Santiago v. Commissioner of NewYork City Corrections et al

Filing 32

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re: 23 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Frances, Joseph Ponte. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the defendants' motion for summary Judgment be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a), and 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from this date to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. (As further set forth in this Report and Recommendation.) Objections to R&R due by 3/7/2016 (Signed by Magistrate Judge James C. Francis on 2/18/2016) Copies Sent By Chambers. (kko)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
f,PIFANlO SANTIAGO,

14 Civ.

Plaintiff,

6473

(PAE)

(JCF)

REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

- against -

-·-----1
·--·---·

;I U''D. S 'SD~'v
j
0
- _,,.l_"j _._

COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK CITY
CORRECTIONS JOSEPH PONTE and
CAPTAIN FRANCIS,

I

I DOCUMENT

I

ELEClTO:\IC1\LLY FILED
[IDOC:
.I
-------

Defendants.

; i ~·,"
•

/I' -

rc•r 'crJ·. z_ / _L_u_
· <J
- - . - -- __ ,-=:. ______·_: ____ ,___ :.:.-:::: i

l'F
-·

',

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, U.S.D.J.:

i

, __ , __ ,,_

~--

•

Epifania Santiago is a former inmate at the George Motchan
Detention Center ("GMDC") on Rikers Island.
.Q1:Q

He brings this action

se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Commissioner Joseph Ponte of

the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC"), and DOC Captain
Marline francis-Allahar,

claiming that Captain Francis-Allahar' s

refusal to honor his medical permit for a second mattress violated
his

constitutional

rights

under

the

Eighth

Amendment.

The

defendants now move for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
below,

For the reasons set forth

I recommend that the motion be granted.

Background
Mr. Santiago was an inmate at Rikers Island from August 2012
through October 2013.
Material

(Defendants'

Local l\ule 56.1 Statement of

Facts Not in Dispute dated August

St."), i 1).

31,

2015

("Def.

Ci6. l

On August 7, 2012, while housed at GMDC, he sustained

an injury to his ribs.

(Def.

56.l St.,

5151 2,7).

That same day,

Mr. Santiago was treated by a physician's assistant ("PA"), Donald
McGibbon.

PA McGibbon prescribed ibuprofen

(Def. 56.1 St., i 11)
1

and muscle relaxers for the pain, and provided him with a medical
permit for a second mattress.

(Def. 56.1 St., ¶¶ 17-18).

On June

26, 2013, Captain Francis-Allahar directed that the plaintiff’s
second mattress be removed, telling him that DOC does not honor
permits for multiple mattresses.
Mr.

Santiago

seeks

(Def. 56.1 St., ¶¶ 35, 39).

compensation

of

$500,000

for

the

“negligence of the department for not honoring medical orders
. . . and as a results [sic] of sleepless night [sic] as well as
being in pain.” (Complaint, § V). The defendants move for summary
judgment

on

the

grounds

that

Mr.

Santiago’s

injury

was

not

sufficiently serious to serve as the basis for a constitutional
claim, that Captain Francis-Allahar was unaware that removing the
second mattress posed any risk to Mr. Santiago’s health or safety,
and that Commissioner Ponte was not personally involved in the
conduct at issue.

(Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-16).
Discussion
A.

Standard of Review for a Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court
will grant summary judgment if “the movant shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); accord

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-286 (2d Cir. 2002).
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying “the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
2

323.

The opposing party then must cite specific parts of the

record, such as depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations,
and admissions, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for
trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

Only facts that could affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing substantive law are deemed “material.”

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Holtz v. Rockefeller
& Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001). Additionally, the
court’s review of the record is limited to facts that would be
admissible at trial.
Cir. 1997).

See Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d

Where the non-moving party fails to make “a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial,” summary judgment must be granted.

Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322.
In assessing the record to determine whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial, the court must view all
facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.”); accord Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d
Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, the court must inquire whether “there is

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party,” and may grant summary judgment
where the non-movant’s evidence is “merely colorable” or not
significantly probative.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal
3

citations omitted).

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a

party “may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the
true nature of the facts”, as “conclusory allegations or denials
. . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact
where none would otherwise exist.”

Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159,

166 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Fletcher v.
Atex, 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
(1986) (non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).

However,

“[a]ssessments of credibility and choices between conflicting
versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court
on summary judgment.”

Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549,

553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011
(2d Cir. 1996)).
In the instant case, I am mindful that Mr. Santiago is a pro
se litigant whose submissions must be construed to “raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.”

Triestman v. Federal

Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 471 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon
v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Nevertheless, this

liberality “does not relieve [the] plaintiff of his duty to meet
the

requirements

judgment.”

necessary

to

defeat

a

motion

for

summary

Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d

Cir. 2003) (quoting Jorgenson v. Epic/Sony Records, No. 00 Civ.
9181, 2002 WL 31119377, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002)).

4

B.

Liability
1.

It

is

Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
well-established

that

in

order

to

state

a

valid

conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must satisfy a twopart test by demonstrating that: (1) objectively, the deprivation
he suffered denied him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” and (2) subjectively, the defendants acted

with

“deliberate indifference,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303
(1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337-347 (1981)), in
that they “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety,” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.
1994) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
More recently, in Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2d Cir.
2013), the Second Circuit overturned a district court’s dismissal
of a prisoner’s conditions-of-confinement claim based in part on
the condition of the prisoners’ mattress.

