Cohen et al v. The State Of New York et al

Filing 38

OPINION & ORDER re: 29 MOTION to Dismiss . filed by Barbara Fiala, The State Of New York, Neil Schoen, Ida Traschen, Debbie Langevin.Since Defendants are entitled to both sovereign immunity and qualified immunity, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. (Signed by Judge Paul A. Crotty on 4/30/2015) (lmb)

.rr;SDC SDI'JY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

I DOCUMENT

\l ELECTRONICALI.Y FILED

------------------------------------------------------------)(
RANDY COHEN, ANDREAS COHRSSEN,
NICK GRAY, ABBY HAYWOOD, SHARON
KLIEGMAN, DAN KOHN, HANI
MANSOURIAN, MADELEINE MATSSON,
ROBERT RAKOWITZ, BRAEDEN
ROGERS, CHRIS SCARAFILE, SCOTT
TRUDEAU, and NOAH WILDMAN,

i I DOC#: - - - - - - - \1 DATE FILED: 4- S0 - 1S
I.

14 cv 7496 (PAC)
OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiffs,
-againstThe STATE OF NEW YORK, BARBARA
FIALA, NEIL SCHOEN, IDA TRASCHEN,
DEBBIE LANGEVIN and "JOHN DOE",

Defendants.

------------------------------------------------------------)(
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs bring this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") class action claiming the New
York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") overcharged them between $80 and $88 for
bicycling violations and improperly added three penalty points to their New York State
operator's licenses. 1
The Defendants are the State ofNew York, which operates the DMV; Barbara Fiala, the
DMV Commissioner; Neil Schoen and Ida Traschen, DMV lawyers; Debbie Langevin, the
DMV' s Director of Ticketing Systems; and "John Doe," a supervisor in the DMV's Plea Unit.
Compl.

~~

capacity. !d.

14-19. The individual Defendants are sued both in their official and personal
at~~

15- 19.

1

PlaintiffKliegman resides in Wisconsin and does not have a New York State operator' s license.
See Compl. ~ 27.

1

Plaintiffs seek monetary relief-- in the form of damages, unpaid interest, and attorney
fees-and injunctive relief directing Defendants to ( 1) cease overcharging and applying penalty
points to bicycling violations, (2) modify the DMV website, and (3) modify the UT -60 traffic
ticket.
On January 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) based on sovereign immunity, lack of standing, mootness, qualified
immunity, and failure to state a claim. For the reasons below, Defendants' motion is
GRANTED. 2
DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim against the State of New York
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim for monetary and injunctive

relief under Rule 12(b)(l) based on, inter alia, New York's sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
United States does not extend "to any suit in law or equity" by a citizen against a state. See

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("[W]e have reaffirmed that federal
jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ' was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States."' (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 15 (1890))). There are only two exceptions to state sovereign immunity: "when Congress
authorizes such a suit through enforcement of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a
state consents to being sued." McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing

College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)).

2

Since Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim is dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claim under N.Y. V.T.L. § 1809(4). See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
2

Neither exception is applicable here. Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity,

see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); nor has New York consented to being sued.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim against the State of New York is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
II.

Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim against the Individual Defendants in their Official
Capacity
Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in their capacity as state officials for both

monetary and injunctive relief under Section 1983. Defendants move to dismiss the claim under
Rule 12(b)(l) based on, inter alia, the individual Defendants' sovereign immunity. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) ("[The Eleventh Amendment's] bar remains in effect when

State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity" (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85,
90 (1982))). The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief because "a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the
state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663
(1974) (citations omitted).
With respect to injunctive relief, however, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), allows a claim where the "complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Idaho v. Coeur d 'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261, 296 (1997). Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege an ongoing violation of federal law.
Indeed, their claim is moot. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726-27 (2013) ("A
case becomes moot- and therefore no longer a 'Case' or ' Controversy' for purposes of Article
III-' when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome."' (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,481 (1982))).

