Lumpkin et al v. Brehm et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER re: 32 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Lauren Brehm, Shkelzen Ahmetaj, Corporation Counsel. As is clear from the preceding, the Court's resolution of this motion was largely foreordained by the particular subdivision of Rule 12 selected by Defendants; Plaintiffs should not assume that a similar result would obtain had the motion been brought under Rule 56. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants motion to dismiss is DENIED. Defen dants are ORDERED to file their answer on or before February 17, 2017. The parties are further ORDERED to meet and confer in order to submit a case management plan to the Court on or before February 28, 2017. (Shkelzen Ahmetaj answer due 2/17/2017; Lauren Brehm answer due 2/17/2017; John Doe answer due 2/17/2017; Richard Roe answer due 2/17/2017.) (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 1/27/2017) (cla)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JESSICA LUMPKIN and JAYLINA LLOYD,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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DETECTIVE LAUREN BREHM, Shield
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No. 969, DETECTIVE SHKELZEN
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AHMETAJ, Shield No. 6476, DETECTIVE
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“JOHN DOE,” and SERGEANT “RICHARD :
ROE,”
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Defendants. :
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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: January 27, 2017
______________
15 Civ. 839 (KPF)
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Jessica Lumpkin and Jaylina Lloyd — mother and daughter,
respectively — bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New York City
Police Department (“NYPD”) Detectives Lauren Brehm, Shkelzen Ahmetaj, and
John Doe, and NYPD Sergeant Richard Roe (together, “Defendants”).
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (the
“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The brief supporting
Defendants’ motion relies heavily on documents the Court may not consider
under Rule 12(b)(6). Moreover, it cites law that is inapposite to Plaintiffs’
claims. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND 1
A.
Factual Background
Around 6:00 a.m. on July 1, 2014, Detectives Ahmetaj and Doe arrived
at Plaintiffs’ shared apartment in Brooklyn, New York. (SAC ¶¶ 6-7, 15).
Lumpkin was home; Lloyd was not. (Id. at ¶ 16). The detectives had an arrest
warrant for a man who was not then in Plaintiff’s apartment, but they informed
Lumpkin that they were also looking for Lloyd. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-19). Ahmetaj and
Doe then ordered Lumpkin to accompany them to the stationhouse of the
NYPD’s 13th Precinct in Manhattan. (Id. at ¶ 20). Ahmetaj and Doe drove
Lumpkin to the stationhouse, but did not handcuff her. (Id. at ¶ 21).
At the stationhouse, Ahmetaj and Doe took Lumpkin’s shoes and phone,
but told her that she was not under arrest. (SAC ¶¶ 22, 24). This was false:
Lumpkin was under arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23). 2 Brehm told Lumpkin as much,
then handcuffed Lumpkin. (Id. at ¶ 25). And at around 1:00 p.m., Brehm
ordered Lumpkin to call Lloyd in order to “get [Lloyd] to come to the
stationhouse.” (Id. at ¶ 26). Roe informed Lumpkin “that she would not be
released from custody until she produced her daughter.” (Id. at ¶ 28).
1
This Opinion draws on facts from Plaintiffs’ SAC (Dkt. #18) and Exhibits (“SAC, Ex.”) A
(Dkt. #18-1), B (Dkt. #18-2), and C (Dkt. #18-3) attached to it. See, e.g., Goel v. Bunge,
Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016). The parties have divergent views on whether the
Court may look beyond the SAC and its Exhibits in resolving Defendants’ motion to
dismiss; the Court explores this issue infra. For ease of reference, the Court refers to
Defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss as “Def. Br.” (Dkt. #33),
to Plaintiffs’ opposition as “Pl. Opp.” (Dkt. #35), and to Defendants’ reply as “Def. Reply”
(Dkt. #39).
2
Defendants concede that “Lumpkin was under arrest at the time Detective Ahmetaj
arrived at her home.” (Def. Br. 9 n.2).
