Jiggetts v. United Parcel Service et al

Filing 56

ORDER: The Court DENIES the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against the UPS Defendants. Further, in its May 10, 2016 order, the Court stayed the deadline for responding to the UPS Defendants' motion to dismiss until after resolution of the pending motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 45. The Court hereby lifts that stay, and orders that, if Plaintiff wishes to respond to the pending motion to dismiss, such response is due on or before February 14, 2017. Any reply from the UPS Defendants will be due on or before February 28, 2017.The Court reminds the UPS Defendants that deadlines will be strictly enforced.SO ORDERED., ( Responses due by 2/14/2017, Replies due by 2/28/2017.) (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 1/17/2017) (ama)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

····r

James Jiggetts,
Plaintiff,
14-cv-8291 (AJN)

-vORDER
United Parcel Service, et al.,
Defendants.

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff James Jiggetts' motion for default judgment against
Defendants United Parcel Service, John Mannion, and Doug Trundiak (together, the "UPS
Defendants"). 1 For the following reasons, that motion is DENIED.

I.

Procedural History

On October 10, 2014, pro se Plaintiff James Jiggetts filed his first complaint against, inter

alia, the United Parcel Service ("UPS"), alleging various causes of action in relation to his
termination of employment. Dkt. No. 1. On February 11, 2015, Jiggetts filed an amended
complaint, Dkt. No. 5, and after service of summons and several extensions, the UPS Defendants
timely filed their first motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July 31, 2015. Dkt. No. 17.
On October 5, 2016, Jiggetts filed his opposition to this motion, Dkt. No. 27, which the Court

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On May 5, 2016, Jiggetts filed a motion asking, inter alia, "for default based upon the non-compliance of
the defen[d]ing parties to the dispute, of lateness, tardiness, and four motions for dismissal for actions at bar that the
Court already agrees that remedy must be sought in this matter at common law." Dkt. No. 44, at 2. By order dated
May 10, 2016, the Court construed the Plaintiffs submission as a motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 45. Further,
in that May I 0 order, the Court denied the Plaintiffs motion for default against the final defendant in this case,
Mohanie Sukhu. Id.

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subsequently construed as a request to file an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 28. In the order
granting that request, the Court further stated that the UPS Defendants would have until April 13,
2016, to file a new motion to dismiss, indicate that they intended to rely on their existing motion
to dismiss, or otherwise respond to the operative second amended complaint. Id. On that same
day, the Court issued an order to show cause directed at Mohanie Sukhu, an individual defendant
in this case, ordering her to file a notice of appearance. Dkt. No. 29. After Ms. Sukhu filed such
a notice, the Court set a deadline of April 25, 2016, by which time she was ordered to answer or
otherwise respond to the second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 33. On April 11, 2016, the UPS
Defendants moved for a similar extension of time to file their response, to April 25, 2016, on the
theory that such extension would allow the UPS Defendants to file their motion or pleading on
the same day as Ms. Sukhu. Dkt. No. 34. On April 15, 2016, Magistrate Judge Kevin Fox
denied this request, finding that the UPS Defendants had not demonstrated good cause for such
an extension. Dkt. No. 35. Nevertheless, the UPS Defendants did not file their motion to dismiss
until April 25, 2016-12 days late, and five days after Ms. Sukhu filed hers. Dkt. No. 39.

Shortly after the UPS Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed the pending
motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 44. In that motion, Jiggetts appears primarily to cite the
lateness of the UPS Defendants' second motion to dismiss as justification for the Court awarding
him a default judgment. 2 See id. at 5. On May 19, 2016, the UPS Defendants submitted an
opposition to Jiggetts' motion. Dkt. No. 46. In that opposition, then-counsel for the UPS
Defendants Basil Sitaras 3 represents that during the week of April 15, 2016, his grandmother

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Jiggetts also cites, inter alia, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and "the common law." Id. at 5-6. He
also refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, rather than Rule 55, as providing a legal basis for the requested
relief. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, as indicated in his supplemental letter, Jiggetts' primary argument (putting aside its
legal contours) appears to be that the lateness of the motion to dismiss justifies default. Dkt. No. 48.

