Geo-Group Communications, Inc. v. Goldberg et al

Filing 412

OPINION AND ORDER re: 368 MOTION to Set Aside Judgment in favor of Ravi Chopra and NYC Telecom as more fully described in GCI's Notice of Motion. filed by Geo-Group Communications, Inc. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to reopen the judgment in this matter is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at docket number 368 (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 9/26/2023) (rro)

Case 1:15-cv-01756-KPF Document 412 Filed 09/26/23 Page 1 of 46

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GEO-GROUP COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
-v.-

15 Civ. 1756 (KPF)

RAVI CHOPRA; MAHENDRA SHAH; VIPIN SHAH; 728
OPINION AND ORDER
MELVILLE PETRO LLC; KEDIS ENTERPRISES LLC;
JMVD HILLSIDE LLC; NYC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORP.,
Defendants.
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Once again, this Court finds itself considering a motion by Plaintiff GeoGroup Communications, Inc. (“Geo-Group”) to reopen this eight-year-old case.
This time, Plaintiff alleges that previously-dismissed Defendants Ravi Chopra
(“Chopra”) and NYC Telecommunications, Inc. (“NYC Telecom,” and together
with Chopra, “Respondents”) engaged in misconduct and fraud on the Court in
connection with their 2017 motion for summary judgment, thereby entitling
Plaintiff to relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 60(d).
At the heart of Plaintiff’s motion is a set of decades-old documents from
non-party Jaina, a customer of Geo-Group and the subject of the arbitral
award that precipitated the instant litigation. Plaintiff contends that these
documents, which Plaintiff first received from Defendant Vipin Shah (“V. Shah”)
and his wife, non-party Nayana Shah (“N. Shah”), on or about November 2,
2021, prove that Chopra proffered false testimony earlier in the litigation.

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Respondents vigorously oppose Plaintiff’s motion on two broad bases.
First, Respondents argue that Plaintiff’s motion was not brought within a
reasonable time, and that Plaintiff must bear the consequences of its tardiness.
Second, Respondents maintain that Plaintiff mischaracterizes the substance of
the documents, which Respondents claim are actually consistent with Chopra’s
prior testimony, such that Plaintiff cannot establish that Respondents engaged
in fraud or misconduct. For the reasons set forth in the remainder of this
Opinion, the Court agrees with Respondents, and finds that Plaintiff cannot
carry its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it is
entitled to the extraordinary relief it seeks under Rule 60.
BACKGROUND 1
A.

The Litigation and Its Antecedents
The instant motion is the latest chapter in an eight-year-old saga to

confirm an arbitral award, and the facts associated with the underlying
litigation are detailed in the Court’s numerous prior opinions, all of which are
incorporated by reference. See Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chopra, No. 15 Civ.
1

The facts set forth in this Opinion are drawn from the parties’ submissions in
connection with the instant motion. The exhibits attached to Govind Vanjani’s
(“Vanjani”) Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen are referred to as “Pl.
Decl., Ex. []” (Dkt. #370), and the exhibits attached to Vanjani’s Supplemental
Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen are referred to as “Pl. Reply Decl.,
Ex. []” (Dkt. #402). The exhibits attached to Humayun Siddiqi’s (“Siddiqi”) Declaration
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen are referred to as “Resp. Decl., Ex []” (Dkt.
#388). Plaintiff’s moving brief is referred to as “Pl. Br.” (Dkt. #369); Respondents’ brief
in opposition is referred to as “Resp. Opp.” (Dkt. #387); Plaintiff’s reply is referred to as
“Pl. Reply” (Dkt. #401); and Respondents’ reply is referred to as “Resp. Reply” (Dkt.
#406). The Court has also considered materials submitted by the parties in connection
with prior motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration; references to those
materials are made using the citing conventions identified in Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Chopra, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2018 WL 3632498, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018)
(“Geo-Group III”).

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1756 (KPF), 2016 WL 390089 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2016) (“Geo-Group I”); Geo-Grp.
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chopra, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2016 WL 4098552 (S.D.N.Y.
July 27, 2016) (“Geo-Group II”); Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chopra, No. 15 Civ.
1756 (KPF), 2018 WL 3632498 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018) (“Geo-Group III”); GeoGrp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shah, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2020 WL 5743516
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2020) (“Geo-Group IV”); Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shah,
No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2020 WL 6729181 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (“Geo-Group
V”); Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shah, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2021 WL
2822564 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2021) (“Geo-Group VI”). Because Plaintiff’s Rule
60(b) and Rule 60(d) requests are grounded in alleged misconduct during this
litigation, the Court here summarizes the relevant factual and procedural
histories necessary to resolve the motion.
1.

The Parties

Geo-Group “is a telecommunications company that was in the business
of buying minutes from carriers and reselling those minutes to an array of
customers.” Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *2. Chopra is the president
of NYC Telecom, a company that sells phone cards and phone card subscriber
identification modules (or SIMs). Id. Non-party Jaina was a customer of GeoGroup. Id. Previously-dismissed Defendant Mahendra Shah (“M. Shah”) was
both a shareholder and the President of Jaina; previously-dismissed Defendant
Vipin Shah (together with M. Shah, the “Shah Defendants”) is Mahendra
Shah’s brother; and non-party Nayana Shah is Vipin Shah’s wife and a Jaina
shareholder. Id. Both Vipin and Nayana Shah often transferred money to

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Jaina. Id. During the relevant time period, Surajit Bose (“Bose”) was the CEO
of Jaina, and Jagdish Alwani (“Alwani”) was Jaina’s accountant. Id. Bose is
believed to be living abroad, while Alwani passed away before this litigation was
filed. Id. Also relevant to the current motion are several previously-dismissed
corporate Defendants, including 728 Melville Petro LLC (“Melville”), Kedis
Enterprises LLC (“Kedis”), and JMVD Hillside LLC (“JMVD,” and together with
Melville and Kedis, the “LLC Defendants”).
2.

The 2015 Arbitral Award and the Inception of the Geo-Group
Litigation

More than ten years ago, on May 30, 2013, Plaintiff commenced an
arbitration against Jaina to recover an alleged debt. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL
3632498, at *2. On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff prevailed in that proceeding, and
the award was later confirmed in New York County Supreme Court in a
judgment entered on April 3, 2015, in the amount of $2,712,175.51. Id. When
Plaintiff was thwarted in its efforts to collect on this debt, it filed the instant
case on March 9, 2015 (Dkt. #1), naming a slew of individuals who Plaintiff
alleged had improperly received funds from Jaina while it was subject to the
arbitral proceeding and award. Geo-Group II, 2016 WL 4098552, at *1. As
relevant here, Plaintiff originally alleged that between February 2, 2014, and
October 1, 2014, Jaina made payments to the law firm then known as
Robinson Brog Leninard Green Genovese & Gluck, P.C. (“Robinson Brog”),
totaling $1,350,000, in order to satisfy Chopra’s personal debt to the law firm.
Id. at *2. These payments are referred to herein as the “Robinson Brog
Transfers.”
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Plaintiff separately alleged that Jaina made another set of transfers at
Chopra’s behest, this time to the LLC Defendants. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL
3632498, at *4 This set of transactions, herein referred to as the “LLC
Transfers,” consists of transfers by Jaina totaling $460,000 to Melville in
October 2014; $200,000 to Kedis in January 2014; and $200,000 to JMVD on
August 13, 2014. Id. As its legal basis for relief, Plaintiff relied on several
sections of Article 10 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law (the “NYDCL”),
namely Sections 273, 273-A, 274, and 276, which establish the circumstances
in which a conveyance constitutes constructive or actual fraud. Id. at *7-8; see
generally N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law §§ 273, 273-A, 274, 276. 2 In broad
summary, Plaintiff alleged that the Robinson Brog Transfers and the LLC
Transfers (together, the “Disputed Transfers”) were constructive or actual
fraudulent conveyances, such that Respondents and the LLC Defendants,
among others, were liable to Plaintiff for the funds.
On February 1, 2016, the Court denied in part Chopra’s motion to
dismiss, while granting in full the respective motions to dismiss filed by the
Shah and LLC Defendants. See Geo-Group I, 2016 WL 390089, at *1.
However, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to replead, and Plaintiff exercised
this grant by filing its Third Amended Complaint (or “TAC”) against
Respondents, the Shah Defendants, and the LLC Defendants on February 22,
2

As Respondents note (Resp. Opp. 3 n.1), New York enacted a version of the Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”) on April 4, 2020, which replaced the Debtor and
Creditor Law, including the provisions related to fraudulent conveyances. See Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act, N.Y. Laws 2019, ch. 580, sec. 2, §§ 270-281, eff. April 4,
2020. The UVTA is not retroactive, and the transactions in this case are still governed
by the old Debtor and Creditor Law.

