Hung v. Idreamsky Technology Limited et al
Filing
35
OPINION AND ORDER: In case number 15-cv-3794, the motion to remand (Dkt. No. 19) is DENIED. In case number 15-cv-2514, the iDream Groups motion to consolidate cases is GRANTED, the motion to appoint lead counsel is GRANTED, and the motion to appoint lead plaintiff is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. No. 18.) Case numbers 15-cv-2514, 15-cv-2944, 15-cv-3484, and 15-cv-3794 are consolidated as "In re IDreamSky Technology Limited Securities Litigation under the master docket number 15- cv-2514. Melvyn Boey Kum Hoong is designated lead plaintiff, and The Rosen Firm, P.A., and Glancy Prongay & Murray, LLP are designated co-lead counsel. The remaining motions to consolidate and appoint lead counsel are DENIED. The request for judicial notice (No. 15-cv-2514, Dkt. No. 31) is DENIED as moot. The parties are directed to meet and confer and, by February 9, 2016, submit a joint letter with a proposed schedule including dates for the filing of a consolidated complaint and the defendant s' response. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at docket numbers 6, 15, 18, and 31 in 15-cv-2514, docket number 7 in 15-cv-2944, docket number 12 in 15-cv-3484, and docket numbers 11 and 19 in 15-cv-3794. SO ORDERED. re: (15 in 1:15-cv-02514-JPO) MOTION to Appoint Stephen Crane to serve as lead plaintiff(s) filed by Stephen Crane, (31 in 1:15-cv-02514-JPO) MOTION Request for Judicial Notice re: (15) MOTION to Appoint Stephen Crane to serve as lead plaintiff(s) . . filed by IDream Group, (12 in 1:15-cv-03484-JPO) MOTION to Consolidate Cases 15-cv-02514; 15-cv-02944; 15-cv-03484; 15-cv-03794 Notice of Motion by Plaintiffs Abraham Jeremias, Roger Mariani, and Michael R ubin for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs and Approval of Selection of Lead filed by Abraham Jeremias, Michael Rubin, Roger Mariani, (11 in 1:15-cv-03794-JPO) MOTION to Consolidate Cases 15-cv-02514; 15-cv-02944; 15-cv-03484; 15- cv-03794 Notice of Motion by Plaintiffs Abraham Jeremias, Roger Mariani, and Michael Rubin for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs and Approval of Selection of Lead filed by Abraham Jeremias, Michael Rubin, Roger Mariani, (6 in 1:15- cv-02514-JPO) MOTION to Consolidate Cases 15-cv-02514; 15-cv-02944; 15-cv-03484; 15-cv-03794 Notice of Motion by Plaintiffs Abraham Jeremias, Roger Mariani, and Michael Rubin for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs and Approval of Selection of Lead filed by Abraham Jeremias, Michael Rubin, Roger Mariani, (19 in 1:15-cv-03794-JPO) MOTION to Remand . filed by Stephen Mansour, (18 in 1:15-cv-02514-JPO, 18 in 1:15-cv-02514-JPO, 18 in 1:15-cv-02514-JPO) MOTION t o Appoint Counsel Rosen and Glancy Firms. MOTION to Appoint Lead Plaintiff. MOTION to Consolidate Cases . filed by IDream Group, (7 in 1:15-cv-02944-JPO) MOTION to Consolidate Cases 15-cv-02514; 15-cv-02944; 15-cv- 03484; 15-cv-03794 Notice of Motion by Plaintiffs Abraham Jeremias, Roger Mariani, and Michael Rubin for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs and Approval of Selection of Lead filed by Abraham Jeremias, Michael Rubin, Roger Mariani. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 1/25/2016) Filed In Associated Cases: 1:15-cv-02514-JPO, 1:15-cv-02944-JPO, 1:15-cv-03484-JPO, 1:15-cv-03794-JPO(ama)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
TROY HUNG, Individually and on Behalf of All :
Others Similarly Situated,
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
:
-v:
IDREAMSKY TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, et al., :
Defendants. :
-------------------------------------------------------------X
JAMES PATRICK GRIFFITH, Individually and :
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
-v:
:
IDREAMSKY TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, et al., :
Defendants :
-------------------------------------------------------------X
ABRAHAM JEREMIAS, ROGER MARIANI, :
and MICHAEL RUBIN, Individually and on
:
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
-v:
:
IDREAMSKY TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, et al., :
Defendants, :
-------------------------------------------------------------X
STEPHEN MANSOUR, Individually and on
:
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
-v:
:
IDREAMSKY TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, et al., :
Defendants, :
------------------------------------------------------------ X
OPINION AND ORDER
15-CV-2514 (JPO)
15-CV-2944 (JPO)
15-CV-3484 (JPO)
15-CV-3794 (JPO)
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
These four cases are putative class actions brought against iDreamSky Technology
Limited, its officers and directors, and four underwriters, relating to iDreamSky’s initial public
offering of American Depository Shares on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Before the Court are
motions for consolidation and appointment of lead plaintiffs. One Plaintiff, Stephen Mansour,
also moves to remand his case to New York state court. For the reasons that follow, the motion
to remand is denied, the motions to consolidate the cases are granted, and Melvyn Boey Kum
Hoong is appointed lead plaintiff.
