer factor were considered weak, the
evidence offered in support of the other Cammer factors as well as the
non-Cammer factors is more than sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the stocks and bonds at issue traded in an efficient market.”).
86
See 546 F.3d 196, 205 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008) (“This Court has not
adopted a test for the market efficiency of stocks or bonds, and we do not do so
here.”).
27
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.87
Likewise, there would be no need for a five factor test — or
consideration of the other factors described earlier in part III.B. — if one factor
were dispositive in every context. Not surprisingly, no court has adopted a per se
rule that any one Cammer factor is dispositive.88 The majority of courts have used
the Cammer factors as “an analytical tool rather than as a checklist.”89 Thus,
numerous courts have found market efficiency in the absence of an event study or
87
See In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“While we agree . . . that the [Cammer] factors considered by the district court
were relevant to the issue of market efficiency, these factors are not exhaustive.”);
In re DVI, 639 F.3d at 634 n.16 (“We have noted the Cammer factors may be
instructive depending on the circumstances.”); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP,
368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Cammer for the proposition that, “to
determine whether a security trades on an efficient market, a court should consider
factors such as, among others, whether the security is actively traded, the volume
of trades, and the extent to which it is followed by market professionals”); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his list [of eight factors,
including the five Cammer factors,] does not represent an exhaustive list, and in
some cases one of the above factors may be unnecessary.”); Regions Fin. Corp.,
762 F.3d at 1257 (same).
88
Not even the Cammer court considered the fifth factor necessary,
stating only that “it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking to allege an efficient
market . . . .” Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287 (emphasis added).
89
Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., S.A., 281 F.R.D. 150, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing Unger, 401 F.3d at 325). Accord Bombardier, 546 F.3d at 210 (“We
conclude [ ] that the district court properly used the Cammer factors as an
‘analytical tool[.]’”) (quoting Unger, 401 F.3d at 325).
28
where the event study was not definitive.90
Furthermore, requiring a plaintiff to submit proof of market reactions
— and to do so with an event study — ignores Supreme Court precedent as well as
practical considerations. Event studies test for a degree of efficiency that may not
be required. In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the fraud on the
market presumption is based “on the fairly modest premise” that “market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements
about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.”91 “That the . . . price [of
a stock] may be inaccurate does not detract from the fact that false statements
90
See Winstar Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 290 F.R.D. 437, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (holding that although plaintiff’s expert “was unable to complete a formal
event study” due to lack of data, the expert had demonstrated efficiency by
“select[ing] five days on which news was released that she thought might be
material, and qualitatively analyz[ing] the change in the price of Winstar bonds
relative to the price change of the Lehman U.S. Bond Composite Index (a
market-wide bond index composed of investment grade government, agency,
corporate and mortgage-backed bonds)” and finding that on two of those days the
price changed in response to news); Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302
F.R.D. 657, 669 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (finding market efficient for common stock even
though expert had not performed an event study and implicitly finding that
empirical evidence of the stock price change on the corrective disclosure date
satisfied Cammer 5); In re Computer Sci. Corp. Sec. Litig., 288 F.R.D. at 120
(rejecting the argument that plaintiffs had failed to establish market efficiency
because they had not submitted an event study); Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., 295
F.R.D. 423, 437 (D. Ariz. 2013) (holding that where Cammer 1, 2, and 4 weighed
in plaintiffs’ favor, Cammer 3 was partially unsatisfied, and Cammer 5 did not
favor either the plaintiffs or the defendants, plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to
establish market efficiency by a preponderance of the evidence).
91
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410.
29
affect it, and cause loss,” which is “all that Basic requires.”92 Yet, event studies are
designed to test the hypothesis “that publicly available information is impounded
immediately into stock prices such that an investor cannot earn abnormal profits by
trading on the information after its release.”93 The failure of an event study to
show immediate impoundment does not necessarily indicate whether the market is
efficient for purposes of the Basic presumption.
