Soberanis v. The City of N.Y. et al

Filing 62

OPINION AND ORDER: re: 48 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by The City of N.Y. For the foregoing reasons, the City's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 48) is granted. The Clerk is requested to enter judgment and to close this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein on 3/23/2017) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
ERNESTO SOBERANIS,
:
Plaintiff,
:
-v.:
CITY OF NEW YORK,

OPINION AND ORDER
15 Civ. 1161 (GWG)

:

Defendant.
:
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GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Ernesto Soberanis, currently an inmate in the Watertown Correctional Facility in
Watertown, New York, brought this suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New
York (“the City”) and the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (“DOCCS”). Complaint, dated Feb. 16, 2015 (Docket # 2) (“Compl.”). Soberanis
alleges that he was illegally confined at the Queensboro Correctional Facility (“Queensboro”) in
New York City for approximately two weeks. See id. at *2, *8.1 DOCCS was previously
dismissed as a defendant. See Order, dated Mar. 31, 2015 (Docket # 6). The sole remaining
defendant in this case, the City, has moved for summary judgment.2

1

2

“*___” refers to page numbers assigned by the ECF system.

See Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 21, 2016 (Docket # 48);
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, dated Nov. 21,
2016 (Docket # 49) (“56.1 Statement”); Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 21, 2016 (Docket # 50); Declaration of Okwede N. Okoh in
Support of City Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, dated Nov. 21, 2016 (Docket # 51) (“Okoh Decl.”); Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 21, 2016 (Docket
# 52) (“Def. Mem.”); “Memo Endorsed Letter from Ernesto Soberanis,” dated Nov. 29, 2016
(Docket # 53); “Memo Endorsed Letter from Ernesto Soberanis,” dated Dec. 12, 2016 (Docket
# 54); Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgement, dated Dec. 14, 2016 (Docket # 55) (“Pl.

For the following reasons, the City’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.

FACTS
On a motion for summary judgment, we “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion,” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted) — in this
case, Soberanis.3
On September 3, 2014, while he was on parole for a 2006 burglary conviction, Soberanis
was arrested for another burglary. See “Transcript of Deposition of Ernesto Soberanis,” dated
Aug. 23, 2016 (attached as Ex. B to Okoh Decl.) (“Pl. Dep.”), 28:24-29:2, 31:5-20. That arrest
resulted in Soberanis being sentenced to serve 90 days in jail at Queensboro for a violation of his
parole. See 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 2-4; Pl. Dep. 34:4-35:13.
On December 22, 2014, while Soberanis was serving his sentence for the parole
violation, see 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1-2; Pl. Dep. 34:4-35:13, a Bronx County Supreme Court
Justice, Justice Richard Lee Price, issued an Order to Produce, which recited that Soberanis had
been indicted, see Order to Produce, dated Dec. 22, 2014 (attached as Ex. C to Okoh Decl.)

Opp’n”); Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of the City of New York’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated Jan. 25, 2017 (Docket # 57) (“Def. Reply”).
3

The City accurately points out that Soberanis failed to submit a response to the City’s
Local Rule 56.1 statement and asks that its contentions be deemed admitted. See Def. Reply
at 3. In light of Soberanis’s pro se status, and the fact that he submitted a sworn statement in
opposition to the City’s motion, we elect to ignore this procedural failure. See, e.g.,
Mateo v. Bristow, 2014 WL 4631569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014) (“Given that [plaintiff] is
proceeding pro se and made an effort to respond to the motion for summary judgment by
submitting an affidavit, this Court exercises its discretion to excuse [plaintiff’s] failure
to the extent that [plaintiff] has provided admissible evidence controverting the facts in
defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement.”) (citations omitted). Soberanis’s failure is of no practical
significance inasmuch as the parties agree on the essential facts.
2

(“Order to Produce”) — apparently for an April 2014 burglary, not the September 2014 burglary,
see Pl. Dep. 31:14-32:16, 34:4-36:6, 37:20-42:4; 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 3-5. The Order to Produce
required that the Warden of Queensboro produce Soberanis in Bronx County Supreme Court on
December 24, 2014, so that the Bronx District Attorney could proceed on the indictment against
him. The record contains a copy of the arrest warrant related to the indictment for the April
burglary. Warrant of Arrest, dated Dec. 23, 2014 (attached as Ex. D to Okoh Decl.) (“Warrant”);
see also 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 5-7; Pl. Opp’n at *1. The Order to Produce directed that Soberanis be
“returned” to Queensboro following his court appearance.
Queensboro is a New York State correctional facility. 56.1 Statement ¶ 1; Pl. Dep.
30:18-21. In compliance with the Order to Produce, two New York State correctional officers
took Soberanis to the Bronx County courthouse on December 24, 2014. Pl. Dep. 38:4-39:20.
The court was closed, however, and Soberanis was not arraigned. See 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 9-10;
Pl. Dep. 39:21-40:12.4 The officers then took Soberanis to the New York Police Department’s
(“NYPD”) 42nd Precinct, where detectives processed Soberanis’s arrest on the warrant. 56.1
Statement ¶¶ 7-10; accord Compl. at *8; Pl. Dep. 40:11-42:12. After the arrest, Soberanis was
returned to the Queensboro facility. 56.1 Statement ¶ 10; accord Compl. at *8; Pl. Dep. 40:3-20.
Soberanis alleges that he was due to be released from Queensboro on December 24,
2014, and asserts that the Superintendent of Queensboro “kept [Soberanis] there for 2 weeks

