CMG Holdings Group, as successor to XA The Experimental Agency, Inc. v. Wagner et al

Filing 42

OPINION AND ORDER: re: 37 LETTER MOTION for Oral Argument ; Request for Oral Argument Be Heard on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint addressed to Judge J. Paul Oetken from Scott R. Matthews dated November 2, 20 15 filed by Estelle Pizzo, Jean Wilson, Mixed Company, Inc, Hudson Gray LLC, Darren Andereck, Studio AG, LLC, Joseph Wagner, Michael Day, Jessie Lomma, Remigio Gudin, 22 MOTION to Dismiss ; Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff& #039;s Second Amended Complaint filed by Jeffrey Smith, Estelle Pizzo, Jean Wilson, Mixed Company, Inc, Hudson Gray LLC, Studio AG, LLC, Darren Andereck, Joseph Wagner, Michael Day, Jessie Lomma, Remigio Gudin. For the foregoing rea sons, the Defendants motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants shall file their answer to the surviving claims by September 30, 2016. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 22 and 37. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 9/07/2016) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
:
CMG HOLDINGS GROUP,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
JOSEPH WAGNER, et al,
:
Defendants. :
------------------------------------------------------------ X

15-CV-5814 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff CMG Holdings Group (“CMG”), as successor to XA The Experiential Agency,
Inc. (“XA”), initiated this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York. Defendants Joseph Wagner, HudsonGray, Inc. (“HudsonGray”), Darren Andereck, Jessie
Lomma, Michael Day, Jean Wilson, Estelle Pizzo, Studio AG, LLC (“Studio AG”), Mixed
Company Inc. (“Mixed Company”), and Remegio Gudin (collectively the “Defendants”)
removed the action to this Court on July 24, 2015.
On August 31, 2015, CMG filed its Second Amended Complaint against Defendants
asserting two claims for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq., twelve assorted state law claims, and a plea for punitive
damages. Defendants moved to dismiss all but three of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
granted in part and denied in part. 1

Defendants filed a letter motion seeking oral argument on the motion to dismiss,
which this Court denies as moot. (Dkt. No. 37.)
1

1

I.

Background
The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint and are presumed

true for the purposes of this motion.
This dispute arises from actions taken by several employees of XA—an event planning
agency acquired by CMG in 2009—and involves several other companies with which they were
associated. (Dkt. No. 19 (“Compl.”).) Simply put, CMG alleges that Defendants engaged in a
“shell game” to divert profits and property away from XA to their own companies and pockets
by defrauding XA and its clients and by taking XA’s physical property. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.) The
details of the alleged scheme are somewhat more complicated.
Due to the sprawling number of defendants (ten) and claims (fifteen), some groundclearing is in order. CMG asserts claims against seven individual defendants and three corporate
defendants. Of the seven individual defendants, five were executive employees at XA: Wagner
as Chief Executive Officer; Wilson as Chief Operating Officer; Andereck as President/Creative
Director; Lomma as Vice President of Production; and Day as Executive Producer. (Compl.
¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 25, 26.) The three corporate defendants—HudsonGray, Studio AG, and Mixed
Company—are in the same industry as XA and are owned by some of the former-XA individual
defendants: HudsonGray and Studio AG were both established by Wagner, Andereck, and
Wilson; Mixed Company was established by Wilson and an outside partner. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 29.)
The remaining two individual defendants, Pizzo and Gudin, are employees of Studio AG, and
Gudin is also an employee of HudsonGray. 2 (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.)

2

Gudin also worked for XA, but only for six weeks. (Compl. ¶ 88.)
2

For further clarity, the “HudsonGray Defendants” will refer to Wagner, Andereck,
Wilson, Lomma, Day, Gudin, and HudsonGray, and the “Studio AG Defendants” will refer to
Pizzo and Studio AG.
CMG acquired XA in 2009 through an Illinois procedure similar to a bankruptcy sale.
(Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.) From 2009 to 2014, XA hovered around break-even profitability despite
significant gross revenues. (Id. ¶ 36.)
CMG alleges that XA’s lack of profitability resulted from Defendants’ behind-the-scenes
activity between 2009 and 2014. Specifically, CMG alleges that the Defendants were engaged in
a scheme to divert clients and profits from XA to HudsonGray, Studio AG, and Mixed Company
(separate companies owned and operated by Defendants) and to steal XA’s physical property.
(Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) Defendants did so, CMG claims, by misrepresenting to clients of XA that
Defendants’ own businesses were the same as XA. (E.g., id. ¶ 52.) Defendants allegedly
charged XA for costs incurred by their own businesses and claimed revenues for their own
businesses that should have gone to XA. (E.g., id. ¶ 54.) In addition, CMG claims that
Defendants dispossessed XA of a significant amount of physical property—including furniture,
lighting, and business records—and also absconded with a substantial proportion of XA’s data.
(Id. ¶¶ 80-82; Dkt. No. 19-2.) The particularities of this alleged scheme will be described in
further detail below, as necessary.
CMG brings suit against various configurations of the Defendants alleging two claims
under RICO, twelve state law claims, and a claim for punitive damages. Those claims are for:
(1) RICO and (2) RICO conspiracy against all Defendants; (3) breach of contract against the
individual HudsonGray Defendants; (4) injunctive relief and the imposition of a constructive
trust against the HudsonGray Defendants; (5) breach of fiduciary duty against the HudsonGray