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2016. (Dkt. #105 (TAC)). The Shah Defendants and the LLC Defendants once
again moved to dismiss, on which motions the Court ruled in an Opinion and
Order dated July 27, 2016. Geo-Group II, 2016 WL 4098552, at *2. This time,
the Court denied the Shah Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but granted the LLC
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Id. at *1. In doing so, the Court found that
Plaintiff could not state a claim for constructive or actual fraudulent
conveyance against the LLC Defendants because Plaintiff could not plausibly
establish either that the LLC Defendants had any connection to M. Shah,
Chopra, and/or Jaina such that the LLC Defendants would have been aware of
the arbitration and award, or that there was any lack of fair consideration
underpinning the LLC Transfers. See id. at *5-7.
The parties that remained in the case commenced discovery on
September 14, 2016, but discovery was subsequently stayed on January 27,
2017, in light of the Shah Defendants’ bankruptcy filings in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL
3632498, at *6. On July 25, 2017, the stay was lifted and discovery resumed.
Id. During discovery, Plaintiff took a number of depositions, most notably of
Chopra on August 28 and 29, 2017. (See Pl. Decl., Ex. 16-17 (transcripts)).
Additionally, Plaintiff deposed the owners of two entities — TD Time and Vision
Impex — that were the apparent recipients of the Robinson Brog Transfers.
(See Pl. Decl., Ex. 14 (Surjeet Singh (TD Time) transcript); id., Ex. 15 (Dalip
Kumar (Vision Impex) transcript)). Plaintiff also deposed V. Shah on August 8,

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2017, and M. Shah on August 11, 2017. (See Dkt. #218-3 through #218-10
(transcripts)).
3.

The 2018 Summary Judgment Opinion and Order

On December 4, 2017, Respondents filed a motion for summary
judgment, which motion is the subject of Plaintiff’s current Rule 60 application.
Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *6. The Shah Defendants also filed
motions for summary judgment on December 11, 2017, and December 14,
2017, respectively. Id.
In essence, Respondents contended that the record established that:
(i) Chopra had been involved in facilitating short-term loans provided by TD
Time and Vision Impex prior to the arbitration; (ii) the Robinson Brog Transfers
were made to pay back those antecedent loans; and (iii) Chopra was not in fact
a beneficiary of those transfers. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *9-11. As
such, Respondents argued, Chopra and NYC Telecom were outside the scope of
any NYDCL liability. Id. Respondents advanced a similar position with regard
to the LLC Transfers, arguing that such transfers were made pursuant to
antecedent loans brokered by Chopra, and that Chopra was not a beneficiary.
Id. at *12 n.11.
To support their motion, Respondents provided a lengthy statement of
material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 that was supported by extensive
evidence, including a declaration from A. Mitchell Greene, a shareholder at
Robinson Brog; excerpts from the Chopra, Singh, and Kumar depositions; and
copies of bank statements and wire transfer receipts. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL

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3632498, at *2-4. Additionally, M. Shah and V. Shah provided Rule 56.1
Statements in support of their respective motions, to which statements they
appended copies of checks and transaction receipts, as well as other materials.
Id. at *1 n.2. Plaintiff, for its part, responded to the factual assertions
contained in each movant’s Rule 56.1 Statement, but was unable to refute, or
even to identify a material dispute concerning, certain of those assertions. Id.
On July 30, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of
Respondents. On the basis of the comprehensive submissions from the
parties, the Court made several findings with respect to the Disputed
Transfers. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *1 n.2 (observing that “[t]he
parties have submitted numerous deposition transcripts, affidavits,
certifications, and declarations, with voluminous exhibits attached thereto”).
With regard to the Robinson Brog Transfers, the Court found that Respondents
had sufficiently established that no genuine dispute of material fact existed as
to the scope of Chopra’s involvement in the transfers. In particular, the Court
found that while Chopra had helped to arrange the loans from TD Time and
Vision Impex to Jaina, which loans were repaid through transfers to Robinson
Brog, Chopra had no ownership interest in either entity, and therefore “there
[was] no evidence in the record suggesting that Chopra received the funds
transferred to Robinson Brog.” Id. at *9. As to the LLC Transfers, the Court
found similarly that the record established that Chopra “brokered the loan
from Kedis to Neminath and received a fee for his services,” but that “Chopra or

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NYC Telecom [did not benefit] from the transfers from Jaina to Kedis, Melville,
or Hillside.” Id. at *12 n.11.
Pertinent to Plaintiff’s current motion, in making its findings on the
summary judgment motions, the Court observed that, while the alleged loans
had not been reduced to a formal writing, the relevant transactions “were
substantiated by documents and testimony from third parties who
corroborated the timing and amount of certain challenged transfers, and who
testified that they were loans or payments made on behalf of others who
intended those payments to be loans.” Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at
*14. The Court further found that “the other transactions were supported by
circumstantial evidence, insofar as the amounts of the payments from Jaina to
the third parties roughly matched the amounts alleged to be loans, and where
the amounts did not match, witness testimony was often available to explain
the discrepancies.” Id.
These findings dictated summary judgment in Respondents’ favor on the
constructive fraudulent conveyance claims, as they precluded the necessary
finding under the NYDCL that Chopra or NYC Telecom was “a transferee of the
assets or a beneficiary of the conveyance.” Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at
*8; see also id. at *9 (“[A] party may not be held liable in constructive or
intentional fraud for a transfer in which he did not participate as either a
transferee or a beneficiary.” (citing Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Midland Ave.
Assocs., LLC, 820 F. Supp. 2d 510, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))). Additionally, the
Court found “no basis to hold Chopra liable under section 276 for actual

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fraud,” as the record did not suggest that Jaina acted with any fraudulent
purpose in transferring funds to Robinson Brog or the LLC Defendants that
could be imputed to Chopra. Id. at *11. Consistent with the Court’s grant of
summary judgment, Respondents were terminated as parties to the matter.
The Court also granted summary judgment in M. Shah’s favor on a similar
basis and terminated him as a party to the matter. Id. at *14 (finding no
evidence “to elucidate how M. Shah personally benefitted from the transfers at
issue in th[e] action”).
Importantly, the Court denied V. Shah’s motion for summary judgment.
Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *1. The Court did so on the basis that
Jaina’s bank records confirmed that V. Shah had improperly received transfers
of funds from Jaina “during the pendency of the arbitration and after the
award was issued.” Id. at *14. In sharp contrast to the wealth of record
evidence substantiating the loans forming the basis of the Disputed Transfers,
the Court was “struck by the lack of documentary evidence … , declarations,
and/or depositions from disinterested parties” to support V. Shah’s
characterization of the payments. Id.
4.

The Shah Settlement

After Geo-Group III, the case proceeded against V. Shah alone. The Court
set a trial date, after which Plaintiff made late-breaking applications for
additional discovery against previously-dismissed parties, requiring the Court
to issue a scheduling order adjourning the trial sine die. Geo-Group IV, 2020
WL 5743516, at *7. Eventually, the Court set a new trial date of July 12, 2021.

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(Dkt. #302). On the eve of trial, however, Plaintiff and V. Shah reported to the
Court that they had reached a settlement. Geo-Group IV, 2020 WL 5743516,
at *1. In particular, on July 1, 2021, Plaintiff, V. Shah, and non-party N. Shah
entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release (the “Settlement
Agreement”), and on July 9, 2021, they submitted a Conditional Stipulation
and Order of Dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against V. Shah (the
“Shah Dismissal Order”), which stipulation was endorsed by the Court on the
same day. (Dkt. #330 (Shah Dismissal Order); Dkt. #338 (Settlement
Agreement)). The Settlement Agreement included monetary consideration of
$50,000 and the agreement of V. Shah and N. Shah to produce a broad set of
documents to Plaintiff in exchange for Plaintiff’s release of its claims against
the Shahs. (Settlement Agreement 1-4). The Shah Dismissal Order was also
conditioned on the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
New York entering a final, non-appealable order approving the settlement,
which order was issued on September 3, 2021. (See Dkt. #331).
A settlement agreement normally signals the end of a matter. The
Settlement Agreement between Plaintiff and the Shahs, however, has proven to
be a wellspring of additional litigation. In particular, while the Shahs made an
initial 87,000-page production to Plaintiff on November 21, 2021 (the
“Settlement Production”), Plaintiff sought to compel additional productions in
the ensuing year; these requests were principally resolved by this Court in two
lengthy orders, one issued on July 18, 2022, and the other on November 4,
2022. See generally Geo-Grp. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chopra, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF),

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2022 WL 2801010 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022) (“Geo-Group VII”); Geo-Grp.
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shah, No. 15 Civ. 1756 (KPF), 2022 WL 16722098 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 2022) (“Geo-Group VIII”). Related proceedings continued through a
status update filed by V. Shah on February 17, 2023, in which Plaintiff, V.
Shah, and N. Shah represented that they would be able to work through any
remaining issues without the Court’s involvement. (Dkt. #396).
B.