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suffered a medical emergency, and, as a result of that emergency and travel associated with it, he
lost track of the relevant deadline. Id. at 4. The UPS Defendants argue in their opposition that
default judgment is not warranted on the basis of the late filing, and that the case should proceed
to adjudication on the merits. See id. at 4-9. The Court agrees.
II.

Discussion

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the Court may grant a default judgment
when a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise to defend an action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
Though a district court may, in its discretion, grant such a judgment, "[t]he Second Circuit has
repeatedly emphasized its 'preference for resolving disputes on the merits,' and 'when doubt
exists as to whether default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor
of the defaulting party."' Moreno-Godoy v. Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP, No. 14 CIV. 7082
(PAE), 2015 WL 5737565, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v.
Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)). District courts in this Circuit

primarily consider three factors when determining whether a default judgment is warranted: "(1)
whether the default was willful, (2) whether the defendant demonstrates the existence of a
meritorious defense, and (3) whether, and to what extent, vacating the default will cause the
nondefaulting party prejudice." Id. (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz
Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2004)). Further, "motions for default judgments will be

denied where a party appears to defend unless it is clear that under no circumstances could the
defense succeed." Ranke! v. Kabateck, No. 12 CV 216 (VB), 2013 WL 7161687, at *7 n.8

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On August 5, 2016, Mr. Sitaras withdrew as counsel for the UPS Defendants in this case. Dkt. Nos. 50,

51.

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(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013) (quoting Guangxi Hanning Baiyang Food Co., Ltd. v. Long River Int'!,
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 3059 (TPG), 2010 WL 1257573, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010)).

There is no question that default judgment is not warranted here. 4 Though the UPS
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss late (despite Judge Fox's clear denial of their motion for
an extension), they have actively participated in this case for years. Further, the three factors
articulated above strongly weigh against default. First, it is evident that the late-filing was not
willful. Second, a review of the motion to dismiss reveals multiple potentially meritorious
defenses to many of the causes of action alleged. See Dkt. No. 39. Finally, Jiggetts has pointed
to no prejudice that this relatively minor delay has caused to him, nor could he. Cf MorenoGodoy, LLP, 2015 WL 5737565, at *9 (citing, as an example of such prejudice, a claim "that

delay occasioned by [the defendant's] disregard of (a] lawsuit resulted in the destruction of
relevant evidence"). Indeed, a finding of default in this case, given the potential existence of one
or more meritorious defenses on the merits, would be patently inconsistent with "the interests of
justice." Id. (assessing the interests of justice before concluding that default was not warranted
given the potential existence of meritorious defenses).
The Court DENIES the Plaintiffs motion for default judgment against the UPS Defendants.
Further, in its May 10, 2016 order, the Court stayed the deadline for responding to the UPS
Defendants' motion to dismiss until after resolution of the pending motion for default judgment.
Dkt. No. 45. The Court hereby lifts that stay, and orders that, if Plaintiff wishes to respond to the

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The UPS Defendants also point out, correctly, that the pro se Plaintiff failed to append to his application
for default judgment the Clerk's certificate of default. See Dkt. No. 46, at 4 (citing Local Rule 55.2(b)). The
Defendants do not "formally object to" this procedural error, and thus the Court need not determine whether it alone
justifies denial of the motion to default. Id.; see also Ranke!, 2013 WL 7161687, at *7 (stating that, even in a prose
case, "[a] motion for a default judgment must be made in compliance with Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Local Civil Rule 55.2").

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pending motion to dismiss, such response is due on or before February 14, 2017. Any reply from
the UPS Defendants will be due on or before February 28, 2017.
The Court reminds the UPS Defendants that deadlines will be strictly enforced.
SO ORDERED.

~'

2017
Dated: January
New York, New York

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