Trustees Of The New York City District Council Of Carpenters Pension Fund et al v. Vintage Tile and Flooring, Inc. et al
OPINION & ORDER: For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby enters judgment against defendants. It is ordered that: 1. Vintage 2 shall furnish its books and records to the Funds, for the purposes of conducting an audit to determine contributio ns from the period November 25, 2008 to the present, and to pay any delinquent contributions determined as a result of the audit; 2. Vintage 2 shall pay the Funds damages of $9,856.43; 3. the Funds are awarded $16,045.00 in attorney's fees, $618.81 in costs, and interest consistent with the prime rate of Citibank plus 2% on any delinquent contributions discovered as a result of the audit. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 24 and to terminate this action. (As further set forth in this Order) (Signed by Judge Katherine B. Forrest on 6/18/2015) (lmb) Modified on 6/18/2015 (lmb).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK CITY
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS
PENSION FUND, WELFARE FUND, ANNUITY :
FUND, and APPRENTICESHIP,
JOURNEYMAN RETRAINING, EDUCATIONAL :
AND INDUSTRY FUND, and TRUSTEES OF
THE NEW YORK CITY CARPENTERS RELIEF :
AND CHARITY FUND,
VINTAGE TILE AND FLOORING, INC. and
VINTAGE FLOORING N TILE OF NY, INC.,
KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: June 18, 2015
OPINION & ORDER
On August 13, 2014, plaintiffs Trustees of the New York City District Council
of Carpenters Pension Fund, Welfare Fund, Annuity Fund, and Apprenticeship,
Journeyman Retraining, Educational and Industry Fund, and Trustees of the New
York City Carpenters Relief and Charity Fund (collectively, “the Funds” or
“plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Vintage Flooring and Tile, Inc.
(“Vintage 1”)1 and Vintage Flooring N Tile of NY, Inc. (“Vintage 2”) (collectively,
“defendants”), alleging failure to pay required contributions to a group of employee
benefit plans pursuant to section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and section 301
Vintage 1 was initially incorrectly named as “Vintage Tile and Flooring, Inc.” (ECF No. 12 at 2.)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1974 (“LMRA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) The Funds also alleged that Vintage 2 is the alter
ego, successor, or predecessor of Vintage 1, or that Vintage 1 and Vintage 2
constitute a single employer, and that therefore Vintage 2 should be held jointly and
severally liable with Vintage 1 for a previous judgment entered against Vintage 1
and sanctions entered against Vintage 1 for frustrating the enforcement of that
judgment. (See Compl. ¶¶ 20, 23-27.)
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint (the “Complaint”) on
December 18, 2014. (ECF No. 15 (“Am. Compl.”).) The Funds served the summons
and first amended complaint on Vintage 1 and 2 by personal service, at the office of
the New York State Secretary of State, on December 24, 2014. (ECF Nos. 19-20.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)(i), the latest deadline for
defendants to answer plaintiff’s complaint was January 14, 2015.
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must follow a
two-step process before entering default judgment. First, under Rule 55(a), the
Clerk of Court must determine that the party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to “plead or otherwise defend” itself, and then
enter that party's default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, under Rule 55(b)(2),
the party seeking affirmative relief must apply to the court for a default judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
On February 13, 2015, the Funds obtained certificates of default against
defendants. (ECF No. 21.) On April 24, 2015, the Funds filed a motion for default
judgment, which the Funds served on defendants on April 24, 2015. (ECF Nos. 2428.) On April 27, 2015, the Court ordered defendants to appear and show cause
why default judgment should not enter against them at a hearing on May 26, 2015.
(ECF No. 29.) The Funds served this order, and again served the default judgment
materials on defendants on April 29, 2015. (ECF No. 30.) Defendants did not
appear at the May 26, 2015 hearing, and have not appeared or sought to defend
themselves at any time during this litigation.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby enters default judgment
Before entering a default judgment, the Court must review the complaint to
determine whether plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. See, e.g., City of New
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011); Young-Flynn v.