Procedural Background to the Instant Motion
On November 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a letter motion “advis[ing] the Court

of [Plaintiff’s] intention to file, no later than December 6, 2022, a motion … to
set aside the portion of the final judgment in this action that was in favor of
[Respondents].” (Dkt. #364). Respondents filed their response on
November 28, 2022, and the Court set a briefing schedule for the motions on
the same day. (Dkt. #365, 366). Pursuant to that schedule, Plaintiff filed its
motion, memorandum of law, and a supporting Declaration of Govind W.
Vanjani, to which Vanjani appended 54 exhibits, on December 6, 2022.
(Dkt. #368-370).
On December 15, 2022, Respondents filed a letter motion seeking an
order from the Court “compelling [Plaintiff] to produce all documents received
[by Plaintiff] pursuant to [the Settlement Agreement],” as well as an extension
of time to file its opposition brief. (Dkt. #373). One day later, Plaintiff filed its
letter response, consenting both to produce the relevant documents and to the
proposed extended briefing schedule. (Dkt. #374). The Court endorsed the
parties’ submissions and briefing continued. (Dkt. #375).

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On February 10, 2023, Chopra and NYC Telecom filed their
memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, as well as the
supporting Declarations of Humayun Siddiqi, Ravi Chopra, and Dalip Kumar.
(Dkt. #386-390). On March 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed its reply memorandum of
law and a Supplemental Declaration of Govind W. Vanjani, containing an
additional 31 exhibits and a new argument under Rule 60(d). (Dkt. #401-402).
Finally, on March 27, 2023, Chopra filed his response in opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(d). (Dkt. #403406). 3
DISCUSSION
A.

Applicable Law
1.

Rule 60(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) states: “On motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for … fraud (whether previously called intrinsic

3

After filing its opening memorandum, Geo-Group filed a pre-motion letter seeking leave
to include a claim for relief under Rule 60(d)(3). (Dkt. #391). Respondents not only
opposed the request (Dkt. #398), but also filed a separate pre-motion letter seeking
leave to file a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), noting among other
things, that “the Delaware Division of Corporations of the State of Delaware declared
[Plaintiff’s] corporate charter ‘void’ for failure to pay necessary franchise taxes and file
an annual report” (Dkt. #393). The same argument is made by Respondents in their
opening brief. (Resp. Opp. 6-9). In a subsequent submission to the Court, Plaintiff
advised that on “February 17, 2023, [Plaintiff] paid $525 to the State of Delaware,
bringing itself up to date on franchise taxes; filed the missing report; paid filing revival,
and same day processing fees; and filed on an expedited basis a revival certificate
pursuant to 8 Del. Code § 328,” which development the Court recognized in its
endorsement of Plaintiff’s letter. (Dkt. #397 at 1-2; Dkt. #399 at 5 (observing that
“Plaintiff has now remedied the issue and is now in good standing in Delaware” such
that there is no merit to Defendants’ contemplated motion to dismiss)). Respondents
did not renew the standing argument in their reply brief. (Resp. Reply).

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or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Any motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be made within a
“reasonable time,” and in the case of Rule 60(b)(3), must also be made “no
more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Put differently, while “the one-year period
represents an ‘extreme limit’ for filing a Rule 60(b)[(3)] motion,” such a motion
“may be rejected as untimely if not made within a reasonable time even though
the one-year period has not expired.” Wyche v. Adv. Drainage Sys., Inc., 332
F.R.D. 109, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Gonzales v. Nat’l Westminster Bank,
PLC, No. 11 Civ. 1435 (LAP), 2013 WL 6978874, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013)).
What is reasonable is “based on ‘the particular circumstances of the case,’
taking into account the reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the nonmoving party, and the interests of finality.” Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting
PRC Harris, Inc., v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1983)).
After clearing these threshold requirements, the proponent of a Rule
60(b)(3) motion bears the burden of proof and must establish its entitlement to
relief “by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing or adverse party
engaged in fraud or similar misconduct.” Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank AG, 216
F.R.D. 72, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Fleming v. New York Univ., 865 F.2d 478,
484 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 182 (“The burden is
on the moving party to demonstrate that it is entitled to relief, and courts
‘[g]enerally … require that the evidence in support of the motion to vacate a

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final judgment be highly convincing.’” (quoting Kotlicky v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987))). Finally, the movant “must show that the
conduct complained of prevented the moving party from fully and fairly
presenting his case.” State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz
Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). That said, “a
Rule 60(b)(3) motion … cannot serve as an attempt to relitigate the merits.”
Fleming, 865 F.2d at 484.
Separately, Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a final
judgment based on “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(6). To qualify for relief, however, “‘extraordinary circumstances’ are
required to bring the motion within the ‘other reason’ language and to prevent
clause (6) from being used to circumvent the 1-year limitations period that
applies” to the remaining clauses of Rule 60(b).” Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11 (1988) (citing Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949)). To that end, “[c]ontrolling cases have held
that if the reasons offered for relief from judgment can be considered in one of
the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b), such reasons will not justify relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).” United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370,
391-92 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Therefore, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is
available only “when the asserted grounds for relief are not recognized in
clauses (1)-(5) of the Rule and there are extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief.” Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

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Properly applied, “Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the ends
of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793
F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing House v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
688 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1982); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401
(5th Cir. 1981)). “In other words[,] it should be broadly construed to do
‘substantial justice,’ yet final judgments should not ‘be lightly reopened.’” Id.
(quoting Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 401). With this guidance in mind, “a motion
under [Rule 60(b)] to vacate a judgment of dismissal is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Altman v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir.
1972) (per curiam).
2.

Rule 60(d)

Rules 60(d)(1) and (3) allow a court, respectively, to “entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding”
and to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1),
(3). Unlike motions under Rule 60(b), a motion pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) is not
subject to “any time constraint.” United States v. Key, Nos. 12 Cr. 712-1,
18 Civ. 7716 (SHS), 2019 WL 2314693, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019); see also,
e.g., King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2002). Still,
the moving party must shoulder a heavy burden to demonstrate its entitlement
to relief. In particular, the moving party must show that the other side
committed a “fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the normal process
of adjudication.” Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1988)
(defining “fraud upon the court”); see also Key, 2019 WL 2314693, at *9 (noting

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that Rule 60(d) relief “is only available to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “The concept of fraud on the
court embraces only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the
court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial
machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging
cases.” Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Significantly, “neither perjury
nor nondisclosure, by itself, amounts” to fraud on the court. Gleason, 860
F.2d at 560. Finally, the moving party is entitled to relief only if “[f]raud upon
the court [is] established by clear and convincing evidence.” King, 287 F.3d
at 95.
B.

Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Relief Under Rule 60(b)(3)
Ultimately, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish any of the

necessary elements for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). As elaborated herein, the
Court first finds that Plaintiff failed to apply for relief within a reasonable time;
then finds that Plaintiff cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondents proffered false testimony; and finally finds that the significance of
the new materials proffered by Plaintiff is limited and did not prevent Plaintiff
from fully and fairly presenting its case. Each one of these findings is an
independent basis for denial of Plaintiff’s motion; taken together, they make
clear that Plaintiff comes up well short of the showing necessary to obtain relief
under Rule 60(b)(3).

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1.