In academic research, event studies are almost exclusively conducted
across a large swath of firms.94 The notion that event studies are the paramount
tool for testing market efficiency comes from multi-firm event studies, and courts
have generally not distinguished between the power of multi-firm and single firm
event studies. However, when the event study is used in a litigation to examine a
single firm, the chances of finding statistically significant results decrease
dramatically.95 “[T]he event study technique improves as the number of firms in
92
Id.
93
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I:
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 141, 142 (2002).
94
See Alon Brav and J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation:
Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias at 3 (“Importing a methodology that
economists developed for use with multiple firms into a single firm context creates
three substantial difficulties: low statistical power, confounding effects, and
bias.”).
95
See Bhagat & Romano, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. at 149 (“An important
question is can an event study be conducted with just one firm, that is, is a sample
30
the sample increase, as the number of days in the announcement window decrease,
and as the alternative of a larger abnormal return is considered against the null
hypothesis of zero abnormal return.”96 The following example from the literature
highlights the problems inherent in placing too much emphasis on event studies to
measure market efficiency:
[i]n a sample size of twenty-five companies, the probabilities of
detecting an abnormal return (or an effect on the stock price) of
0.5%, 1% and 2% is 24%, 71% and 100% respectively. But if the
sample size is increased to 100 companies, the probabilities of
detecting an abnormal return of 0.5%, 1%, and 2% is 71%, 94%,
and 100% respectively. Thus, there is significant difference in
detecting an abnormal return, or effect on the stock price,
size of one acceptable? This question is especially relevant in court cases or
regulatory injunctions involving only one firm. Conceptually, a sample of one is a
rather small sample but this by itself does not invalidate the event study
methodology. However, the statistical power with a sample of one is likely to be
quite low. First, the variability of (abnormal) returns of a portfolio with just one
stock in it is significantly higher than a portfolio with even a few, say five, stocks
in it. Any standard finance or investment textbook will have a graph depicting the
sharp drop in variance of portfolio returns as the number of stocks in the portfolio
increases from one, to five, to ten; after about fifty stocks in the
portfolio the decrease in variance is quite small. Second, it is plausible that the
announcement period return of an announcing firm will be affected by other
information unrelated to the event under study. If a sample of one is considered, it
is quite difficult to determine the separate effects on firm value of the
announcement and of the unrelated information item(s). If the sample has several
firms, then the effect on firm value of such unrelated information is likely to cancel
out. As the sample size increases the effect on firm value of such unrelated
information (goes to zero) becomes less and less significant.”).
96
Id. at 148.
31
depending on the size of the event study.97
A further problem is that in any particular case it may not be possible
to conduct an event study that looks at the relationship between the stock price and
unexpected news. For example, there may only be a few — or perhaps no —
unexpected events in a given class period that can be tested.98 This could be
because of the short length of the class period, a long period of uninteresting news,
or because the company has withheld the unexpected information.99 As just
discussed, the corollary of this is that event studies become increasingly unreliable
when the period they cover increases.100
For all these reasons, a plaintiff attempting to demonstrate market
efficiency through an event study will often face an onerous task, whether or not
the market is efficient. However, indirect evidence of market efficiency —
including that a stock trades in high volumes on a large national market and is
97
Kaufman & Wunderlich, 15 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. at 232-33.
98
See Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d at 1257 (“In any given case there
may be no unexpected disclosures during the period at all, because the company is
withholding that information.”).
99
It is true that different event study methodologies may be used in the
absence of unexpected news. In Freddie Mac the methodology was simply to look
at news days versus non-news days and to determine whether there were
substantially more statistically significant returns on news days than non-news
days. See 281 F.R.D. at 179-80.
100
See Bhagat & Romano, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. at 148.
32
followed by a large number of analysts — will typically be sufficient to satisfy the
Basic presumption on class certification.101 In such cases there is no need to
demonstrate efficiency through a direct test, such as an event study. Of course, if
101
See, e.g., Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d at 1255 (“[T]he market for a
stock is generally efficient when millions of shares change hands daily and [when
there is] a critical mass of investors and/or analysts who study the available
information and influence the stock price through trades and recommendations.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 232 F.R.D.
