Nypl v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. et al

Filing 775

ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the CUCL claim is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because no plaintiff in this action has standing to bring such a claim. It is further ORDERED that Defendants' request for Nypl to be dismis sed from the case entirely because he lacks standing is DENIED. Under the one-plaintiff rule, so long as one plaintiff has standing to assert each claim in the case, a court can adjudicate the case without inquiring as to the standing of remain ing plaintiffs. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) ("Because the superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts' decisions, we need not consider whether the Legislators also have standing to do so."); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Where, as here, at least one plaintiff has standing, jurisdiction is secure and we can adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiff has standing or not."). Here, as to the remaining claims, which are brought on behalf of a putative nationwide class, two Plaintiffs, Lisa McCarthy and Valarie Jolly, testified at their depositions that they purchased foreign currency at JPMorgan branches and have met their burden of demonstrating standing for this stage of the litigation. (Signed by Judge Lorna G. Schofield on 1/19/2022) (tg)

Case 1:15-cv-09300-LGS Document 775 Filed 01/19/22 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
:
JOHN NYPL, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al.,
:
Defendants.
:
------------------------------------------------------------- X

15 Civ. 9300 (LGS)
ORDER

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:
WHEREAS, courts have an independent duty to assess subject matter jurisdiction. Hertz
Corp. v Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010); SPV OSUS, Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 347 (2d Cir.
2018) (Calabresi, J., concurring);
WHEREAS, “[t]he objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be
raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation.” In Touch
Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship, 788 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted);
WHEREAS, “Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC,
963 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted);
WHEREAS, “[t]he standing doctrine, which emerges from Article III, is designed ‘to
ensure that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.’”
Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). “The doctrine imposes three
requirements: ‘[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to
the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547);
WHEREAS, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim. Town of Chester v.

Case 1:15-cv-09300-LGS Document 775 Filed 01/19/22 Page 2 of 4

Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017);
WHEREAS, once the issue of standing is put at issue, a District Court has leeway as to
the procedure it follows. All. for Envt. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 8788 (2d Cir. 2006). If genuine disputes of material fact exist, a Court may conduct a hearing, or
the issue may be resolved on motion supported by affidavits. Id. Here, no party has requested an
evidentiary hearing and, as explained below, no material fact is in dispute that would warrant a
hearing;
WHEREAS, Defendants pointed to evidence that Plaintiff Nypl lacks Article III standing
in their memorandum of law in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Dkt.
No. 726 at 29). Nypl testified at his deposition that he has not taken cash into a bank branch and
exchanged it for foreign currency. He further testified that he does not remember ever going to a
bank branch where he had an account and trading currency there. He then testified that he does
not have any recollection of ever going to a bank branch in the U.S. and exchanging currency;
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs did not dispute this evidence. (Dkt. No. 738 at 12-13);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs were provided an additional opportunity to meet their burden of
showing that Nypl has standing and to explain why the California Unfair Competition Law claim
should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Nypl is the only Plaintiff
asserting that claim (Dkt. No. 770 at 2);
WHEREAS, Nypl did not refute the evidence identified by Defendants to show that he
lacks standing, offered no contrary evidence that shows that he has standing and has not met his
burden of demonstrating standing. Although Plaintiffs quote a litany of deposition testimony to
argue that Nypl has standing, none of that testimony answers the straightforward standing
question at issue here. The claims in this action are limited to injuries connected to transactions
“involving foreign currency purchased with U.S. Dollars and physically received at Defendants’

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Case 1:15-cv-09300-LGS Document 775 Filed 01/19/22 Page 3 of 4

retail branches within the United States.” (Dkt. No. 349 at 1). Plaintiffs have not presented any
evidence to show that Nypl participated in such a transaction and therefore, cannot show that he
has suffered an injury for purposes of Article III standing. Other than the bald assertion that Nypl
“did refute” Defendant’s evidence that he lacks standing, Plaintiffs present no argument or
analysis to connect the evidence they have identified to any basis for finding that Nypl has
standing.
Plaintiffs have presented evidence of some transactions by Nypl, but none meeting the
contours of the claims in this case. First, Plaintiffs point to testimony that at some point Nypl
gave U.S. Dollars to one of the defendants and received a non-U.S. currency in return. This
testimony is insufficient to meet his burden because it does not provide any details about the
transaction, such as the currencies exchanged, the geographic location of the exchange, whether a
bank branch was involved or which Defendant was involved. Second, Plaintiff Nypl points to
testimony that he lived in California from January 2007 to December 2013, and that he
exchanged currency on many occasions. That testimony does not support Nypl’s standing
because it states that the exchange of currency took place outside of the United States. Nypl
stated, “I have exchanged currency. . . . I don’t recall specific dates, but I’ve done it on many
occasions. I’ve traveled to many countries, and I do it wherever I go.” The claims in this case
are limited to transactions “involving foreign currency purchased with U.S. Dollars and
physically received at Defendants’ retail branches within the United States.” (Dkt. No. 349 at 1,
4). Third, Plaintiffs point to testimony that Nypl has exchanged money in airports, that he has
sometimes conducted ATM transactions and that his ex-wife has exchanged money at a Chase
Bank. Again, none of this testimony supports finding that Nypl has purchased foreign currency
with U.S. Dollars at bank branches in the United States.
WHEREAS, Nypl is the sole plaintiff in this action asserting a claim under the California

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Unfair Competition Law (“CUCL”). (Dkt. No. 186 at 15-16; Dkt. No. 190 ¶¶ 98-100);
WHEREAS, to the extent Plaintiffs characterize Nypl’s standing issue as one of
supplemental jurisdiction, their argument is misplaced. Plaintiffs’ letter argues that the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the CUCL claim. This argument fails to address the threshold
issue of whether there is a case and controversy sufficient to provide Nypl with standing to bring
his claim -- a question separate from that of supplemental jurisdiction. “A plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each claim.” Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1650 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It is hereby
ORDERED that the CUCL claim is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because no plaintiff in this action has standing to bring such a claim. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ request for Nypl to be dismissed from the case entirely
because he lacks standing is DENIED. Under the one-plaintiff rule, so long as one plaintiff has
standing to assert each claim in the case, a court can adjudicate the case without inquiring as to
the standing of remaining plaintiffs. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) (“Because
the superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts' decisions, we need not
consider whether the Legislators also have standing to do so.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, at least one plaintiff has
standing, jurisdiction is secure and we can adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiff has
standing or not.”). Here, as to the remaining claims, which are brought on behalf of a putative
nationwide class, two Plaintiffs, Lisa McCarthy and Valarie Jolly, testified at their depositions
that they purchased foreign currency at JPMorgan branches and have met their burden of
demonstrating standing for this stage of the litigation.
Dated: January 19, 2022
New York, New York

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