Wright, No. 05 Civ. 1488, 2007 WL 241332, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007) (“A
default judgment is inappropriate where a plaintiff has failed to state a cause of
action against the allegedly defaulting defendant, regardless of whether the
defendant filed a prompt response, or any response at all.”).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the
complaint support defendants’ liability under ERISA § 515 and Vintage 2’s liability
for Vintage 1’s obligations under the previous judgment.
In this case, the Funds assert two claims for relief: (1) defendants’ violation of
ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, and (2) Vintage 2’s joint and several liability for a
separate judgment that plaintiffs previously obtained against Vintage 1. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 9-27.)
ERISA § 515
ERISA § 515 provides that “every employer who is obligated to make
contributions to a multiemployer plan . . . under the terms of a collectively
bargained agreement shall . . . make such contributions in accordance with the
terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 1145. Upon a
finding that an employer has violated § 515, the employer is liable for damages
under ERISA § 502(g)(2). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).
a. Liability of Vintage 1
Here, the Funds have pleaded sufficient facts to establish Vintage 1’s liability
for a violation of ERISA § 515. First, the Funds allege that Vintage 1 entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) with the District Council of New York
City and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO (the “Union”) on November 24, 2008. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Declaration of
Luke Powers, ECF No. 26 (“Powers Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 & ex. A.) Second, the Funds
allege that Vintage 1 was required to make “specified hourly contributions to the
Funds in connection with all work performed in the trade and geographical
jurisdiction of the Union,” and to furnish its books and payroll records upon request
in order to conduct an audit and ensure compliance with required benefit fund
contributions. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) Lastly, the Funds allege that Vintage 1
failed to pay its required contributions. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20.) Accordingly, the
Funds have stated a valid claim for relief under ERISA § 515 against Vintage 1.
b. Liability of Vintage 2
The Funds further assert that Vintage 2 is jointly and severally liable for
Vintage 1’s obligations under the CBA because Vintage 2 is the alter ego, successor,
or predecessor of Vintage 1, or because Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 are a “single
employer” within the meaning of ERISA. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20; ECF No. 27 (“Pls.’s
Mem.”) at 5.)
Alter Ego Status
“The purpose of the alter ego doctrine in the ERISA context is to prevent an
employer from evading its obligations under the labor laws ‘through a sham
transaction or technical change in operations.’” Ret. Plan of UNITE HERE Nat’l
Ret. Fund v. Kombassan Holding A.S. (“UNITE HERE”), 629 F.3d 282, 288 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting Newspaper Guild of N.Y. v. NLRB, 261 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2001)).
“Determining that an entity is an alter ego ‘signifies that, for all relevant purposes,
the non-signatory is legally equivalent to the signatory and is itself a party to the
[collective bargaining agreement].’” Id. (quoting Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Custom Air Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir.
“The test of alter ego status is flexible, allowing courts to weigh the
circumstances of the individual case,” while assessing the following key factors:
“whether the two enterprises have substantially identical management, business
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision and ownership.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trs. of the New City Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. Integrated Structures Corp., 595 Fed. App’x 15, 18 (2d
Cir. 2014) (noting that whether two entities shared telephone numbers and
equipment or kept their finances separate were relevant considerations in
determining alter ego status). Moreover, “‘[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine is
primarily applied in situations involving successor companies, where the successor
is merely a disguised continuance of the old employer, it also applies to situations
where the companies are parallel companies.’” UNITE HERE, 629 F.3d at 288
(quoting Mass. Carpenters Cent. Collection Agency v. Belmont Concrete Corp., 139
F.3d 304, 307 (1st Cir. 1998)). “No one factor is controlling, and all need not be
present to support a finding of alter ego status.” N.Y. Dist. Council of Carpenters
Pension Fund v. Perimeter Interiors, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(quoting C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 354
(1st Cir. 1990)).
Here, the Funds allege that “Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 had substantially
identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers,
supervision and/or ownership.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) Further, the Funds assert that,
“[a]t relevant times,” Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 employed the same carpenters,
operated out of the same premises, shared the same phone number, had the
identical business purpose of the installation of tile and other flooring, and
“intermingled” their financial books and records. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-20;
Declaration of Michael Isaac, ECF No. 25 (“Isaac Decl.”) ¶¶ 8, 11-12 & exs. C-D.)