176, 185 n.75 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Defendants do not dispute that RSL was traded
on an efficient market. Moreover, RSL shares were traded on the NASDAQ
National Market . . . were traded at high volumes during the class period . . . [and
were] extensively followed by analysts and received extensive media attention.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted, alterations in original); In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that “the record
in this case contains several strong indications that the market in which the focus
stocks traded was efficient. Three facts stand out as particularly probative: first, all
the focus stocks were traded on the NASDAQ National Market; second, the focus
stocks were traded actively at high volumes throughout the class period; and third,
the focus stocks were the subjects of numerous analyst reports and extensive media
coverage. Under any conceivable test for market efficiency, these three facts are
sufficient to meet plaintiffs’ Rule 23 burden.”). See also Smilovits, 295 F.R.D. at
431 (“In keeping with Basic and the other cases cited in the first paragraph of this
section, the Court concludes that the trading of First Solar stock on NASDAQ — a
major, well-developed stock exchange — weighs in favor of finding market
efficiency. Defendants have not identified any authority, binding or otherwise, that
has held that common shares traded on the NASDAQ are not traded in an efficient
market. Moreover, Defendants’ expert . . . agrees that ‘[m]ost of the time, . . .
stocks traded on large national exchanges are likely to be efficient.’”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); In re Computer Sci. Corp. Sec. Litig., 288
F.R.D. at 120 (“It is not surprising that no other federal courts have concluded that
common shares traded on the NYSE are not traded in an efficient market.”); In re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 278-79 (D. Mass. 2006)
(stating “that listing on such an exchange undisputably improves the market
structure for trading in a particular stock” and “that one would be hard-pressed to
deny the relevance of this fact in an efficiency analysis”).
33
there is reason to doubt the efficiency of the market, as when the additional
Cammer factors do not weigh heavily in favor of market efficiency (or when
defendants’ evidence weighs against market efficiency), a plaintiff may have to
present direct evidence to establish market efficiency.
Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence,102 including
that Barclays ADS trades on the NYSE at high volumes103 with heavy analyst
coverage,104 I conclude that plaintiffs have established market efficiency indirectly
and therefore do not consider whether they have also satisfied Cammer 5 by proof
of an event study.
2.
Defendants Have Not Rebutted the Basic Presumption
102
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification (“Pl. Mem.”), at 13-22; 7/24/15 Expert Report of Zachary Nye, Ph.D.
(“Nye Report”) ¶¶ 12-73; Def. Opp. at 17-20; 9/11/15 Declaration of Christopher
M. James Ph.D., defendants’ expert, at 8-27.
103
See Nye Report ¶ 31 (explaining that the average weekly share trading
volume as a percentage of shares outstanding, excluding weeks not entirely
contained within the Class Period, was 17.7% for Barclays ADS, and therefore the
average weekly reported trading volume for Barclays stock exceeds the 2% strong
presumption of market efficiency described in Cammer).
104
See id. ¶¶ 37-40 (explaining that over seven hundred analyst reports
for Barclays were issued during the Class Period; information pertinent to Barclays
was also disseminated to investors via media coverage, investor conferences, trade
magazines, public presentations by Barclays, and SEC filings; and that the amount
of reporting on Barclays by security analysts during the Class Period indicates that
company-specific news was widely disseminated to investors, thereby facilitating
the incorporation of such information into the market price of Barclays ADS).
34
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court recognized that “defendants
should at least be allowed to defeat the [Basic] presumption at the class
certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in fact affect
the stock price.”105 The Court reasoned that “[w]hile Basic allows plaintiffs to
establish [price impact] indirectly, it does not require courts to ignore a defendant’s
direct, more salient evidence showing that the alleged misrepresentation did not
actually affect the stock’s market price and, consequently, that the Basic
presumption does not apply.”106 Halliburton II supports this conclusion with the
following hypothetical:
Suppose a defendant at the certification stage submits an event
study looking at the impact on the price of its stock from six
discrete events, in an effort to refute the plaintiffs’ claim of
general market efficiency. All agree the defendant may do this.