Plaintiff Did Not Apply For Relief in a Reasonable Time

Two related questions about timeliness pursuant to Rule 60(c) must be
resolved before the Court may consider the merits of Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3)
motion. First, the Court evaluates whether Plaintiff’s motion is time-barred,
i.e., whether it was filed before or after the one-year cutoff. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c)(1). Assuming the former, the Court then considers whether Plaintiff’s
motion is timely, i.e., whether it was “made within a reasonable time.” Id.
(emphasis added); see Wyche, 332 F.R.D. at 116 (observing that a Rule 60(b)(3)
motion “may be rejected as untimely if not made within a reasonable time even
though the one-year period has not expired”).
Despite the fact that the relevant grant of summary judgment in GeoGroup III was made in 2018, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion is not
technically time-barred. As is apparent from the lengthy history of this
litigation, there have been many intermediate opinions and orders dismissing
various parties to this litigation. Still, “[a] judgment is final for purposes of
Rule 60(b) when it is appealable.” Wyche, 332 F.R.D. at 112 (citing In re
Shengdatech, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 11 Civ. 1918 (LGS), 2015 WL 342209, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015) (collecting cases)). As is well established, for the
purposes of an appeal, “[a] final judgment or order is one that conclusively
determines all pending claims of all the parties to the litigation, leaving nothing
for the court to do but execute its decision.” Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2008). This requirement is rooted in the text of Rule 54(b), which
provides that where there are multiple claims brought against multiple parties,

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“the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Plaintiff correctly notes that the Court made no such express
determination under Rule 54(b) in its grant of summary judgment in Geo-Group
III. (Pl. Reply 2). Accordingly, while Respondents were terminated as parties to
the litigation, the action continued as to V. Shah, thereby precluding GeoGroup III from serving as a final judgment for the purposes of Rule 60(c). See In
re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York on Nov. 12, 2001, 490 F.3d 99, 109 (2d
Cir. 2007) (requiring an “express determination that there is no just reason for
delay” and an “express[] direc[tion]” to “the clerk to enter [partial final]
judgment”). Rather, it was the conditional entry of the Shah Dismissal Order
on July 9, 2021, that resolved the claims as to the remaining party, and the
related notice on September 7, 2021, of the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of
that Order, that precipitated a final judgment in the matter. (See Dkt. #330331). Even then, because the Shah Dismissal Order was not a separate
document of judgment, pursuant to Rule 58(c)(2)(B), final judgment was
entered on December 6, 2021, which date falls 150 days after the Court’s
July 9, 2021 approval of the Shah Dismissal Order. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 58(c)(2); see also In re Litas Int’l, Inc., 316 F.3d 113, 117-20 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing the “separate-document requirement”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
December 6, 2022 motion technically falls within the one-year limit required by
Rule 60(c).

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But while Plaintiff clears the first hurdle, it falls at the second, due to
Plaintiff’s failure to establish that its motion was made within a reasonable
time. As a general matter, a request for relief under Rule 60(b) is unreasonable
and will not be granted “where the applicant fails to move for relief promptly.”
Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 443 F.3d 180, 190 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006). To
establish reasonableness, Plaintiff advances several arguments, none of which
is persuasive to the Court. To begin, Plaintiff argues that because its motion is
filed under Rule 60(b)(3) and makes allegations of fraud, it should be held to a
more permissive reasonableness standard as compared to other requests for
relief under Rule 60(b). (Pl. Reply 3-4). Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that caselaw
interpreting reasonableness in the context of Rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(2) is
inapposite in the context of Rule 60(b)(3). (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff maintains that
personal circumstances and its desire to marshal as much supporting evidence
as possible justify the delay. (Pl. Br. 28-29).
Plaintiff’s blanket propositions regarding the reasonableness standard
are inconsistent with the case-specific approach prescribed by the Second
Circuit: “What is reasonable is ‘based on the particular circumstances of the
case, taking into account the reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the
non-moving party, and the interests of finality.’” Wyche, 332 F.R.D. at 116
(quoting Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd., 864 F.3d at 182). Such an approach, in
turn, is consistent with the text of Rule 60(c)(1), which does not differentiate
among the different subsections of Rule 60(b) when setting out the
reasonableness standard for assessing a motion’s timeliness. See Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”).
Nor has Plaintiff provided any caselaw to support its position that cases under
Rule 60(b)(3) should be understood in a categorically different way than cases
brought under other subsections of Rule 60(b). 4
Indeed, the particular circumstances of Plaintiff’s motion, which purports
to be based entirely on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial,” fall
as neatly under Rule 60(b)(2) as they do under (b)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
Plaintiff concedes as much, acknowledging that its proof is based entirely on
Jaina-related documents produced in response to the Settlement Agreement,
documents that Plaintiff claims should have been produced in discovery. (Pl.
Br. 2-3). Try as it might, Plaintiff cannot simply proclaim that the body of
caselaw on Rule 60(b)(2) is irrelevant as a consequence of Plaintiff’s conscious
decision to cite one subsection of Rule 60(b) over another.
The Court of course understands why Plaintiff has tried to do so, as an
examination of caselaw considering reasonableness under Rule 60(b)(2)
provides significant support for the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s motion is

4

Bouret-Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., on which Plaintiff relies in its reply
brief, does not compel a different result. (See Pl. Reply 4-5 (citing Bouret-Echevarria v.
Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2015))). There, plaintiffs’
counsel discovered new evidence of an improper disclosure to the jurors some eleven
months after the jurors rendered their verdict in the case, after which counsel took
prompt action in moving for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d
at 40-41. Here, and as discussed more extensively infra, Plaintiff’s motion exclusively
involves old evidence concerning the underlying factual dispute, which evidence was
available during discovery in this matter, had Plaintiff’s counsel exercised more
diligence. This key difference in the timing that evidence became available renders
Bouret-Echevarria distinguishable on its facts.

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untimely. In those cases, courts evaluated reasonableness by considering the
time period that elapsed from when the materials were able to be discovered, to
when the motion was ultimately made. See, e.g., Wyche, 332 F.R.D. at 116-17.
Here, Plaintiff received the Settlement Production on November 2, 2021, and
represents that it had completed an “initial review” of the Production by midDecember 2021. (Pl. Decl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff’s decision to wait until December 6,
2022 — almost one year later — to file its motion, without more, represents a
presumptively unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Wyche, 332 F.R.D. at 117 (finding
movant’s unexplained four and one-half month delay was unreasonable);
Barrett v. Loc. 804 Union (IBT), No. 18 Civ. 2046 (MKB), 2023 WL 4551686, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2023) (finding movant’s unexplained ten-month delay was
unreasonable); Simon v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 5209 (ER), 2020 WL 832887,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) (finding movant’s unexplained one-year-andeight-month delay was unreasonable).
This conclusion is further buttressed by Plaintiff’s deficient explanations
for the delay. First, Plaintiff disclaims the diligence of its initial review of the
Settlement Production, done in November and December of 2021, noting that
while such review “discover[ed] some potentially useful documents, as well as
documents that were interesting,” it was not intended as a factfinding exercise.
(Pl. Br. 28). Rather, Plaintiff indicates that such review was done to provide
more ammunition for its protracted fight with the Shahs over the Settlement
Agreement. (Pl. Reply 5 (“[Plaintiff] had completed only its ‘initial review,’ which
was designed principally to determine whether the Shahs had produced the

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documents for which [Plaintiff] had bargained.”)). Plaintiff further represents
that it did not begin its review of the Settlement Production in earnest until
after the May 11, 2022 conference in this matter — a full six months after
receiving the Production — when Plaintiff realized it was likely not going to
obtain any additional documents from the Shahs. (Pl. Br. 28-29). That
Plaintiff deliberately chose to focus its resources on attempting to obtain more
documents, without simultaneously reviewing the 87,000 documents it already
had in its possession, does not suffice as a reasonable explanation for
Plaintiff’s delay.
Similarly unsatisfying is Plaintiff’s representation that it lacked the
capacity to review the materials in a timely way, as it was incumbent on
Plaintiff and its counsel to arrange for the necessary resources to do so, and
Plaintiff’s decision to forego arranging such resources should not inure to
Respondents’ detriment. Cf. Securities and Exch. Comm’n v. McNulty, 137 F.3d
732, 739 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Normally, the conduct of an attorney is imputed to
his client, for allowing a party to evade ‘the consequences of the acts or
omissions of []his freely selected agent’ ‘would be wholly inconsistent with our
system of representative litigation in which each party is deemed bound by the
acts of his lawyer-agent.’” (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 63334 (1962))). The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s counsel’s unfortunate family
circumstances. (Pl. Br. 28-29). Still, such developments do not absolve
Plaintiff for its otherwise drawn-out approach to its review of the Settlement
Production or its concomitant failure to notify the Court and the parties of the

