Wood et al v. Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. et al

Filing 265

ORDER terminating 259 Letter Motion for Discovery. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' objections to Judge Freeman's order closing discovery are OVERRULED. Defendants' request for an extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. By September 9, 2020, the parties shall submit a briefing schedule on Defendants' anticipated motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 259 and mail a copy of this order to Plaintiffs pro se.. (Signed by Judge Analisa Torres on 8/5/2020) (mro) Transmission to Docket Assistant Clerk for processing.

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to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “As a ‘non-dispositive matter,’ a pretrial
discovery ruling is reviewed under this highly deferential standard.” HotelsAB Green, LLC v.
Reignwood Europe Holdings SARL, No. 17 Civ. 8776, 2019 WL 2236580, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
15, 2019).
II.

Analysis

The Court finds no basis to overturn Judge Freeman’s well-reasoned order, made after
reviewing the entirety of the lengthy docket, which contains no fewer than 248 entries.
Discovery order at 1. “Nothing in the record suggests that the [Discovery Order] was clearly
erroneous or contrary to law, or that the substantial deference due to the resolution of discovery
disputes by a [m]agistrate [j]udge should not be accorded in the instant matter.” TVT Records v.
Island Def Jam Music Grp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 471, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court finds that
Judge Freeman has been exceptionally patient and generous with deadlines in her administration
of general pretrial matters. Moreover, Judge Freeman provided explicit notice to the parties that
the September 27, 2019 was “final,” and would “not be extended by this Court absent a showing
of extraordinary cause.” March 21 Order at 7.
Turning to Plaintiffs specific objections, the Court finds that these objections lack merit.
First, Plaintiffs contend that “fundamental fairness requires that Plaintiffs be allowed to take
depositions.” Pl. Objs. at 1 (alterations omitted). But Plaintiffs were never prevented from
taking depositions. In fact, the parties agreed to a deposition schedule, which the Court ordered,
that dictated that depositions would begin in May 2019 and end in July 2019. Discovery Order
at 10. Judge Freeman also warned the parties that depositions should proceed “regardless of
whether any party believes that any document production is still outstanding,” ECF No. 177, at
8, and further cautioned that Plaintiffs’ depositions should proceed even if pro bono
representation could not be secured, ECF No. 199. In August of 2019, with over a month
remaining before the close of discovery, Plaintiffs were asking Defendants to consent to an
extension of the discovery deadline until 2020. Discovery Order at 12. Plaintiffs failed to
adhere to the schedule set forth by the Court, disregarding Judge Freeman’s warnings that no
further extensions would be granted. The Court, therefore, finds no clear error in Judge
Freeman’s decision to close discovery.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that additional time for discovery is warranted. Pl. Obj. at 4–5.
“Where a scheduling order has been entered, the lenient standard under Rule 15(a), which
provides leave to amend shall be freely given, must be balanced against the requirement under
Rule 16(b) that the Court’s scheduling order shall not be modified except upon a showing of
good cause.” Grochowski v. Phoenix Const., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “A finding of good cause depends on the diligence of the moving
party.” Id. Judge Freeman found that Plaintiffs did not demonstrate good cause for further
modification of the discovery schedule. Discovery Order at 2. Her decision to close discovery,
therefore, was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the scope of discovery was improperly narrowed. Pl. Objs. at
9–10. Plaintiffs object that discovery was narrowed because Judge Freeman concluded that

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Plaintiffs should be bound to an agreement made by their former attorney. Plaintiffs’ former
attorney entered into an agreement with Defendants on the production of certain documents.
Discovery Order at 4–5. In order to determine the content of the parties’ agreement, Judge
Freeman reviewed non-privileged writings between Plaintiffs’ former attorneys and Defendants,
which memorialized counsel’s agreement. Id. at 4. Again, given Judge Freeman’s thorough
inquiries, nothing in the record suggests that Judge Freeman’s determination was “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law, or that the substantial deference due to [her] resolution of discovery
disputes . . . should not be accorded in the instant matter.” TVT Records, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
Finally, throughout their objections, Plaintiffs allude to their status as pro se litigants.
See Pl. Objs. at 2 n.6, 3, 5, 7, 11. “All litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply
with court orders.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Plaintiffs failed to comply with
Judge Freeman’s order setting both a deadline for depositions to be completed, and for fact
discovery to be completed in general, even with the understanding that further extensions would
not be granted. See Discovery Order at 10. Judge Freeman’s Discovery Order, therefore, was
neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
Accordingly, because the Court reviewed Judge Freeman’s discovery order for clear error
and found none, the Court affords Judge Freeman “substantial deference” in resolving this
discovery dispute and OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ objections. See Tylena M. v. Heartshare
Children’s Servs., 220 F.R.D. 38, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
III.

Request to File Summary Judgment Motion

Along with closing discovery, the Judge Freeman directed that if the parties anticipated
filing any summary judgment motions, they were to “confer and jointly . . . propose a briefing
schedule no later than November 26, 2019.” Discovery Order at 19. The parties did not submit
a briefing schedule by the deadline. On January 2, 2020, Defendants indicated that they intend
to move for summary judgment and requested that their time to make such a motion be extended
to thirty days after the Court’s resolution of Plaintiffs’ objections to the Discovery Order. ECF
No. 257 at 1. They also indicated that they inquired with Plaintiffs as to whether they intended
to move for summary judgment, and, if so, when, but that Plaintiffs had not responded to
Defendants’ inquiries. Id. at 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(E) provides that a
Court may consider and take appropriate action with respect to “determining the appropriateness
and timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56.” Fed Rule Civ. P. 16. Pursuant to this
Court's authority under Rule 16 (c)(2)(E), Defendants’ request for an extension of time to move
for summary judgment is GRANTED. The parties shall meet and confer and propose a briefing
schedule by September 9, 2020.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ objections to Judge Freeman’s order closing
discovery are OVERRULED. Defendants’ request for an extension of time to file a motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED. By September 9, 2020, the parties shall submit a briefing
schedule on Defendants’ anticipated motion for summary judgment.

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The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 259 and mail a copy of
this order to Plaintiffs pro se.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 5, 2020
New York, New York

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