Suppose one of the six events is the specific misrepresentation
asserted by the plaintiffs. All agree that this too is perfectly
acceptable. Now suppose the district court determines that,
despite the defendant’s study, the plaintiff has carried its burden
to prove market efficiency, but that the evidence shows no price
impact with respect to the specific misrepresentation challenged
in the suit. The evidence at the certification stage thus shows an
efficient market, on which the alleged misrepresentation had no
price impact. And yet under EPJ Fund’s view, the plaintiffs’
action should be certified and proceed as a class action (with all
that entails), even though the fraud-on-the-market theory does not
105
134 S. Ct. at 2414. The Basic presumption can also be rebutted by
showing that “a plaintiff would have bought or sold the stock even had he been
aware that the stock’s price was tainted by fraud . . . .” Id. at 2408.
106
Id. at 2416.
35
apply and common reliance thus cannot be presumed.
Such a result is inconsistent with Basic’s own logic.
Under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory, market efficiency and
the other prerequisites for invoking the presumption constitute an
indirect way of showing price impact. As explained, it is
appropriate to allow plaintiffs to rely on this indirect proxy for
price impact, rather than requiring them to prove price impact
directly, given Basic’s rationales for recognizing a presumption of
reliance in the first place.107
Thus, Halliburton II permits a defendant to attempt to rebut the Basic
presumption at class certification. However, having this right does not mean that it
is easily done, which is why some have recognized that Halliburton II’s holding
will not ordinarily present a serious obstacle to class certification.108 Indeed, this
Circuit has permitted rebuttal evidence on class certification since at least 2008,109
and the vast majority of courts have found that defendants have failed to meet their
107
Id. at 2415.
108
See id. at 2417 (Ginsburg J., concurring) (“[T]he Court recognizes
that it is incumbent upon the defendant to show the absence of price impact. The
Court’s judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud
plaintiffs with tenable claims.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 2424 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n practice, the so-called ‘rebuttable
presumption’ is largely irrebuttable.”). Accord Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679,
681 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a large, public company makes statements that are said
to be false, securities-fraud litigation regularly proceeds as a class action.”).
109
See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484 (2d
Cir. 2008) (permitting defendants “to rebut the presumption, prior to class
certification, by showing, for example, the absence of a price impact”).
36
burden of proving lack of price impact.110 This is also true of courts in other
circuits post-Halliburton II.111
110
See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 3461,
2015 WL 5613150, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015) (defendant’s expert failed “to
demonstrate that no part of the [stock price] decline was caused by the [ ]
disclosure” of the alleged fraud); Carpenters, 310 F.R.D. at 95-97 (defendants’
reliance on plaintiffs’ proof was insufficient to show lack of price impact); Wallace
v. IntraLinks, 302 F.R.D. 310, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“defendants’ speculation
that factors unrelated to the [alleged fraud] . . . exclusively caused the drop in []
share price” was insufficient; McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 38
F. Supp. 3d 415, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (defendant did not meet “burden to prove
that its alleged misstatements did not improperly maintain” the stock price); City of
Livonia Emps’ Ret. Sys., 284 F.R.D. at 182 (“Defendants’ assertion that ‘[t]he
evidence does not indicate that the drop was due to information about hepatic
events in Study 315’, but rather due to other confounding events, is a loss
causation argument and, therefore, not appropriate at the class certification stage.”)
(internal citations omitted); In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying class where market
dropped on the corrective disclosure date and defendant’s expert failed to
demonstrate the case was not related to alleged fraud); In re SLM Corp. Sec. Litig.,
2012 WL 209095, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012) (same); In re Sadia,
S.A. Sec. Litig., 269 F.R.D. 298, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (defendants “failed to . . .
prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been no impact
on price as a result of the failure to disclose information”) (emphasis in original);
Fogarazzo, 263 F.R.D. at 106 (“defendants have failed to rebut the fraud on the
market presumption by the preponderance of the evidence on the basis that the
analyst reports at issue lacked material information”). Cf. In re Moody’s Corp.
Sec. Litig., 274 F.R.D. 480, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Based on the motion currently
before this Court, there is no period within the proposed class period where the
alleged misrepresentation caused a statistically significant increase in the price or
where a corrective disclosure caused a statistically significant decline in the
price.”).
