Coleman v. ADA Perez
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, Coleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. In addition, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Coleman has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a feder al right, and appellate review is therefore not warranted. See Love v. McCray, 413 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court also finds, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The Clerk of Court is requested to terminate this case. So ordered. Re: 15 Report and Recommendation. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 3/23/2016) (rjm)
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
·-·
· DATE F-IL-E...::::..D-:
M_A_R_2__-...Z-01-6
3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Nathan Coleman,
Petitioner,
14-cv-7201 (AJN) (KNF)
-vMEMORANDUM &
ORDER
ADA Perez,
Respondent.
ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:
Before the Court are prose Petitioner Nathan Coleman's objections to a report and
recommendation (the "R & R") issued by the Honorable Kevin Fox, United States Magistrate
Judge, recommending that Coleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 be denied. See Dkt. No. 15. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the R & R in its
entirety and therefore denies Coleman's petition.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts as stated in the R & R. Briefly, in October
2008, Coleman shot his brother, Dwan Williams, in the leg. Coleman was subsequently
convicted of second-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon
following a jury trial in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County. He was
sentenced, as a second-violent-felony offender, to concurrent terms of six years' imprisonment
on the assault count and eleven years' imprisonment on the weapon count, to be followed by five
years of post-release supervision. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, and
the New Your Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. See People v. Coleman, 946 N.E.2d 181
(N.Y. 2011).
1
Coleman sought two forms of post-conviction relief in state court. In July 2011, he filed
a motion for a writ of error coram no bis in the Appellate Division, arguing that his appellate
counsel was ineffective in litigating his direct appeal. The Appellate Division summarily denied
the motion, and Coleman did not seek leave from the Court of Appeals to appeal that decision.
In July 2012, Coleman filed a motion in the Supreme Court, New York County to vacate the
judgment of conviction, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 440.10,
arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court denied Coleman's motion on two
grounds. First, it held that his claims were procedurally barred by CPL§ 440.10(2)(c) because
Coleman could have raised the issues in his § 440.10 motion in his direct appeal. Second, the
court held that, in any event, Coleman's claims lacked merit. Coleman applied to the Appellate
Division for leave to appeal, and that request was denied.
Coleman filed his federal habeas petition in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on
August 7, 2014. Dkt. No. 1 ("Pet."); see Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001) (prose
prisoners' petitions are deemed filed on the date they are delivered to prison officials). The
petition raises three grounds for relief: first, that Coleman's trial counsel was ineffective; second,
that the police lacked probable cause when they arrested Coleman; and third, that an unduly
suggestive identification procedure violated his right to a fair trial and the Confrontation Clause.
Pet. at 6-11 of 18. After conducting an initial review of the petition, the Court ordered
Respondent to submit an answer and referred the case to Magistrate Judge Fox. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.
The State of New York ("the State") filed a brief opposing the petition on July 15, 2015. Dkt.
No. 13.
On September 23, 2015, Judge Fox issued his R &R recommending that the Court deny
Coleman's petition. Judge Fox reasoned that (1) Coleman's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is barred because a New York court rejected the same claim on adequate and independent
state procedural grounds; (2) Coleman cannot challenge the alleged lack of probable cause for
his arrest-a Fourth Amendment claim-because he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
that issue in state court; and (3) any claim relating to the suggestiveness of the identification
2
procedures used in this case has been procedurally defaulted. R & Rat 11-13. Coleman filed an
initial version of his objections to the R & Ron October 15, 2015, see Dkt. No. 17, but the Court
granted Coleman's request for an extension. Dkt. No. 18. Coleman filed his revised objections
on November 16, 2015, see Dkt. No. 24 ("Objections"), and the State has declined to respond
further.
II.
LEGALSTANDARD
When reviewing a report and recommendation on a dispositive motion, a district court
may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). If a party files objections to the report and
recommendation, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. By
contrast, the district court reviews unobjected-to portions of the report and recommendation for
clear error. Watson v. Geithner, No. 11-CV-9527 (AJN), 2013 WL 5441748, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2013).
Because Coleman is proceeding prose, his submissions "must be construed liberally and
interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest."' Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459
F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Coleman raises two objection to the R & R. First, he argues that his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not barred because, although the state court that rejected the claim
did so on procedural grounds, it also reached the merits of the claim. Second, Coleman raises
various substantive arguments concerning the constitutionality of his arrest and of the
identification procedures that were used in his trial and at a pre-trial hearing. Both objections are
unavailing.
3
With respect to the first objection, Coleman appears to concede that Judge Fox is correct
that New York's CPL§ 440.10(2)(c) provides an adequate and independent basis for barring an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where, as here, the alleged basis for the claim is evident
from the trial record. See R & Rat 11-12; see also Sweet v. Bennett, 353 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim procedurally barred where "the trial record
provided a sufficient basis for the ineffective assistance claim"). Coleman argues, however, that
because "[t]he state court analyzed [his] 440.10 motion ... in a way that suggested it understood
he was raising substantive constitutional claims," this Court "cannot apply the [rule ofJ
procedural bar." Objections at 2of20. The Court disagrees.