In doing so, the court

held that the adequacy of a mattress may, alone or in combination
with other factors, constitute a condition that satisfies the
objective prong of the conditions-of-confinement test if it causes
or threatens to cause sufficiently serious harm.

Id. at 126-27.

Specifically, to meet the required standard, a plaintiff must
plead: (1) he had a medical condition requiring a non-standard bed
to protect against serious damage to his future health; (2) he made
his condition known to the prison officials; (3) he requested a
non-standard bed to accommodate the condition; and (4) his request
was denied by an official who knew of and disregarded an excessive
5

risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.

See, e.g., Youmans v.

Schriro, No. 12 Civ. 3690, 2013 WL 6284422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
2013).
In this case, even if Mr. Santiago’s medical condition were
sufficiently serious, he has failed to demonstrate that his request
to keep his second mattress was denied by an official who acted
with deliberate indifference.
To prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must “show that
the official was subjectively aware of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 829. A prison official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and [s]he must also draw the inference.”

Id.

at 837.
Here, it is not reasonable to infer that Captain FrancisAllahar acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind to
constitute

deliberate

indifference.

Although

Mr.

Santiago

presented her with his medical permit for a second mattress, there
is no evidence that Captain Francis-Allahar was actually aware of
the severity of the underlying condition.
First, the medical permit contains no details as to the nature
or seriousness of Mr. Santiago’s injury.

Instead, the permit

merely reads “Please allow patient double mattress/pillow for
medical reason[.]”

(Def. 56.1 St., ¶ 38).
6

As this is the only

information contained in the document, and the plaintiff does not
allege that he provided more detail, Captain Francis-Allahar could
not have been aware of any excessive risk to Mr. Santiago’s health
or safety.

See Waul v. Cunningham, No. 9:05 CV 24, 2009 WL

2405898, at *8, 11 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) (finding no deliberate
indifference by prison official who refused to honor prisoner’s
vague medical permit).
Further, the staleness of the permit also militates against a
finding that Captain Francis-Allahar should have inferred that Mr.
Santiago’s underlying condition was severe.

When Captain Francis-

Allahar confiscated the mattress on June 26, 2013, the permit was
nearly 10 months old.
Based on the lack of specificity of the permit, coupled with
its age, it is unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Santiago’s second
mattress

was

removed

by

an

official

who

was

deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs.
2.

Individual Liability

In order to state a claim of individual liability under §
1983,

a

“plaintiff

must

allege

sufficient

facts to demonstrate the defendants were personally or directly
involved in the violation, that is, that there was ‘personal
participation by one who ha[d] knowledge of the facts that rendered
the conduct illegal.’”

Harris v. Westchester County Department of

Corrections, No. 06 Civ. 2011, 2008 WL 953616, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
April 2, 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Provost v. City of
Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)).
7

Personal involvement

in a § 1983 violation may be shown by evidence that: (1) the
official participated directly in the violation; (2) the official,
after learning of the violation, failed to remedy the wrong; (3)
the

official

created

a

policy

or

custom

under

which

unconstitutional practices occurred; (4) the official was grossly
negligent in supervising subordinates who caused the unlawful
condition or event; or (5) the official exhibited deliberate
indifference by failing to act on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Morgan v. Ward, No. 14 Civ.

7921, 2016 WL 427913, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2016) (citing Colon
v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Lloyd v.
City of New York, 43 F. Supp. 3d 254, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Ramey v.
Perez, No. 13 Civ. 17, 2014 WL 407097, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2014).
Mr. Santiago fails to establish individual liability on the
part of Commissioner Ponte.
facts

to

establish

The plaintiff does not provide any

Commissioner

Ponte’s

knowing

and

personal

involvement in the refusal to honor the permit for a second
mattress.

Rather, he bases his claim on a “chain-of-command”

theory in which he assumes Captain Francis-Allahar was following
orders “from the top.”

(Def. 56.1 St. ¶¶ 67-69).

Such a chain-of-

command theory is not a permissible basis upon which to premise
individual liability.

See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144

(2d Cir. 2003) (citing Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d
Cir. 1985) (stating that “proof of ‘linkage in the prison chain of
command’ is insufficient” to establish individual liability)).
8

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,

I recommend that the defendants'

motion for summary JUdgment be granted.
636(b) (1)

and Rules

Civil Procedure,
this

date

to

72,

6(a),

and

6(d)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
of the

Federal

the parties shall have fourteen
file

written

objections

to

(14)

this

§

Rules of
days from

Report

and

Recommendation.

Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of

thee

extra

Court,

with

copies

delivered

to

the

chambers

of

the

Honorable Paul A. Engelmayer, Room 2201, 40 Foley Square, New York,
New York 10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned, Room 1960,
500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007.

Failure to file timely

obJections will preclude appellate review.

Respectfully submitted,

~~.·£~Jo]]!__

~ ~~~~~D

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: New York, New York
February 18, 2016
Copies transmitted this date:
Epifania Santiago
14-A-3547
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 999
Coxsackie, NY 12051-0999
(via U.S. Mail)
Agnetha Jacob, Esq.
New York City Law Department
100 Church St.
New York, NY 10007
(via ECF)

9