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prospects of a Rule 60(b) motion until the absolute last minute. To the latter
point, Plaintiff failed even to raise the possibility of any such motion in
connection with the Settlement Production during its numerous submissions
to the Court regarding enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, despite
conceding that, as of December 2021, it had already “discover[ed] some
potentially useful documents, as well as documents that were interesting.” (Pl.
Br. 27; see also Resp. Opp. 13 (collecting relevant docket citations)).
It bears mention that the Court has seen analogous behavior by Plaintiff
before, notably in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See
generally Geo-Group IV, 2020 WL 5743516, further reconsideration denied, GeoGroup V, 2020 WL 6729181. In particular, Plaintiff sought reconsideration of
the Court’s 2018 grant of summary judgment in M. Shah’s favor in Geo-Group
III, and the Court’s 2016 grant of the LLC Defendants’ motion to dismiss in
Geo-Group II. See Geo-Group IV, 2020 WL 5743516, at *11. In support of its
motion, Plaintiff proffered a set of after-acquired documents related to the LLC
Transfers, which documents Plaintiff maintained established that the LLC
Transfers were not made to discharge an antecedent debt. See id. The Court
denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding in part that Plaintiff failed to timely file — or
even hint at — its motion for reconsideration “for more than a year from the
date it first learned of the facts that prompted this motion.” Id. at *13. In
particular, the Court observed Plaintiff’s “conce[ssion] that its decision to delay
raising these issues was a strategic one,” tied up in Plaintiff’s settlement

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negotiations with the Shahs, and that such a decision was not a reasonable
basis for delay. Id. at *7, 13-14.
Separately, the Court found that “the evidence that Plaintiff did not have
in hand at summary judgment was obtainable, if only Plaintiff had exercised
‘due diligence,’” which Plaintiff had not. Geo-Group IV, 2020 WL 5743516, at
*12. In doing so, the Court chronicled the numerous points at which Plaintiff
failed to seek subpoenas despite being prompted to do so by the Court, failed to
follow up on subpoenas after they were issued, and simply made the decision
to proceed without more discovery, because Plaintiff “felt it had sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment.” Id. at *8, 12; see also id. at *13
(“Plaintiff conceded that its decision not to pursue this discovery was a
strategic one, grounded in an ultimately mistaken belief that it had obtained
sufficient evidence to raise a disputed issue of material fact … at summary
judgment.”). Ultimately, the Court found that “the interests of finality, coupled
with Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in seeking this relief after years of litigation,
compel the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motions.” Id. at *1.
So too here. Having not learned its lesson from its failures in Geo-Group
IV and V, Plaintiff engaged in similar gamesmanship, albeit with its sights now
set on Respondents. Once again, Plaintiff is relying on a set of documents that
it should have sought (and could have obtained with more diligence) during
discovery. 5 Even after eventually obtaining these documents, Plaintiff sat for

5

For example, and as Respondents note, in a July 25, 2017 Conference, the Court
directly put the question to Plaintiff of whether it would file a subpoena on Jaina in
light of Jaina’s alleged discovery noncompliance. (See Resp. Opp. 15-16 (citing Dkt.

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almost a year without ever informing the Court or the parties of its intention to
move to reopen the judgment, despite conceding that it had already begun to
develop theories regarding such a motion. Plaintiff’s post hoc justification for
this delay as being due to its desire to wait for more documents, which would
make its motion “more powerful and likely to succeed,” neither tips the scales
in its favor nor adequately explains Plaintiff’s long radio silence. See Metzler
Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 147 (2d Cir. 2020)
(upholding denial of Rule 60(b) motion notwithstanding plaintiffs’ assertion
that “they received the new evidence in ‘drips-and-drabs over an extended
period without any organization,’ and that they ‘needed time to understand and
assimilate the information received’”). Moreover, this failure to inform the
Court is even more unreasonable given Plaintiff’s concession that “[t]he whole
point of the [S]ettlement [A]greement was for GCI to obtain certain specific
financial documents that it believes will demonstrate … beyond any doubt that
the judgment in favor of Chopra should be vacated.” (Pl. Br. 31). As Plaintiff
recognizes in its arguments about whether the current motion is time-barred,
the consequence of the Settlement Agreement was to bring about a final
judgment in this matter. That Plaintiff had the secret purpose of using the
Settlement Agreement to reopen the final judgment brought about by its very
terms is gamesmanship that the Court cannot abide.

#172 (transcript))). In reply, Plaintiff explains that it did not seek such a subpoena, as
it was relying on the Shahs’ representation, through counsel, that they had no
documents to turn over. (Pl. Reply 16). Still, Plaintiff’s decision to continue to press the
Shahs for additional documents belies Plaintiff’s position that it trusted the Shahs at
the time, and cannot therefore fully justify Plaintiff’s failure to seek a subpoena.

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Put simply, Plaintiff’s explanations for its decision to file its motion on
the absolute last day such a motion was permitted are not evidence of reasoned
decisionmaking. If anything, they are the exact opposite. Accord Amoco
Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d
648, 656 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Although the fact that a motion was made barely
within the one-year limit gives the court the Power to entertain it, as the delay
in making the motion approaches one year there should be a corresponding
increase in the burden that must be carried to show that the delay was
‘reasonable.’”). And even acknowledging that certain documents may have
been improperly withheld from Plaintiff during discovery, the Court finds
nonetheless that such relief should lie against the Shahs for their failure to
timely produce documents, and not Respondents, who satisfied their discovery
obligations in this case. (See Resp. Opp. 14-16). Plaintiff’s unreasonable
approach to discovery, compounded by potential misrepresentations by the
Shahs, should not prejudice Respondents, who oppose the current motion.
See Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 187 (observing that the court “must be
attentive to the fact that the burden of demonstrating that vacatur is
appropriate lies with the party seeking that result”).
Considering the particular circumstances of this case, and taking into
account the reasons given for the delays, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot
carry its burden to establish that the current motion was made within a
reasonable time and therefore that Plaintiff is not entitled to Rule 60(b)(3) relief.

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2.

Plaintiff Has Not Established That Chopra or NYC Telecom
Engaged in Fraud or Misconduct

While the preceding finding forecloses Plaintiff’s claim under Rule
60(b)(3), the Court nonetheless considers the merits of that claim for
completeness. As elaborated herein, the Court ultimately finds that Plaintiff
cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents engaged
in fraud or similar misconduct, providing a second, independent basis for
denial of Plaintiff’s motion.
To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Plaintiff must establish “by clear
and convincing evidence that [Respondents] engaged in fraud or similar
misconduct.” Buxbaum, 216 F.R.D. at 81. Pertinent to the Court’s analysis,
“[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard is an intermediate one, in that it is more
than a ‘preponderance’ of the evidence but less than ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Stat Med. Servs., Inc. v. Daughters of Jacob Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 797 F.
Supp. 253, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 42324 (1979)). As the Supreme Court has explained, a party would achieve the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard “only if the material it offered
instantly tilted the evidentiary scales in the affirmative when weighed against
the evidence [its adversary] offered in opposition.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467
U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit has similarly held
that “[c]lear and convincing evidence is evidence that satisfies the factfinder
that it is highly probable that what is claimed actually happened and it is
evidence that is neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions.” Loreley
Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 13 F.4th 247, 260 (2d Cir.
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2021); see also Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 182 (requiring that the “evidence
in support of the motion to vacate a final judgment be highly convincing”
(quoting Kotlicky, 817 F.2d at 9)). This evidentiary standard is important, and
a district court must pay “[c]areful attention to these considerations and to
whether the movant is entitled to relief in the particular circumstances of each
case [to] ensure[] that Rule 60(b) will ‘be broadly construed to do substantial
justice,’ while respecting that ‘final judgments should not be lightly reopened.’”
Id. at 183 (quoting Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61).
With those teachings in mind, the Court carefully considers the evidence
submitted by Plaintiff as proof that Respondents proffered false testimony. As
to the pertinent testimony, neither party disputes that in 2017 Chopra testified
that: (i) TD Time and Vision Impex lent Jaina money on occasions, which loans
were repaid through payments to Robinson Brog; (ii) he (Chopra) did nothing
other than help to arrange the alleged loans; and (iii) he (Chopra) never
received any funds from Robinson Brog, Vision Impex, or TD Time. Geo-Group
III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *2-3.
i.