111
See City of Sterling Heights Gen. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin.,
Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5275, 2015 WL 5097883 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2015); Local 703, I.B.
of T. Grocery and Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. 10 Civ.
2847, 2014 WL 6661918 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014).
37
The notable exception is the district court’s decision on remand from
Halliburton II, in which the district court held that the presumption had been
rebutted as to certain misstatements.112 Such rebuttal was achieved through
consideration of the evidence presented by Halliburton, including that its expert
“developed a market model and performed an event study to determine whether
there was statistically significant price movement on the dates of the alleged
misrepresentations and corrective disclosures.”113 Reviewing the evidence, the
court found that Halliburton’s expert had demonstrated lack of price impact on
several of the corrective disclosure dates.114 In addition, the court found that
Halliburton had met its burden of showing lack of price impact with respect to a
particular date because the plaintiff “ha[d] not shown that Halliburton disclosed
any information . . . that [had] not already impounded in the market price of the
stock” by that date.115 Finally, the court held that
Halliburton [did] not [meet] its burden of showing lack of price
impact with respect to the announcement of the Baltimore verdict
on December 7th. Although the Court finds that at least some of
112
See generally Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D.
251 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (holding that defendants have the burdens of production and
persuasion to show lack of price impact).
113
Id. at 263.
114
See id. at 270, 271, 274, 276.
115
Id. at 272.
38
Halliburton’s stock price decline on that date is likely attributable
to uncertainty in the asbestos environment that also impacted
other companies with asbestos exposure, Halliburton has not
demonstrated that uncertainty caused the entirety of Halliburton’s
substantial price decline.116
By contrast to the proof submitted on remand in Halliburton, the
defendants in the instant case have not submitted an event study — either
analyzing the price impact on the date of the misstatements or on the corrective
disclosure date — to prove lack of price impact. Nonetheless, they argue that they
have established lack of price impact. Defendants first note that the regression
analysis performed by plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Nye, does not show a statistically
significant increase in the price of Barclays ADS on any of the alleged
misstatement dates.117 Of course, Dr. Nye did not attempt to show price movement
on the misstatement dates. This is because plaintiffs’ case is premised on a price
maintenance theory.118 Under that theory, “a material misstatement can impact a
stock’s value . . . by improperly maintaining the existing stock price.”119
Defendants contend, however, that plaintiffs’ theory of the case is
inconsistent with the price maintenance theory. This argument has two prongs.
116
Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
117
See Def. Opp. at 8.
118
See Reply Mem. at 6-13.
119
Carpenters, 310 F.R.D. at 86-87.
39
The first is that Dr. Nye apparently believes that the inflation maintained by
misstatements about LX made during the Class Period entered the stock price prior
to the beginning of the Class Period.120 The second is that following the logic in
this Court’s April 2015 Order, inflation due to LX could not have entered the stock
prior to the beginning of the Class Period because LX only became material after
the start of the Class Period.
However, these arguments do not foreclose plaintiffs’ reliance on the
price maintenance theory. First, the price maintenance theory does not require
inflation in the stock price prior to the date of a misstatement. When an omission
or misrepresentation prevents a non-inflated price from falling, that omission or
misrepresentation introduces inflation into the stock.121 In addition, plaintiffs are
120
See Def. Opp. at 10-11.
