Romano v. Santander Holdings USA, Inc. et al

Filing 135

MEMO ENDORSED ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION for 130 Report and Recommendation. ENDORSEMENT: No objections have been filed to the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopts it as its opinion. The Clerk is directed to grant the motion a t ECF No. and unseal as directed by Judge Netburn, and to dismiss the case. (Signed by Judge Colleen McMahon on 9/27/2018) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (mml) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing. Transmission to Sealed Records Clerk for processing.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DOC 11; - - - - - - - DATE FILED: __ 6/412018

ROBERT ROMANO,
15-CV-7387 (CM)(SN)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

-againstSANTANDER HOLDINGS USA, INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

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SARAH NETBURN, United States Magistrate Judge.

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TO THE HONORABLE COLLEEN MCMAHON:

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Plaintiff Robert Romano, pro se, brings this action alleging that his former employer,
Defendant Santander Bank, N.A., and its parent company, Defendant Santander Holdings USA,
Inc., retaliated against him in violation of the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the
Consumer Financial Protection Act. ECF No. 4 ,r,r 1, 11, 16. On December 6, 2017, the parties
signed an agreement entitled Confidential Terms of Settlement (the "Agreement"), which
outlines terms for settling the claims in this matter. First ldrissa Aff. Ex. 4. On December 27,
2017, Defendants moved to enforce the Agreement. Defendants also requested that the Court
seal their motion, the parties' briefs, and various supporting materials, which the Court granted
on a provisional basis. ECF Nos. 116, 122, 127. The Honorable Colleen McMahon subsequently
referred the motion to enforce the Agreement to me for a report and recommendation. ECF No.
118. I recommend granting Defendants' motion to enforce the Agreement and dismiss the case.
In addition, I order the unsealing of the motion and most of the accompanying materials.

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BACKGROUND
The discovery process in this matter has been long and drawn out, largely due to
Romano's repeated refusals to comply with various Court orders. See ECF Nos. 73, 78, 81, 86,
101. On September 25, 2017, in an attempt to bring the discovery process to a close, the Court
tentatively scheduled Romano's deposition for November 17, 2017. ECF No. 86. The day before
the scheduled deposition, Romano informed the Court that a close family friend was
experiencing a medical emergency that would interfere with the deposition. To accommodate
Romano, Defendants agreed to reschedule Romano's deposition for November 21, 2017, and the
Court ordered Romano to appear on that date. See ECF No. 10 I. Romano subsequently failed to
appear for the deposition on November 21, 2017. Id. After a show cause hearing, the Court
allowed Romano's deposition to be rescheduled one last time-for 10:00 a.m. on December 6,
2017-and reluctantly extended the discovery deadline yet again. See ECF No. 105. The Court
warned Romano that his deposition would "not be rescheduled, postponed, or delayed." Id.
In the days leading up to Romano's deposition, the parties exchanged several e-mails
regarding the terms of a potential settlement, and in the evening on December 5, 2017, defense
counsel sent Romano a proposed settlement agreement. First Idrissa Aff. Exs. 1-2. Later that
evening, Romano responded with a few concerns regarding the proposal. Id. Ex. 3. The
following morning, the parties continued their settlement discussions via e-mail. Id. At 9:03 a.m.,
however, defense counsel e-mailed Romano, stating, "if there are other changes you want to
request and/or you need more time to review the agreement, we will need to proceed with you[r]
deposition this morning." Id. After Romano continued to push for further settlement discussions,
defense counsel responded at 9:24 a.m., "I'm happy to discuss the agreement with you but I have
to plan to proceed with your deposition in the event we cannot come to an agreement

2

quickly .... We can also take your deposition and continue discussions on the agreement
afterwards." Id.
Romano then sent defense counsel an e-mail claiming that he did not previously
understand that a signed agreement would be necessary to adjourn the deposition. Id. Defense
counsel replied, "I never told you that I would not require a signed agreement to adjourn the
deposition .... The Court has ordered your deposition to take place today. There is no way I
could not proceed with your deposition unless we had an agreement concluding the matter." Id.
At 10:20 a.m. and again at 11 :55 a.m., Romano e-mailed defense counsel indicating that he
would come to the deposition. Id. At 1:25 p.m., defense counsel again e-mailed Romano:
Your deposition was supposed to begin at 10 am. You told me at 11 :55 you would
be here shortly. If you are not here by 1:45 p.m. I will have to let the Court reporter
and videographer go and inform the Court that you failed to appear and request
dismissal of your case.
Id. Approximately ten minutes later, Romano arrived at the deposition. First Idrissa Aff.

