Williams v. City of New York et al

Filing 49

OPINION AND ORDER: re: 37 MOTION for Attorney Fees Notice of Motion filed by Rhonda Williams. For the foregoing reasons, Williams's motion for attorney's fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to all fees and costs up un til the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and DENIED IN PART, as regards the fees sought in connection with preparing this motion for attorney's fees.The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 37. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 5/09/2017) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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RHONDA WILLIAMS,
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Plaintiff,
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-v:
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CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
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Defendants. :
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16-CV-233 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
On September 19, 2016, the Court was notified that Defendants provided, and Plaintiff
Rhonda Williams accepted, an offer of judgment in this matter pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in the amount of $10,001.00. (Dkt. No. 31.) Accordingly, the case was
closed (Dkt. No. 32), and a Clerk’s Judgment was issued on September 27, 2016 (Dkt. No. 33).
On November 1, 2016, Williams filed for attorney’s fees and costs. (Dkt. No. 37.)
Defendants oppose the motion on two grounds: the reasonableness of hourly rate of the fees and
the reasonableness of the number of hours billed. For the reasons that follow, Williams’s motion
is granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Legal Standard
“Federal statute permits the court, ‘in its discretion’ to ‘allow a prevailing party’ in a

federal civil rights action ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.’” Schoolcraft v. City
of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 6005, 2016 WL 4626568, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b)). “The Second Circuit has held that plaintiffs who accept Rule 68 offers of judgment
qualify as ‘prevailing parties’ entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.” Davis v. City of N.Y., No. 10
Civ. 699, 2011 WL 4946243, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011).

“District courts are afforded considerable discretion in determining the amount of
attorneys’ fees in any given case.” Id. In doing so, courts multiply the number of hours by a
reasonable hourly rate—this method “creates a presumptively reasonable fee.” Stanczyk v. City
of N.Y., 752 F.3d 273, 284 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Millea v.
Metro–N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)).
II.

Discussion
As an initial matter, Defendants do not oppose the costs sought by Williams, and those

few items—including, for example, the process server fees and PACER charges (Dkt. No. 39,
Ex. 4)—appear reasonable.
The Court now turns to the disputed question of attorney’s fees, first discussing the
appropriate hourly rate and then the number of hours billed. Finally, the Court resolves the
question of additional fees in connection with this motion.
A.

Hourly Rate

Defendants challenge Williams’s counsel’s hourly rate.
“A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the ‘prevailing market rate,’ that is, the rate
‘prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.’” Mosher v. Davita Healthcare Partners Inc., No. 15 Civ. 7594,
2016 WL 3963131, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
n.11 (1984)). “The relevant community, in turn, is the district in which the court sits.” Id.
(quoting Farbotko v. Clinton Cty. of N.Y., 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)).
In evaluating the reasonableness of the hourly rate, the Second Circuit has urged district courts to
keep in mind the twelve Johnson factors. See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). They are:

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(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s
customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974)).
Williams’s counsel graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 2003, held two
federal-court clerkships, and honed his litigation skills at several diverse jobs—including at the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, in private practice at the firm of
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, and at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
among others. (Dkt. No. 40 ¶¶ 11-18.) In 2015, he established a solo practice, focusing on
Section 1983 litigation. (Id. ¶ 10.) Based on these qualifications, Williams’s counsel seeks an
hourly rate of $400.
Looking to comparable cases in this District, a rate of $400 per hour is in line with the
prevailing market rate for a similarly credentialed attorney. To support his rate, Williams’s
counsel points to his own prior billing rate of $490 and $510 per hour, as well as rates approved
by courts in this District for similarly credentialed and experienced lawyers. (See Dkt. No. 38 at
10-13.) For example, in the context of a Section 1983 action, a court in this District awarded an
hourly rate of $550 for attorneys roughly in Williams’s counsel’s peer group (considering law
school attended and years of litigation experience). See Bailey v. Pataki, No. 08 Civ. 8563, 2016
WL 3545941, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016). Defendants, too, cite a case supporting a range
that includes William’s counsel’s hourly rate. (Dkt. No. 46 at 4 (citing Wise v. Kelly, 620 F.