2
Because Lloyd did not pick up her phone when Lumpkin called her,
Lumpkin remained at the stationhouse, “illegally held hostage,” for roughly
nine hours. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 29, 30-31). Brehm released Lumpkin only after she
promised to produce Lloyd at the stationhouse on some future date. (Id. at
¶ 31). In exchange, Brehm issued Lumpkin a desk appearance ticket that
“falsely and maliciously accuse[d] [Lumpkin] of petit larceny” and ordered
Lumpkin to appear before the Criminal Court of the City of New York on
August 5, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 39; id. at Ex. A). Brehm promised Lumpkin
that she would void the desk appearance ticket once Lloyd came to the
stationhouse, but never followed through. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 38).
Lloyd went to the stationhouse at around 9:00 a.m. on July 17, 2014.
(SAC ¶ 35). Around 12:30 a.m. on July 18, after “the New York County District
Attorney” determined that “there was not probable cause for [Lloyd’s] arrest,”
Lloyd was released. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37).
Lumpkin appeared in Criminal Court on August 5, 2014. (SAC ¶ 39).
But that same day, Lumpkin received from the District Attorney’s Office a
document indicating that it “was not ready to proceed with [her] prosecution.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 40-41; id. at Ex. B). And when Lumpkin’s attorney called the District
Attorney’s Office on December 29, 2014, he learned “that the charge against
[Lumpkin] had been dismissed and sealed.” (Id. at ¶ 42; id. at Ex. C).
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on February 4, 2015. (Dkt. #1).
After a conference with the Court on April 14, 2016 (see Dkt. #22), Plaintiffs
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submitted an amended complaint (Dkt. #16). And on April 21, 2016, Plaintiffs
filed the SAC, the operative complaint in this case. (Dkt. #18; see Dkt. #20).
Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on August 8, 2016. (Dkt. #32).
Plaintiffs responded on September 7, 2016 (Dkt. #35), and briefing concluded
when Defendants submitted their reply on September 23, 2016 (Dkt. #39).
DISCUSSION
A.
Applicable Law
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A “plausible” claim is one
“that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As relevant here, “[a] complaint based
upon a violation of [§] 1983 that does not allege facts establishing the personal
involvement of an individual defendant fails as a matter of law.” Banks v. Cty.
of Westchester, 168 F. Supp. 3d 682, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted).
B.
Analysis
The SAC raises two claims. First, both Plaintiffs argue that they were
arrested (Lumpkin on July 1, and Lloyd on July 17) without probable cause.
The SAC does not specify the Defendants against whom Plaintiffs bring their
false-arrest claims. (See SAC ¶¶ 43-44). As far as the Court can tell, Lumpkin
brings her false-arrest claim against all four Defendants, while Lloyd brings her
false-arrest claim against Detective Ahmetaj alone. Second, Lumpkin alleges
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that Detective Brehm detained her for an unconstitutionally long period of time
(nine hours) before releasing her on July 1. 3
But the issue the parties contest most vigorously is prefatory: What
documents may the Court consider in deciding this Opinion? Defendants
argue that this is an open-and-shut identity-fraud case: Lloyd stole an out-ofstate tourist’s debit-card number, which Plaintiffs then used to pay for laundry
services. (Def. Br. 2-3). And Defendants substantiate that narrative with six
exhibits attached to the Declaration of Joshua Friedman (“Friedman
Declaration” (Dkt. #34)). The exhibits include an affidavit from Plaintiffs’ victim
(Friedman Decl., Ex. A); 4 emails between Detective Brehm and the laundry
service Plaintiffs patronized (id. at Ex. B); and a document which allegedly
shows that Lumpkin spent just six hours at the 13th Precinct’s stationhouse
on July 1 (id. at Ex. F; see Def. Br. 3).
Defendants insist that the Friedman Declaration’s six exhibits establish
that Plaintiffs’ suit lacks merit. Maybe so. But the Court cannot consider any
of these exhibits at this stage. “[A] court adjudicating … a [Rule 12(b)(6)]
3
Or so the parties seem to think. It is not clear from the face of the SAC that Lumpkin is
raising an excessive-detention claim. The parties, however, have briefed this issue.
(See Def. Br. 16; Pl. Opp. 14; Def. Reply 7). For this reason, the Court will proceed on
the assumption that Lumpkin brings a claim for excessive detention.