4

We thus accept Soberanis’s assertion, Pl. Opp’n at *2, that, notwithstanding a
document that indicates he was arraigned on December 24, 2014, at 11:14 a.m, see id. at *13, he
was not in fact arraigned on that date.
3

until 1/7/15,” despite having “no right to hold [Soberanis] there.” Compl. at *8. Soberanis was
kept in the “SHU” at Queensboro during this period. Pl. Dep. 44:6-46:13.5
On January 7, 2015, Soberanis was brought to court again and was arraigned on the
indictment referenced in the Order to Produce. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 12; Pl. Dep. 46:4-16, 57:716. Soberanis ultimately pled guilty to the burglary charged in the indictment (as well as to
another burglary) and was sentenced to 2-1/2 to 5 years imprisonment. Pl. Dep. 57:25-58:9.
II.

LAW GOVERNING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is

appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Tolan v.
Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, “[t]he evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed,” and the court must draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of the
non-moving party. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970)); accord Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. Nevertheless, once the moving party has shown that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, “the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

5

SHU is the “Special Housing Unit,” a form of solitary confinement in a New York
State prison facility. See generally Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 62, 64-65 & n.3 (2d Cir.
2004) (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 304.1-.14, 305.1-.6); see also Pl. Dep.
27:8-9 (confirming that when Soberanis says “SHU” he refers to “solitary”).
4

(1986) (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted), and “may not rely on
conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d
368, 373-74 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jeffreys v. City of New
York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005)). In other words, the nonmovant must offer “concrete
evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256. Where “the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is
warranted if the nonmovant fails to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to [its] case.’” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (alteration in
original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Thus, “[a] defendant
moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough
evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its
case.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
Because Soberanis is proceeding pro se, we construe his papers “liberally and interpret
them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” E.g., McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d
276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “our
application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to meet the
requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony
Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). These
requirements include “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

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III.

DISCUSSION
On March 31, 2015, Judge Torres dismissed all claims against DOCCS on Eleventh

Amendment grounds. See Order, dated Mar. 31, 2015 (Docket # 6). Thus, no New York State
actors or entities are defendants in this matter. Only the City of New York remains as a
defendant. We will put to the side the fact that Soberanis has not purported to sue any individual
City employees or officials, and that his only potential claim in this case is thus based on proving
the existence of an unconstitutional “policy or custom” as described in Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Whether this suit was brought against individual
officers or against the City, it would have to be dismissed as Soberanis has not shown a federal
constitutional violation by any City actor.
The only claims made in the complaint arise from the actions of the two NYPD
detectives who arrested Soberanis on the burglary warrant. Soberanis’s claim arises from the
fact that the two detectives did not take him to central booking and to court for arraignment
immediately following his arrest, but instead returned Soberanis to the custody of Queensboro,
where he remained for two weeks. Compl. at *8. In other words, Soberanis asserts that he was
improperly confined at Queensboro rather than being brought to court to be arraigned on the
indictment.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create any federal rights;
rather, it provides a mechanism to enforce rights established elsewhere. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002); accord Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch.
6

Dist., 423 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
816 (1985)).
To the extent Soberanis intends to bring a claim for false arrest, any such claim would
fail because the existence of an arrest warrant, as was true here, vitiates any claim of false arrest.
See, e.g., Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of
probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest . . . . ”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Pugh, 2013 WL
3013661, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) (“Where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, a
plaintiff cannot make the essential showing that defendant confined him without justification;
thus, there can be no claim for false arrest under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).6
Soberanis, however, states that he is not asserting a claim for false arrest. See Pl. Opp’n
at *1. Instead, he asserts that his continued detention at Queensboro was improper because he
was not brought to a judge for arraignment. See Letter from Ernesto Soberanis, dated Dec. 3,
2015 (attached to Order, dated Dec. 9, 2015 (Docket # 19)) (“Soberanis Letter”) (“My only point

