Woods v. The District Council for New York City and Vicinty of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, DC's motion to dismiss Woods's complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to close the motion at docket number 7 and to close this case. (As further set forth in this Order) (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 6/16/2015) (kl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------------)(
O'NEAL WOODS,
Plaintiff,
-v-

14-CV-9057 (JPO)
THE DISTRICT COUNCIL FOR NEW YORK
CITY AND VICINITY OF THE UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

------------------------------------------------------------- )(
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff O'Neal Woods brings this action against Defendant the District Council for New
York City and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America ("DC"),
alleging violations of Sections 101(a)(5), 102, and 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 41 l(a)(5), 412, 529; Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185; Section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); and his contract with DC. DC moves to
dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that
follow, DC's motion is granted.
I.

Background
On December 5, 2011, Woods, then a member of DC, was criminally charged in New

York state court with assault in the first and second degrees. (Dkt. No. 1, Complaint iii! 36-37.) 1
Because the assault charges arose from an incident that took place while Woods was on the
job-one of his DC Brothers alleged that Woods "stabbed, cut, and physically battered" him-

1

All record citations are to the Complaint unless specified otherwise.
1

Woods also received a notice of internal union disciplinary charges.

(~~

38-39 (alterations

omitted).) He pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges and to the union's allegations.
DC, pursuant to its constitution, convened a Trial Committee and scheduled a hearing on
the disciplinary charges. The hearing took place on April 12, 2012, while the criminal charges
were still pending. Accordingly, Woods's counsel (also his counsel here), requested that the
hearing be postponed so that Woods could attend the hearing without prejudicing himself in the
criminal proceeding.
request.

(~~

(~~

42-43.) The head of the Trial Committee, Chairman Mack, denied that

46-47.) Mack held that Woods had no right to be free from self-incrimination in

the disciplinary proceeding and that ifhe attended he would be called to testify. (Id.) Woods's
counsel argued that his client was forced into a dilemma. Either he could forfeit his rights as a
union member or he could forfeit his rights as a criminal defendant. Counsel vigorously objected
to his client being forced into this dilemma and urged Mack to postpone the hearing.
Nonetheless, Mack proceeded with the hearing. Woods was found guilty by a jury of union
members, expelled from the union, and fined $50,000.

(~~

50-51.)

Woods availed himself of the appeals process of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
("UBC"), DC's parent union. On appeal, DC conceded that "[Mack's] statement that Brother
Woods had no right to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination before the Trial
Committee[] was incorrect."

(~

76 (alterations omitted).) Despite this concession, DC's

appellate tribunal affirmed Woods' s discipline. Meanwhile, Woods' s criminal prosecution
continued. He testified at the criminal trial that he acted in self-defense. The jury acquitted him
of all charges.

(~~

83-84.)

In July 2013, Woods was working a job at Pinnacle Industries II ("Pinnacle").

(~

88.) He

claims that, in August 2013, he was told that he could not work at Pinnacle because he had been
expelled from DC and because he owed DC $50,000.
2

(~

89.) He did not go to work the day after

he heard this.

(~

90.) When he did return to work, he was told that he could not work until he

showed his union card.

(~

91.) The same day, Woods filed an unfair labor practice charge with

the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). DC and Woods settled this charge, with DC
agreeing to pay Woods back pay, to notify Pinnacle that it did not object to Woods's
employment, and to request that Pinnacle remove any references to Woods's discharge from
their records.
In May and June 2014, DC referred Woods to two jobs at Tutor Perini Building
Corporation ("Tutor"). (~~ 102, 110.)2 At both of these jobs, he was told by various people that
there were problems with his union membership and that he could not work. (See

generally~~

102-25.) As a result of these incidents, Woods filed two more charges with the NLRB. The
Complaint does not say what became of these charges.

II.