The TSN Payments Spreadsheet

The Court begins with a spreadsheet titled “TSN Payments.” (Pl. Decl.,
Ex. 13 (the “TSN Payments Spreadsheet”)). This spreadsheet contains two
columns, a left-hand column titled “Receipts[:] USD Paid IN US By Ravi,” and a
right-hand column titled “Payments[:] Paid.” (Id. at 2). The left-hand Receipts
column lists fifteen dollar-denominated payments dated from October 14,
2013, through March 28, 2014, made to Jaina by entities including TD Time,

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totaling $1,405,571.00. (Id.). The right-hand Paid column contains a longer
list of individual transactions in Indian Rupees, which entries Plaintiff
maintains represent cash payments “in India to Chopra or persons whom he
designated,” as evidenced by the apparent inclusion of Ravi Chopra’s name in
parentheticals after each individual’s name. (Pl. Br. 11; see, e.g., TSN
Payments Spreadsheet 2 (“Given to Bittu (Ravi)”)). Plaintiff also provides a
transmittal email dated January 25, 2015, from S. Bose to V. and M. Shah,
that attaches the spreadsheet; it contains the subject line “Payments made to
Ravi in India,” and no other information. (TSN Payments Spreadsheet 1).
Relatedly, Plaintiff provides two emails sent on October 22, 2013, that
discuss a $60,000 payment made to Jaina. The first email was sent from S.
Bose to an individual named Ram Sarda, who was associated with a foreign
exchange service, directing Sarda to “[p]lease deliver to … Mahendra Bhai
Shah … Total USD $60K.” (Pl. Decl., Ex. 19). The next email was sent three
minutes later, from S. Bose to Chopra, stating: “I need a favor URGENTLY
today. Please coordinate with Mahendra Bhai and Collect USD 60K Cash and
please wire me the am[oun]t in Jaina TODAY as I need to make $500k payment
to Aircel today by hook or crook.” (Id., Ex. 37).
Plaintiff maintains that these documents support a conclusion that
payments from TD Time were not actually loan payments, and therefore that
Chopra’s testimony was false. (See Pl. Br. 12-13). In particular, Plaintiff
contends that the TSN Payments Spreadsheet depicts “hawala transactions,”
which are informal, trust-based transactions in which money is transferred

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internationally via personal exchanges. 6 Plaintiff suggests that the
transactions in fact depict Jaina’s attempts to transfer its own funds from India
to the United States, and that Chopra was a beneficiary of these transactions.
(See id. at 10, 18). Respondents first dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of the
TSN Payments Spreadsheet, maintaining that it supports neither Plaintiff’s
inference that the funds actually belonged to Jaina (and therefore were not
loans), nor Plaintiff’s argument that Chopra was a beneficiary. (Resp. Opp. 17,
19-20). Respondents also question the reliability of the spreadsheet, observing
that it is an unauthenticated document “created … more than a year after the
transactions it purports to document,” and therefore “has no evidentiary
value.” (Resp. Opp. 18).
On its own review, the Court finds that the TSN Payments Spreadsheet
does not establish that Chopra’s prior testimony was untruthful. As an initial
matter, the Court credits Respondents’ observation that, without disinterested
testimony to substantiate the spreadsheet, the conclusions that can be drawn

6

As the Second Circuit has helpfully explained:
Though there are many forms of hawala, in the paradigmatic
hawala system, funds are transferred from one country to another
through a network of hawala brokers (i.e., ‘hawaladars’), with one
hawaladar located in the transferor’s country and one in the
transferee’s country. In this form, a hawala works as follows: If
Person A in Country A wants to send $1,000 to Person B in Country
B, Person A contacts Hawaladar A in Country A and pays him
$1,000. Hawaladar A then contacts Hawaladar B in Country B and
asks Hawaladar B to pay $1,000 in Country B currency, minus any
fees, to Person B. The effect of this transaction is that Person A
has remitted $1,000 (minus any fees) to Person B, although no
money has actually crossed the border between Country A and
Country B.
United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Feb. 22, 2012).

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from the various entries are ambiguous. At best, the spreadsheet depicts
transfers of money from TD Time to Jaina that correspond with transfers
between TD Time and Jaina that are recorded in Jaina’s 2013 Citibank
statements. (Compare TSN Payments Spreadsheet, with Pl. Decl., Ex. 21
(Jaina’s 2013 Citibank Statements)). Moreover, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion
that Chopra was the actual recipient of funds from the transactions depicted in
the spreadsheet is noticeably unsupported by any of the actual bank
statements, which depict money flowing from TD Time to Jaina on or about the
relevant dates in the spreadsheet. (See, e.g., Pl. Decl., Ex. 21, 23 (Jaina’s 2014
Citibank Statements)).
As to the scope of Chopra’s involvement, the Court finds Respondents’
interpretation to be just as plausible as Plaintiff’s. In particular, the Court
agrees that the references to Chopra in the TSN Payments Spreadsheet are
consistent with Chopra’s coordinating role in these transactions, which is in
turn consistent with Chopra’s prior testimony about his involvement in the TD
Time transfers and the Court’s findings in that regard at summary judgment.
See Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *9 (“Chopra testified that he helped
broker [the loans from TD Time and Vision Impex to Jaina]; [and] that those
loans were repaid through payments to the law firm Robinson Brog.”). While
the spreadsheet may cast some doubt on Chopra’s version of the facts, it is far
from clear and convincing evidence that Chopra’s prior testimony was
untruthful. Loreley Fin., 13 F.4th at 260 (observing that clear and convincing

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evidence is “neither equivocal nor open to opposing presumptions” (emphasis
added)).
Likewise, the Court does not find that the related October 22, 2013
emails establish that Chopra altered documents or proffered false testimony.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide the Court with any basis to
discredit Respondents’ representations that the email was produced in a
system-generated format; that such format was consistent with other emails
across the production; and therefore that the relevant information was not
intentionally omitted. (Resp. Opp. 16). Moreover, as Plaintiff acknowledges,
Chopra was subjected to extensive questioning about the email at his
deposition, indicating that the information contained in the email was itself
sufficient to put Plaintiff on notice of its significance. (Pl. Br. 12). Most
importantly, the Court finds that the new information does not render Chopra’s
testimony false or misleading, as Chopra once again offers a reading of both
emails that is clearly consistent with Chopra’s prior testimony: that Chopra
had assisted Jaina with a transaction that Jaina had arranged but was not a
beneficiary of the funds transferred. (Resp. Opp. 20-21).
ii.

The Banking Spreadsheet and the Deposit Analysis
Spreadsheet

The Court turns next to various accounting spreadsheets and ledgers
provided by Plaintiff that purport to depict cashflows in and out of Jaina. First,
Plaintiff provides a worksheet “chronicl[ing] in general ledger form” Jaina’s
bank transactions from roughly January 2010 to February 2015. (Pl. Br. 14
(citing Pl. Decl., Ex. 22 (the “Banking Spreadsheet”))). The spreadsheet
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contains entries corresponding to inbound wire transfers from Vision Impex,
recorded under the title “Ravi Chopra” and categorized as “Foreign Cash
Injected[:] Sundry Borrowing.” (Banking Spreadsheet). The spreadsheet also
contains entries corresponding to each of the outbound Robinson Brog
Transfers, also recorded under the title “Ravi Chopra” and categorized as
“Foreign Cash Refund[:] Loan Refunds.” (Id.). For the TD Time payments, the
spreadsheet contains entries without descriptions, but which correspond in
time and amount. These payments are recorded under the title “TS USA Inc.”
and categorized as “Received From[:] Carrier” and “Payment To[:] Carrier.” (Id.).
Next, Plaintiff provides a lengthy spreadsheet titled “Deposit Analysis —
2014,” recording various deposits made to Jaina’s accounts from a variety of
parties from January 2, 2014, through December 16, 2014. (Pl. Decl., Ex. 35
(the “Deposit Analysis Spreadsheet”)). Like the Banking Spreadsheet, the
Deposit Analysis Spreadsheet contains entries corresponding to the inbound
wire transfers from Vision Impex, and records these as “STI Loan/Ravinder
Chopra.” (Id.).
Finally, Plaintiff provides a spreadsheet “contain[ing] information about
Jaina’s 2014 invoices to its customers and from its suppliers, as well as 2014
payment and collection information.” (Pl. Decl., Ex. 24 (the “Customer
Spreadsheet”)). This spreadsheet contains a subsection for Vision Impex LTD,
listing various payments and dates, some of which correspond to entries in the
Banking Spreadsheet and Deposit Analysis Spreadsheet. (Id.).