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Supp. 2d 435, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases awarding $230 to $430 per hour for civil
rights litigators in this District).)
Addressing specific Johnson factors contested by the parties, the Court finds that the first
factor (the time and labor required), as well as the second and third factors (the difficulty of the
matter and the level of skill required of the legal work), counsel in favor of Williams’s attorney’s
proposed fee. Williams’s lawyer represents that, at the time of the Rule 68 offer of judgment, he
had already undertaken to build a substantial record to support motion practice in the case,
particularly as regards undercover officer discovery (thus strengthening his client’s position),
together with other complexities of the case (such as the facts surrounding Williams’s co-arrestee
and related motion practice required to obtain the relevant records to distinguish Williams).
(Dkt. No. 38 at 12.) In light of the work Williams’s counsel undertook to put his client in a
strong position leading up to the Rule 68 offer, Defendants’ argument that his tasks were not
difficult, and required neither labor nor skill, is unpersuasive. (See Dkt. No. 46 at 6.)
Williams’s counsel also represents—under the fourth and fifth Johnson factors (the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case and the attorney’s
customary hourly rate)—that because he is a solo practitioner, this work prevented him from
taking on other employment and that the rate he seeks in connection with this motion is
supported by his customary hourly rate. (Id. at 13.)
And the comparison to the rate charged by comparable attorneys, as discussed above,
buttresses Williams’s counsel’s claim that, under the ninth and twelfth Johnson factors, his
experience, reputation, and ability merit this hourly rate. While Williams’s counsel’s rate is
somewhat higher than some rates cited by Defendants (see Dkt. No. 46 at 4 (citing two cases
describing an hourly rate between $250 and $350)), here, counsel has credentials and a diversity
of litigation experience (including, as discussed above, years practicing in various selective legal
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jobs, such as his federal clerkships and his time working in a federal prosecutor’s office) that
warrants a slight uptick, see Bailey, 2016 WL 3545941, at *6. In light of Williams’s counsel’s
years of practice in diverse roles, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that—
because his solo Section 1983 practice is relatively young—he should be considered less
experienced and compensated at a lower rate. (Dkt. No. 46 at 4.)
Taken together, the weight of the Johnson factors thus support Williams’s counsel’s
hourly rate.
Williams’s counsel also seeks compensation for additional time entries at a paralegal rate
of $125 per hour (though counsel himself carried out these tasks). (See Dkt. No. 39, Ex. 4.) This
Court follows the example of others in this District in approving of such costs at the rate sought.
See, e.g., Muñoz v. Manhattan Club Timeshare Ass’n, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7037, 2014 WL
4652481, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (noting that paralegals in this District bill between $75
and $200 per hour and permitting an attorney who performed paralegal work to receive fees at an
hourly paralegal rate of $150). The Court also notes that the requested paralegal rate of $125 per
hour finds additional support from the fact that Williams may well have benefited from having a
single, trained attorney handling the case in its entirety, including some paralegal work. See,
e.g., Sanguineti v. Boqvist, No. 15 Civ. 3159, 2016 WL 1466552, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016)
(approving of a $129 per hour paralegal rate for work completed by an attorney).
As a result, the Court finds that both the hourly rate and the paralegal rate are reasonable
and should be used in calculating a fees award.
B.

Number of Hours Billed

Defendants also dispute the number of hours billed—twenty-five, all told. (Dkt. No. 39,
Ex. 4.) Defendants argue that Williams’s counsel simply spent too much time reviewing

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material in connection with this case and that he has included entries that do not rise to the level
of attorney work.
“[A] court must determine how much time was reasonably expended in order to arrive at
the presumptively reasonable fee.” Mosher, 2016 WL 3963131, at *2 (quoting Danaher Corp. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 10 Civ. 0121, 2015 WL 409525, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015),
adopted in full, No. 10 Civ. 121, 2015 WL 1647435 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015)). In doing so,
courts exclude “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours.” Id. (quoting Danaher
Corp., 2015 WL 409525, at *3).
As an initial matter, Williams’s counsel’s declaration, line-item invoice, and
contemporaneous records show how he spent his time (see Dkt. No. 39, Exs. 3-4), and provide
sufficient information for the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the hours billed, see N.Y.S.
Ass’n for Retarded Child., Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983); Wilder v.
Bernstein, 975 F. Supp. 276, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Turning to the reasonableness of the number of hours, Defendants’ objection to
Williams’s counsel’s time entries amounts to a complaint that he spent too much time reviewing
fairly lengthy materials and drafting documents connected to the litigation, some of which
Defendants claim could have been farmed out or else constituted clerical work. (Dkt. No. 46 at
10-11.) But these entries are not unreasonable tasks for an attorney to carry out given the facts
of this litigation, such as the back-and-forth correspondence with defense counsel. And given
the volume of pages reviewed by Williams’s attorney, the number of hours is not excessive. To
that end, the Court is mindful that the relevant standard for evaluating the reasonableness of fees
considers the “minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned
Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2007)).
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For these reasons, the number of hours requested by Williams is appropriate.
C.

Fees in Connection with this Motion

Williams also seeks fees in connection with the preparation of this motion. When, as
here (see Dkt. No. 39, Ex. 1), “a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment that includes fees ‘up to
the date’ of the offer, the Court, as a general matter, should not award fees for work performed
on the plaintiff’s claims after that date,” see Lee v. Santiago, No. 12 Civ. 2558, 2013 WL
4830951, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Long v. City of N.Y., No. 09 Civ. 699, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81020, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010)). As such, and in the absence of bad
faith on Defendants’ part in contesting the fees award, see Long, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81020,
at *5-*6, the Court declines to award fees in connection with the preparation of this motion.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Williams’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED

IN PART, with respect to all fees and costs up until the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and
DENIED IN PART, as regards the fees sought in connection with preparing this motion for
attorney’s fees.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 37.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2017
New York, New York

____________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge
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