Discussion
DC moves to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that (1) Woods fails to plead an

actionable violation of Section 101 of the LMRDA; (2) Woods fails even to allege that DC
retaliated against him in violation of Section 609 of the LMRDA; (3) Woods has failed to
exhaust his internal union remedies; (4) Woods's claims regarding unfair labor practices are
within the exclusive competence of the NLRB; and (5) Woods's state-law claims are completely
preempted by federal law.

A.

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead sufficient
factual allegations "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the well-pleaded factual allegations

2

The Complaint does not explain how Woods was referred to these jobs despite having been
expelled from DC.
3

of the complaint, presumed true, permit the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Moreover, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
B.

Due Process

Woods alleges that his misconduct hearing violated his "due process" rights under
Section 101 of the LMRDA, Section 301 of the LMRA, and his contractual rights secured by the
union constitution under New York state law.
1.

Section 101

Section 101 3 of the LMRDA forbids a labor organization from disciplining one of its
members without providing the member a "full and fair hearing." United States v. Int'! Bhd. of

Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 385 (2d Cir. 2001) ["!BT'] (quoting Kuebler v. Cleveland
Lithographers & Photoengravers Union Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1973)).
"Not all of the due process protections available in the federal courts apply to union disciplinary
proceedings." Id. Instead, only the "basic principles of due process" apply. Id. Accordingly,
"the LMRDA protects only against a breach of fundamental fairness." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Wildberger v. Am. Fed'n ofGov't Employees AFL-CIO, 86 F.3d 1188,
1193 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

3

Woods asserts a second cause of action under Section 102. Section 102 provides a private right
of action for union members whose rights under Section 101 have been violated. Finnegan v.
Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 439 n.10 (1982). Woods's Section 102 claim is dismissed because he has
failed to plead a violation of Section 101.
4

The Second Circuit, in !BT, addressed and rejected the same arguments that Woods
presses here. In that case, a union member alleged that he had been denied a full and fair
hearing-in violation of Section 101 and his union's constitution-because the union had failed
to adjourn his trial on account of his pending criminal investigation. The Second Circuit held
that it was "consistent with [its] caselaw" to hold that "[b]ecause the Fifth Amendment is
unavailable to a union member called to sworn examination before an internal disciplinary body,
this Court finds that it does not support [the union members'] request to stay the [hearing]." Id.
at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This holding would appear squarely to foreclose Woods's claims here. Nonetheless,
Woods offers two reasons why the rule in !BT does not apply to his case. First, he contends that,
unlike the union members in !BT, he had an "absolute right" under the UBC constitution to
attend his union trial, which right was violated when he was forced to choose between it and "his
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination." (Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 14-15.) But
even if it were true that Woods' s right to attend his trial was violated when he was forced to
choose between not attending the trial and forfeiting the "Fifth Amendment right" that the
Second Circuit has specifically held does not apply to the proceeding, Woods's argument would
still be unavailing. "A violation of a procedural provision of a union's constitution is actionable
only if the violation deprived the party of a full and fair hearing under the LMRDA." !BT, 247
F.3d at 387. Woods does not allege any facts sufficient to give rise to the inference that his trial
was fundamentally unfair; indeed, he has not pleaded any problems with the trial other than his
failure to get the stay he requested and Mack's insistence that he would be made to testify if he
attended.
Second, Woods contends that"[ c]ontrary to the factors applicable in the Teamsters case,
Plaintiff was not being 'called to [a] sworn examination before an internal disciplinary body,'

5

where such member could be compelled to give testify [sic]." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, at 16.)
Although this may be true-indeed, Woods was not forced to testify-its relevance is unclear.
This case is on all fours with !BT.
Undeterred, Woods argues that DC is bound by its incorrect statement before the UBC
Appeals Committee that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protected his
right not to testify before the Trial Committee. This argument is unmeritorious. The Court is not
bound by a party's incorrect statement of the law. E.g., N. Y. State Nat. Org. for Women v. Terry,
159 F.3d 86, 97 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998). Woods's Section 101 claim is dismissed. 4

2.