6

Soberanis questions the validity of the warrant by noting that the Order to Produce
recites that a warrant was issued on December 22, 2014, but that the warrant in the record is
dated December 23, 2014. See Pl. Opp’n at *1. While the City has not explained this
discrepancy, it does not affect our analysis. The discrepancy may be explained by the fact that
there was at one time an arrest warrant dated December 22, 2014, or that the date on the Order to
Produce was in error. In any event, Soberanis has provided no evidence that the December 23,
2014, warrant was not itself valid. Moreover, Soberanis was indicted prior to his arrest and that
indictment by itself provides probable cause vitiating any claim of false arrest. See, e.g.,
Zanfardino v. City of New York, 2017 WL 476725, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (“Because
Plaintiff alleges that he was detained by [a detective] only after the grand jury issued the
indictment — and was therefore only detained pursuant to legal process — the facts alleged in
the complaint cannot form the basis for a claim of false arrest.”).
Soberanis also denies the City’s unsupported claim, see Def. Mem. at 4, that he was
aware of the warrant before his arrest, see Pl. Opp’n at *1. However, Soberanis’s awareness of
the warrant plays no role in our reasoning.
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of contention is that my civil/criminal rights were trampled from 12/24/14 thru 1/7/15. I was rearrested and I was never afforded an[] opportunity to see a judge for arraignment as is required
by law ‘without unne[cessa]ry delay.’”) (capitalization omitted). If we construe this claim as
asserting that Queensboro should have released Soberanis on December 24, 2014, following the
failed arraignment attempt, the problem with this claim is that the City police officers did not
have custody of Soberanis after they processed him at the police station and returned him to
Queensboro. The Order to Produce required Soberanis’s return to Queensboro, and Soberanis
was returned there on December 24, 2014. If Queensboro was not entitled to hold him after that
date, any claim relating to Soberanis’s confinement at Queensboro would have to be brought
against a New York State actor, not a City actor.
Soberanis’s challenge may be construed as focusing on the fact that the City delayed
arranging to have him arraigned for two weeks following his arrest. As Soberanis notes, see Pl.
Opp’n at *3; Soberanis Letter, section 120.90(1) of New York State’s Criminal Procedure Law
requires an officer making an arrest on a warrant to “without unnecessary delay bring the
defendant before the local criminal court in which such warrant is returnable.” While the delay
here — even assuming it was attributable to City employees — may constitute a statutory
violation of state criminal law, it does not result in a federal constitutional claim. In considering
New York’s similarly-worded statute regarding speedy arraignment following a warrantless
arrest, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.20(1), the Second Circuit squarely held that because the
statute was “a state rule of criminal procedure,” it “does not create a liberty interest that is
entitled to protection under the federal Constitution,” Watson v. City of New York, 92 F.3d 31,
37-38 (2d Cir. 1996); accord Simmons v. Kelly, 2009 WL 857410, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2009) (New York Criminal Procedure Law § 140.20(1) “does not create a
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constitutionally-protected right”). Thus, there is no federal constitutional violation created by
the similarly-worded New York Criminal Procedure Law § 120.90(1) where a person is not
timely arraigned following an arrest based on a warrant.7
Certainly, the Fourth Amendment requires a speedy arraignment following an arrest
made without probable cause, such as a warrantless arrest. See County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (“States must provide a fair and reliable determination of
probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.”)
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
(1975)). In such a circumstance, the arraignment is normally expected to occur within 48 hours.
See id. at 56. Here, however, there was already a probable cause determination made by virtue
of the indictment. Thus, the doctrine articulated in County of Riverside does not apply.
As the City notes, the case of Wells v. Manhattan Criminal Court Arraignment # 3, 2000
WL 460458 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000), involved claims nearly identical to those of Soberanis. In
Wells, the plaintiff was due to be released from a Brooklyn detention center when he was
informed that a Manhattan arrest warrant had been issued against him. Id. at *1. Because of the
arrest warrant, the plaintiff was detained for over two weeks until he was finally arraigned. Id.
As was true here, the plaintiff in Wells brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for the delay in his
arraignment. See id. The court in Wells noted that the federal constitution requires speedy
arraignment only when there has been an arrest without a probable cause determination. Id. at
*1-2. It went on to state:

7

Watson also held that there is no cause of action under state law in this situation. See
92 F.3d at 36-37.
9

[Plaintiff] acknowledges that he was held based on an outstanding warrant.
Moreover, he does not allege that he was denied any particular right that a prompt
arraignment is designed to secure. Instead, he claims that the delay itself, and the
daily transportation between Brooklyn and Manhattan during the time before he
was arraigned, violated his constitutional rights. Absent an allegation of the
deprivation of a right secured by prompt arraignment, however, a delay in
arraignment does not in itself support a cause of action under Section 1983.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). The same analysis applies here.
In Wells, the court concluded that a remedy for a delay in arraignment might be available
in a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. (citations omitted). As stated in Wells, the elements of
a malicious prosecution claim are “(1) the defendant commenced a criminal proceeding against
[the plaintiff]; (2) the proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant did not have
probable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged; and (4) the defendant
acted with actual malice.” Id. (citation omitted); accord Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d
72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). The court in Wells held that because the plaintiff had
failed to allege that the related criminal proceedings ended in his favor, he had failed to state a
claim for malicious prosecution. 2000 WL 460458, at *2-3.
We agree with the reasoning in Wells. Any potential claim for malicious prosecution
would fail because Soberanis pled guilty to the burglary charge. See Pl. Dep. 57:25-58:9. Thus,
there was not a “termination of the proceeding in [Soberanis’s] favor.” Mitchell, 841 F.3d at 79.
Because this is a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim, his challenge to the delay
in arraignment must fail.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion for summary judgment (Docket # 48) is

granted. The Clerk is requested to enter judgment and to close this case.

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