3

Defendants; (6) breach of the faithless servant doctrine against the Individual Hudson Gray
defendants; (7) tortious interference with contract against Wilson, Wagner, Andereck, Studio AG
and HudsonGray; (8) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against all Defendants except
Mixed Company; (9) misappropriation against all Defendants except Mixed Company; (10) theft
of corporate opportunities and aiding and abetting the theft of opportunities against all
Defendants except Mixed Company; (11) tortious interference with business relationships
against all Defendants except Mixed Company; (12) tortious interference with prospective
advantage against all Defendants except Mixed Company; (13) conversion against the
HudsonGray Defendants; (14) unjust enrichment against all Defendants except Mixed Company;
and (15) punitive damages. (Compl. ¶¶ 149-295.)
Defendants move to dismiss all but three of these claims for failure to state a claim, and
all claims against Defendant Wagner on the basis of a release provision in his employment
agreement with XA. (Dkt. No. 31.) Defendants do not (at this stage) challenge Claim 6 (breach
of the faithless servant doctrine), Claim 13 (conversion), or Claim 14 (unjust enrichment). (Id. at
6.)
II.

Discussion
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering a motion to dismiss, courts
must accept as true all “factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

4

572, and must draw “all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[ ],” In re
NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.) (citation omitted).
A.

Claim 1 and Claim 2: RICO and RICO Conspiracy

RICO was enacted to “eradicate[e] . . . organized crime in the United States.” Am. Fed.
Of State, Cnty. And Mun. Emps. Dist. Council 37 v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 12 Civ. 2238,
2013 WL 2391999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2013) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91–452 (1970) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). RICO creates a private right of action and provides for treble
damages where a plaintiff can show: “(1) a substantive RICO violation under § 1962; (2) injury
to the plaintiff’s business or property; and (3) that such injury was by reason of the substantive
RICO violation.” Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 Fed. App’x 582, 584
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010)).
A substantive RICO violation occurs where “any person employed [by] or associated
with any enterprise . . . conduct[s] or participate[s], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). A “pattern”
of racketeering activity requires “at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity.” Id.
§ 1961(5).
To establish a RICO conspiracy, a plaintiff must show a conspiracy to commit a
substantive RICO violation. Id. § 1962(d).
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that the RICO and RICO conspiracy claims
should be dismissed because: (1) CMG fails to allege RICO predicate acts; and (2) CMG fails to
allege a “pattern” of racketeering activity. (Dkt. No. 31 at 18-29.) Defendants do not dispute
RICO’s injury and causation elements. See Curtis, 443 Fed. App’x at 584.

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1.

RICO Predicate Acts

In order to assert a claim under RICO, a plaintiff must allege at least two predicate acts of
racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “Racketeering activity” is defined as any of a long
list of state and federal crimes, id. § 1961, including mail fraud, id. § 1341, and wire fraud, id.
§ 1343.
“The elements of mail or wire fraud are (i) a scheme to defraud (ii) to get money or
property, (iii) furthered by the use of interstate mail or wires.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d
105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 327 (2d Cir. 1997)). To
assert a scheme to defraud, a plaintiff must show: “(i) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (ii)
the requisite scienter (or fraudulent intent) on the part of the defendant, and (iii) the materiality
of the misrepresentations.” United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). For a claim of mail fraud, “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and
any mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element.”
Curtis, 443 F. App’x at 584 (quoting Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647
(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, for wire fraud, a defendant need only be
“one of the participants in a fraudulent scheme which was furthered by the use of interstate
transmission facilities.” Id. (quoting City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425,
446 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Allegations of fraud—including allegations of fraudulent acts as RICO predicates—must
satisfy a heightened pleading requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading
Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013). “To satisfy this requirement, a complaint must ‘specify
the time, place, speaker, and content of the alleged misrepresentations,’ ‘explain how the
misrepresentations were fraudulent and plead those events which give rise to a strong inference

6

that the defendant[ ] had an intent to defraud, knowledge of the falsity, or a reckless disregard for
the truth.’” Cohen, 711 F.3d at 359 (quoting Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F.3d 181, 191 (2d Cir.
2001) (alteration in original)).
In considering CMG’s claims, the Court is attentive to balancing both the Supreme
Court’s reminder that “the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes,” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the Second Circuit’s instruction that “RICO
claims premised on mail or wire fraud must be particularly scrutinized because of the relative
ease with which a plaintiff may mold a RICO pattern from allegations that, upon closer scrutiny,
do not support it,” BWP Media USA Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 342, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Federal courts must guard against granting
jurisdiction to garden-variety state-law disputes shoehorned into a RICO pattern; but if the shoe
fits, the Court must wear it. See Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. at 660 (“We have
repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a
preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe.”).
CMG sufficiently alleges RICO predicate acts. As to each Defendant, CMG asserts at
least two fraudulent predicate acts that support a strong inference that the defendant had an intent
to defraud, knowledge of the falsity, or a reckless disregard for the truth.
In an exhibit appended to the Second Amended Complaint, CMG enumerates 134
discrete alleged RICO predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. (Dkt. No. 19-1.) For each act, CMG
provides the date of the act, the type of act, the participants, the content of the communication,
and the role of the act in furthering the fraud. Additionally, the Complaint itself sprawls to