I.
Motion to Remand
As a threshold issue, the Court considers whether the Mansour case is properly part of
this litigation. That action was filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
New York, on April 22, 2015, and removed to this Court on May 18, 2015. (No. 15-cv-3794,
Dkt. No. 1.) Mansour now seeks remand back to state court.
The Mansour action alleges only violations of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a et seq. That Act is subject to a complicated removal scheme, the interpretation of which
has divided federal and state courts. See, e.g., Plymouth Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Model N, Inc., No. 14cv-04516, 2015 WL 65110, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (collecting cases). As a general rule,
cases falling within the court’s federal question jurisdiction—such as this one—are removable
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. The Securities Act, however, prohibits removal for cases
arising under the Act “and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a).
This bar on removal is subject to two exceptions. First, the Securities Act includes an
explicit exception to the general prohibition on removal “as provided in section 77p(c).” As the
Supreme Court has explained in considered dicta, “removal jurisdiction under subsection (c) is
. . . restricted to . . . actions defined by subsection (b) [of section 77(p)].” Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 643-44 (2006); see, e.g., Niitsoo v. Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 902 F. Supp.
2d 797, 802-04 (S.D.W. Va. 2012). Section 77p(b), in turn, precludes certain securities class
actions that are “based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof.”
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b). Together, these provisions function to allow removal, followed by
dismissal, of certain state class actions. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 642-44. Despite Defendants’
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arguments to the contrary, this exception to the removal bar is not relevant to this despite, which
concerns only federal securities claims. See, e.g., Niitsoo, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (rejecting
attempts to distinguish Kircher); W. Va. Laborers Tr. Fund v. STEC Inc., No. SACV 11-01171JVS, 2011 WL 6156945, at *3-5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (reaching this conclusion); cf. Knox v.
Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that Kircher is consistent
with its reading of the second exception, without passing on the application of Kircher to this
exception).
The second exception to the removal bar derives from the fact that the Securities Act
prohibits removal from a “State court of competent jurisdiction.” 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). If a state
court lacks jurisdiction over a Securities Act case, it is not a court of competent jurisdiction, so
the removal bar does not apply and the usual federal removal statute does.
The parties dispute whether state courts have jurisdiction over Securities Act class actions
like this one. Section 77v(a) of the Act grants concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over
actions “brought to enforce any liability or duty created by” the Securities Act “except as
provided in section 77p of [Title 15] with respect to covered class actions.” 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
Defendants argue that the language “except as provided in section 77p” refers to § 77p(f)(2),
which defines “covered class actions” as lawsuits involving more than 50 persons with common
questions of law or fact, or lawsuits brought on a representative basis. Id. § 77p(f). Under this
reading, there is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over individual Securities Act claims
and certain group claims—such as a suit involving 30 persons—but not over “covered”
Securities Act class claims. There is no dispute that the Mansour class action satisfies the
definition of a covered class action in § 77p(f). Accordingly, under Defendants’ interpretation,
state courts lack jurisdiction over the case, so it is removable to federal court.
Mansour, in contrast, argues that the language “except as provided in section 77p” refers
to the entirety of § 77p, primarily §§ 77p(b)-(c) precluding certain state-law class actions. Under
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this reading, there is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over Securities Act claims, except
with respect to those state-law class actions removable under § 77p(c) and precluded by
§ 77p(b). By this interpretation, state courts have jurisdiction over Mansour’s case, and it is not
removable.