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Plaintiff contends that the Banking Spreadsheet, the Deposit Analysis
Spreadsheet, and the Customer Spreadsheet, when read together, indicate that
Vision Impex was actually a customer of — and not a lender to — Jaina,
thereby rendering Chopra’s prior testimony on this point untrue. (Pl. Br. 1415). Once again, however, Respondents advance a competing interpretation of
the spreadsheets that is consistent with Chopra’s prior testimony and the
Court’s summary judgment findings. For example, Respondents note that the
line entries for Vision Impex are recorded in the Banking Spreadsheet as
“Sundry Borrowing,” indicating that the transfers were in fact loans. (Resp.
Opp. 23).
As to the Customer Spreadsheet and invoices, Respondents acknowledge
that they cannot explain “the manner in which Jaina booked loans,” or why
certain materials list Vision Impex as a customer. (Resp. Opp. 24). That said,
Respondents proffer several bases to explain the references and reaffirm
Chopra’s prior testimony. First, Respondents provide renewed testimony from
Dalip Kumar, the owner of Vision Impex, averring that Vision Impex “was never
a client or customer of Jaina,” and that the payments were not for the
purchase of goods or services, which testimony is consistent with Kumar’s
deposition testimony that the Court considered at summary judgment. (Id.
(citing Dkt. #390); see also Dkt. #370-16 (deposition transcript)). Second, to
explain why Jaina booked these loans as revenue, Respondents suggest that
Jaina may have done so in an attempt to inflate its books in an attempt to be
more attractive to investors. (Resp. Opp. 21-22, 24). Respondents’

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explanation, coupled with Kumar’s renewed confirmation that the payments
were loans notwithstanding Jaina’s internal accounting methods, is once again
a plausible, and therefore sufficient, rebuttal of Plaintiff’s interpretation of the
documents. Third and finally, Respondents note that the references to Chopra
throughout both spreadsheets simply reflect “Chopra’s name [being] used as a
category identifier.” (Resp. Reply 5; see also Resp. Opp. 24). Such an
interpretation is also plausible, given that it is consistent with Chopra’s prior
testimony that he was involved in facilitating or brokering the transactions,
though not a beneficiary.
Once again weighing the competing interpretations, the Court finds that
the new documents do not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Chopra’s prior testimony was false. To be sure, Jaina’s internal bookkeeping
documents characterize Vision Impex as a customer. But as has been
established, Jaina’s bookkeeping was far from meticulous, and testimony from
the principal of Vision Impex reaffirms that the payments were intended as
loans. And while the Court is aware that the proper sources to interpret these
spreadsheets are not readily available, the consequences for their absence fall
on Plaintiff, who bears the burden on this motion to reopen the judgment. See
Thai-Lao Lignite, 864 F.3d at 182 (“The burden is on the moving party to
demonstrate that it is entitled to relief, and courts ‘[g]enerally … require that

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the evidence in support of the motion to vacate a final judgment be highly
convincing.’” (quoting Kotlicky, 817 F.2d at 9)). 7
iii.

The LLC Transfers

Finally, the Court considers the LLC Transfers. As to these transfers,
Chopra originally testified that: (i) he was approached by Alwani, who was
looking for financing for Neminath to use for the benefit of Jaina; (ii) he was
told that Jaina needed money quickly; (iii) he understood that Alwani and Bose
decided to use Neminath’s building as collateral to seek funding to then
transfer to Jaina; and (iv) he helped arrange the loan with Sanjiv Chand, the
owner of Kedis, for which he received a broker’s fee. Geo-Group III, 2018 WL
3632498, at *4. As the principal basis for the current motion, Plaintiff again
cites the Banking Spreadsheet, which contains similar entries for the LLC
Transfers as it does for the Robinson Brog Transfers — namely payments to
“JMVD Hillside LLC” and “728 Melville Petro LLC,” booked under the title “Ravi
Chopra,” and categorized as “Foreign Cash Refund[:] Loan Refunds.” (Pl.
Br. 19-20 (citing Banking Spreadsheet)). Plaintiff’s conclusory interpretation of
the Banking Spreadsheet entries regarding the LLC Transfers is no more

7

To this end, the Court also agrees with Respondents’ position that the references in
Jaina’s documents to “TS USA,” are ambiguous, given the assortment of entries
recorded under that header. (See Resp. Opp. 21-22). Indeed, it could be the case that
TS USA was both a customer of Jaina and also a catchall reference in certain Jaina
books. Absent clarifying evidence, the Court cannot find that such references establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the TD Time payments were actually made by TS
USA, especially given that bank records confirm the transfer originated from TD Time,
and that the owner of TD Time testified that such payments were loans. (See Pl. Decl.,
Ex. 21). See Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *3 (“Singh testified … that [TD Time]
loaned Jaina $250,000 through a series of four transfers spanning October to
December 2013.”).

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persuasive than its interpretation of the Robinson Brog Transfers, especially as
the “Description” column clearly establishes that the wires, confirmed by the
relevant bank records, were sent to Melville and Hillside (and not to Chopra).
(See Banking Spreadsheet). The references to Chopra are furthermore
consistent with Chopra’s prior testimony that he helped broker the
transactions. See Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *4. Nor do the various
documents related to the sale of the 235 Hillside Avenue property repudiate
Chopra’s past testimony that he was not the beneficiary or recipient of any of
the funds transferred. (Pl. Br. 21-22).
Ultimately, and as should be apparent from the Court’s findings, Plaintiff
cannot carry its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Chopra proffered false testimony. At best, the documents relied upon by
Plaintiff provide a marginal degree of support for Plaintiff’s version of the
Disputed Transfers. Still, the documents also support, or at least do not
foreclose, Respondents’ version of the Disputed Transfers, which version is
consistent with Chopra’s prior testimony and with the broader evidentiary
record considered at summary judgment. As the documents are both
“equivocal [and] open to opposing presumptions,” they are not clear and
convincing evidence of Plaintiff’s position, as they do not satisfy the Court “that
it is highly probable that what is claimed actually happened.” Loreley, 13 F.4th
at 260; cf. Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, 910 F. Supp. 2d 591, 611 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“[T]o meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the specific
intent to deceive must be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn

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from the evidence. … Hence, when there are multiple reasonable inferences
that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found.” (quoting Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir.
2003))). Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
3.

Plaintiff Was Not Prevented from Fully and Fairly Presenting
Its Case

To briefly recap, the Court has found that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion
was untimely and that Plaintiff cannot establish by clear and convincing
evidence that Respondents engaged in misconduct, both of which findings
independently require denial of Plaintiff’s motion. Finally, and again for
completeness, the Court considers the remaining element — whether Plaintiff
was prevented from fully and fairly presenting its case. As elaborated herein,
the Court finds that Plaintiff was not so prevented, and therefore is
conclusively not entitled to Rule 60(b)(3) relief.
At this stage of the analysis, the moving party must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the alleged misconduct “prevented the moving
party from fully and fairly presenting its case.” State St. Bank, 374 F.3d at
176. While “the moving party need not show that the outcome would have
been different absent the misconduct,” the movant cannot establish such
interference occurred where the alleged misconduct “turn[s] out to be
cumulative, insignificant, or of marginal relevance.” Thomas v. City of New
York, 293 F.R.D. 498, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park
Place Ent. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Such is the case
here, as the Court finds that the new documents, if anything, are cumulative of
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the materials that have already been considered by the Court and do not bear
on the Court’s prior finding that Respondents were not beneficiaries of the
transaction.
To review, the NYDCL in effect during the relevant time period did not
establish liability for aiding and abetting a fraudulent conveyance, but rather
required a finding that a party was a beneficiary to a transaction. See GeoGroup III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *9 (“[T]here is no cause of action for aiding and
abetting a fraudulent conveyance against a person … who is alleged merely to
have assisted in effecting the transfer, in a professional capacity, and who is
not alleged to have been a transferee of the assets or to have benefitted from
the transfer.” (quoting BBCN Bank v. 12th Ave. Rest. Grp. Inc., 55 N.Y.S.3d 225,
226 (1st Dep’t 2017))). Put somewhat differently, the NYDCL recognized that
“[a] fraudulent conveyance claim seeking to recover money damages can only
be maintained against a person who participates in the fraudulent transfer as
either the transferee of the assets or the beneficiary of the conveyance.”
Amusement Indus., 820 F. Supp. 2d at 527. In granting summary judgment in
Respondents’ favor, the Court observed that while it was undisputed that
Chopra was implicated in the transactions, Plaintiff had failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Chopra was also a beneficiary of
the transactions. See Geo-Group III, 2018 WL 3632498, at *9 (finding that,
while “Chopra testified that he helped broker the loans from TD Time and
Vision Impex to Jaina, and that he understood that those loans were repaid
through transfers to Robinson Brog … there is no evidence in the record