7

nearly 300 paragraphs, describing the underlying schemes in deep detail and the role that
particular communications played in those schemes. This level of specificity satisfies the
heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b). See Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273,
290 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring a complaint alleging fraud to: “(1) specify the statements that the
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the
statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” (quoting Mills v.
Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Rothstein v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 12 Civ. 3412, 2013 WL 5437648, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 794 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[I]n complex RICO
cases ‘a detailed description of the underlying scheme and the connection therewith of the mail
and/or wire communications, is sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b).’” (quoting In re Sumitomo Copper
Litig., 995 F. Supp. 451, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Studio AG. Some of these predicate acts involve Studio AG—a separate company in the
event-planning business formed in late 2009 by Wagner, Andereck, and Wilson. These alleged
predicate acts include: emails among Wilson, Wagner, and Andereck in May of 2009 falsely
informing a bank and the clients of an XA subsidiary that Studio AG was part of XA (Compl.
¶ 52; id. Ex. A ¶ 5); emails among Wilson, Pizzo, Andereck, and others in November 2010
describing plans to doctor invoices to make it appear that XA, rather than Studio AG, was
responsible for Studio AG’s debts (id. ¶ 54; id. Ex. A ¶ 27); and Pizzo’s creating fake bills for
goods and services that Studio AG never provided (id. ¶ 182).
Defendants argue that the Studio AG allegations must be disregarded because the
existence of Studio AG was disclosed to CMG. (Dkt. No. 31 at 21-22.) But the mere fact of this

8

disclosure does not negate these and other allegations of mail or wire fraud absent indication that
CMG was or should have been aware of the fraud itself.
For the same reason, Defendants’ argument that the allegations regarding Studio AG are
time-barred does not merit dismissal. (Id. at 22-23.) Defendants correctly assert that the fouryear statute of limitations applicable to RICO claims “runs even where the full extent of the
RICO scheme is not discovered until a later date, so long as there were ‘storm warnings’ that
should have prompted an inquiry.” World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc. 328 Fed.
App’x 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 547 F.3d 406,
427 (2d Cir. 2008)). However, such “storm warnings” trigger an obligation to inquire only
where “a person of ordinary intelligence would consider it ‘probable’ that fraud had occurred.”
Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Koch v. Christie’s
Int’l PLC, 785 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). While Defendants allege that XA had
notice of Studio AG’s existence, they do not provide any basis on which XA should have found
it probable that fraud had occurred, especially given that many of XA’s key employees were
themselves involved in perpetrating the alleged fraud.
Mixed Company. Other predicate acts involve Mixed Company, a florist owned by
Wilson and a partner. CMG alleges that Mixed Company “fraudulently billed XA over
$183,705.00,” which was paid through a series of checks written in 2013 and 2014, despite XA
records showing no participation by Mixed Company in the underlying projects. (Compl. ¶ 214;
id. Ex. 1 ¶ 133.) CMG also alleges that Wilson subsequently lied about the Mixed Company
bills to XA auditors. (Id. Ex. 1 ¶ 107.)
HudsonGray. A final set of RICO predicate acts, occurring in 2014, involves
HudsonGray—a competitor to XA founded and run by XA employees while they were still

9

employed by XA. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Notably, Defendants do not directly challenge the allegations
of mail fraud and wire fraud regarding the activities of HudsonGray. (Dkt. No. 31 at 21.) XA
alleges that the very formation of HudsonGray was a scheme to defraud the clients and affiliates
of XA in order to obtain money and physical property for HudsonGray. Emails and text
messages were consistently used to plan and execute the HudsonGray scheme. (Compl. Ex. 1.)
Among the predicate acts that strongly support the inference that the actions of the
HudsonGray Defendants—HudsonGray, Wagner, Andereck, Lomma, Day, Wilson, and Gudin—
were part of a scheme to defraud are: text messages describing how the HudsonGray Defendants
would tell XA clients that HudsonGray was the same company as XA, just using a different
name (id. ¶ 52); a text message from Gudin to a temporary XA employee informing them that
HudsonGray is “the same [as XA] with a different name” (id. ¶ 83); the porting of proprietary
XA data and information to new iPhones possessed by the HudsonGray Defendants and
unattached to XA’s server (id. ¶¶ 80-82); and HudsonGray’s receiving payment for a project
developed by and belonging to XA (id. ¶ 112).
Between the predicate acts involving Studio AG, Mixed Company and HudsonGray,
CMG has sufficiently alleged at least two RICO predicate acts against each Defendant. In its
lengthy complaint, CMG also alleges numerous acts that do not rise to the level of RICO
predicate acts. At this stage of the litigation, the Court need not decide whether each individual
act constitutes a RICO predicate act, only that at least two such acts have been properly alleged.
In finding that CMG’s allegations satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b), the Court is also mindful of allegations that Defendants took aggressive steps to conceal
their actions, making it difficult for CMG to marshal the facts its claims require. (Id. ¶ 11.) In
certain circumstances, courts are permitted to apply “some leniency when confronted with the