121
See 10/26/16 Expert Rebuttal Report of Zachary Nye, Ph.D. (“Nye
Reply”), at 36 (“[M]isstatements and/or material omissions can maintain or
introduce artificial inflation even if they are not associated with a statistically
significant price increase) (citing Deposition Transcript of Dr. Christopher James
at 206 (“Q. Can the omission of a material fact introduce inflation into the stock
price? A. Sure.”); City of Livonia Emps’ Ret. Sys., 284 F.R.D. at 182 (“In a case
such as this, where Plaintiffs argue that the failure to disclose information . . . made
[] statements misleading, the fact that the stock price did not significantly increase
on the days in question is not dispositive. . . . [T]he fact that the stock price
remained consistent could, in fact, indicate inflation. Indeed, in an omission case,
the impact of the defendants’ misrepresentation should be measured by the stock
price reaction following the truth being disclosed to the market.”) (citing Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) “[T]o establish loss
causation, a plaintiff must allege that the misstatement or omission concealed
something from the market that, when disclosed, negatively affected the value of
40
not required to show when inflation entered into the price of Barclays ADS.122
Furthermore, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint do
not depend on the existence of inflation in the stock price prior to the start of the
Class Period. According to plaintiffs, “[d]efendants’ false and misleading
statements regarding Barclays’ transparency and safeguards maintained the price
of Barclays’ securities at levels that reflected investor confidence in the integrity of
the Company.”123 Plaintiffs argue that had defendants been “honest about the
workings of the dark pool and the level of ‘transparency’ surrounding its
the security.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Glickenhaus &
Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Note too that a
stock can be inflated even if the price remains the same or declines after a false
statement because the price might have fallen even more (e.g., “We only lost $100
million this year,” when actually losses were $200 million).”); Regions Fin. Corp.,
762 F.3d at 1257 (“Regions’s disclosures were designed to prevent a more
precipitous decline in the stock’s price, not bring about any change to it. When a
company releases expected information, truthful or otherwise, the efficient market
hypothesis underlying Basic predicts that the disclosure will cause no significant
change in the price.”).
122
See, e.g., Glickenhaus, 787 F.3d at 418 (explaining that “there is no
law” that “requires the plaintiffs to prove how the inflation was introduced into the
stock price in the first place”).
123
Pl. Mem. at 6. See Complaint ¶ 113 (“Defendants’ false and
misleading statements about Barclays’ transparency and safeguards, as well as
Barclays’ repeated commitment to a reformed culture, maintained the price of
Barclays’ common stock at levels which reflected investor confidence in the
integrity of the company. Particularly in light of the public’s concern of aggressive
trading and manipulations by high frequency traders, Defendants’ assurances of
Barclays’ transparency and credibility were meant to and did assuage those
concerns.”).
41
operations, Barclays’ securities would have traded at a substantially lower
price.”124 Thus, plaintiffs conclude that “[t]he stock was maintained at an
artificially inflated level until . . . Barclays’ shares fell 7.38% on June 26, 2014.”125
In short, “[p]laintiffs allege that Defendants’ misstatements began as early as
August 2011 (the start of the Class Period) and that [the misstatements]
‘maintained the price of Barclays’ common stock at levels which reflected investor
confidence in the integrity of the company.’”126 Consequently, plaintiffs have
asserted a tenable theory of price maintenance, and defendants’ attempt at rebuttal
via their argument regarding the timing of the inflation in the stock price fails.
Defendants also attempt to prove lack of price impact by reference to
the price change on the corrective disclosure date. To succeed, defendants must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the price drop on the corrective
disclosure date was not due to the alleged fraud. Defendants attempt to do this by
focusing on Dr. Nye’s testimony and expert report. Again, they do not offer their
own regression analysis to show that the price drop on the corrective disclosure
date was not due to the alleged fraud.
Defendants’ argument has two parts. The first is that Dr. Nye agrees
124
Pl. Mem. at 6.
125
Id.
126
Nye Reply at 36 (quoting Complaint ¶ 113).
42
that the disclosure of a government investigation can, by itself, result in a
statistically significant decline in the price of a security. Defendants thus suggest
that because the disclosure in this case was in the context of the NYAG lawsuit,
plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the misstatements themselves caused part of
the price decline.127 Defendants also rely on Dr. Nye’s use of reports and news
stories that do not attribute the post-disclosure price drop to “concern[s] about
127
Plaintiffs, of course, were under absolutely no duty to establish that
the decline in price was “because of the correction to a prior misleading statement
and that the subsequent loss could not otherwise be explained by some additional
factors revealed then to the market.” Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342
(2005)). That is the showing required to prove loss causation, and plaintiffs do not
have to prove loss causation at class certification. See id. at 2186 (“The fact that a
subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the revelation of a
misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on the
misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively through the
fraud-on-the-market theory. Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts
necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-the-market
theory.”). And while defendants presume that disclosure of the NYAG lawsuit is
not related to the alleged fraud as a matter of law, I decline to make that
determination at this stage in the proceedings. To a large extent, it is a meritsbased inquiry relating to loss causation that is not ripe for resolution on class
certification. See Reply Mem. at 15 (arguing that “disclosure of the fraud and
announcement of regulatory action are inextricably intertwined (the regulatory
action constitutes a materialization of the risk caused by Defendants’ unethical
operation of Barclays LX) and therefore do not require disaggregation”); Tr. at
138:19-139:1 [Jeremy Lieberman, plaintiffs’ attorney] (“There has been testimony
regarding whether or not the investigations relate to the fraud, whether or not the
investigatory effects somehow relate to the fraud or is that a separate issue. We
don’t think so at all, your Honor. It can’t be a separate issue. If investors knew
during the [C]lass [P]eriod there was an exposure to this type of investigation, this
type of lawsuit, that would have been factored into the share price.”).
