Hernandez v. Vioculescu
Filing
85
ORDER AND OPINION re: 63 MOTION to Dismiss . filed by Lucia Vioculescu. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 63 and close the case. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 12/6/2016) (kgo)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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VICTOR HERNANDEZ,
:
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Plaintiff,
:
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-against:
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DR. LUCIA VIOCULESCU,
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Defendant. :
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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: 12/6/2016
15 Civ. 4003 (LGS)
ORDER AND OPINION
LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Victor Hernandez brings suit against Defendant Dr. Lucia Vioculescu
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant moves
to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons below, the motion is
granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and are construed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, as required on a motion to dismiss. See Littlejohn v. City of New
York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff suffers from back pain due to scoliosis, neuropathy, herniated disc and
degenerative spine disorder. At all times relevant to this dispute, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee
of the City of New York in the custody of the New York City Department of Corrections.
On at least two occasions during 2014 and 2015, Plaintiff was treated at Bellevue
Hospital by Defendant, a pain management specialist. When Plaintiff asked Defendant to help
him with his pain, Defendant replied, “I am not telling or discussing with you what is my
medical recommendation. When you get to Rikers Island you will find out.” Defendant also
wrote in Plaintiff’s medical records “on several occasions” that Plaintiff was a cocaine addict and
that medical staff should stop giving him opiate analgesics. As a result, Plaintiff did not receive
any type of pain medication -- “not even [T]ylenol” -- for several months. The lack of pain
medication stopped Plaintiff from walking long distances, eating normally and writing, and made
Plaintiff feel depressed.
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 10, 2016. After receiving an
extension, Plaintiff was to submit a response by August 7, 2016. Plaintiff did not timely submit
a response and instead sent a letter indicating that he had recently been released from the
segregated housing unit at one correctional facility and transferred to a different correctional
facility. On August 30, 2016, the Court held a conference during which Plaintiff had an
opportunity to explain orally his reasons for opposing Defendant’s motion.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
“On a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and
all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 306. “In determining
the adequacy of the complaint, the court may consider any written instrument attached to the
complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as documents upon
which the complaint relies and which are integral to the complaint.” Subaru Distribs. Corp. v.
Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Beauvoir v.
Israel, 794 F.3d 244, 248 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. While “‘detailed factual allegations’” are not necessary, the
pleading must be supported by more than mere “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In construing complaints by plaintiffs proceeding pro se, the Court “appl[ies] a more
flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency than [it] would when reviewing a complaint
submitted by counsel.” Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 139–40 (2d Cir.
2000); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”).
Thus, the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings with “‘special solicitude,’ interpreting
the complaint to raise the ‘strongest [claims] that [it] suggest[s].’” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006)).
III.
DISCUSSION
The Amended Complaint does not state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs because the alleged facts do not support a conclusion that Defendant acted
with the requisite culpable state of mind.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment -- rather
than under the Eighth Amendment, as the Amended Complaint alleges -- because it concerns his
pretrial detainment. See Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). “However, this
distinction is not material because ‘[c]laims for deliberate indifference . . . should be analyzed
under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth
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Amendment.’” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Caiozzo, 581 F.3d
at 72).
To prove deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test, one prong being objective and the other subjective.
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2006).
The objective prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the alleged deprivation of
medical care was “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
deprivation is sufficiently serious where “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death,
degeneration, or extreme pain exists.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Two inquiries determine whether a deprivation is
sufficiently serious -- first, whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care;
and second, whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious, specifically
examining “how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has
caused or will likely cause the prisoner.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279–80.
The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official acted
with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. Specifically, a plaintiff must prove that the
official acted with “deliberate indifference,” which is a state of mind “equivalent to subjective
recklessness.” Id. “This mental state requires that the charged official act or fail to act while
actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.” Id. “[N]egligence,
even if it constitutes medical malpractice, does not, without more, engender a constitutional
claim.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing, under the subjective prong, that
Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant
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wrongly concluded that Plaintiff was addicted to cocaine and instructed medical staff to “stop
giving [him] Opiate Analgesics.” The Amended Complaint does not allege any facts to show
that Defendant’s state of mind met the standard of subjective recklessness. See Chance, 143
F.3d at 703; Joyner v. Greiner, 195 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A] difference of
opinion between a prisoner and prison officials regarding medical treatment does not, as a matter
of law, constitute deliberate indifference. Nor does the fact that an inmate might prefer an
alternative treatment, or feels that he did not get the level of medical attention he preferred.”). It
does not allege any facts to show that Defendant knew that her instruction to stop administering
opiate analgesics would cause the medical staff to stop administering pain medication altogether.
See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm).
Because the Amended Complaint does not satisfy the subjective prong of a deliberate
indifference claim under § 1983, and without addressing the objective requirement, the Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to close the motion at Docket No. 63 and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 6, 2016
New York, New York
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