Section 301

Next, Woods alleges that the same denial of due process violated Section 301 of the
LMRA, which provides a cause of action for violation of a union's constitution. United Ass 'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe.fitting Indus. of US. & Canada, AFL CIO v.
Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 619-22 (1981). DC argues that this claim should be dismissed because

(1) Woods fails to allege a violation of the UBC constitution and (2) Woods has failed to exhaust
his remedies within the UBC process. Because the Court finds that Woods failed to exhaust his
internal remedies, the Court need not address whether DC violated the UBC constitution.
"An employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of [a union constitution] must
attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by that
agreement before he may maintain a suit against his union or employer under§ 301(a) of the
[LMRA]." Clayton v. Int'/ Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981). Woods argues that exhaustion is not appropriate or required

here. He also baldly pleads that he "exhausted his internal remedies" (if 129), although DC
4

DC also argues that Woods' s Section 101 claim should be dismissed because he failed to
exhaust his remedies within the union. The Court need to reach this question because Woods's
Section 101 claim has no merit.
6

contends-and Woods concedes-that he failed to take the final step of appealing to the general
executive board ofUBC as required by the UBC constitution. (Defendant's Memorandum, at
18.)
The first question, then, is whether Woods was required to exhaust his internal appeals in
this case. "Under both the LMRA and the LMRDA, the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust
internal union remedies lies within the court's discretion." Maddalone v. Local 17, United Bhd.

of Carpenters & Joiners ofAm., 152 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1998). Three factors guide the
exercise of that discretion: "first, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he
could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals
procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award him
the full relief he seeks ... ; and third, whether exhaustion of internal procedures would
unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his
claim." Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689. All three factors point in favor of exhaustion here. First, there
is no reason to believe that UBC-a very large national union headquartered in Washington,
DC-would be hostile to Woods's claims. See Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 187. Second, although
Woods contends that punitive damages would be unavailable in his union appeal, it is clear that
all he was requesting was a retrial and a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of his
criminal trial. UBC could have offered him that. And this is Woods's only allegation plausibly
implicating Section 301. Finally, as the discussion ofUBC's appeals procedures below will
demonstrate, there is no reason to believe that further appeal would have resulted in any
appreciable delay.
The UBC constitution allows a party who has suffered an adverse determination by an
appellate committee to appeal that determination to the General Executive Board or General

7

Convention. 5 Woods does not contend that he appealed to the General Executive Board or the
General Convention. Instead, he writes as follows:
[U]nion members [must] exhaust reasonable hearing procedures "provided that a
four month lapse of time has not been exceeded in exhausting the procedures."
Plaintiff's ... claim ripened on or about on April 12, 2012 when he was denied
due process at his internal disciplinary trial, and that the penalty that stemmed
from that trial was converted to an Order and Judgment, dated April 15, 2012, and
that his appeal to the International Union, dated June 15, 2012, was denied in the
International Union's decision, dated October 15, 2012. At that point, Plaintiff
had exhausted, from April 12, 2012 to October 15, 2012 at his internal appeal, and
satisfied his exhaustion requirement.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum, at 20 (all errors in original) (citing Schermerhorn v. Local JOO,
Transport Workers Union ofAmerica, AFL-CIO, 91F.3d316, 325 (2d Cir. 1996).) It is unclear
whether the four-month period that Woods mentions above applies to LMRA claims. See
Monaco v. Smith, No. 00 CIV. 5845 (RMB), 2004 WL 203009, at *5 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2004)
("Courts are divided on whether the LMRDA's four-month limit should inform interpretation of
the LMRA's 'unreasonable delay' provision."). But even assuming that it does apply, the timeperiod at most "inform[s]" this Court's "interpretation of the LMRA's 'unreasonable delay'
provision." Id. It is not a hard-and-fast rule. And Woods cannot be heard to complain that DC's
procedures took too long. Rather than seek any expedited relief in the internal process-indeed,