43
Barclays’ alleged misconduct related to LX or Barclays’ attempts to restore its
‘integrity.’”128
While defendants’ arguments suggest that the post-disclosure price
movement does not support a strong inference or provide compelling evidence of
price impact, they have not met their burden of proving lack of price impact. The
fact that other factors contributed to the price decline does not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the drop in the price of Barclays ADS was not
caused at least in part by the disclosure of the fraud at LX.129 Accordingly,
plaintiffs have established that they are entitled to rely on the Basic presumption,
and defendants have failed to rebut the applicability of that presumption.
C.
Individualized Damages Issues Will Not Predominate
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend held that a model for determining damages
128
Def. Opp. at 13.
129
See Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. at 280 (“Halliburton has not
demonstrated that uncertainty caused the entirety of Halliburton’s substantial price
decline.”); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2015 WL 5613150, at *7
(“Defendants’ attempt to demonstrate a lack of price impact merely marshals
evidence which suggests a price decline for an alternate reason, but does not
provide conclusive evidence that no link exists between the price decline and the
misrepresentation.”) (citing Aranaz, 302 F.R.D. at 672 (“Because Defendants have
the burden of showing an absence of price impact, they must show that price
impact is inconsistent with the results of their analysis. Thus, that an absence of
price impact is consistent with their analysis is insufficient.”) (emphasis in
original)).
44
must “measure damages resulting from the class’s asserted theory of damages.”130
Relying on Comcast, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not shown that damages
can be calculated on a class-wide basis.131 However, “Comcast does not mandate
that certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that damages are
capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”132
Plaintiffs intend to use an event study and the constant dollar method
to calculate damages. The proposed methodology fits their theory of the case and
individualized damages issues will not predominate.133 Defendants argue that
plaintiffs must demonstrate the mechanism by which confounding information can
be identified and disaggregated in order to determine the precise level of price
inflation.134 However, “any failure of the methodology to disaggregate the losses
purportedly attributable to disclosures about government enforcement activities
from those that Plaintiffs attribute to the challenged statements would not defeat
the class’s predominance because it would affect all class members in the same
130
Roach, 778 F.3d at 407 (interpreting Comcast narrowly).
131
Def. Opp. at 20-24.
132
Roach, 778 F.3d at 402.
133
See Carpenters, 310 F.R.D. at 99-100.
134
See Def. Opp. at 23-24.
45
manner.”135 Whether plaintiffs will be able to prove loss causation or damages are
questions that go to the merits and not to whether common issues predominate.136
D.
Class Period
Defendants contend that the Class Period should be defined to begin
no earlier than February 24, 2013. According to defendants, the April 2015 Order
held that only misstatements that were made after Barclays’ June 27, 2012
LIBOR-related settlement are material.137 Plaintiffs believe that Supreme Court
135
In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2015 WL 5613150, at *8
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Defendants raise additional
arguments that do not preclude class certification but may have to be addressed at a
later stage of this case. For example, they argue that because plaintiffs allege two
distinct schemes — that Barclays both (i) concealed the amount of aggressive highfrequency trading in LX and (ii) improperly over-routed client orders on LX —
plaintiffs’ damages framework must separately account for both. See Def. Opp. at
22.