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strictures of Rule 9(b),” such as “when ‘the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendants.’” Boritzer v. Calloway, No. 10 Civ. 6264, 2013 WL 311013, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
24, 2013) (quoting Am. Buying Ins. Serv., Inc. v. S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 240,
249 (S.D.N.Y.1996)). Leniency is likewise justified where defendants intentionally deprive
plaintiffs of access to facts supporting a claim.
Here, CMG alleges that Defendants absconded with much of XA’s digital and hard-copy
information and erased data from XA’s servers. (Compl. ¶ 12.) As a result, the Complaint relies
on information obtained from “one recovered XA telephone that did not have its data erased”
and data recovered by IT professionals. (Id. ¶ 13.) At times, the holes in the record are apparent.
(E.g., id. ¶ 114 (“XA has been unable to access documents showing costs because all the
physical contracts are missing and XA IT professionals have not yet been able to restore
documents regarding this project.”).) Given these allegations, some leniency is justified in
determining whether CMG has satisfied Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.
2. RICO Pattern
To bring a claim under RICO, a plaintiff must allege a “pattern of racketeering activity.”
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). A “pattern” of racketeering activity requires “at least two acts of
racketeering activity.” Id. § 1961(5). While two acts of racketeering activity are necessary for a
RICO claim, merely alleging two acts is not alone sufficient to establish a “pattern.” Rather,
“the acts must be related and ‘amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’” United
States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d
1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)).
To satisfy the “relatedness requirement . . . [t]he racketeering acts must be related to each
other (‘horizontal’ relatedness), and they must be related to the enterprise (‘vertical’

11

relatedness).” Rosenson v. Mordowitz, No. 11 Civ. 6145, 2012 WL 3631308 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2012) (quoting Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106). “[B]oth the vertical and horizontal relationships are
generally satisfied by linking each predicate act to the enterprise.” Burden, 600 F.3d at 216
(quoting United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 376 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
As for continuity, RICO requires a plaintiff to allege either closed-ended continuity or
open-ended continuity. Id. at 217. Closed-ended continuity requires “a series of related
predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time.” Spool v. World Child Int'l. Adoption
Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). Open-ended continuity requires “activity that poses a
threat of continuing criminal conduct beyond the period during which the predicate acts were
performed.” Id. But “[w]hether closed-ended or open-ended, continuity is ‘centrally a temporal
concept.’” Fresh Meadow Food Servs., LLC v. RB 175 Corp., 282 F. App'x 94, 99 (2d Cir.
2008) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)).
Defendants argue that CMG has failed to adequately allege a “pattern” of racketeering
activity. (Dkt. No. 31 at 25.) Defendants do not challenge the relatedness requirement. Rather,
they contend that the allegations are insufficient to show continuity. Defendants argue that the
schemes lack closed-ended continuity because they took place over too short a time period,
focusing only on the HudsonGray activities to argue that CMG has alleged acts occurring over
the course of just eight months beginning in January 2014. (Id. at 27-28.) CMG, however,
argues that the schemes took place over a much longer time horizon, beginning in 2009 with the
Studio AG activity. (Dkt. No. 34 at 17-18.)

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The Court concludes that CMG has plausibly alleged closed-ended continuity. 3
Defendants correctly assert that short-term activity is generally insufficient to show closed-ended
continuity. Worldwide Directories, S.A. De C.V. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 14 Civ. 7349, 2016 WL
1298987, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (“The Second Circuit has never found a period of less
than two years to be ‘substantial.’” (quoting Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co.,
187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 1999)). But Defendants fail to explain why the earlier actions
involving Studio AG and Mixed Company, for which CMG has plausibly alleged RICO
predicate acts that took place as early as 2009, should not be considered in establishing the
relevant timeframe. See Spool, 520 F.3d at 184 (“The relevant period . . . is the time during
which RICO predicate activity occurred.”). Defendants’ argument against continuity starts from
the premise that their earlier acts were not RICO predicate acts, and then assumes that their later
acts were of insufficient duration. However, given this Court’s conclusion that CMG has
plausibly alleged predicate acts occurring as early as 2009 and as late as 2014, Defendants’
actions over this five-year period—throughout which Defendants engaged in diverse activities in
furtherance of the alleged schemes involving multiple companies and multiple defrauded
counterparties—satisfy the requirement of close-ended continuity. See GICC Capital Corp. v.
Tech. Fin. Grp., Inc., 67 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts have attempted to measure
whether closed-ended continuity exists by weighing a variety of non-dispositive factors,
including, inter alia, the length of time over which the alleged predicate acts took place, the
number and variety of acts, the number of participants, the number of victims, and the presence

Defendants also contend that because the schemes are “inherently terminable,”
they lack open-ended continuity. (Dkt. No. 31 at 26-27.) Because the Court concludes that
CMG has alleged closed-ended continuity, it need not address whether open-ended continuity
has also been adequately pleaded. See Burden, 600 F.3d at 217.
3

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of separate schemes.”); see also Fresh Meadow, 282 F. App’x at 99-100 (finding that “[w]here
the racketeering acts span nearly three and one-half years,” other factors of continuity were “less
critical”).
CMG thus plausibly alleges a claim under RICO sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion
to dismiss.
Defendants contend that the non-HudsonGray allegations were “clearly included in the
Second Amended Complaint to ‘mold’ XA’s business dispute into a RICO claim.” (Dkt. No. 31
at 28 (quoting Spool, 520 F.3d at 184-85).) Indeed, “there is no question that RICO’s private
right of action, in conjunction with the statute’s inclusion of mail and wire fraud (for which there
is no independent private right of action) as racketeering acts, creates federal treble damage
actions out of business disputes that would otherwise never be in federal court. However, the
Supreme Court long ago observed that ‘this defect—if defect it is—is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.’” Fresh Meadow, 282 F. App’x at 100
(quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
3.