While the construction of § 77v(a) has split federal district courts, this Court concurs with
those agreeing with the Defendants—including the other judges from this district. See In re
Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No. 08–cv-7831, 2009 WL 4067266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,
2009); Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 425; see also Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., No. 06-cv-2964, 2007 WL
778485, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007). Compare, e.g., Wunsch v. Am. Realty Cap. Props.,
Civ. No. JFM-14-4007, 2015 WL 2183035 (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2015) (Motz, J.) (agreeing with
Knox), with Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Am. Intern. Grp., Inc., No. SA CV 15-0687-DOC, 2015 WL
3631833, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2015) (disagreeing with Knox). First, the Defendants have
the better reading of the text. Defendants interpret “except as provided in section 77p with
respect to covered class actions” to mean “except with respect to covered class actions, as
defined in section 77p.” The statutory language is amenable to this reading, and the phrase
“covered class action” is a term of art with no meaning absent a reference to some definition.
Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 424. But see Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716,
721 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
Mansour’s parsing, meanwhile, runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kircher.
Mansour interprets the “except” clause to strip state courts of jurisdiction over cases removable
under § 77p(c). In Kircher, the Supreme Court said just the opposite. 547 U.S. at 646 (“[A]
defendant can elect to leave a [removable] case where the plaintiff filed it and trust the state
court (an equally competent body) to make the preclusion determination.” (citation omitted)); see
Lowenthal & Choe, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Securities Act Class Actions, But the
Frequent Failure to Ask the Right Question Too Often Produces the Wrong Answer, 17 U. Pa. J.
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Bus. L. 739, 775 (2015). Mansour’s interpretation would also create an inconsistency in the
language of the Securities Act. Niitsoo, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 805. As noted above, the Act grants
state courts jurisdiction over actions “created by” the Securities Act “except as provided in
section 77p.” According to Mansour, this language grants state courts jurisdiction over federal
claims “except” for certain state claims. But state claims, of course, are not a subset of federal
claims, excisable through an exception. Id. (finding the “created by” reference superfluous to
avoid this inconsistency).
To reconcile the language in § 77v(a), Mansour argues that the reference to “this
subchapter” is aimed at cases involving both federal and state claims. According to this
argument, §§ 77p(b)-(c) allow removal and dismissal of cases involving certain state-law
securities claims even if they also include federal claims. Congress was worried that the grant of
concurrent jurisdiction, which (under Mansour’s view) contains an exception for cases
removable under § 77p(c), would be understood to exclude such mixed federal/state cases. So it
left in the reference to claims “created by” the Securities Act to clarify that state courts retain
jurisdiction over federal claims in cases that are removed via §§ 77p(b)-(c). See In re Tyco Int’l,
Ltd. Multidist. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 n.7 (D.N.H. 2004) (accepting this argument).
Though this reading is clever, it is also unconvincing. Prior to the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), § 77v(a) granted concurrent jurisdiction over all
Securities Act claims. SLUSA added the exception “as provided in section 77p of this title with
respect to covered class actions.” Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, Tit. I, § 101(a)(3). Mansour’s reasoning, then, is that the Securities Act granted
concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving Securities Act claims, so Congress added an
exception to clarify that there is concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving Securities Act
claims. That proposition is doubtful. See Niitsoo, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 806-07 (“I cannot
understand why Congress would add an exception to a statute that already gave state courts
5
concurrent jurisdiction for the purpose of making it clear that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction); see also Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 1:06-cv-2931, 2007 WL 2729011, at *7
n.9 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (J. Carnes, J.) (“[T]his Court doubts that [SLUSA’s] drafters were
exercising the forethought attributed to them by the court in Tyco.”).
Finally, Mansour argues that it is unlikely that Congress would have stripped state courts
of jurisdiction to hear federal class actions through an oblique reference to a definition. See
Niitsoo, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 805 n.4 (accepting this argument); see also, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135
S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (“Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The text is inartfully drafted. But it would not be odd for Congress to draw a line between
federal securities claims within and outside jurisdiction of state courts by pointing to a definition
in another statutory provision.
Rather, Congress’s purpose was relatively clear. As noted above, this language was
added as part of SLUSA, which was intended to make “federal court the exclusive venue for
class actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain covered securities.” Lander v. Hartford Life &
Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). That statute amended the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-67, which imposed a heightened
pleading standard and other “stringent procedural hurdles” to deter “meritless class actions that
allege fraud in the sales of securities.” Id. at 107. Both of these objectives are accomplished
through Defendants’ reading of the Act. Mansour’s reading, in contrast, produces an odd result.
