Odeon Capital Group, LLC et al v. Ackerman

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER re: 22 MOTION to Amend/Correct Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award filed by Mathew Van Alstyne, Evan Schwartzberg, Odeon Capital Group, LLC, 6 CROSS MOTION to Confirm Arbitration Award. filed by Bre t Ackerman. Accordingly, Respondent's counsel is directed to submit, within three business days, a calculation of prejudgment interest and a tabulation of costs incurred in responding to the instant motion to vacate. Petitioner's counsel may submit any response three business days afterward. After reviewing these submissions, the Court will enter final judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to close docket entries 6 and 22. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 4/25/2016) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------x
ODEON CAPITAL GROUP, LLC,
MATHEW VAN ALSTYNE, and
EVAN SCHWARTZBERG,
16 Civ. 274
Petitioners,
OPINION AND ORDER
-v-

BRET ACKERMAN,
Respondent.
-------------------------------------x
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
On November 19, 2015, an arbitration panel of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")

rendered an award of

$1,102,193 against Odeon Capital Group, LLC ("Odeon")

and Odeon

employees Mathew Van Alstyne and Evan Schwartzberg
(collectively, "Petitioners"), and in favor of former Odeon
employee Bret Ackerman. See Amended Notice of Removal, Exhibit
1, Dkt. 4-1,

FINRA Award. On December 18, 2015, Petitioners

moved in New York State court to vacate the arbitration panel's
award of unpaid wages to Mr. Ackerman, and to remand the unpaid
wages issue to a new FINRA arbitration panel. See Amended Notice
of Removal, Exhibit 1, Dkt. 4-1,

Petition to Vacate an

Arbitration Award; Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition to
Vacate Arbitration Award ("Pet. Br."), Dkt. 4-5, at 31. On
January 13, 2016, Respondent Ackerman filed a notice of removal
1

to this Court, see Notice of Removal,
2016,

Dkt. 1, and on February 1,

filed a cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award in

this Court. See Notice of Cross-Motion to Confirm Arbitration
Award, Dkt.

6. Petitioners then moved to remand the matter to

state court, but the Court denied that motion. See Opinion and
Order dated February 29, 2016, Dkt. 21. Thereafter, the Court
heard oral argument on the cross-motions to confirm and vacate
the FINRA award. See Transcript of Proceedings dated April 4,
2016

("Tr.").
Having now reviewed the parties' submissions and arguments,

the Court hereby denies the petition to vacate the arbitration
award and grants the motion to confirm the award.

1

The Court also

denies Petitioners' application to amend their petition to add,
as a ground for vacatur, that the award was procured by means of
fraud.
By way of background, Respondent Ackerman worked as a bond
trader for Odeon, a New York-based broker dealer,

for

approximately three years before he was discharged on March 10,
2014. See Pet. Br. at 1; Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

; As stated at oral argument, the Court struck the declaration of Respondent's
counsel Paul Aloe except to the extent that this declaration attached the
transcript of the arbitration hearing and any exhibits that were introduced
or sought to be introduced at the arbitration hearing. See Tr. 2:11-15.
"[D]eclarations of counsel are generally properly used only to describe the
documents attached to them as exhibits for the Court's consideration
not to advance factual averments or legal arguments." Clark v. Kitt, No. 12cv-8061, 2014 WL 4054284, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014), aff'd, 619 F. App'x
34 (2d Cir. 2015).
2

Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and in Support of CrossMotion to Confirm Award ("Resp. Br."), Dkt. 8, at 21; Amended
Notice of Removal, Exhibit 1, First Amended Statement of Claims,
at 3. On June 26, 2014, Mr. Ackerman filed a Statement of Claim
with FINRA, asserting eleven causes of action against
Petitioners, including breach of his employment agreement,
disability discrimination, retaliation, and filing of a false
(a Form U-5) . 2 See FINRA Award at 2.

termination notice

Particularly relevant to the instant petition is that Mr.
Ackerman alleged that he had been denied commissions to which he
was entitled, so that he had not been paid wages that he had
earned. See First Amended Statement of Claims at 2-5; Pet. Br.
at 6-7.
FINRA held an arbitration hearing in front of a threemember panel over the course of six days between October 7, 2015
and October 15, 2015. See Pet. Br. at 6. In an award dated
November 19, 2015,

3

the FINRA panel found in favor of Ackerman on

his claims for unpaid wages and expungement of his Form U-5.

4

See

2 Mr. Ackerman,
in the arbitration proceedings, also brought claims against
Bonwick Capital Partners LLC, but the arbitration panel denied these claims,
and Bonwick is not part of the instant petition to vacate the arbitration
award. See FINRA Award at 2; Pet. Br. at 6 n.4.

The last of the arbitrators' signatures on the award is dated November 19,
2015. The award was served on November 20, 2015. See FINRA Award at 6.

3

4 In the instant petition, Petitioners do not challenge the arbitration
panel's ruling on Respondent's Form U-5. See Pet. Br. at 6 n.6.