RICO Conspiracy

CMG asserts a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) against Wilson,
Wagner, Andereck, Lomma, Mixed Company, Day, and Gudin. Defendants argue that because
the RICO claim fails, the RICO conspiracy claim must also be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 31 at 29.)
Because the Court has concluded above that the RICO claim is sufficient to survive the
motion to dismiss, the only element remaining to be pleaded in support RICO conspiracy is the
existence of an agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); see Rothstein, No. 12 Civ. 3412, 2013 WL
5437648, at *19. The allegations described above plausibly allege such an agreement and
document the existence of the agreement by describing numerous communications about the

14

alleged scheme among all of the Defendants. (See Compl. Ex. 1.) The RICO Conspiracy claim
thus survives the motion to dismiss.
B.

Claims Against Wagner

As a defense to all claims against Wagner, Defendants argue that the Second Release
Agreement—a contract executed on April 22, 2014, in anticipation of Wagner’s departure from
XA—is operative and releases Wagner from all claims by CMG. (Dkt. No. 31 at 29-34.) The
Second Release Agreement, they contend, supersedes the First Release Agreement, executed on
February 26, 2014, which superseded Wagner’s original Employment Contract from 2009.
(Compl. ¶ 90-93.) Defendants also argue that all claims against Wagner must be dismissed for
improper venue due to the forum selection clause in the Second Release Agreement. (Id. at 34.)
In response, CMG claims that both the Second Release Agreement and the First Release
Agreement are invalid as they were only obtained as a result of Wagner’s fraud. (Dkt. No. 34 at
23.)
While valid release agreements are enforced according to their terms, “[c]ourts will not
enforce a release that is the product of fraud.” Becher v. Tyco Intern. Ltd., 27 Fed. App’x 48, 51
(2d Cir. 2001) (citing Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)).
“[E]ven an explicit waiver will not be given effect[,] ‘when the facts are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the party invoking the disclaimer.’” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete
Co., 404 F.3d 566, 576 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Banque Arabe Et Internationale v. Md. Nat.
Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1995)).
As discussed above, CMG pleads pervasive and particularized allegations of fraudulent
behavior by Wagner (namely that, unknown to CMG, Wagner engaged in a pattern of fraud over
a period of five years designed to siphon clients and profits away from XA and to other

15

businesses owned or controlled by him and his associates). The scope and magnitude of those
actions strongly support an inference that if CMG knew about Wagner’s actions it would not
have entered into the two Release Agreements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Put another way, CMG
has sufficiently alleged that Wagner’s calculated nondisclosures induced it to enter into the
Release Agreements. See Sokolow, Dunaud, Mercadier & Carreras v. Lacher, 299 A.D.2d 64,
70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002) (enumerating the elements of fraudulent inducement under
New York law: a material misrepresentation or omission intended to induce another party to rely
upon it to their detriment); accord 23-25 Bldg. P’ship v. Testa Produce, Inc. 886 N.E.2d 1156,
1164 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (Illinois law). Because CMG has adequately alleged that the releases in
the Release Agreements were the products of fraudulent inducement, those releases do not bar
claims against Wagner at this stage.
Defendants also argue that the claims against Wagner must be dismissed for improper
venue, given the forum-selection clauses in the agreements between the parties providing for
exclusive jurisdiction in Cook County, Illinois. (Dkt. No. 31 at 34.) However, a party may
“enforce a forum-selection clause by seeking dismissal of the suit . . . only when venue is
‘wrong’ or ‘improper.’” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, -- U.S.
--, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 (2013). Defendants do not argue that venue in this Court is wrong or
improper, only that the forum-selection clauses warrant dismissal. That this Court cannot do.
C.

State Law Claims

In addition to the RICO claims, CMG alleges a dozen state-law claims against mixedand-matched groups of Defendants, seeking punitive damages. Defendants challenge all but
three of these claims.

16

1.

Claim 3: Breach of Contract

CMG alleges breach of contract against all individual HudsonGray Defendants, claiming
that Wagner, Andereck, and Wilson breached the non-competition and non-solicitation clauses
of their employment agreements and that all individual HudsonGray Defendants breached
provisions of the XA Employee Handbook. (Compl. ¶¶ 221-226.) Defendants argue that these
claims must be dismissed due to the absence of breach in Wagner’s case and the non-existence of
the alleged contractual obligations in the other Defendants’ cases. (Dkt. No. 31 at 34-35.)
Defendants argue that XA’s own failure to comply with Wagner’s contract—in particular, XA’s
failure to pay Wagner compensation to which he was entitled upon termination—estops them
from alleging its breach. (Dkt. No. 38 at 9.) As to the remaining Defendants, Defendants argue
that only Wagner signed an employment agreement and that the Handbooks do not constitute
contracts given a disclaimer contained therein. (Dkt. No. 31 at 34-37.)
“To state a claim in federal court for breach of contract under New York law, a
complaint need only allege (1) the existence of an agreement, (2) adequate performance of the
contract by the plaintiff, (3) breach of contract by the defendant, and (4) damages.” 19
Recordings Ltd. v. Sony Music Entm't, 97 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Harsco
Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 1996)).
As regards Wagner, Defendants argue that CMG has failed the second prong of this
inquiry by failing to perform on its own obligations under the contract. Wagner’s employment
contract 4 includes a robust non-competition provision, prohibiting him from engaging in “the

