Bishop v. City of New York et al

Filing 34

ORDER. For the reasons in this Order, Plaintiff's motion is denied. This resolves Dkt. No. 29. So ordered. re: 29 LETTER addressed to Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis from Samaad Bishop, dated 10/8/15 re: LETTER MOTION TO STRIKE CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. Document filed by Samaad Bishop. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 11/11/2015) (rjm).

USDC
DOCUMENT
FILED
ELECTRONIC
DOC
DATE FILED:-Nf..H+-+-+'~IT'..1t

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Samaad Bishop,
Plaintiff,

-v-

14-CV-7786 (AJN)
ORDER

City of New York et al.,
Defendants.
ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

On September 22, 2014, Samaad Bishop ("Plaintiff') filed the above-captioned action
against the City of New York and several New York Police Department ("NYPD") officers
("Defendants"). See Dkt. No. 1. On October 9, 2015, Plaintiff moved to strike three of the
affirmative defenses contained within Defendants' Answer. See Dkt. No. 29. For the reasons
articulated below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
I.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a district court to strike "from any pleading
an insufficient defense." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(£). Motions to strike affinnative defenses are
"not favored and will not be granted 'unless ... plaintiffs would succeed despite any state of the
facts which could be proved in support of the defense."' William Z. Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v.
Envicon Equities Corp. ("Edelman"), 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Durham Indus.,
Inc. v. N River Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 910, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). In addition, "the movant must
show that he will be prejudiced by inclusion of the defense" in order for the court to grant a
motion to strike. Connell v. City ofNew York, 230 F. Supp. 2d 432, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff seeks to strike the following three affirmative defenses: (1) that Plaintiff's claims
are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that Plaintiff failed to comply with New York's notice
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of claim requirements; (3) and that Plaintiff lacks standing to demand declaratory or injunctive
relief. See Dkt. No. 29 at 3-5. The Court will address each of these affinnative defenses in tum.
A. Statute of Limitations
First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' statute oflimitations affirmative defense should be
stricken because he filed his complaint within the applicable statute oflimitations for claims
under 42 U.S.C § 1983. See Dkt. No. 29. at 3. Defendants argue that the Court could construe
the Amended Complaint to assert claims against New York City under New York state law,
which would be barred by the year-and-ninety-day statute oflimitations for such claims. See
Dkt. No. 30 at 2.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding prose, the Court must interpret his pleadings liberally "to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1994). In so doing, the Court will look at the facts alleged by the Plaintiff and determine what, if
any, law applies to those facts. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau ofPrisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d
Cir. 2006) (construing factual allegations to assert a negligence claim). For this reason, the
Court could interpret the Plaintiff's pleadings to implicate state as well as federal law. As a
result, it is not impossible for Defendants to succeed on their statute oflimitations defense. See

Edelman, 744 F.2d at 939.
Additionally, Plaintiff would not be "prejudiced by inclusion of the defense." Connell,
230 F. Supp. 2d at 438. Because the statute oflimitations affirmative defense does not implicate
any factual dispute, inclusion of the defense would not lead to "increased discovery costs," nor
would it "increase the duration and expense of trial." Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corporations, 756 F.
Supp. 2d 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Instead, this affinnative defense is only applicable at the
motion to dismiss stage to the extent that the Court may construe Plaintiffs pleadings to

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implicate state law. See Burgos, 14 F.3d at 790. As a result, the inclusion of the statute of
limitations defense does not prejudice the Plaintiff.
For this reason, Plaintiff's motion to strike the statute oflimitations affirmative defense is
denied.

B. New York's Notice of Claim Requirement
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' notice of claim affirmative defense should be
stricken because his federal claims are not subject to a notice of claim law requirement. As
noted above, the Court could interpret Plaintiff's pleadings to raise state law claims and the
inclusion of the defense does not prejudice the Plaintiff. For that reason, Plaintiff's motion to
strike the notice of claim affirmative defense is denied.

C. Standing to Demand Declaratory or Injunctive Relief
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' standing affirmative defense should be stricken
because he is "still subjected to being illegally [s]topped and [f]risked" and is thus entitled to an
injunction. See Dkt. No. 29 at 5. Defendants argue that there is a legitimate question about
Plaintiff's entitlement to an injunction under City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983),
which held that "standing to seek [an] injunction ... depend[s] on whether [a plaintiff is] likely
to suffer future injury" from the challenged activity. Id. at 105. At this early stage of the
litigation, it has not yet been established whether Plaintiff is "likely to suffer future injury." Id.
For that reason, it cannot be said that Plaintiff "would succeed despite any state of the facts
which could be proved in support of the defense." Edelman, 744 F.2d at 939. As a result,
Plaintiff's motion to strike the standing affirmative defense is denied.

II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied. This resolves Dkt. No. 29.

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SO ORDERED.

Dated: November _ _, 2015
New York, New York

United States District Judge

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