,r 10.

At Romano's request, defense counsel then agreed to continue the settlement discussions,
but she informed Romano that the deposition would need to proceed if the parties were unable to
reach an agreement quickly. Id.

,r 11. Romano actively participated in the ensuing settlement

discussions and made specific requests for revisions to Defendants' proposed settlement terms.
Id.~ 12. Defendants agreed to some of Romano's proposals but declined to accept others. Id.

,r,r 12-13. Defense counsel then drafted the Agreement, which memorialized the agreed-upon
settlement terms, and gave it to Romano to review. Id.

,r 13. After indicating that the Agreement

was acceptable, Romano signed the Agreement, with a notary witnessing his signature. Id.
Relying on the Agreement, the parties did not proceed with the deposition. Id.

,r 14.

,r 15.

The Agreement states that it is "an outline of the material terms of settlement and a more
complete written settlement agreement shall be executed by the parties." Id. Ex. 4 ~ 11. The

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Agreement also indicates that Romano "will be given 7 business days to review the final written
settlement agreement with an attorney and/or the pro se Legal Clinic at the Southern District of
New York." Id. Ex. 4 ,r 10. On December 7, 2017, defense counsel e-mailed Romano a proposed
draft of the more formal written settlement agreement. Id. Ex. 5. A few days later, on December
13, 2017, defense counsel received an email from Patricia L. Boland, Esq., an attorney at Frank
& Associates, P.C., stating that her firm had been retained to represent Romano and that Romano

"rejected Defendants' offer to settle.'' Id. Ex. 6. Defense counsel later spoke with Ms. Boland
and her colleague, Neal M. Frank, Esq., who apparently asserted that the Agreement was
unenforceable because it gave Romano time to review the more formal written settlement
agreement and because Romano was allegedly coerced into signing the Agreement. Id. ,r 18. On
December 20, 2017, defense counsel received another e-mail from Mr. Frank informing her that
Frank & Associates, P.C. was unable to finalize a retainer agreement with Romano and would
not be representing him. Id. Ex. 7.
Romano did not execute the more formal written settlement agreement that defense
counsel sent him. First Idrissa Aff.

,r 20. Therefore, on December 27, 2017, Defendants filed a

motion to enforce the Agreement. Defendants also requested that their motion, the parties' briefs,
and the parties' supporting materials be sealed or, in the alternative, redacted. The Court granted
Defendants' requests to seal the documents on an interim basis. ECF Nos. 116, 122, 127. The
Court also indicated that it would revisit its rulings allowing documents to be filed under seal
when it issued its decision on the motion to enforce the Agreement. Id.

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DISCUSSION

I.

Motion to Enforce the Agreement
"A settlement agreement is a contract that is interpreted according to general principles of

contract Iaw." 1 Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437,443 (2d Cir. 2005). To form a
valid contract, "there must be an offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent and intent to be
bound." Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 427 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Louros v.
Cyr, 175 F. Supp. 2d 497,512 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). "Once entered into, the contract is binding
and conclusive. When a party makes a deliberate, strategic choice to settle, a court cannot relieve
him of that ... choice simply because his assessment of the consequences was incorrect." Powell
v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). In opposing Defendants'
motion, Romano argues that (A) the attorneys who communicated with Defendants regarding the
Agreement did not represent him, (B) Romano never assented to the Agreement, and (C) defense
counsel "attempted to force" Romano to sign the Agreement. Pl. 's Resp. 1-2.
A.

Attorneys from Frank & Associates, P.C.

Romano argues that Defendants have moved to enforce the Agreement "based on hearsay
from Attorneys that Defendant[ s] admit had never filed a notice of appearance on [Romano's]
behalf in this instant matter." Id. at 1. Defendants acknowledge that Romano is not represented
by attorneys from Frank & Associates, P.C. Defs.' Reply 2. Defendants merely describe their
communications with those attorneys in order to explain how Defendants initially learned that
Romano objected to the Agreement. Id. In his opposition brief, Romano states that he objects to
the Agreement and does not believe it is enforceable. Pl. 's Resp. 5. Thus, any communications

1 It is "an open question in the Second Circuit whether the enforceability of a settlement agreement m a federal
action [is] to be determined under state or federal law." Silas v City of New York, 536 F Supp. 2d 353, 355
(SD NY. 2008) But "there is no material difference between the applicable state law or federal common law
standard" Ciaramella v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 13 I F 3d 320, 322 (2d C1r. I 997)

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between defense counsel and attorneys at Frank & Associates, P.C. are inconsequential to the
dispute at hand.