Additionally, the Funds have submitted a compliance form submitted by Vintage 1
to the Union and a section of the website buzzfile.com identifying Amanda
DiGiuseppe as the owner of both Vintage 1 and Vintage 2, thereby impliedly
alleging common management. (Isaac Decl. ¶ 10, exs. D, F.) The Funds have thus
sufficiently alleged that Vintage 2 is an alter ego of Vintage 1, and therefore the
Funds have sufficiently alleged that Vintage 2 is liable under ERISA § 515.
Single Employer Status
“A collective bargaining agreement binding on one employer may be enforced
against a non-signatory employer if (1) the two employers constitute a ‘single
employer’ and (2) the employees of the companies constitute a single appropriate
bargaining unit.” United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers
Local No. 210, AFL-CIO v. A.W. Farrell & Son, Inc., 547 Fed. App’x 17, 19 (2d Cir.
2013). “Whether two entities constitute a ‘single employer’ is determined by four
factors enumerated by the Supreme Court: (1) interrelation of operations, (2)
common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common
ownership.” Id. The Second Circuit has “added two additional factors: (5) ‘the use
of common office facilities and equipment,’ and (6) ‘family connections between or
among the various enterprises.’” Id. (quoting Lihli Fashions Corp. v. NLRB, 80 F.3d
743, 747 (2d Cir. 1996)). No single factor is dispositive and they need not all be
present. Id. Single employer status ultimately depends on the particular facts of
the case, and “is characterized by absence of an ‘arm's length relationship found
among unintegrated companies.’” Lihli, 80 F.3d at 747 (quoting NLRB v. Al Bryant,
Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 551 (3d Cir. 1983)).
However, a finding that separate entities constitute a “single employer” is
“not enough to bind all the separate companies to the collective bargaining
agreements of any one of the companies.” Id. Rather, it must also be shown that
they “represent an appropriate employee bargaining unit.” Id. Relevant
considerations in determining whether the defendants’ employees constitute a
“bargaining unit” include “a community of interests among the relevant employees,
. . . and factors such as bargaining history, operational integration, geographic
proximity, common supervision, similarity in job function and degree of employee
interchange.” Brown v. Sandimo Materials, 250 F.3d 120, 128 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the Funds allege that “[t]here was never an arm’s length relationship
between Vintage 1 and 2.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Further, as explained above, the
Funds allege that Vintage 1 and 2 employed the same carpenters, operated the
same kind of business out of the same premises, shared a phone number, had
intermingled books and records, and had the same owner. The Funds have thus
alleged common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control of
labor relations, and common ownership, and therefore have sufficiently alleged that
the separate companies constitute a single employer. Further, by alleging that
Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 were operationally integrated, operated out of the same
geographic location, were under common supervision, and shared employees and
lines of business, the Funds have adequately alleged that Vintage 1 and Vintage 2
represented an appropriate employee bargaining unit. Thus, the Funds have
sufficiently alleged single employer status, thereby providing another independent
basis for Vintage 2’s liability for violations of ERISA § 515.2
Vintage 2’s Liability for the Prior Judgment Against Vintage 1
The Funds allege that on April 20, 2011, in an action filed in the Southern
District of New York (No. 11 Civ. 1316), they obtained a judgment against Vintage 1
for $4,047.51 in damages as well as an order for Vintage 1 to produce all books and
records necessary to conduct a payroll audit. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Isaac Decl. ¶¶ 1415 & ex. G.) On July 18, 2012, the court issued an order against Vintage 1 that
sanctioned Vintage 1 for failing to comply with the April 20, 2011 judgment and
awarded plaintiffs $7,680.00 in fees and $69.31 in costs, and ordered Vintage 1 to
provide the necessary records within fourteen days and pay $50.00 per day until it
had so complied, or if it failed to do so within 30 days of the order, to pay $300.00
per day thereafter until it had so complied. (Am. Compl ¶ 24; Isaac Decl. ¶ 16, ex.
The Funds now seek a declaration that Vintage 2 is jointly and severally
liable for Vintage 1’s obligations to the Funds under this separate judgment. As set
forth above, the Funds have pleaded sufficient facts to establish that Vintage 2 is
Vintage 1’s alter ego and/or single employer. Therefore, Vintage 2 may be held
jointly and severally liable for Vintage 1’s obligations under the previous judgment.