State-law class actions alleging securities fraud could be removed and dismissed. Federal-law
securities class actions would encounter the PSLRA’s procedural protections if filed in federal
court. But federal-law securities class actions filed in state court would have to stay in state
court and proceed without the PSLRA’s protections. Taken together, the PSLRA and SLUSA
would encourage plaintiffs to litigate federal securities class actions in state court, with lessened
6
procedural protections, and they would prohibit defendants from removing such cases to federal
court. See Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the SLUSA
was enacted “[i]n an effort to curb” the shift of federal securities fraud class actions to state
court). This outcome is implausible given the purpose of the Acts in question.
Insofar as the legislative history is helpful, it also contains support for Defendants’ view.
See Lowenthal & Choe, supra, at 779-82. For example, SLUSA’s preamble explains that the
Act was passed after “considerable evidence” showing “that a number of securities class actions
have shifted from Federal to State Courts . . . prevent[ing] the PSLRA from fully achieving its
objectives.” SLUSA § 2. The conference report explains that SLUSA “bars from State court . . .
actions brought on behalf of more than 50 persons, actions brought on behalf of one or more
unnamed parties, and so-called ‘mass actions.’” H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-803, at 13 (1998).
Mansour makes much of statements in the reports suggesting that SLUSA was focused on
preventing state-law class actions, and that Congress intended federal courts as the “the exclusive
venue for most”—so presumably not all—“securities fraud class action litigation involving
nationally traded securities.” Id. at 15; see Parker v. Nat’l City Corp., No. 1:08 NC 70012, 2009
WL 9152972, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2009). Neither of the types of statements invoked by
Mansour is inconsistent with Defendants’ interpretation of SLUSA. SLUSA could and did
remove state court jurisdiction of both federal and certain state covered class actions. This made
federal court the exclusive venue for most class actions, but not all. Class actions that may still
proceed in state court include those that fail to satisfy § 77p(f)’s definition of “covered class
actions,” state-law class actions not precluded by § 77p(b), and state-law class actions expressly
preserved by § 77p(d), see Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Additionally, SLUSA contains a savings clause that preserves certain types of state-law claims
that would otherwise be subject to its preclusion provision.”).
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In summary, the Court adopts Defendants’ interpretation of § 77v(a), and New York state
courts lack jurisdiction over this covered class action. Because the New York court is not a court
of competent jurisdiction under §77v(a), the bar on removal does not apply, and the case is
removable. The motion to remand is therefore denied.
II.
Motion to Consolidate
Next, the Court considers whether the cases should be consolidated. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(ii), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(ii) (requiring decisions on consolidation before selection of
lead plaintiffs). Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts may consolidate
cases “involv[ing] a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see In re Fuwei
Films Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 432, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Each of the Complaints here seeks certification of a class action on behalf of purchasers
of iDreamSky securities around the time of iDreamSky’s IPO, generally from August 7, 2014, to
mid-March 2015. The core of each concerns alleged misrepresentations by iDreamSky. The
Complaints each allege violations of §§ 11 and 15 of the Securities Act, and all Plaintiffs but
Mansour allege violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Other
than Mansour’s request for a remand, the parties do not resist consolidation, nor do they identify
any conflicts that might arise due to consolidation. Accordingly, the motions to consolidate are
granted.
III.
Motions for Appointment of Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel
Though there are four cases, there are only two parties seeking appointment as lead
plaintiff: Stephen Crane and the so-called iDream Group, consisting of six individuals. A group
led by Abraham Jeremias withdrew its motion for appointment as lead plaintiff in favor of the
iDream Group (No. 15-cv-2514, Dkt. No. 20), while Mansour filed his motion to remand without
an alternative request for consolidation and appointment as lead plaintiff (No. 15-cv-3794, Dkt.
No. 22). Insofar as Mansour asks the Court to delay deciding the motions to consolidate and to
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appoint a lead plaintiff until sometime after deciding his motion to remand, that request is
denied.
The PSLRA establishes a procedure for appointing a lead plaintiff in securities class
actions. First, the plaintiff who filed the initial complaint must publish a notice informing class
members of their right to move to be lead plaintiff within sixty days of the notice. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). The Court then selects a lead plaintiff.
The PSLRA provides that:
the court . . . shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members
of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members
(hereafter . . . referred to as the “most adequate plaintiff”).