B.

Assent to the Terms

Parties negotiating settlements "often enter into preliminary agreements, which may
provide for the execution of more formal agreements." Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs.,
Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 1998). "Ordinarily, where the parties contemplate further
negotiations and the execution of a formal instrument, a preliminary agreement does not create a
binding contract." Id. at 548. "In some circumstances, however, preliminary agreements can
create binding obligations." Id. One such circumstance is when the parties enter "a fully binding
preliminary agreement"; that is, they "agree on all the points that require negotiation (including
whether to be bound) but agree to memorialize their agreement in a more formal document." Id.
"Such an agreement is preliminary only in form-only in the sense that the parties desire a more
elaborate formalization of the agreement." Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune
Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). "A binding preliminary agreement binds both sides
to their ultimate contractual objective in recognition that, 'despite the anticipation of further
formalities,' a contract has been reached." Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548 (quoting Teachers Ins.,
670 F. Supp. at 498).
"In deciding whether a preliminary agreement is binding, '[t]he key, of course, is ...
whether the parties intended to be bound."' Jian Wang v. IBM Corp., No. 11-CV-2992 (VB),
2014 WL 6645251, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (first alteration in original) (quoting Adjustrite,
145 F.3d at 548-49), aff'd, 634 F. App'x 326 (2d Cir. 2016). "When a preliminary agreement is
reduced to a writing signed by the parties or their representatives, the plain language of the
agreement is the best evidence of the parties' intent." Id.; see also Khalian v. Skintej. No. 15-

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CV-1318 (LTS)(KNF), 2016 WL 10566660, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (enforcing a
handwritten preliminary agreement against a prose plaintiff because the plain language "clearly
show[ ed] the parties' intent to be bound by the agreement and settle the litigation"); McLeod v.
Post Graduate Ctr. for Mental Health, No. 14-CV-10041 (ALC)(JCF), 2016 WL 6126014, at *2
(S.D.N. Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (finding that a pro se plaintiff intended to be bound by a preliminary
agreement because the agreement sta~ed that the parties had "reached an agreement to settle the
above-referenced lawsuit"), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-10041 (ALC),
2016 WL 6126383 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016).
In this case, the plain language of the Agreement unequivocally shows the parties' intent
to be bound and settle the litigation. The Agreement states that the parties "reached an agreement
on December 6, 2017 to resolve Romano's claims currently pending in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York." First Idrissa Aff. Ex. 4. The Agreement then describes
the "terms of the settlement, which will be documented in a more formal written agreement
between the parties." Id. In addition, the Agreement states that "[a]ny party who breaches the
Agreement agrees to pay counsel fees and costs to the other party in the event the other party is
successful in an action to enforce the settlement agreement." Id. ,r 9. These provisions
demonstrate that the parties agreed upon the material terms of the settlement, the subsequent
written agreement was simply intended to be a "more formal" version of the existing contract,
and any party who breached the Agreement would pay the attorneys' fees and costs that the other
party incurred enforcing it. Although the Agreement also provides that Romano "will be given 7
business days to review the final written settlement agreement with an attorney and/or the pro se
Legal Clinic," it does not allow Romano to negotiate changes to the material settlement terms
that were agreed upon by the parties and memorialized in the Agreement. Id. ,i 10.

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Beyond the express terms of the Agreement, the contemporaneous email between the
parties makes clear that Romano's deposition would be adjourned only if the parties had entered
into a binding settlement agreement. First Idrissa Aff. Ex. 3. Following the negotiations, the
parties signed the Agreement, and defense counsel did not depose Romano. First Idrissa Aff.

,r,r 11-15. Thus, in addition to the plain language of the Agreement, the parties' conduct
unquestionably demonstrates their intent to settle this case.
Romano argues that he "couldn't have made it anymore [sic] clear that he was not in
agreement with the material terms defen~e counsel proposed." Pl. 's Resp. 2. But "in the absence
of fraud or other wrongful act on the part of another contracting party, a party 'who signs or
accepts a written contract ... is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to
them."' Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Metzger
v. Aetna Ins., 227 N.Y. 411,416 (1920)). Romano's decision to sign the Agreement indicates
that he assented to the material terms Defendants proposed. Accordingly, unless Romano can
show that he did not sign voluntarily, the Agreement constitutes a binding preliminary agreement
and may be enforced.