5

The Court can consider the UBC constitution in this appeal because, although it was not
attached to Woods's Complaint, he extensively quoted from it in the Complaint. See Rodriguez
v. Haynes, 341 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)).
The relevant portion of the UBC Constitution reads: "A member who has been found
guilty of a charged violation under Section 52 may file an appeal with the General SecretaryTreasurer in accordance with the provisions of this Section. . . . All appeals received in proper
form shall be referred by the General Secretary-Treasurer to an Appeals Committee for decision,
subject to a final appeal to the General Executive Board; provided however, that cases involving
expulsions from membership may be appealed to the General Convention." (Dkt. No. 9,
Declaration of Kevin McVeigh, Ex. A, at 8-9.)

8

he did not seek any further relief at all-Woods instead chose to wait two years and bring suit
here. Woods's Section 301 claim is dismissed.
C.

Retaliation

Woods next alleges that DC's failure to provide him adequate process at the hearing
constituted retaliation in violation of Section 609. But Woods has not alleged any protected
action in response to which DC is supposed to have retaliated. Even assuming that the denial of
the stay was sufficiently adverse to Woods to constitute retaliation, Woods has said nothing-in
either his memorandum of law or his complaint-suggesting that this denial was retaliatory or
indicating what action it might be in retaliation against. Instead, he says simply: "Retaliation
against Plaintiff, during the disciplinary process, can be reasonably inferred, because the Trial
Officer wrongfully refused to allow Plaintiff to maintain his Fifth Amendment rights, the rule
applicable in carpenter court, and that chilled Plaintiffs ability to attend his hearing."
(Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 17-18.) Woods's Section 609 claim is dismissed.

D.

Unfair Labor Practices

Finally, Woods alleges that DC violated the NLRA and state law when it interfered with
his employment at Pinnacle and Tutor. DC contends that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims because they are within the exclusive competence of the NLRA.
Under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen 's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245 (1959), "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to [Section] 7 or [Section] 8 of the
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board .... " Id. Woods alleges that DC and its officers-Woods
neither names these officers nor includes them in the caption-"are liable under Section 8(a)(4)

9

of the NLRA." (~ 142.)6 Nonetheless, Woods argues that purely internal union matters are not
covered by the Garmon rule. In support of this argument, Woods cites Int 'I Ass 'n of Machinists
v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621-22 (1958), which held that purely internal union matters are not
within the exclusive competence of the NLRB. First of all, that case precedes Garmon, and the
Supreme Court has explicitly said that "[i]t seems evident that the full-blown rationale of
Gonzales could not survive the rule of Garmon." Amalgamated Ass 'n ofSt., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 295 (1971). Regardless, even if Gonzales were
still the rule, it would not apply here. In that case, the plaintiff alleged only a state-law claim.
Here, Woods alleges a violation of the NLRA. This claim is preempted by Garmon and is
therefore dismissed.

E.

State-Law Claims

To the extent that Woods asserts state-law causes of action for breach of contract related
to this incident, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See In re
Merrill Lynch Ltd. P 'ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (observing that
once all federal claims are dismissed, state claims should generally be dismissed as well);
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) ("[I]n the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point
toward declining jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.") Therefore, the Court need
not determine whether they are completely preempted by Section 301. And, similarly, Woods's
request to amend the NLRA cause of action to "a supplemental state contract claim, instead of a

6

Section 8(a) covers unfair labor practices by employers. Woods presumably means to allege
that DC violated Section 8(b), which applies to labor organizations.
10

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federal claim" (Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 23), is denied because the Court would not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the (redundant) state cause of action.

III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reason.s, DC's motion to dismiss Woods's complaint is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to close the motion at docket number 7 and to
close this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2015
New York, New York

~··,
J.PAULOETKEN
United States District Judge

11

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