Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 439

MEMORANDUM ORDER: re: 430 MOTION for Reconsideration, Notice of Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC, Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC, S & A Capital Partners, Inc., 431 MOTION for Reconsideratio n re; 423 Memorandum & Opinion Memorandum in support of Partial Reconsideration as to post December 24, 2009 damages filed by 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC, Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC, S & A Capital Partners, Inc. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied. This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry nos. 430 and 431. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 1/22/2021) (ama)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
MORTGAGE RESOLUTION SERVICING,
LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-v-

No. 15 CV 293-LTS-RWL

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before this Court is a motion for partial reconsideration (docket entry nos. 43031, the “Motion”) brought by Plaintiffs Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC, 1st Fidelity Loan
Servicing, LLC, and S&A Capital Partners, Inc. (together, the “Plaintiffs”), of the Court’s
September 27, 2019, Memorandum Opinion and Order (docket entry no. 423, the “September
Order”), in which the Court granted, in relevant part, a motion for summary judgment brought by
Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Chase Home Finance,
LLC (collectively, “Chase” or “Defendants”). In their Motion, Plaintiffs contest the September
Order’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims for alleged breaches that occurred on or
after December 24, 2009, on the basis that the Plaintiffs had failed to proffer sufficient proof of
damages suffered as a consequence of the relevant alleged contract breaches to raise a triable
issue of fact. (See September Order at 24-27.) Plaintiffs argue that reconsideration of the
Court’s decision is warranted because the Court overlooked evidence on the record that could
support a finding of damages, and therefore the Court’s dismissal of the breach of contract
claims at issue here results in both a clear error and manifest injustice. The Court has

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jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332. The Court has reviewed and
considered carefully all of the parties’ submissions and, for the following reasons, Plaintiffs’
Motion is denied. 1
“Reconsideration of a court’s previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.”
MPD Accessories B.V. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 2014 WL 3439316, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15,
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he major grounds justifying
reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd.
v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case
under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the
apple[.”] Analytical Surv., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[U]nless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court[,]” reconsideration is “generally denied.” Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The standard for reconsideration is strict and is
committed to the discretion of the court.” S.E.C. v. Wojeski, 752 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223
(N.D.N.Y. 2010) aff'd sub nom. Smith v. S.E.C., 432 F. App'x 10 (2d Cir. 2011).
The Court, which had reviewed carefully all of the parties’ submissions in
connection with the summary judgment motion practice, granted the relevant aspect of

1

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the background facts of this case, which
are laid out in detail in the Court’s prior Memorandum Opinions and Orders issued in this
case, including the September Order. (See docket entry nos. 140, 288, and 423.)

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Defendants’ motion based on determinations that: the evidence proffered by the Plaintiffs was
insufficient to frame a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiffs’ alleged damages;
the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the legal viability of certain of their theories of damages; and
Plaintiffs’ promise to produce evidence of damages at a later stage through trial testimony was
insufficient to meet their burden at the summary judgment stage to produce hard evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
In their instant Motion, Plaintiffs fail to proffer additional, admissible evidence to
correct the flaws previously found by the Court, identify any clear error in the Court’s reasoning
that warrants reconsideration, or demonstrate that manifest injustice would result from a failure
to reconsider the Court’s decision in the September Order. Rather, Plaintiffs’ Motion consists
primarily of attempts to relitigate issues previously argued in their opposition to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (see docket entry no. 388) and decided by the Court in the
September Order. For example, Plaintiffs argued in the summary judgment motion practice that
“[i]n total, the recorded lien releases and debt forgiveness letters sent by Chase to borrowers
interfered with over $16 million in secured debt after March 1, 2012 alone.” (See docket entry
no. 388 at pg. 5 (citing Plaintiffs’ Counter Statement of Facts, docket entry no. 387 at ¶ 73)
(discussing Chase’s monetary gains resulting from settlement agreements with the U.S.
Government after granting consumer relief on loans sold to Plaintiffs).) In their Motion,
Plaintiffs now reargue this point, without citing any evidence or authority as support, by
submitting that the Court erred by conflating the Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Chase’s
interference with its $16 million in secured debt with Chase’s monetary gains because Plaintiffs
were actually arguing “that Chase’s actions obliterated $16 million in recoverable loan equity.”
(See Motion at 5). Plaintiffs point to nothing in the record that would have supported a

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reasonable determination that the alleged $16 million Chase received in benefits from the United
States government correlated to “recoverable loan equity.” Indeed, Plaintiffs’ conclusory
arguments that the Court’s findings in the September Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ alleged
damages were clearly erroneous or work manifest injustice, without more than a
recharacterization of arguments previously made, are insufficient to warrant reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied. This
Memorandum Order resolves docket entry nos. 430 and 431.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
January 22, 2021
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
United States District Judge

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