Youngblood v. The City of Mount Vernon et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Youngblood has not adequately alleged that Johnson was acting in a deliberate conspiracy with state actors to deprive him of his constitutional rights. See Rankel v. Town of Somers, 999 F. Supp. 2d 527, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (dismissing sua sponte § 1983 claim against private actors); Gonzalez v. Lufkin, No. 08CV1134, 2009 WL 5219018, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009) (same). In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's claims against the defendant Johnson are dismissed without prejudice. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 5/5/2015) (rjm).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
EUGENE YOUNGBLOOD,
Plaintiff
14 Cv. 10288 (JGK)
- against -
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, ET AL.,
Defendants.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The plaintiff Eugene Youngblood, Jr. brings this action
against the City of Mount Vernon, several officers and
detectives of the Westchester County Police Department, and an
individual, Nadeen Johnson, alleging false arrest and false
imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Youngblood alleges that on
August 14, 2012, he was arrested for aggravated harassment and
detained for approximately eight months in Westchester County
Jail, until the charge against him was dismissed.
Youngblood
alleges that Johnson, a private citizen, intentionally and
maliciously filed a false report against him and provided false
testimony at a separate trial.
Youngblood seeks damages from
Johnson and requests that criminal charges be filed against her.
In his Complaint, Youngblood notes that Johnson has filed
an Order of Protection against him.
Johnson, who is currently
pro se, has also submitted a letter to this Court in which she
asserts that Youngblood has only filed the action against her to
1
intimate her.
She attaches several temporary protection orders
ordering Youngblood to refrain from contacting Johnson.
The
Court will file the correspondence from Johnson under seal.
Court takes judicial notice of the orders of protection.
The
See
Daniels v. City of New York, No. 03cv0809, 2004 WL 1161231, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) (noting that orders of protection are
matters of public record of which a court may take judicial
notice).
A district court may dismiss sua sponte a case brought in
forma pauperis, as this case was, if it “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Civil Rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that a
plaintiff demonstrate that the challenged conduct was “committed
by a person acting under color of state law,” and that the
conduct “deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010).
“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from
its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory
or wrongful.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To state
a Section 1983 claim against a private actor, like Johnson,
Youngblood must show that Johnson was a “willful participant in
2
joint activity with the State or its agents.”
Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (quoting United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
To establish state action
pursuant to such joint activity or conspiracy, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private
party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional
injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal
causing damages.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307,
324–25 (2d Cir. 2002). “A merely conclusory allegation that a
private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not
suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity.”
Id. at 324.
In this case, Youngblood alleges that Johnson filed a false
police report and provided false testimony against him.
The
“general rule” within the Second Circuit is that “providing
information to the police—even if the information turns out to
be false—will not suffice to convert a private party into a
state actor under § 1983.”
Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d
351, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Accordingly, Youngblood has not adequately alleged
that Johnson was acting in a deliberate conspiracy with state
actors to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
See Rankel
v. Town of Somers, 999 F. Supp. 2d 527, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
3
(dismissing sua sponte § 1983 claim against private actors);
Gonzalez v. Lufkin, No. 08CV1134, 2009 WL 5219018, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009) (same).
In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff’s claims against
the defendant Johnson are dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
May 5, 2015
__________/s/________________
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?