Walsh v. The City Of New York , et al
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate the motion. [Dkt No. 38] (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein on 6/30/2016) (cf)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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'ICA"Y FILED
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MARTIN WALSH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND OPINION
DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
-againstCITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL,
14 Civ. 7108 (AKH)
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Martin Walsh filed this lawsuit against Defendants Lieutenant Jason
Lunsford, Officer Michael Clark, and Sergeant Catherine Roach, alleging claims for false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to his complaint, on
December 31, 2013, Walsh was working as a security guard at the Hilton Hotel, assigned to
prevent members of the public from entering the hotel through an e)(it-only door. Retired police
officer David Vadala tried to enter through the door that Walsh was guarding and instigated a
physical confrontation when blocked. Vadala was ultimately subdued by a number of police
officers and arrested at the scene. Walsh went to the Eighteenth Precinct to file a complaint, as
instructed by Defendant Lunsford. The defendants pressured Walsh to drop his complaint
against Vadala, and then arrested him when he refused. The defendants now move for summary
judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims fail as a matter oflaw. For the reasons stated below, the
defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
I.
False Arrest
The defendants argue that the false arrest claim fails because there was probable
cause for plaintiff's arrest based on a cross-complaint from David Vadala. For a claim of false
arrest under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants, acting under color of state
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law, (1) "intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,
(3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
privileged." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Broughton v. State of New York, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93 (N.Y. 1975); see also llygh v. Jacobs, 961
F .2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1992). "The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification
and 'is a complete defense to an action for false arrest."' Weyant v. Okst, 101F.3d845, 852 (2d
Cir. 1996) (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). Probable cause
exists "when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
committed by the person to be arrested." Singer, 63 F.3d at 118.
The defendants contend that Vadala told the police that Walsh assaulted him, and
pointed to the visible injuries that he had on his face. And, they argue that this citizen complaint
established probable cause, because "a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he
received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness, who it
seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth." Miloslavsky v. AES Eng'g Soc., Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993). And, they argue that the
subjective motivation of the defendants is irrelevant, because, "under both New York and federal
law, summary judgment dismissing a plaintiffs false arrest claim is appropriate if the undisputed
facts indicate that the arresting officer's probable cause determination was objectively
reasonable." Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
However, while it is true that "[p ]robable cause will generally be found to exist
when an officer is advised of a crime by a victim or an eyewitness," Wahhab v. City of New
York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added), "under some circumstances,
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a police officer's awareness of the facts supporting a defense can eliminate probable cause,"
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2003). While an officer has no obligation to
investigate exculpatory defenses, an officer also cannot "deliberately disregard facts known to
him which establish justification." Id. The defendants argue that Vadala's complaint gave them
an objectively reasonable basis to arrest Walsh, ignoring that there are issues of material fact as
to what the defendants knew at the time of Walsh's arrest, and whether the defendants
deliberately disregarded exculpatory information. Wahhab, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 287 ("Where
there is no dispute as to the knowledge of the officers, whether probable cause existed may be
determined as a matter oflaw." (emphasis added)). The court cannot determine that probable
cause existed as a matter of law when there are factual questions about the knowledge of the
individual defendants that might render the arrest objectively unreasonable.
II.
Malicious Prosecution
The defendants similarly argue that the plaintiff's malicious prosecution must fail.
To establish a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, a plaintiff first must prove the
elements of malicious prosecution under New York law, "l) that the defendant initiated a
prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to believe the
proceeding could succeed, (3) that the defendant acted with malice, and (4) that the prosecution
was terminated in the plaintiffs favor," Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 417
(2d Cir. 1999), "and then show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated after legal
proceedings were initiated," Little v. City of New York, 487 F. Supp. 2d 426, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). Defendants argue that they did not initiate the prosecution against Walsh, and that there
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is no indication that they acted with malice. 1 But, there are issues of material fact that prevent
this court from finding that either element is lacking as a matter of law.