C.

Voluntarily Entering the Agreement

Romano argues that defense counsel "attempted to force" him to sign the Agreement and
thereby release his claims against Defendants. In the employment context, courts consider the
"totality of the circumstances" in "determining whether a release is voluntary." Bormann v.
AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399,403 (2d Cir. 1989). The following factors are relevant to
that inquiry:
I) the plaintiffs education and business experience, 2) the amount of time the
plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the role
of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement,
5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and
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6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds employee
benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law.
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp .. 681 F. Supp. 216,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). These
"factors are not exhaustive and not every factor must be in defendant's favor for the release to be
found knowing and voluntary; rather, all of the factors must be examined under the totality of the
circumstances." Neal v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. IO-CV-1157 (JFB)(ETB), 2012 WL
3249477, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2012).
First, Romano has a college education and worked as a branch manager in the banking
industry for several years. Second Idrissa Aff. Ex. 1. His education and business experience both
suggest that he was able to understand the Agreement and its implications.
Second, the amount oftime Romano had access to the Agreement before signing it was
fairly brief. The parties discussed the final settlement terms during the afternoon on December 6,
2017, and signed the Agreement shortly thereafter. First Idrissa Aff.

~~

7-14. But Romano was

familiar with Defendants' proposed settlement terms long before those final discussions and was
fully aware that Defendants would not agree to a settlement unless he released his claims against
them. See id. Exs. 1-3. Moreover, defense counsel's statements that she would seek dismissal of
Romano's case if he did not arrive at his deposition by 1:45 p.m.-several hours after the
scheduled start time-did not somehow suggest that defense counsel was pressuring or coercing
Romano into signing an agreement right away. On the contrary, Romano was fully aware that his
deposition needed to proceed on December 6, 2017-after repeatedly tolerating Romano's
attempts to avoid being deposed, the Court had unequivocally warned Romano that his
deposition would "not be rescheduled, postponed, or delayed" again. ECF No. 105. And
throughout the morning and early afternoon on December 6, 2017, defense counsel continually

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told Romano that the parties could proceed with his deposition first and discuss the terms of a
settlement afterward. See First Idrissa Aff Ex. 3.
Third, Romano played an active role in negotiating the terms of the Agreement. In the
days and hours before he signed the Agreement, Romano requested various changes to the
settlement terms and release of claims. Id. Moreover, during the afternoon on December 6, 2017,
Romano proposed specific changes to the settlement terms, some of which were agreed to by
Defendants and incorporated into the Agreement. First Idriss a Aff.

~

13. The mere fact that

Defendants did not assent to all of the settlement terms Romano requested does not suggest that
his decision to ultimately sign the Agreement was involuntary.
Fourth, the Agreement is drafted in clear, simple language that is easy to understand. Id.
Ex. 4. The Agreement contains neither legal jargon nor the type of boilerplate legal provisions
that Defendants included in previous versions of the settlement agreement and in the "more
formal" settlement agreement that was later sent to Romano for review. Id. Exs. 2, 4-5.
Fifth, Romano was not represented by counsel and did not consult with counsel before
signing the Agreement. This factor weighs against a finding that Romano voluntarily released his
claims against Defendants. Nevertheless, Romano had represented himself on a pro se basis for
at least a year and was thoroughly familiar with the litigation process and the implications of
entering a settlement agreement.
Sixth, the Agreement provides that Romano will receive a significant settlement sum in
exchange for the release of his claims against Defendants. Id. Ex. 4. Although it is difficult to
predict whether Romano might have obtained a larger recovery at trial, it is clear that Romano
has not yet established any contractual or legal entitlement to greater benefits.

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On the whole, these factors strongly suggest that Romano was fully capable of entering a
settlement agreement and was fully cognizant of the legal implications of doing so. Thus, I find
that Romano voluntarily signed the Agreement and thereby released his claims against
Defendants. I recommend granting Defendants' motion to enforce the Agreement.

II.

