Cracco v. The City of New York et al

Filing 46

OPINION AND ORDER re: 39 MOTION for Reconsideration. Motion denied. See pdf. (Signed by Judge Paul A. Crotty on January 28, 2016) (mov)

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;IELECTRONICALLY FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JOSEPH CRACCO,

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14 Civ. 8235 (PAC)

Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK; Police Officer JONATHAN
CORREA, Shield 7869, Transit Division District 4; Police
Officer JOHN DOE (a fictitious name); and CYRUS R.
VANCE JR., in his official capacity as District Attorney
for the County of New York,
Defendants.

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HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph Cracco was arrested for possession of a gravity knife. He pleaded guilty
to disorderly conduct and paid a fine. Cracco wants to continue carrying the same type of knife
that led to his arrest, but fears he will be arrested again. He seeks declaratory judgment against
Cyrus R. Vance Jr., in his official capacity as New York County District Attorney, that New
York Penal Law§§ 265.00(5) and 265.01(1)-which define the simple possession of a gravity knife
as a misdemeanor-are void for vagueness. 1 On December 9, 2015, the Court denied District
Attorney Vance's motion to dismiss the claim, and it now denies his motion for reconsideration. 2

1. In its opinion ofDecember 9, 2015, the Comi stated: "District Attorney Vance argues
that Cracco' s claims under 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 are barred by his guilty plea. The Court agrees. 4 But
that does not affect whether Cracco can seek declaratory judgment." (Dkt. 38 at 6.) Footnote 4
explained: "The Court dismissed Cracco's § 1983 claims in its prior opinion. The Court notes
1

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts, which are set forth in greater detail the Court's two prior opinions.
(Dkt. 37, 38.)
2
Cracco also named as defendants the City of New York, Officer Jonathan Correa, and an unnamed officer, alleging
various constitutional and state-Jaw claims. The Court dismissed those claims with prejudice. (Dkt. 37 .)

1

that none of Cracco' s § 1983 or tort claims were brought against District Attorney Vance." (!d. at
6 n.4.) In his motion for reconsideration, District Attorney Vance argues that if the Court in fact
"agree[d]" with his position and "dismissed Cracco's § 1983 claims," Cracco's request for a
declaratory judgment is unmoored from any cause of action and must be dismissed. See Chevron

Corp. v. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not create a cause of action but depends on some "valid
legal predicate").
The Court admits it inartfully employed the term"§ 1983 claims" in its prior opinion as
shorthand for Cracco's § 1983 claims seeking damages for conduct arising out of his arrest.
Those claims are barred because a judgment in Cracco's favor would "necessarily imply the
invalidity ofhis conviction." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). But unlike Cracco's
damages claims, his § 1983 claim for declaratory relief against District Attorney Vance seeks
only prospective relief and casts no doubt on his conviction. 3 As such, that claim has survived
both motions to dismiss, and Cracco may seek declaratory relief based on that "valid legal
predicate." Chevron Corp., 667 F.3d at 244.
2. District Attorney Vance also argues that because Cracco's guilty plea conclusively
establishes that his arrest was lawful, his "fears that the statute will be unlawfully applied against
him in the future" are too speculative to support standing. (Dkt. 40 at 6.) Not so. The fact that
police had probable cause to arrest Cracco as a matter oflaw-because he later pleaded guilty to

3 Cf Edward v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997) (applying the rationale of Heck to bar a§ 1983 claim for a
declaration that prison disciplinary hearing officer was biased because such a declaration would necessarily imply
the invalidity of the punishment imposed); see also Poventud v. City ofNew York, 750 F.3d 12 1, 132 (2d Cir. 2014)
(en bane) ("Not every § 1983 claim that arises out of a criminal case requires that the underlying criminal process
reach a favorable tem1ination. 'Contrary to the district court's view in this case, Heck does not automatically bar a§
1983 claim simply because the processes of the criminal justice system did not end up in the plaintiff's favor. A
plaintiff need not prove that any conviction stemming from an incident with the police has been invalidated, only a
conviction that could not be reconciled with the claims of his civil action."') (quoting VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d
689, 692 (7th Cir. 2006)).

2

disorderly conduct- bears little on Cracco' s fear that he will again be arrested for carrying a
common folding knife. As explained in the Court's prior opinion, that fear is real. (Dkt. 38 at 35.) And it remains so regardless whether his prior arrest was lawful.

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The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration. The Clerk is directed to terminate the
motion at Docket No. 39.

Dated: New York, New York
January 28, 2016
SO ORDERED

PAUL A. CROTTY
United States District Judge

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