4
In this affidavit, Plaintiffs’ alleged victim avers that her “debit card information” was
compromised. (Friedman Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 7; see id. at ¶¶ 3, 4, 8 (referring to card as one
issued by a bank)). Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiffs stole this tourist’s credit
card information. (Def. Br. 2-3). The Court assumes that this is an oversight on
Defendants’ part, and that their intention was to argue that Plaintiffs fraudulently used
a debit or bank card. (But see Friedman Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 10 (“I corresponded with
Detective Lauren Brehm and informed her that someone stole my credit card
information[.]”)). To be clear, apart from resolving this minor and non-dispositive
factual discrepancy, the Court does not rely on the Friedman Declaration nor on any of
its exhibits.
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motion may review only a narrow universe of materials … [including] facts
stated on the face of the complaint, ... documents appended to the complaint or
incorporated in the complaint by reference, and ... matters of which judicial
notice may be taken.” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That universe may also
encompass documents “‘integral’ to the complaint”; “[a] document is integral to
the complaint where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants argue that the Friedman Declaration’s six exhibits are either
integral to the SAC or subject to judicial notice. Defendants are mistaken.
None of these exhibits is mentioned in, let alone “integral” to, the SAC. And
even if the Court could take notice of these exhibits — a proposition the Court
doubts seriously — it could not glean from them the facts Defendants adduce
in their brief. See Bloomingburg Jewish Educ. Ctr. v. Vill. of Bloomingburg, N.Y.,
111 F. Supp. 3d 459, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“When [a] Court takes judicial notice
of a document, it takes notice of the document’s existence, not the truth of the
statements asserted in the document.”). Consequently, the Court will not
consider the Friedman Declaration nor any of its exhibits. It will instead review
the SAC, the three exhibits attached thereto, and nothing more. 5
5
Defendants’ misapprehension of the relevant law in this regard is particularly
perplexing, inasmuch as the topic of what documents could properly be considered in a
motion to dismiss was clearly discussed during the premotion conference held on
April 14, 2016. (See Transcript of Proceedings of April 14, 2016 at 3 (Dkt. #22)).
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Because Defendants rely heavily on the Friedman Declaration’s exhibits
in their brief, that conclusion streamlines this Opinion’s analysis. Both
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for false arrest. And Lumpkin has stated a claim
for excessive detention. The Court considers each claim in turn.
1.
Both Plaintiffs Have Alleged a Plausible False-Arrest Claim
“Under New York law,” which governs Plaintiffs’ false-arrest claims, “an
action for false arrest requires that the plaintiff show that [i] the defendant
intended to confine him, [ii] the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,
[iii] the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement[,] and [iv] the confinement
was not otherwise privileged.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19
(2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), as amended (Dec. 4,
2012); Sforza v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 6122 (DLC), 2009 WL 857496, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (citation omitted). “To avoid liability for a claim of
false arrest, an arresting officer may demonstrate that either [i] he had
probable cause for the arrest, or [ii] he is protected from liability because he
has qualified immunity.” Simpson v. City of N.Y., 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir.
2015). And “[a]n officer is entitled to qualified immunity … if he can establish
that he had ‘arguable probable cause’ to arrest the plaintiff,” which requires
the officer to demonstrate “either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer
to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Garcia v. Does,
779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation mark and citations omitted).
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Defendants appear to argue that Detectives Brehm and Ahmetaj had
probable cause to arrest Lumpkin and Lloyd or, at minimum, arguable
probable cause sufficient to warrant qualified immunity. (Def. Br. 5-10). They
do not address Detective Doe or Sergeant Roe. For the sake of completeness,
the Court will.
Because “an officer who cannot establish arguable probable cause
necessarily cannot establish probable cause,” Tompkins v. City of N.Y., 50 F.
Supp. 3d 426, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), the Court proceeds directly to consider
whether the officers who arrested Lumpkin and Lloyd enjoy qualified immunity.
And because Defendants have raised qualified immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, they must demonstrate that facts establishing arguable probable cause
are “clear from the face of the [SAC].” Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305,
316 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). That is “a formidable hurdle.” McKenna v. Wright, 386
F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 2004).
Defendants have not overcome that hurdle. To start, nothing in the SAC
establishes that Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Lumpkin.
Ahmetaj and Doe arrived at Plaintiffs’ apartment with an arrest warrant. It
wasn’t for Lumpkin. Nonetheless, and for no apparent reason, they ordered
Lumpkin to come with them to the 13th Precinct’s stationhouse. Brehm
handcuffed Lumpkin and ordered her to call Lloyd. And Roe told Lumpkin that
she could not leave the stationhouse until she convinced Lloyd to come there
as well. All four Defendants confined Lumpkin against her will and without
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arguable probable cause. Lumpkin has thus alleged plausibly that Defendants
falsely arrested her.