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suggesting that Chopra received the funds transferred to Robinson Brog”); id.
at *12 n.11 (“To be sure, Chopra testified that he brokered the loan from Kedis
to Neminath and received a fee for his services. But the record does not
indicate that Chopra or NYC Telecom benefitted from the [LLC Transfers].”
(internal citation omitted)). In making such a finding, the Court considered the
substantial record furnished by the parties, including lengthy Rule 56.1
statements that drew from Chopra’s two-day-long deposition testimony, sworn
testimony from a shareholder of Robinson Brog, additional deposition
testimony from the owners of TD Time and Vision Impex, and bank statements
and other financial documents. Id. at *1 n.2 (acknowledging the parties’
evidentiary submissions).
As discussed extensively above, Plaintiff’s documents fall far short of
providing the clear and convincing evidence necessary to substantiate
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Respondents, and Chopra in particular,
were beneficiaries of these transactions. At best, the spreadsheets are
cumulative of the otherwise vast array of evidence and testimony on this topic,
and do not support Plaintiff’s current allegations any more than they support
the Court’s prior ruling in Geo Group III that Chopra was merely associated
with the transactions. See Thomas, 293 F.R.D. at 504 (observing that
cumulative evidence is insufficient to establish substantial interference). Nor
do these spreadsheets establish by clear and convincing evidence that Jaina
acted with fraudulent intent in transferring funds. Rather, the spreadsheets
indicate what was already known to the Court and the parties, namely that

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Jaina engaged in informal lending with a variety of entities. Geo-Group III,
2018 WL 3632498, at *2. Beyond that, the spreadsheets and documents
merely reference transactions that are consistent with the various bank
statements and related sworn testimony as to the flow of funds, and do not
suggest that the transactions were made with fraudulent intent. See Walther v.
Maricopa Int’l Inv. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 4816 (HB), 2002 WL 31521078, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2002) (denying Rule 60(b)(3) motion because allegedly
perjurious testimony was not material to outcome of case and therefore did not
prevent movant from fully and fairly presenting his case); see also Gonzales v.
Nat’l Westminster Bank, Plc, No. 11 Civ. 1435 (LAP), 2013 WL 6978874, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (denying Rule 60(b)(3) motion where the “new evidence
of [defendant’s] purported fraud could not change the ruling in [the prior
case],” such that plaintiffs were not “prevented from fully and fairly presenting
their case”).
At the end of this analysis, the Court is mindful of the Second Circuit’s
guidance that “a Rule 60(b)(3) motion cannot be granted absent clear and
convincing evidence of material misrepresentations and cannot serve as an
attempt to relitigate the merits.” Fleming, 865 F.2d at 484. As should be
apparent at this point, Plaintiff’s motion is exactly such an improper attempt.
Plaintiff does not advance consequential, newly-discovered evidence that
Respondents had proffered false testimony or withheld necessary documents
during discovery. Rather, Plaintiff puts forth an untimely motion, rife with
conclusory allegations supported by ambiguous spreadsheets and related

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materials, obtained pursuant to a strategic Settlement Agreement that Plaintiff
admits was designed to provide a vehicle to reopen the very judgment that the
Agreement purported to bring about. Accord Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61
(advising that “final judgments should not be lightly reopened” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Ultimately, having considered the “balance between serving the ends of
justice and preserving the finality of judgments,” the Court finds, pursuant to
its sound discretion and its history of presiding over this litigation, that
Plaintiff has not met their burden to prevail on its Rule 60(b)(3) motion.
Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61; see Altman, 456 F.2d at 1116 (“[A] motion under
[Rule 60(b)] to vacate a judgment of dismissal is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.”).
C.

Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d)(3)
Separately, Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to relief under two

additional provisions of Rule 60: Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(d)(3). Plaintiff’s
sought-after relief under Rule 60(b)(6) fails at the outset. The Second Circuit
has clarified that Rule 60(b)(6) applies only “when the asserted grounds for
relief are not recognized in clauses (1)-(5) of the Rule and there are
extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.” See Tapper, 833 F.3d at 172
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As has been established
above, Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct by Respondents and its proffers of
newly-obtained evidence supporting its case are squarely within the ambit of

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Rules 60(b)(2) and (b)(3), foreclosing Plaintiff’s motion under the catch-all
provision of Rule 60(b)(6).
As the basis for its entitlement to relief under Rule 60(d)(3), Plaintiff
spins a narrative of misconduct perpetrated by Humayun Siddiqi, counsel to
Respondents, as well as Anil Arora, former counsel to the Shahs. Plaintiff
rewinds the clock to “the latter part of 2016,” when Plaintiff alleges that
Siddiqi, Arora, the Shah Defendants, and Respondents met to “coordinat[e] a
strategy to misrepresent to the Court and [Plaintiff] that the Brog and LLC
Transfers were made to discharge antecedent debt[.] Attorneys [] knew those
transfers were nothing of the sort, and that R. Chopra was a beneficiary of
those transfers.” (Pl. Reply 18-19).
As should be apparent at this juncture, however, Plaintiff has not
provided sufficient evidence to support its foundational premise that the
Robinson Brog and LLC Transfers were sham payments made for Chopra’s
benefit. 8 The Court understands that Plaintiff’s inability to collect on its
arbitral award, and its difficulty unraveling the web of informal loans and
transfers associated with Jaina’s business dealings, must be of some

8

To this end, and as Respondents maintain, the significance of the slew of additional
documents first provided by Plaintiff in its reply brief is markedly different when the
Robinson Brog Transfers are credited as loans. (Compare Pl. Reply 18-24, with Resp.
Reply 4-8). In particular, the Court sees no basis to discredit Respondents’ assertion
that the purpose of the November 8, 2016 meeting, as well as the correspondence
related to it, was “to confirm the accuracy of the[] determination as to the origins of the
loans.” (Resp. Reply 6). And once again, the references to Chopra in the exhibits cited
in Plaintiff’s reply at best contain the speculation of third parties as to Chopra’s
involvement in Jaina’s business dealings, but are far from clear and convincing
evidence that Chopra himself was a beneficiary (rather than a mere affiliate), so as to
render his prior testimony untruthful. (See, e.g., Pl. Reply Decl., Ex. 77, 78).

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frustration to Plaintiff, who has pursued Jaina-related litigation for the better
part of a decade. But Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to pull parties back into this
litigation based on conclusory assertions that they are beneficiaries suggest
that Plaintiff misunderstands the merits of its NYDCL claims, which do not
provide a basis for aiding and abetting a fraudulent conveyance. And Plaintiff’s
baseless assertions that Siddiqi’s factfinding actions were actually done with ill
intent, or that Siddiqi’s successful advocacy on behalf of Respondents amounts
instead to fraud on the court, fly too wide of the mark.
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges Arora engaged in misrepresentations
and other misconduct during discovery, Plaintiff picks the wrong target by
going after Siddiqi and Respondents, who have certified that they have
produced all of the documents in their possession, control, or custody. (Resp.
Opp. 14). In any event, misconduct during discovery, without more, does not
rise to the extreme level of misconduct that Rule 60(d)(3) exists to remedy. See
Gleason, 860 F.2d at 559-60 (“[A]llegations of nondisclosure during pretrial
discovery do not constitute grounds for an independent action” under Rule
60(d).); LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“After-discovered evidence of alleged perjury by a witness or other fabricated
evidence is also not sufficient for a finding of ‘fraud upon the court.’”
(alteration adopted) (quoting Gleason, 860 F.2d at 559)); see also In re Accent
Delight Int’l Ltd., No. 16 Misc. 125 (JMF), 2019 WL 6716419, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 10, 2019) (noting that plaintiff’s arguments were predicated on alleged

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perjury and nondisclosure, neither of which, without more, “amounts to fraud
on the court” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing King, 287 F.3d at 95)).
In sum, Plaintiff’s motion provides no basis for the Court to find that any
alleged misconduct by any of the parties or their counsel was of such a degree
that “the judicial machinery [could not] perform in the usual manner its
impartial task of adjudging cases.” Hadges, 48 F.3d at 1325. Therefore,
Plaintiff cannot carry its burden to establish it is entitled to relief under Rule
60(d)(3).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the judgment in
this matter is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion
at docket number 368.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

September 26, 2023
New York, New York

__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge

46