For reasons discussed above, CMG has adequately pleaded that the First Release
Agreement and the Second Release Agreement were the products of fraudulent inducement. Due
to their presumptive invalidity, only Wagner’s original employment contract is at issue here.
(Compl. ¶¶ 90-98.)
4

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same, or a substantially similar, type of business as that in which [XA] engages” for nine months
following his termination. (Compl. Ex. D ¶ 6.) However, the contract also provides that the
non-competition clause is operative “if and only if” XA paid certain required compensation to
Wagner “within two (2) business days” of his termination. (Id.) Defendants claim that XA
failed to make this required payment. (Dkt. No. 31 at 33.) CMG does not dispute this claim.
Rather, it argues that “any inability on XA’s part to pay Wagner any monies he claimed he was
owed was the result of Wagner’s thefts of XA business and property.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 23.)
Because CMG does not allege that it adequately performed its obligations under the operative
employment agreement, it cannot sustain its breach of contract claim against Wagner. See
Merritt Hill Vineyards, Inc. v. Windy Heights Vineyard, Inc., 460 N.E.2d 1077 (1984) (“[A]
contracting party’s failure to fulfill a condition excuses performance by the other party whose
performance is so conditioned.”).
As regards the breach of contract claims against Andereck and Wilson, Defendants
dispute CMG’s pleading of the first prong of the standard for breach of contract: “the existence
of an agreement.” 19 Recordings Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d at 438. Defendants contend that Andereck
and Wilson did not sign employment agreements. (Dkt. No. 31 at 35.) CMG does not produce
the employment contracts. Rather, it alleges on information and belief that Andereck and Wilson
signed contracts that were identical to Wagner’s contract, based in part on its discovery (at the
bottom of an abandoned box) of draft employment contracts for Andereck and Wilson. (Compl.
¶¶ 222-223.) On this basis, CMG alleges that Andereck and Wilson were in breach of noncompetition and non-solicitation agreements identical to that in Wagner’s employment contract.
(Id.)

18

But this Court need not determine whether the alleged contracts existed. Even assuming
their existence, CMG’s claim for breach is unavailing given CMG’s failure to allege its own
adequate performance under the contracts. If Andereck’s and Wilson’s contracts were identical
to Wagner’s—as CMG argues—then its claim for breach of contract against them must fail for
the same reason that the analogous claim against Wagner fails.
As regards the remaining HudsonGray defendants Lomma, Day, and Gudin, CMG makes
no specific allegations about the existence or contents of their employment contracts in its
complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 221-226.) Only in its opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss
does CMG claim that its “belief that [Lomma, Day, and Gudin], too, signed written employment
agreements is based on the fact that Wilson represented to CMG that everyone working at XA
had signed agreements.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 28.) These generalized claims are insufficient to state a
claim for breach of contract.
CMG also argues that all Defendants breached provisions of the XA Employee
Handbook. But Defendants correctly assert that the Handbooks do not constitute binding
employment contracts, given the express disclaimer therein. (See Compl. Ex. C (“These policies
are not a legal document or an employment contract.”).) Under New York law, “[r]outinely
issued employee manuals, handbooks and policy statements should not lightly be converted into
binding employment agreements. . . . especially in light of conspicuous disclaiming language.
An employee seeking to rely on a provision arguably creating a promise must also be held to
reliance on the disclaimer.” Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312, 317 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 2001). In response, CMG claims that the provisions in the Handbook “largely replicate
ordinary common law fiduciary duties . . . and the absence of a signed agreement or handbook

19

does not shield such misconduct.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 30.) If this is the case, CMG should seek
relief for breach of fiduciary duty—as indeed it has—not breach of contract.
The Court thus grants the motion to dismiss as to the claim for breach of contract.
2.

Claim 4: Injunctive Relief and Constructive Trust

CMG seeks injunctive relief and the imposition of a constructive trust against the
HudsonGray Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 227-233.) CMG requests that the Court “enter an
injunction preventing [the HudsonGray Defendants] from using XA trade secrets, contacting or
working with any customers who were former XA customers,” impose “a constructive trust . . .
on the profit [these] Defendants have made,” and find that “[e]ach of the Individual
[HudsonGray Defendants is] deemed to be holding XA’s former physical resources and
proprietary/confidential information in a constructive trust.” (Id. ¶¶ 230, 233.) Defendants argue
that the request for injunctive relief should be dismissed because CMG has failed to allege
irreparable harm and that the request for a constructive trust should be dismissed because there is
no allegation that XA transferred the property in question to Defendants. (Dkt. No. 31 at 38-39.)
Defendants further argue that the claim for injunctive relief and constructive trust must be
dismissed given the request for monetary damages and the adequacy of money damages to
compensate CMG for its loss. (Id.)
Injunctions and constructive trusts are both equitable remedies. As such, they should not
be invoked absent indication that remedies at law are insufficient to compensate a plaintiff for its
injuries. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165-66 (2010) (“If a less
drastic remedy . . . was sufficient to redress respondents’ injury, no recourse to the additional and
extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted.”); In re First Central Fin. Corp., 377 F.3d
209, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (“New York courts have clarified that ‘[a]s an equitable remedy, a