As the Funds have sufficiently alleged that Vintage 2 is liable for violations of ERISA § 515 under
both alter ego and single employer theories of liability, the Court need not address the Funds’
allegations that Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 are successors and/or predecessors of each other.
The Funds now request that the Court: (1) order Vintage 2 to produce its
books and payroll records to the Funds for the purpose of conducting an audit and
ensuring compliance in making required contributions under the CBA; (2) order
Vintage 2 to pay any delinquent contributions determined as a result of the audit;
(3) award the Funds their attorney’s fees and the costs they incurred in prosecuting
this action; (4) in connection with the prior judgment against Vintage 1, award the
Funds $262,156.43 in damages from Vintage 2 plus $300.00 per day from the date
of the amended complaint through the date of the judgment in this action.3 (Am.
Compl.; Isaac Decl. ¶ 34.) The Court grants the Funds’ request for injunctive relief
and damages in its entirety.
A court may award equitable relief as appropriate in an ERISA action
brought by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a benefit plan to enforce rights under
ERISA § 115. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). Because “injunctive relief does not follow
automatically upon a finding of statutory violations,” a plaintiff in an ERISA action
who seeks injunctive relief on a motion for default judgment “must also show
irreparable harm and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” Local Union No.
40 of the Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Car-Wi
Constr., No. 12CV4854–LTS–MHD, 2015 WL 690811, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,
While the Court acknowledges that plaintiffs initially requested liquidated damages of 20% of the
principal amount of the delinquency (Am. Compl.), the Court need not address this request because
it was not included in plaintiffs’ default judgment submissions (see Pls.’s Mem. 13-17; Isaac Decl. ¶
2015) (quotations omitted). Courts regularly grant requests requiring defendants in
ERISA actions to permit and cooperate with audits of their books and records for
the purpose of determining what those defendants owe on their collective
bargaining agreement obligations. Id. at *23 (collecting cases).
Here, the Funds allege that under the CBA, Vintage 1 was required to
furnish its books and payroll records when requested by the Funds for the purpose
of conducting an audit and ensure compliance with required contributions (Am.
Compl. ¶ 13; Powers Decl. ¶ 5 & ex. A art. XI), and, as explained above, the Funds
have sufficiently alleged that Vintage 2 is Vintage 1’s alter ego and/or that Vintage
1 and Vintage 2 are a single employer, such that Vintage 2 is bound by the CBA.
The Funds have thus met the applicable standards for the granting of their
requested injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders Vintage 2 to furnish its books
and records to the Funds, for the purposes of conducting an audit to determine
contributions from the period November 25, 2008 to the present, and to pay any
delinquent contributions determined as a result of the audit.
If an employer is found to have violated ERISA § 515, they are liable for
interest on the unpaid contributions. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B). If there is a
collective bargaining agreement, interest on the unpaid contributions is determined
“by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate prescribed under [26
U.S.C. § 6621].” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). Here, the Funds allege that the CBA set
an interest rate at the prime rate of Citibank plus 2%. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Thus,
the Court awards interest, consistent with this rate, on any delinquent
contributions discovered as a result of the audit.
If an employer is found to have violated ERISA § 515, a district court may
award a plaintiff “reasonable attorney's fees.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). A district
court has “considerable discretion” in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee
award. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522
F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). A reasonable fee award should be based on a
“reasonable hourly rate,” which is “the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,”
as determined based on a holistic assessment of all of the circumstances at issue in
the case. Id. at 190. A reasonable hourly rate is one in line with rates “prevailing
. . . in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill
expertise and reputation.” McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the
NYSA–ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). The relevant community is “the district in
which the reviewing court sits.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
226, 232 (2d Cir. 1987). In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the court may
rely on its knowledge of hourly rates at private firms. See Miele v. N.Y. State
Teamster Conf. Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987). An
applicant for an award of attorney's fees generally must submit “contemporaneous
time records” that “specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the
nature of the work done.” N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children. Inc. v. Carey, 711
F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983).