3

Prior to bringing suit, Plaintiffs' counsel and a New York State Senator adopted the
common sense approach of trying to resolve the problem. They contacted the DMV, pointed out
the violations, and requested corrective action. Compl.

mi 69-74. Defendants promptly initiated

the actions requested, see id. at ,[75, and have since implemented the prospective relief sought in
Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants have (1) segregated bicycle summonses into a separate
processing basket to "reduce the occurrence of data entry errors," Traschen Decl.
reminded staff and agencies about the proper handling of bicycle violations, id.

at~~

~

32; (2)

33- 34; (3)

modified the UT-60 ticket,3 id. at ~ 35, Ex. H (noting that the "Mandatory Surcharge" for
bicycles is "$0"); and (4) modified the DMV website, id.

at~

37, Ex. J (adding the following

language to the website: "If you plead Guilty to an offense committed while operating a bicycle
or in-line skates you are not required to pay a surcharge. Convictions for bicycle/in-line skate
offenses do not result in points on your driving record").
Having achieved success by using common sense, Plaintiffs abandon that approach and
sue anyway. They argue that their claim is not moot for three reasons, none of which have merit.
First, Plaintiffs argue that although Defendants refunded Plaintiffs the overcharged amounts and
removed the points from the licenses, Plaintiffs still have a live claim for unpaid interest,
consequential hikes to insurance premiums, and attorney fees. But as noted above, claims for
monetary relief are plainly barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4 Next, Plaintiffs argue that
police agencies are slow to use the modified UT-60 form. See Grannan Decl. (noting that when
he was issued a ticket on January 20, 2015, the officer provided him with the old version of the

3

Since the new UT -60 tickets would be issued to police agencies as they replenished their stock,
Defendants distributed a supplement to be issued by police in the intetim. See Traschen Decl. ~
36, Ex. I.
4
Since Plaintiffs were overcharged between $80 and $88 and were generally refunded within a
number of months, the amount of interest at stake here is de minimis in any event.
4

UT-60 form). In so doing, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the individual Defendants continue to
violate federal law since the police agencies are not named as defendants and since Defendants
have sent both the modified UT -60 forms and supplements to police agencies along with a
memorandum outlining the applicable charges for cyclists. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they
have yet to receive prospective relief in the form of a "written confirmation" of the DMV's error.
But Plaintiffs impermissibly request this relief for the first time in their motion papers. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a demand for the
relief sought"). Since Defendants have ceased overcharging cyclists and have implemented
policies to prevent future overcharging, there is no reasonable probability that Defendants'
conduct will recur. See Byrd v. Goard, No. 00 Civ. 2135(GBD), 2007 WL 2789505, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007). Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to allege an ongoing violation of federal law
to justify prospective relief.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief against the individual Defendants in
their official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and Plaintiffs' fail to satisfy the
requirements for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. Therefore, Defendants' motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.

III.

Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim against the Individual Defendants in their Personal
Capacity
Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in their personal capacity under Section 1983,

claiming that Defendants violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants move to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) based on, inter alia, the individual
Defendants' qualified immunity. See Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2013)
("Where the nonexistence of a constitutional right may be discerned from the face of the

5

complaint, an official defendant sued in his individual capacity may be granted a dismissal on the
ground of qualified immunity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)"); see also Rivers v. Fischer, 390 Fed.
Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir. 201 0) ("A government official is entitled to qualified immunity for his
actions unless his conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which
a reasonable person would have known." (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009))).
Not only does Plaintiffs' complaint fail to outline a clearly established constitutional or
statutory right to be free from overcharges and points on licenses, but it also fails to allege any
violation of that right (if it exists at all) since the complaint alleges no facts demonstrating
Defendants' intent to overcharge Plaintiffs. See Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[M]ore than negligent conduct by the state actor is needed in order for a cognizable §
1983 claim to exist based on violations of the due process clause"). Accordingly, the individual
Defendants in their personal capacity are entitled to qualified immunity and Defendants' motion
to dismiss is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION

Since Defendants are entitled to both sovereign immunity and qualified immunity,
Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice. 5 The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment and close this case.

Dated: New York, New York
April 30, 2015

SO ORDERED

p!.~TY

United States District Judge

5

In light of Defendants' immunity, the Court does not reach Defendants' additional arguments
concerning justiciability under Article III and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
6