The Second Circuit has made clear that "federal habeas review is foreclosed when a state
court has expressly relied on a procedural default as an independent and adequate state ground,
even where the state court has also ruled in the alternative on the merits of the federal claim."
Glenn v. Bartlett, 98 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (emphasizing that "a state court need not fear
reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding" because "[b ]y its very definition,
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state
holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment"). The state court considering
Coleman's post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective explicitly relied on CPL
§ 440.10(2)( c) as a basis for denying the claim. See SR 404-05. 1 The court also made clear that
its rejection of the merits of Coleman's claim was an alternative holding. Id. at 410.
Accordingly, the Comi rejects Coleman's objection and adopts the R &R's conclusion that
Coleman is barred from bringing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 2
1
"SR" refers to the State Court Record submitted along with the State's brief. See Dkt. No. 14, Exs. 1-8.
Coleman also contends that the state court that considered his § 440. l 0 motion evaluated his probable
cause claim "on its merits." Objections at 2 of20. But the state court only addressed Coleman's probable cause
argument in the context of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See SR 409. And for the reasons outlined
above, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is now procedurally barred.
2
4
Coleman's second objection is more difficult to parse, but it is in essence a challenge to
the constitutionality of several aspects of his trial and pre-trial proceedings. First, Coleman
contends that the state trial court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding
at a pre-trial hearing that there was probable cause for his arrest. Objections at 3of20. He
argues that the State failed to sustain its burden of showing probable cause, that testimony
introduced at the hearing violated the Confrontation Clause, and that the state court failed to
assess the evidence submitted for reliability and credibility. Id. at 6-8of20. Second, Coleman
challenges police and layperson testimony at his trial in which he was identified in a surveillance
video. Id. at 9-11 of20. 3
Each of these arguments, however, goes to the merits of Coleman's underlying
constitutional claims, and not the procedural barriers that Judge Fox relied on in his R & R.
With respect to Coleman's argument that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, Judge
Fox correctly noted that "[a] state prisoner cannot obtain federal habeas corpus relief on a Fourth
Amendment claim if he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state court." R &
Rat 12; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (restricting Fourth Amendment
habeas claims "in light of the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule").
And although Coleman briefly contends that he "did not have a full and fair suppression
hearing," Objections at 8of20, he has put forward no arguments that would allow the Court to
reach that conclusion. The Second Circuit has identified two circumstances in which a habeas
petitioner may raise a Fourth Amendment claim: "(a) if the state has provided no corrective
procedures at all to redress the alleged fourth amendment violations; or (b) if the state has
provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from using that mechanism
because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process." Capellan v. Riley, 975
F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, as Judge Fox noted, the corrective procedure available to
3
Coleman also argues that he suffered prejudice due to his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
Objections at 12-17 of20. But that argument goes to one of the prongs in the ineffective assistance of counsel
analysis, see Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and does not provide an independent basis for
habeas relief.
5
Coleman was CPL Article 710, which governs the process for litigating Fourth Amendment
claims in New York. See id., 975 F.2d at 70 n.1. And Coleman cannot credibly argue that he
was precluded from using this mechanism, given that he received an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of whether there was probable cause for his arrest. Accordingly, to the extent Coleman's
arguments address the analysis in Judge Fox's R &R, the Court's de novo review results in the
conclusion that Coleman cannot obtain habeas relief on his Fourth Amendment claim because he
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state court.
Similarly, Coleman's arguments concerning the identification procedures that were used
in his case do not respond to Judge Fox's analysis that these arguments are procedurally
defaulted. In Coleman's CPL§ 440.10 motion, the only claim he raised was that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient, see SR 372-83, and Coleman likewise did not raise the
arguments in his habeas petition in his direct appeal. Coleman's failure to previously raise the
arguments in his petition concerning the constitutionality of the identification procedures used in
his case can only be excused if he "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as
a result of the alleged violation of federal law," or if he can show that "failure to consider [his]
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991). Coleman's objections do not expressly challenge Judge Fox's determination that
neither exception applies here, see R &Rat 13, other than to contend that failing to consider his
habeas claims would subject him "to a miscarriage of justice," Objections at 17 of 20. This
argument in meritless. As the Second Circuit has explained, the Supreme Court has "limited the
availability of the 'miscarriage of justice' exception to 'extraordinary case[s], where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."'
Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 540 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). Coleman does not attempt to argue that he is actually
innocent. Accordingly, a de novo review leads this Court to the same conclusion as Judge Fox:
Coleman has procedurally defaulted his claim that unconstitutional identification procedures
were used, and he has not shown that one of the narrow exceptions to procedural default applies.
6
Finally, the Court has reviewed the rest of the R &R for clear error and has found none.
The Court therefore adopts the R & R in its entirety, and Coleman's petition is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Coleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. In
addition, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Coleman has not made a
substantial showing of a denial of a federal right, and appellate review is therefore not warranted.
See Love v. McCray, 413 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court also finds, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § l 915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The Clerk of Court is requested to
terminate this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March ~), 2016
New York, New York
United States District Judge
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?