Here, the Funds seek $16,045.00 in attorney’s fees for 75.80 hours of work by
attorneys and paralegals, at the rate of $225.00 per hour for work performed by
attorneys, and $90.00 per hour for work performed by paralegals through February
28, 2014, and $100.00 per hour for work performed by paralegals thereafter. The
Funds have also provided a breakdown of the tasks and distribution of hours among
attorneys and paralegals, as well as the dates on which they were performed. (See
Isaac Decl. ex. L.) Based on the Court’s knowledge of legal practice and billing rates
in this district, the Court finds that plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is
reasonable, and adequately supported by documentation. Accordingly, the Court
awards plaintiff $16,045.00 in attorney’s fees.
If an employer is found to have violated ERISA § 515, a court may award
plaintiff “costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). The Funds seek
reimbursement of $618.81 in costs, consisting of filing and service fees. (Pls.’s Mem.
at 17; Isaac Decl. at ¶ 32 & ex. L.) The Court finds that these requests are
reasonable, and awards plaintiff $618.81 in costs.
Damages Against Vintage 2 Consistent with Prior Judgment
While a party's default is considered a concession of all well-pleaded
allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages. Cement &
Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors, Inc.,
699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.2012). “There must be an evidentiary basis for the
damages sought,” id., and so a court must “conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty,” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc.
v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1997). To determine the damages owed,
courts often conduct an inquest hearing, but such a hearing is not required. See
Cement, 699 F.3d at 234 (“Rule 55(b)(2) and relevant case law give district judges
much discretion in determining when it is ‘necessary and proper’ to hold an inquest
on damages.” (quoting Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d
Cir.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the Court has not held an
inquest hearing, and it relies solely on the papers provided by plaintiff.
The Funds seek the initial judgment amount of $4,047.51, the subsequent
award of $7,749.31 in attorneys’ fees and costs, plus sanctions in the amount of
$50.00 per day for the 30 days following July 18, 2012, plus $300 per day for all of
the following days of noncompliance, less the $1,940.39 that the Funds have
recovered from Vintage 1. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 26; Isaac Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, exs. G, H.)
In total, the Funds seek $252,300 in sanctions for the 866 days from Vintage 1’s
August 3, 2012 deadline to produce all books and records necessary to conduct a
payroll audit (which was imposed by the court’s July 18, 2012 order in the prior
action), through December 18, 2014, the date the Funds filed the Complaint in this
action, plus $300.00 per day from that date through the date of judgment in this
action. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27; Isaac Decl. ¶ 19 & ex. H.) The Funds therefore seek
damages of $262,156.43, plus $300.00 per day from the date of the amended
complaint through the date of judgment as against Vintage 2.
The Court declines to award the Funds damages based on the sanctions
imposed in the July 18, 2012 order in the prior action. An award of over $252,300
in sanctions against Vintage 2 for Vintage 1’s frustration of a $4,047.51 judgment is
excessive, particularly in light of the fact that Vintage 2 has not, until this Opinion
& Order, been found liable for that judgment. Vintage 2 must first be given an
opportunity to fulfill its obligations before this Court will effectively sanction it.
The Funds’ other requests for damages, which are based on the initial
judgment amount of $4,047.51, the subsequent award of $7,749.31 in attorneys’ fees
and costs, less the $1,940.39 that the Funds have recovered from Vintage 1, are
granted. As explained above, the Funds have sufficiently alleged that Vintage 2 is
Vintage 1’s alter ego and/or Vintage 1 and Vintage 2 constitute a single employer,
the Court hereby grants these request for damages as against Vintage 2. Vintage 2
is therefore liable to the Funds for $9,856.43.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby enters judgment against
defendants. It is ordered that:
1. Vintage 2 shall furnish its books and records to the Funds, for the
purposes of conducting an audit to determine contributions from the
period November 25, 2008 to the present, and to pay any delinquent
contributions determined as a result of the audit;
2. Vintage 2 shall pay the Funds damages of $9,856.43;
3. the Funds are awarded $16,045.00 in attorney’s fees, $618.81 in costs, and
interest consistent with the prime rate of Citibank plus 2% on any
delinquent contributions discovered as a result of the audit.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 24 and to
terminate this action.
New York, New York
June 18, 2015
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
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