Skyfield v. United States of America

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth above, Defendants-Petitioners Tyriek Skyfield and Prince Wareham's motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences are DENIED. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability be cause neither Skyfield nor Wareham have made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also United States v. White, No. 16 Cr. 82 (VEC), 2020 WL 5898680, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (denying habeas relief to petitioners challenging § 924(c) convictions). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order by Skyfield or Wareham would not be taken in good faith. S ee Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 44445 (1962). That being said, however, should the law of this Circuit change with respect to whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Skyfield and Wareham may move for reconsideration of this Order at that time. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions docketed at ECF Nos. 202, 271, 365, and 374 in criminal case 11 Cr. 912 (JFK) and close civil cases 15 Civ. 2222 (JFK) and 16 Civ. 4700 (JFK). So Ordered. (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 5/11/2021) (js)

Case 1:09-md-02013-PAC Document 57

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN OF AMERICA
UNITED STATESDISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
In re FANNIE MAE 2008 SECURITIES
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-against:
LITIGATION
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:
:
TYRIEK SKYFIELD and PRINCE WAREHAM, :
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Defendants.
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Filed 09/30/10 Page 1 of 45
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: 05/11/2021
No. 11 Cr. 912 (JFK)
08 15 Civ. 2222 (JFK)
No.Civ. 7831 (PAC)
09 16 Civ. 4700 (JFK)
No.MD 2013 (PAC)

OPINION & ORDER
OPINION & ORDER

APPEARANCES

HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
FOR DEFENDANT TYRIEK SKYFIELD:
Matthew B. Larsen
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF NEW YORK, INC. 1
BACKGROUND
FOR DEFENDANT PRINCE WAREHAM:
The early years of
Barry D. Leiwantthis decade saw a boom in home financing which was fueled, among
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF NEW YORK, INC.
other things, by low interest rates and lax credit conditions. New lending instruments, such as
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
subprime mortgagesJ. DiMase loans) and Alt-A mortgages (low-documentation loans)
Christopher (high credit risk
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
kept the boom going. Borrowers played a role too; they took on unmanageable risks on the
JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge:
assumption that the market would continue to rise and that refinancing options would always be
Before the Court are motions by Defendants-Petitioners
available in the future. Lending discipline was lacking in the system. Mortgage originators did
Tyriek Skyfield and Prince Wareham to vacate, set aside, or
not hold these high-risk mortgage loans. Rather than carry the rising risk on their books, the
correct their sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the
originators sold their loans into the secondary mortgage market, often as securitized packages
reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.
known as mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”). MBS markets grew almost exponentially.
I. Background
But then the housing bubble burst. In 2006, the demand for housing dropped abruptly
On January 8, 2013, Skyfield, Wareham, and seven others were
and home prices began to fall. In light of the changing housing market, banks modified their
charged with a series of federal offenses for their participation
lending practices and became unwilling to refinance home mortgages without refinancing.
in a violent armed robbery crew that primarily targeted drug
dealers in the Bronx, New York.
1

As relevant here, Skyfield and

Unless otherwise indicated, all references cited as “(¶ _)” or to the “Complaint” are to the Amended Complaint,
dated June 22, 2009. For purposes of this Motion, all allegations in the Amended Complaint are taken as true.

Wareham were charged with one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs

1
1

Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“Count One”); one
count of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the
same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2 (“Count Five”); and
one count of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation
to the attempted Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count Five and
aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2 (“Count Six”).

Counts Five and Six

stemmed from Skyfield’s, Wareham’s, and others’ home invasion and
armed robbery of a suspected marijuana dealer in the Bronx in or
about June 2010, during which one of Skyfield’s and Wareham’s
accomplices discharged a handgun while attempting to forcibly
enter the home.
On September 17, 2013, Skyfield and Wareham each pleaded
guilty, pursuant to plea agreements, to Count Six.