136
See, e.g., In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig., 304 F.R.D. 397, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (stating that “nothing in Comcast requires an expert to perform his analyses
at the class certification stage”) (citing cases); Wallace, 302 F.R.D. at 318
(“Defendants’ arguments concerning the proper class period belong more properly
to the discussion of damages, not class certification. Individualized calculations of
damages do not generally defeat the predominance requirement. Presumably, if
plaintiff prevails, class members who purchased or sold at different times during
the class period will be entitled to significantly different recoveries. While
calculating the proper damages based on the date of purchase and sale may be
complicated, it does not demand excessive individual inquiry. Plaintiff’s proposed
determination of damages by event study appears to be a workable methodology of
determining damages on a class-wide basis that conforms to its theory of liability .
. . .”) (citations omitted); Dodona I, 296 F.R.D. at 270-71 (same). I have
considered and now reject defendants’ remaining arguments under Comcast.
137
See Def. Opp. at 25.
46
precedent holding that “proof [of materiality] is not a prerequisite to class
certification”138 precludes defendants’ line of attack.
District courts are “empowered to carve out any appropriate class”139
and a class should be defined to be consistent with the theory underlying plaintiffs’
allegations. Thus, were the proposed class inconsistent with the August 2015
Order as a matter of law, it would be appropriate to limit the class as suggested by
the defendants. However, at the time of the motion to dismiss, the parties did not
ask the Court to consider when statements became material, and I did not make any
finding regarding this issue.
In addition, I am satisfied that plaintiffs’ allegations are consistent
with material misrepresentations occurring prior to June 2012.140 While defendants
138
Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.
139
Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 269 F.R.D. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
140
See, e.g., Tr. 134:18-135:6 [Jeremy Lieberman, plaintiff’s attorney]
(“There is reference in the materiality section to the LIBOR scandal, but there is
reference generally to the integrity of the company, the integrity of the bank, and
integrity of its management, all of which are implicated, whether or not there was a
LIBOR settlement or not. We do allege, going back as early as 2009, that the SEC
was very concerned about dark pools, how they were being managed, how they
were being maintained, and the ability for fraud to occur. Your Honor, the
integrity of banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis, your Honor, to say that
any investor after the financial crisis would not be concerned about blatant illegal
activity which implicates large institutional investors, we think, your Honor, is
actually a frivolous defense.”).
47
will have the opportunity to require plaintiffs to prove materiality — including the
relevant time period — they have not shown that there is a reason to circumscribe
the Class Period now.
E.
Appointment of Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g)
Lead Plaintiffs have retained Pomerantz LLP to represent them and
the proposed Class in this matter. The Pomerantz firm has litigated securities fraud
cases under federal and state laws for seventy-five years, on behalf of institutional
and individual investors in both class and individual actions. Courts in this Circuit
have previously approved the Pomerantz firm as lead plaintiffs’ counsel in
securities class actions on a number of occasions.141 I have considered each of the
factors set forth in Rule 23(g) and am satisfied that the Pomerantz firm is qualified,
and, along with Lead Plaintiffs, will vigorously protect the interests of the Class.
Accordingly, I hereby appoint the Pomerantz firm as Class Counsel.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. The
141
See, e.g., Elstein v. Net1 UEPS Techs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 9100, 2014
WL 3687277, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014); Goldberger v. PXRE Grp., Ltd., No.
06 Civ. 3410, 2007 WL 980417, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007); In re Elan Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 865, 2002 WL 31720410, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2002) ;
In re Symbol Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 3923, 2006 WL 1120619, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006). See also In re Groupon, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ.
2450, 2012 WL 3779311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2012).
48
- Appearances For Plaintiffs:
For Defendants:
Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
Emma Gilmore, Esq.
Tamar A. Weinrib, Esq.
Pomerantz LLP
600 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016
(212) 661-1100
Jeffrey T. Scott, Esq.
David H. Braff, Esq.
Matthew A. Schwartz, Esq.
Andrew H. Reynard, Esq.
John J. Hughes, III, Esq.
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 558-4000
Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
Joshua B. Silverman, Esq.
Pomerantz LLP
Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 377-1181
50
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