The defendants contend that they cannot be said to have initiated the prosecution,
because "the chain of causation between a police officer's unlawful arrest and a subsequent
conviction and incarceration is broken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment" by
the prosecutor. Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). But in malicious
prosecution actions "alleging that a police officer provided false information to a prosecutor,
what prosecutors do subsequently has no effect whatsoever on the police officer's initial,
potentially tortious behavior." Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 63 (2d Cir. 2010).
Here, there is evidence from which a jury could find that the defendants
intentionally furnished false information about the plaintiffs conduct to prompt a criminal
prosecution. Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F .3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he chain of causation
need not be considered broken if [a defendant government agent] deceived the subsequent
decision maker or could reasonably foresee that his misconduct [would] contribute to an
independent decision that results in a deprivation ofliberty."); Little, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 440
("[A]n officer will not be held liable for malicious prosecution unless there is evidence that he
misled the prosecuting attorney." (emphasis added)). There is evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the defendants were directly involved in the decision to arrest and file charges
against the plaintiff. Though their signatures were not on the formal charging document as the
complaint was sworn out by a different officer, Officer Jhonny Milfort, the plaintiffs account, if
believed by a jury, provides evidence that the defendants reasonably foresaw and intended that
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The defendants also argue that there was probable cause, and thus plaintiff cannot establish the second element of a
malicious prosecution claim. But, as discussed above, there are material issues of fact regarding the existence of
probable cause.
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false information would induce a prosecution. And the same evidence would allow a jury to
conclude that the defendants acted with malice, for a retaliatory purpose. See Lowth v. Town of
Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[M]alice does not have to be actual spite or
hatred, but means only that the defendant must have commenced the criminal proceeding due to
a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
III.
Qualified Immunity
Nor arc these defendants entitled to qualified immunity. "A defendant official is
entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the defendant's actions did not violate clearly established
law, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his actions did not
violate such law." Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). But "[t]hc right not to be
arrested without probable cause is a clearly established right." Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94,102
(2d Cir. 1997). If the plaintiffs evidence is believed by a jury, then the defendants' actions were
in violation of a clearly established right, nor could they reasonably have believed otherwise, and
thus the defendants' motion for summary judgment cannot be granted. Ford, 237 F.3d at 162
("For a defendant to secure summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, he must
show that no reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
could conclude that the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law.").
IV.
Dismissal of Michael Clark
The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the involvement of Defendant Michael
Clark. According to the plaintiffs account of events, Clark explicitly asked him to drop the
charges and then, after his arrest, facilitated a phone call with the plaintiffs boss to add further
pressure. A jury could decide that this personal involvement shows that Clark was involved in
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the plan and actions of the other defendants. See Little, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 438 ("A police officer
can only be held liable for a false arrest that occurs outside his presence if he 'had reason to
know' that such a false arrest was likely to occur." (quoting Escalera v. Lunn. 361 F.3d 737, 748
n.4 (2d Cir. 2004))).
V.
Section 1983 Conspiracy Count
Defendants finally argue that the section 1983 conspiracy claim cannot survive
summary judgment. ''To prove a section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show: (1) an
agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to
act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that
goal causing damages." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
Defendants first argue that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine means that
officers of a single municipal entity are legally incapable of conspiring together. Leaving open
whether the doctrine is applicable to section 1983 conspiracy claims, "courts have recognized an
exception to this doctrine when the defendants 'were motivated by [an] independent personal
stake in achieving the corporation's objective."' Alvarez v. City of New York, No. 11 CIV. 5464
LAK, 2012 WL 6212612, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (quoting Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d
95, 99 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2008)). If the plaintiffs account is believed by a jury, then the defendants
were not coordinating to implement official policy, but rather acting in concert to exact
retaliation that was personal, rather than official, in nature. The defendants also argue that the
section 1983 conspiracy claim is not supported by evidence, but rests instead on purely
conclusory allegations. The jury could conclude that the plaintiffs account of his arrest provides
sufficient circumstantial evidence of coordination to prove a "meeting of the minds" regarding
the retaliatory arrest of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.
1994) ('[C]onspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations that can hardly ever be
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