20

constructive trust should not be imposed unless it is demonstrated that a legal remedy is
inadequate.’” (quoting Bertoni v. Catucci, 498 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)); see
generally 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 21 (2016) (“[T]he absence of an adequate remedy at law is a
precondition to any type of equitable relief. . . . Thus, the plaintiff must affirmatively show a lack
of an adequate remedy at law on the face of the pleading . . . .”).
Here CMG seeks twenty million dollars in compensatory damages, along with treble
damages for injuries arising from its RICO claims, and punitive damages for the non-RICO
conduct in the amount of ten times compensatory injury. (Compl. ¶¶ 290-291.) CMG does not
allege that these remedies at law will be insufficient to compensate it for its loss.
As a result, the Court dismisses CMG’s pleas for equitable relief.
3.

Claim 5 and Claim 8: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Aiding and
Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty

CMG alleges a breach of fiduciary duty against the individual HudsonGray Defendants
and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against the HudsonGray Defendants and the
Studio AG Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 234-237, 247-251.)
Under New York law, “[t]he elements of a claim for breach of a fiduciary obligation are:
(i) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of that duty; and (iii) damages
resulting therefrom.” Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing Barrett v. Freifeld, 64 A.D.3d 736 (2d Dep't 2009)). “A claim for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty [under New York law] requires: (1) a breach by a fiduciary of
obligations to another, (2) that the defendant knowingly induced or participated in the breach,
and (3) that plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach.” Id. at 142 (quoting Kaufman v.
Cohen, 307 A.D.2d 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)) (alteration in original).

21

CMG has adequately pleaded breach of fiduciary duty against Wagner, Wilson,
Andereck, Lomma, and Day. 5 Each of these individuals was an executive officer of XA, which
is alone sufficient to plausibly allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See United States
v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 137 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013). For reasons discussed at length above, CMG has
adequately alleged that these Defendants knowingly breached their fiduciary duties to XA’s
detriment by diverting XA’s profits and clients to their own businesses. (See, e.g., Compl
¶¶ 178-183.) With respect to the remaining Defendants, CMG has adequately pleaded aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, given the extensive allegations of Defendants’ knowing
participation in the breach of fiduciary duties owed to XA by Wagner, Wilson, Andereck,
Lomma, and Day.
4.

Claim 7: Tortious Interference with Contract

CMG alleges tortious interference with contract against Wilson, Wagner, Andereck,
Studio AG, and HudsonGray. (Compl. ¶¶ 242-246.) Defendants argue that this claim must be
dismissed because CMG fails to identify any specific valid contract with a third party that was
breached as result of Defendants’ interference. (Dkt. No. 31 at 40; Dkt. No. 38 at 11.)
“Under New York law, the elements of tortious interference with contract are (1) the
existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional procurement of the third-party’s
breach of the contract without justification; (4) actual breach of the contract; and (5) damages
resulting therefrom.” Plasticware, LLC v. Flint Hills Res., LP, 852 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404

CMG also alleges breach of fiduciary duty against Gudin. (Compl. ¶¶ 234-237;
id. at 1.) However, CMG nowhere alleges that Gudin owed a fiduciary duty to XA. (Dkt. No.
34 at 34-36.) The breach of fiduciary duty against Gudin is therefore dismissed.
5

22

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
CMG has described the existence of multiple specific contracts—such as those between
XA and NBCUniversal—and has alleged that HudsonGray and Studio AG were compensated for
XA’s work on these projects, in breach of the contractual arrangement, as a result of Defendants’
knowing actions. (See Compl. ¶¶ 109-116.) These facts, especially considered in the context of
the alleged scheme described above, are sufficient to plausibly assert a claim for tortious
interference with contract.
5.

Claim 9: Misappropriation and Unfair Competition

CMG alleges misappropriation and unfair competition against the HudsonGray
Defendants and the Studio AG Defendants, claiming that they “willfully and maliciously
misappropriated XA confidential and proprietary information for their own benefit.” (Compl.
¶ 253.) Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed due to CMG’s failure to “allege
any particular piece of secret information that was improperly used by any Defendant,” noting
that XA’s client list was publicly available on its website and thus not secret for the purposes of
alleging misappropriation. (Dkt. No. 31 at 42.)
“The tort of unfair competition (via misappropriation) under New York law specifically
requires proof that the defendant took something in which the plaintiff enjoyed a property right.”
Reed Const. Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 385, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2014), aff’d, 638 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz,
Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982)).
Additionally, a plaintiff must show that the “defendant’s use of the information constitutes freeriding on the plaintiff's efforts.” Id. (quoting National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105

23

F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)). “New York courts have noted the ‘incalculable variety’ of illegal
practice falling within the unfair competition rubric . . . calling it a ‘broad and flexible doctrine.’”
Id. (quoting Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1105 (internal citations omitted)).
Here, CMG has adequately alleged facts that fit its claim within the reach of this broad
and flexible cause of action. As described in detail above, CMG alleges that Defendants
absconded with a significant amount of digital and physical information belonging to XA
describing the operations of its business and the private details of its client relationships, and
then used that information to establish a firm the directly competed with XA. (E.g., Compl.
¶¶ 79-82.) CMG further asserts that even more instances of misappropriation would have been
alleged “but for Defendants theft of all XA’s hard copy files and global erasure of all its
electronic files.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 38.) These allegations plausibly support CMG’s claim of
misappropriation and unfair competition.
6.