During

Skyfield’s plea allocution, he testified under oath that:
DEFENDANT SKYFIELD: In June of 2010 I purchased—
THE COURT: Little slower.
DEFENDANT SKYFIELD: In June—
THE COURT: June 2010, go ahead.
DEFENDANT SKYFIELD: I participated in a robbery in the
Bronx.
During and in furtherance of the robbery a
handgun was fired.
THE COURT:
Okay.
Did you know it was wrong to
participate in a robbery?
DEFENDANT SKYFIELD: Yeah, I knew it was wrong.
(Joint Plea Tr. at 21:15–24, ECF No. 122.)
Wareham testified under oath that:
DEFENDANT WAREHAM:

In June 2010—
2

At that same hearing,

THE COURT: Little louder.
DEFENDANT WAREHAM: In June 2010, I agreed with others
to attempt to rob a marijuana dealer. During the attempt
one of the other participants brandished a handgun.
THE COURT: And was that up in the Bronx?
DEFENDANT WAREHAM: Yes.
THE COURT: And you knew it was wrong, is that right, to
participate in that?
DEFENDANT WAREHAM: Yes, your Honor.
(Id. at 25:9–18.)
On January 30, 2014, the Court sentenced Skyfield to a 120month term of incarceration—the mandatory minimum applicable to
his offense and the stipulated Guidelines sentence set forth in
Skyfield’s plea agreement to which the parties agreed would
constitute a reasonable sentence, see Ex. B to Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF
No. 226, at ECF Pages 35–36—to be followed by three years of
supervised release, and granted the Government’s motion to
dismiss all remaining open counts against Skyfield, including
Counts One and Five.
23, ECF No. 156.)

(Skyfield’s Sent. Tr. at 5:23–7:14; 11:19–

Later that same day, the Court sentenced

Wareham to an 84-month term of incarceration—the mandatory
minimum applicable to him—also to be followed by three years’
supervised release and, as with Skyfield, granted the
Government’s motion to dismiss all remaining open counts,
including Counts One and Five.
10:1–4, ECF No. 154.)

(Wareham’s Sent. Tr. at 7:5–24;

Neither Skyfield nor Wareham appealed his

conviction or sentence.

3

A.

Skyfield’s Habeas Petition

On March 13, 2015, Skyfield filed a pro se motion to vacate
his conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel.
202.)

(ECF No.

The Court ordered Skyfield’s trial counsel to provide

sworn testimony and set a briefing schedule for Skyfield’s
motion.

(ECF No. 205.)

On June 2, 2015, Skyfield’s trial

counsel filed the requested affidavit, and on June 12, 2015, the
Government opposed Skyfield’s petition as substantively meritless
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting
forth a two-part inquiry for claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel).

(ECF Nos. 220, 226.)

Following a pro se letter request by Skyfield, on April 20,
2016, the Court appointed the Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.
to examine whether Skyfield qualified for habeas relief in light
of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held the
so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), to be unconstitutionally vague.

(ECF No. 255.)

On June 22, 2016, the Court granted Skyfield’s subsequent motion
(through his appointed counsel) to amend his habeas petition to
include claims arising under Johnson, and on October 26, 2017, it
granted Skyfield’s subsequent request to stay consideration of
his habeas petition pending the disposition of certain appellatelevel cases examining the constitutionality of § 924(c).
Nos. 275, 303.)
4

(ECF

On June 3, 2020, the Court ordered the Government to explain
whether the stay should be lifted.

(ECF No. 327.)

Six days

later, Skyfield (through his appointed counsel) filed a
memorandum of law arguing that his conviction and sentence should
be vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot be deemed a
“crime of violence” following the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Davis, --- U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019),
which ruled that the residual clause of § 924(c) was
unconstitutionally vague.

On June 9, 2020, the Government

requested the stay be continued to allow the Second Circuit the
opportunity to decide two fully briefed and argued appeals which
raised the question of whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery
constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c).
Skyfield opposed the Government’s request.

(ECF No. 337.)

(ECF No. 338.)

On June 11, 2020, October 1, 2020, and again on October 27,
2020, the Court granted the Government’s requests to continue the
stay and deferred deciding Skyfield’s request to vacate his sole
count of conviction—which would result in his immediate release—
because principles of judicial economy strongly favored allowing
the Second Circuit to first resolve whether attempted Hobbs Act
robbery constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c).
Nos. 339, 352, 359.)