Motions to Seal Defendants' Motion and Related Documents
"The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our

nation's history." Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). "The
presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts, although independent-indeed,
particularly because they are independent-to have a measure of accountability and for the
public to have confidence in the administration of justice." United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d
I 044, I 048 (2d Cir. 1995). "To determine whether documents should be placed under seal, a
court must balance the public's interest in access to judicial documents against the privacy
interests of those resisting disclosure." Application of Utica Mut. Ins. v. INA Reinsurance Co.,
468 F. App'x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2012). "[W]here documents are used to determine litigants'
substantive legal rights, a strong presumption of access attaches." Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
"In addition to the common law right of access, it is well established that the public and
the press have a 'qualified First Amendment right to attend judicial proceedings and to access
certain judicial documents."' Id. at 120. Thus, a court must "consider (a) whether the documents
'have historically been open to the press and general public' ... and (b) whether 'public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question."' United
States v. Erie County. 763 F.3d 235,239 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120).
"Once a First Amendment right of access to judicial documents is found, the documents 'may be
sealed [only] if specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential

)I

..
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'" Id. (quoting Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 120).
"Any document reflecting the terms of the settlement and submitted to the Court is a
'judicial document' to which the presumption of access likely applies." Xue Lian Lin v.
Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., No. 08-CV-6519 (PKC), 2009 WL 2223063, at * I
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009). Similarly, "[d]ocuments created by or at the behest of counsel and
presented to a court in order to sway a judicial decision are judicial documents that trigger the
presumption of public access." Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-792l(KMK)(JC), 2006
WL 2788256, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006). Typically, settlement discussions and draft
settlement agreements are not "presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its
decisions." Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050. Thus, in many cases, "the presumption of public access to
settlement conferences, settlement proposals, and settlement conference statements is very low
or nonexistent under either constitutional or common law principles." United States v. Glens
Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1998). But when a party seeks "judicial
ratification or rejection" of a settlement agreement, "the document sought to be acted upon by
thejudicial power will be placed on file and must become a public record." Id. at 857.
By filing their motion to enforce the Agreement, Defendants asked the Court to act upon
that document and use its judicial power to effectuate it. The parties have also filed briefs and
presented various communications and draft agreements to the Court in order to sway its
decisions on the motion. The Court has been asked to rely upon these documents in determining
the parties' substantive legal rights in this matter, and thus, a strong presumption of public access
attaches. In addition, Defendants' only justification for sealing these documents is their own
generalized desire to keep the Agreement private. Pl. 's Dec. 27, 2017 Letter. This is not enough

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to overcome the strong presumption of public access. Accordingly, I DENY Defendants' motion
to seal their motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the parties' briefs on the motion, and
most of the supporting materials the parties have filed, including the Agreement itself.
Defendants have also provided the Court with an agreement that Romano previously
entered with another former employer. Second Idrissa Aff. Ex. 2. Defendants apparently filed
this document with the Court to demonstrate that Romano has prior experience with settlement
negotiations. Of. 's Reply 7. But the document has little, if any, bearing on whether Romano
voluntarily assented to the Agreement in this case. Moreover, the document contemplates that its
terms will be kept confidential. Second Idrissa Aff. Ex. 2 ~ 4. That confidentiality language
appears to be aimed, at least in part, at protecting the interests of Romano's former employer,
which is not a party in this case. Public disclosure of the agreement would provide the public
with negligible insight into the reasoning behind the Court's decision and would threaten the
privacy interests of a third party. Therefore, this document shall be redacted in Defendants'
filings. Enforcement of this order regarding the motion to seal is stayed pending Chief Judge
McMahon's final decision on Defendants' motion to enforce the Agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend granting Defendants' motion to enforce the
Agreement, ordering Defendants to pay Romano the agreed-upon settlement sum minus
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs Defendants incurred enforcing the Agreement, and
dismissing this case in its entirety with prejudice. In addition, I direct that the motion to enforce
the Agreement, the parties' briefs, and all of the supporting materials, except for the agreement

13

.

.

.

Romano entered with another former employer, be publicly filed on ECF after Chief Judge
McMahon issues a final decision on Defendants' motion to enforce the Agreement.

SA~RN1~
DATED:

June 4, 2018
New York, New York

cc:

United States Magistrate Judge

Robert Romano (by Chambers)
1 Jefferson Avenue, Apt GI I
Rockville Centre, NY 11570

*

*

*

NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS
TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen days from the service of this Report and Recommendation
to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service
is made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F)). A party may respond to another
party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the
chambers of the Honorable Colleen McMahon at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street,
New York, New York 10007, and to any opposing parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be
addressed to Chief Judge McMahon. The failure to file these timely objections will result in a
waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

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