Lloyd has also plausibly alleged that Ahmetaj effected a false arrest.
Ahmetaj arrested Lloyd when she arrived at the 13th Precinct on the morning
of July 17, 2014. Some fifteen-and-a-half hours later, Lloyd was released after
the District Attorney’s Office determined it lacked probable cause to prosecute
her. Nothing in the SAC suggests that Ahmetaj had arguable probable cause to
confine Lloyd for that period. Lloyd, like Lumpkin, has thus stated a claim for
false arrest.
2.
Lumpkin Has Alleged a Plausible Excessive-Detention Claim
Lumpkin alleges that Brehm detained her for an unconstitutionally
excessive time — nine hours — on July 1. Defendants, relying on an exhibit to
the Friedman Declaration, retort that Lumpkin spent only six hours at the
stationhouse that day. But the crux of their argument is that Lumpkin’s
excessive-detention claims fails as a matter of law under City of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), because Lumpkin was detained for fewer than
48 hours.
These arguments miss their mark. On the facts, the Court must accept
Lumpkin’s allegation that she spent nine hours at the stationhouse on July 1.
And on the law, the Court rejects the talismanic significance Defendants attach
to McLaughlin. McLaughlin’s rule is that an individual arrested without a
warrant must receive a “judicial determination[] of probable cause within 48
hours of [his] arrest.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56. That holding does not
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speak to Lumpkin’s excessive-detention claim, which Lumpkin predicates on
her allegation that Brehm “held [her] hostage” until Lumpkin promised to
produce Lloyd. (Pl. Opp. 14).
A more apt precedent is Russo v. City of Bridgeport, where the Second
Circuit read Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), to establish an
individual’s right to be free “from a sustained detention stemming directly
from … law enforcement officials’ refusal to investigate available exculpatory
evidence.” 479 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2007). Russo “permits recovery for
excessive pre-trial detention where a [p]laintiff can show [i] that [she] has a
right to be free from continued detention stemming from law enforcement
officials’ mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence, [ii] that the
actions of the officers violated that right, and [iii] that the officers’ conduct
‘shocks the conscience.’’” Gonzalez v. N.Y. City, No. 16 Civ. 254 (CM), 2016 WL
7188147, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Russo, 479 F.3d at 205).
Russo’s eponymous plaintiff spent 217 days in custody, far longer than
Lumpkin was “held hostage.” Russo, 479 F.3d at 208. But Russo “set no
bright-line rule” for determining the amount of time after which a pretrial
detainee’s confinement violates the Constitution. Gonzalez, 2016 WL 7188147,
at *4; cf. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (“[A] detention of three days over a New Year’s
weekend does not and could not amount to [a constitutional] deprivation.”).
Rather, Russo’s “touchstone is whether the defendants’ actions were objectively
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reasonable under the circumstances.” Gallimore v. Feliciano, No. 14 Civ. 1519
(NSR), 2015 WL 3856694, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015).
Based on the facts alleged in the SAC, coupled with Defendants’ failure
to address squarely this issue, Lumpkin has stated a claim for excessive
detention. Lumpkin alleges that Brehm, without probable cause, arrested and
detained Lumpkin in order to force her to bring Lloyd to the stationhouse. By
Lumpkin’s account, Brehm overlooked the lack of evidence inculpating
Lumpkin for any crime, but calculatedly detained Lumpkin to reach her
daughter. Without a relevant counterargument from Defendants, the Court is
constrained to conclude that Lumpkin plausibly states a claim under Russo.
CONCLUSION
As is clear from the preceding, the Court’s resolution of this motion was
largely foreordained by the particular subdivision of Rule 12 selected by
Defendants; Plaintiffs should not assume that a similar result would obtain
had the motion been brought under Rule 56. For the reasons set forth above,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. Defendants are ORDERED to file
their answer on or before February 17, 2017. The parties are further
ORDERED to meet and confer in order to submit a case management plan to
the Court on or before February 28, 2017.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
January 27, 2017
New York, New York
__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
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