(ECF

On April 22, 2021, the Second Circuit did

just that, issuing United States v. McCoy, --- F.3d ---, No. 173515, 2021 WL 1567745, at *20 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2021), which held
5

that “Hobbs Act attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of
violence under § 924(c).”

Three days later, Skyfield (again

through his appointed counsel) filed a letter requesting the
Court continue the stay because a circuit spit exists on the
question of whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of
violence under § 924(c) and the United States Supreme Court has
yet to weigh in on the issue.
B.

(ECF No. 374.)

Wareham’s Habeas Petition

On June 14 and June 20, 2016, respectively, around the time
the Court appointed counsel for Skyfield, the Federal Defenders
entered a notice of appearance on Wareham’s behalf and filed a
placeholder habeas petition challenging his § 924(c) conviction
and sentence in light of Johnson.

(ECF Nos. 268, 271.)

As with

Skyfield, and consistent with Chief Judge McMahon’s standing
order, In re Petitions Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241 in Light
of Johnson v. United States, 16 Misc. 217 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8,
2016), the Court stayed consideration of Wareham’s newly-filed
habeas petition pending the disposition of certain appellatelevel cases considering the constitutionality of § 924(c).

(ECF

No. 309.)
Similar to Skyfield, on June 3, 2020, the Court ordered the
Government to explain whether the stay of Wareham’s petition also
should be lifted.

(ECF No. 328.)

On June 9, 2020, and again on

October 1, 2020, the Court granted the Government’s unopposed
6

requests to continue the stay of Wareham’s habeas petition to
allow the Second Circuit the opportunity to first decide whether
attempted Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence under
§ 924(c).

(ECF Nos. 333, 353.)

As discussed above, on April 22,

2021, the Second Circuit issued McCoy, holding attempted Hobbs
Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c).
II.

Discussion
A.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner sentenced in
federal court “may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” if the prisoner claims
that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Skyfield and Wareham both argue that their § 924(c)
convictions must be vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery
cannot serve as a predicate “crime of violence” under the
statute.

Skyfield’s petition also includes his earlier filed pro

se motion which argued that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with his guilty plea, and which the Court
will construe liberally and “read ‘to raise the strongest
arguments that [it] suggest[s].’” Green v. United States, 260
7

F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d
75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)).

Each ground for relief is discussed in

turn below.
B.

Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) imposes a mandatory, consecutive sentence
for “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance
of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A).

As relevant here, § 924(c)’s so-called “elements

clause” or “force clause” defines “crime of violence” as a felony
offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

As discussed above, on

April 22, 2021, the Second Circuit ruled that:
Hobbs Act attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of
violence under § 924(c) because an attempt to commit
Hobbs Act robbery using force necessarily involves the
“attempted use . . . of force” under § 924(c)(3)(A), and
because, even though a conviction for an inchoate attempt
to threaten is theoretically possible, [the defendants]
have not shown that there is a “realistic probability”
that the statute will be applied in such a manner.
McCoy, --- F.3d at ---, 2021 WL 1567745, at *20 (citing Gonzales
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
Skyfield’s subsequent letter on April 25, 2021, ECF No. 374,
acknowledges that McCoy decided the question at the heart of his
§ 924(c) challenge against him, but it requests the Court refrain

8

from deciding his petition at this time because the Fourth
Circuit has come to the opposite conclusion—i.e., that attempted
Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence, see
United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203, 210 (4th Cir. 2020)—and
because the Government has petitioned the Supreme Court to
resolve the issue, see id., petition for cert. filed, --U.S.L.W. --- (U.S. Apr. 16, 2021) (No. 20-1459).

The Government

does not oppose Skyfield’s request. 1
Notwithstanding the Government’s nonobjection to continuing
the stay, the Court will not allow it nor delay any longer
deciding Skyfield’s and Wareham’s petitions because their
§ 924(c) challenges are ripe for decision now.

As explained

above, the Second Circuit has now considered and concluded that
attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence
under § 924(c). See McCoy, --- F.3d at ---, 2021 WL 1567745, at
*20.