Id. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(i). To determine the “most adequate plaintiff,”
the court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or
group of persons that—(aa) has either filed the complaint or made
a motion in response to a notice . . . , (bb) in the determination of
the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). This presumption “may be rebutted only upon proof by a member of
the purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff—(aa) will not fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class; or (bb) is subject to unique defenses that render
such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.” Id. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
Crane concedes that the iDream Group has a larger financial interest in the case, but
argues that appointing the group improperly aggregates the losses from multiple clients. The
Court agrees. As the Court has explained elsewhere, the better reading of the PSLRA
discourages appointment of joint lead plaintiffs to “avoid lawyer-driven litigation.” Opinion and
Order, In re Ply Gem Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14-CV-3577 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF
No. 36; see, e.g., Glauser v. EVCI Career Colls. Holding Corp., 236 F.R.D. 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). A group might nonetheless merit appointment if that concern were obviated—for
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example by evidence showing a prior relationship among the group members or showing that the
group members “chose outside counsel, and not vice versa.” Varghese v. China Shenghuo
Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). But the iDream Group’s
joint declaration includes no such evidence. (No. 15-cv-2514, Dkt. No. 22-1.)
Considering the iDream Group members as individuals, one—Melvyn Boey Kum
Hoong—has a financial interest greater than Crane’s. Crane concedes this point. (Id., Dkt. No.
23 at 4.) Hoong is willing to serve as lead plaintiff without the other iDream Group members.
(Id., Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 12.) Hoong also satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a): his claims are
typical of the class, and his interests are aligned with the other putative class members. See
Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin . Corp., No. 07-cv-8538, 2008 WL 2876373, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 2008) (“At this stage of the litigation, the moving plaintiff must only make a preliminary
showing that the adequacy and typicality requirements have been met.”). Accordingly, Hoong is
presumptively the most adequate plaintiff.
Crane attempts to rebut this presumption by alleging a defect in Hoong’s PSLRA
certification. The PSLRA requires that “[e]ach plaintiff seeking to serve as a representative
party on behalf of a class shall provide a sworn certification . . . stat[ing] that the plaintiff has
reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2). Hoong’s
certification, Crane notes, is dated March 18, 2015, yet the first complaint in this action was filed
on April 2, 2015. Crane argues that Hoong cannot have reviewed a complaint and authorized its
filing at the time he signed the certification, so his certification is false, and he cannot be
entrusted to act as lead plaintiff and fiduciary for the class. (No. 15-cv-2514, Dkt. No. 23 at 912.) Hoong avers through a declaration, however, that, at the time of his certification, he “did
authorize and review a draft complaint in this matter.” (Id., Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 2.) That complaint
was not filed because another plaintiff filed a class action against iDreamSky, so Hoong instead
10
moved for appointment as lead plaintiff. (Id.) Hoong says he has “reviewed that complaint as
well.” Id.
On these facts, Crane has offered insufficient evidence of a statutory violation or Hoong’s
dishonesty to rebut the presumption. Accordingly, Hoong is named lead plaintiff.
The PSLRA delegates authority to select lead counsel to the lead plaintiff, subject to the
Court’s review. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). Hoong selects The Rosen Firm, P.A., and
Glancy Prongay & Murray, LLP as co-lead counsel. Having reviewed the firms and their
experience with securities litigation, the Court is aware of no reason why these firms’
appointment is contrary to the interests of the class. Accordingly, Hoong’s choice is approved,
and The Rosen Firm, P.A., and Glancy Prongay & Murray, LLP are designated co-lead counsel.
IV.
Conclusion
In case number 15-cv-3794, the motion to remand (Dkt. No. 19) is DENIED.
In case number 15-cv-2514, the iDream Group’s motion to consolidate cases is
GRANTED, the motion to appoint lead counsel is GRANTED, and the motion to appoint lead
plaintiff is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. No. 18.) Case numbers 15cv-2514, 15-cv-2944, 15-cv-3484, and 15-cv-3794 are consolidated as “In re IDreamSky
Technology Limited Securities Litigation” under the master docket number 15-cv-2514. Melvyn
Boey Kum Hoong is designated lead plaintiff, and The Rosen Firm, P.A., and Glancy Prongay &
Murray, LLP are designated co-lead counsel.
The remaining motions to consolidate and appoint lead counsel are DENIED. The
request for judicial notice (No. 15-cv-2514, Dkt. No. 31) is DENIED as moot.
The parties are directed to meet and confer and, by February 9, 2016, submit a joint letter
with a proposed schedule including dates for the filing of a consolidated complaint and the
defendants’ response.
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The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at docket numbers 6, 15, 18, and 31 in
15-cv-2514, docket number 7 in 15-cv-2944, docket number 12 in 15-cv-3484, and docket
numbers 11 and 19 in 15-cv-3794.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 25, 2016
New York, New York
____________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge
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