Claim 10: Theft of Corporate Opportunities

CMG alleges theft of corporate opportunities against all individual Defendants. 6
Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed as against Pizzo because he was not an
officer or employee of XA. (Dkt. No. 38 at 14.) Defendants do not argue that this claim should
be dismissed against the other individual Defendants.
“The doctrine of ‘corporate opportunity’ is ‘based on a duty of loyalty to an employer’
and provides that ‘corporate fiduciaries and employees cannot, without consent, divert and
exploit for their own benefit any opportunity that should be deemed an asset of the corporation.’”

In its complaint, CMG asserted this claim against all Defendants except Mixed
Company. (Compl. ¶¶ 259-264.) However, in its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, it
corrected the allegation to only cover the individual Defendants, excluding HudsonGray and
Studio AG. (Dkt. No. 34 at 41.)
6

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Dorset Indus., Inc. v. Unified Grocers, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 395, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 384 F. Supp. 2d 649, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Pizzo was general manager of Studio AG. (Compl. ¶ 27.) CMG does not allege that
Pizzo was an employee or corporate fiduciary of XA. CMG also does not explain why this claim
should not be dismissed as against Pizzo. (Dkt. No. 34 at 41.) As a result, the claim for theft of
corporate opportunities must be dismissed against him.
7.

Claim 11 and Claim 12: Tortious Interference with Business
Relationships and with Prospective Advantage

CMG alleges tortious interference with business relationships and tortious interference
with prospective advantage against all Defendants except Mixed Company. Defendants argue
that these claims should be dismissed because CMG fails to allege that the interference was
accomplished through “wrongful means,” claiming that their actions amount only to “offering
services to customers at attractive prices.” (Dkt. No. 38 at 11-12; see Dkt. No. 31 at 40-41.)
Under New York law, “[a] claim for tortious interference with prospective business
advantage must allege that: (a) the plaintiff had business relations with a third party; (b) the
defendant interfered with those business relations; (c) the defendant acted . . . by using unlawful
means; and (d) there was resulting injury to the business relationship.” Thome v. Alexander &
Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (citing Carvel Corp. v Noonan,
3 N.Y.3d 182 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004)).
As described in detail above, CMG has plausibly alleged that Defendants communicated
with XA clients in an attempt to divert business from XA to Studio AG and HudsonGray by
fraudulently representing the relationship between those companies and XA, with the result that
Defendants’ own companies were paid for XA’s work. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 112.) Defendants’
actions were directed at parties with which CMG had business relationships, see Carvel Corp., 3

25

N.Y.3d at 192, and were accomplished by fraudulent means, see id. at 191. CMG does not
allege that Defendants’ activities were mere competition; rather, CMG argues that Defendants’
active and fraudulent solicitation of XA clients resulted in XA’s loss of business revenue.
(Compl. ¶¶ 42, 67, 109-114.) These claims survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
8.

Punitive Damages

Finally, CMG seeks punitive damages for injury caused by Defendants’ non-RICO
misconduct 7 in the amount of ten times compensatory damages. (Compl. ¶ 291.) Defendants
argue that “Plaintiff has, at best, alleged a ‘garden variety’ business dispute, and not anything
‘evil’ or reprehensible” so as to justify punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 31 at 43.)
Punitive damages are available only in the “most egregious” of cases. Poller v. BioScrip,
Inc., 974 F. Supp. 2d 204, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). To obtain punitive damages in ordinary tort
actions, a plaintiff “must show that the defendant committed a tort under ‘circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive . . . or such a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful
or wanton.’” Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 F.Supp. 2d 429, 448 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting
Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Commc'ns, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 466, 479 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993)). In order
to justify punitive damages, such conduct need not necessarily be directed at the public. See
Poller, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
Based on CMG’s allegations, this case may present a rare occasion where punitive
damages may potentially be justified. CMG alleges that Defendants engaged in a comprehensive
scheme over the course of five years to deprive XA of its profits and clients by working as

7

CMG seeks treble damages for injuries arising from Defendants’ RICO
misconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
26

executive officers for XA while simultaneously running separate businesses that fraudulently
competed with XA. CMG has alleged that Defendants: defrauded XA customers into paying
Defendants for work performed by XA; misrepresented the relationship between XA and their
own businesses; absconded with data and confidential information from XA’s servers; and
dispossessed XA of its physical property worth more than $300,000, including everything from
business records to coffee tables. CMG even claims that Defendants took XA’s lighting fixtures
and installed them in HudsonGray’s office, going so far as to include pictures of the fixtures in
HudsonGray advertising materials. (Compl. ¶ 83.) Given the chutzpah with which Defendants
allegedly executed their schemes, the Court finds that the request for punitive damages is
sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. Defendants shall file their answer to the surviving claims by September 30,
2016.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 22 and 37.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 7, 2016
New York, New York
___________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge

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