Accordingly, Skyfield’s and Wareham’s petitions for habeas

relief under Johnson and its progeny are denied. See id.; see
also id. at *21 (explaining that Ҥ 924(c) convictions, based on
On May 3, 2021, Skyfield filed a letter in further support of his
request to continue the stay in which he attached an order of the
Second Circuit that granted a defendant’s unopposed motion to continue
holding briefing of a § 924(c) attempted Hobbs Act robbery challenge in
abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s review of United States v. Taylor.
(ECF No. 375.) Unlike that case, however, which involves an appeal by
the Government of a district court’s finding that attempted Hobbs Act
robbery is not a crime of violence, here, briefing on the issue is
substantially complete and the Court need not prolong deciding
Skyfield’s and Wareham’s habeas petitions in light of the Second
Circuit’s clear ruling in United States v. McCoy.
1

9

[defendants’] guilt as aiders and abetters of the violent crimes
of Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery, are not error, much
less plain error”); Parkes v. United States, No. 03 Cr. 01364
(LAK), 2021 WL 1700375, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021) (denying
habeas relief in light of McCoy).

If, however, the law of this

Circuit changes with respect to whether attempted Hobbs Act
robbery can serve as a predicate offense for a conviction under §
924(c), Skyfield and Wareham may seek reconsideration of this
Order at that time.
C.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Prior to raising his § 924(c) challenge, Skyfield’s original
habeas petition argued that his conviction should be vacated
because his trial counsel failed to correctly assess the facts,
laws, and circumstances of Skyfield’s case, and failed to offer
him an informed and legally correct opinion regarding the
Government’s plea offer.

As a result, Skyfield asserts, he

admitted guilt to a crime to which he was not guilty.

The

Government opposed Skyfield’s pro se habeas petition soon after
it was filed (and before his subsequent § 924(c) challenge)
arguing that Skyfield’s counsel’s representation was not
constitutionally deficient and, even if it was, Skyfield did not
suffer any prejudice as a result.
Government.

10

The Court agrees with the

“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the
right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether
to accept it.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012).

“To

allege a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim a
defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was
unreasonably deficient under prevailing professional standards,
and, (2) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there exists a
reasonable probability that the result would have been
different”—i.e., “that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” United States
v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 716 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 694); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Skyfield’s motion does not satisfy either prong.
First, Skyfield does not demonstrate that his counsel’s
advice was unreasonably deficient.

Construing Skyfield’s

submission to make the strongest arguments it suggests, Skyfield
asserts that his counsel should not have allowed him to plead
guilty to a charge of attempted robbery during which a firearm
was discharged because Skyfield, personally, did not discharge
the firearm.

This argument is without merit because Skyfield’s

conviction is also predicated on his aiding and abetting the
relevant attempted robbery during which a firearm was discharged.

11

Accordingly, the fact that Skyfield did not personally discharge
the firearm is of no consequence.
In the alternative, and once again construing Skyfield’s
submission to make the strongest arguments it suggests, Skyfield
asserts that his counsel erred in allowing him to plead guilty to
a charge of aiding and abetting the above attempted robbery
because his counsel failed to investigate the facts,
circumstances, and laws of Skyfield’s case, which would have
revealed that Skyfield did not have “advance knowledge that a
confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s
commission,” as required by Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S.
65, 67 (2014).

Once again, Skyfield’s argument is without merit

because his post hoc assertions are contradicted by
(1) Skyfield’s position as the person with superior knowledge of
the facts and circumstances of his case; and (2) his counsel’s
sworn statement which explains that:
Skyfield and I discussed the elements of a 924(c) charge
that included the discharge of a weapon.
On many
occasions we discussed the fact that if a weapon is
discharged during a robbery, and such discharge was
reasonably foreseeable to a participant, that the
particular participant in the robbery is liable for the
discharge of the weapon even though another participant
actually fired the weapon.
Skyfield expressed to me
that he understood that concept.
(Aff. of Sanford N. Talkin ¶ 10, ECF No. 220.)
Here, Skyfield, himself, is the one who would have known if
it was not reasonably foreseeable or if he did not have advance
12

knowledge that his confederate would bring a gun to the attempted
robbery.

Only now does Skyfield assert that he did not have such

knowledge—but this is not sufficient to demonstrate unreasonably
deficient performance by his counsel where Skyfield’s counsel
explained the law in language Skyfield could understand, and
where Skyfield’s post-conviction assertions are wholly
inconsistent with (1) Skyfield’s plea, during which he agreed
that he told his counsel everything he knew about the case and
did not hold anything back from his counsel, Plea Tr. at 7:16–20;
and (2) Skyfield’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), to
which Skyfield did not object, Sent. Tr. at 2:13–18, which
described Skyfield’s “participat[ion] in a conspiracy to commit
armed robberies,” PSR ¶ 16 (emphasis added), as well as a second,
substantive armed robbery by Skyfield and the same confederate,
during which Skyfield and the confederate both employed handguns,
id. ¶¶ 17–19.

“An attorney is required to do no more than

‘inform a competent client of the law in a language and manner he
can understand . . . there is no duty for an attorney to insure
that his client understands all that he is told.’” United States
v. Delgado, No. 96 Cr. 126 (JFK), 2018 WL 895615, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2018) (quoting Martinez v. Capra, No. 13 Civ. 3657 (RA),
2016 WL 127587, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 675 F.
App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2017)).

13

Second, Skyfield’s conclusory allegations regarding his
counsel’s purported failure to explain the elements of the crime
to which he pleaded guilty are directly contradicted by
Skyfield’s counsel’s affidavit and Skyfield’s own sworn
statements to the contrary during his plea, see Plea Tr. at 7:9–
20 (Skyfield agreeing that he had reviewed the Indictment with
his counsel; his counsel explained to him the charges and he
fully understood the charges; and Skyfield had told his counsel
everything he knew about the case); 11:7–12:3 (Skyfield agreeing
that he reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel and did not
have any questions about it); 15:4–7 (Skyfield agreeing that he
was pleading guilty because in truth and in fact he was guilty);
15:24–16:4, 19:25–21:3 (Skyfield agreeing that he signed the plea
agreement and offered to plead guilty of his own free will; he
had not been induced to offer to plead guilty by reason of any
promise, fear, pressure, or threat; and Skyfield agreeing that he
was satisfied with the representation his counsel had given him).
Accord United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.
2001) (explaining that a district court may rely upon a
defendant’s sworn statements, made in open court, in finding that
a defendant has not shown deficient performance by his attorney).
Further, before now, Skyfield never once complained about the
assistance he received from his attorney, contested any of the
facts in his PSR, or suggested that he had been misled by his
14

counsel into entering his plea—to the contrary, as recounted
above, Skyfield made clear that he fully understood the charges
against him and the terms of his plea agreement, and he expressed
satisfaction with his counsel’s performance.
Finally, even if Skyfield did demonstrate that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, he fails to show, as he must, “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 60; see also Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163.
Here, Skyfield’s petition does not even assert that he would have
insisted on going to trial—which makes sense because Skyfield’s
counsel’s sworn statement explains that Skyfield “informed me
that he did not want to take the case to trial.”

Accordingly,

Skyfield’s petition fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel, and his request for habeas relief must be denied. See
Hill, 474 U.S. at 60; see also Marston v. United States, No. 17
Cr. 298 (JGK), 2020 WL 6701014, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2020)
(denying habeas relief where petitioner failed to allege a
reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial).
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants-Petitioners
Tyriek Skyfield and Prince Wareham’s motions to vacate, set
aside, or correct their sentences are DENIED.
15

The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability
because neither Skyfield nor Wareham have made a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2); see also United States v. White, No. 16 Cr. 82
(VEC), 2020 WL 5898680, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (denying
habeas relief to petitioners challenging § 924(c) convictions).
Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that any appeal from this Order by Skyfield or Wareham would not
be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 444–45 (1962).

That being said, however, should the law of

this Circuit change with respect to whether attempted Hobbs Act
robbery constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
Skyfield and Wareham may move for reconsideration of this Order
at that time.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions
docketed at ECF Nos. 202, 271, 365, and 374 in criminal case 11
Cr. 912 (JFK) and close civil cases 15 Civ. 2222 (JFK) and 16
Civ. 4700 (JFK).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
May 11, 2021

16