3

FINRA Award at 2-3. The panel held Petitioners jointly and
severally liable for compensatory damages "based on unpaid
wages" in the amount of $1,102,193; interest on that award at
the rate of 9% per annum from November 1, 2012 until the award
is paid in full; attorneys'

fees of $247,532; and costs of

$21,349.25. See id. at 2-3. The panel found in favor of
Petitioners on all of Mr. Ackerman's other claims. See id.
The Federal Arbitration Act

(FAA) provides that

at any time within one year after the [arbitration]
award is made any party to the arbi tra ti on may apply
to the court
for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.
9 U.S.C.

§

9. Section 10 of the FAA states, in relevant part,

that a district court may vacate an arbitration award
1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
( 3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to
hear
evidence
pertinent
and
material
to
the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
9 U.S.C.

§

lO(a). Additionally, the Second Circuit recently

confirmed that it is still the law that "[a] court may also set
aside an arbitration award if it was rendered in manifest
disregard of the law." Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers A.S.,
811 F.3d 584, 588

(2d Cir. 2016)

(internal quotation marks

omitted).
4

For its part, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR), as applicable here,

5

provides that an arbitration award

"shall be vacated on the application of a party who either
participated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of
intention to arbitrate if the court finds that the rights of
that party were prejudiced by:

( i)

misconduct in procuring the award

corruption, fraud or
." CPLR

§

75ll(b). The New

York Court of Appeals has stated that "[o]ne form of misconduct
is the refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence." Prof'l
Staff Cong./City Univ. of New York v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of City
of New York,

347 N.E.2d 918

(N.Y. 1976).

However, "[a] motion to vacate filed in a federal court is
not an occasion for de nova review of an arbitral award."
Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004). Likewise,
under New York law, "judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely limited. An arbitration award must be upheld when the
arbitrator offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for
the outcome reached." Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear,

Inc.,

Petitioners contend that New York law applies "[b]ecause Ackerman's
employment contract . . . was specifically governed by New York law and
because the Award is based on a New York wage statute," but indicate that as
between New York and federal law, "which law governs does not impact the
result" because the arbitration award must be vacated under both the FAA. or
the CPLR. See Pet. Br. at 20 n.14. Respondent argues that Petitioners'
challenges to the arbitration award fail under either the FAA. or New York
law. See Resp. Br. at 4. Like the parties, the Court does not believe that
the choice of federal or New York law materially affects the outcome of these
cross-motions to vacate and confirm the arbitration award.
5

5

846 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (N.Y. 2006)

(quotation and internal

citation omitted).
Here, Petitioners claim (1) that the arbitration panel
committed misconduct in "refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy" and in "refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown," 9 U.S.C.

§

lO(a); and (2)

that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law in
rendering the wage award, calculating attorneys'

fees,

awarding

prejudgment interest on the wage award beginning in November
2012, and imposing joint and several liability against the
Petitioners without clarifying that Mr. Ackerman must first seek
payment from Odeon before seeking recovery from Odeon's members
Van Alstyne and Schwartzberg. See Pet. Br. at 19-31; Reply in
Support of Petition to Vacate and in Opposition to Cross-Motion
to Confirm Arbitration Award ("Pet. Reply Br.") at 8-9.
Petitioners also seek to amend their original petition to
include as an additional basis for vacatur that the award was
"procured by corruption, fraud,
meaning of the FAA,

9 U.S.C.

dated March 16, 2016, Dkt. 22

§

or undue means" within the
lO(a). See Petitioners' Letter

("Pet. Letter"); Respondent's

Letter dated March 22, 2016, Dkt. 23

("Resp. Letter").

Turning to Petitioners' argument that the arbitrators
committed misconduct in their evidentiary determinations, the
6

Second Circuit has held that "[c]ourts have interpreted section
lO(a) (3)

to mean that except when fundamental fairness is

violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened up to
evidentiary review." Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek,
16, 20

Inc., 120 F.3d

(2d Cir. 1997); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union,

AFL-CIO v. Misco,

Inc.,

484 U.S. 29,

40

(1987)

(overruling a

court's refusal to enforce an arbitration award when "assum[ing]
that the arbitrator erred in refusing to consider the disputed
evidence, his error was not in bad faith or so gross as to
amount to affirmative misconduct."). In the instant case,
Petitioners argue that the arbitrators committed misconduct, in
essence, by permitting Mr. Ackerman to introduce damages
calculations at late junctures in the proceedings and providing
Petitioners with an inadequate opportunity to respond. These
calculations identified the transactions as to which Mr.
Ackerman believed he had been underpaid or not paid, and
therefore affected the amount of unpaid wages that Mr. Ackerman
was claiming. See Pet. Br. at 23.
Specifically, Petitioners allege that the arbitrators
"ignor[ed]" Petitioners' motion,

submitted on September 23,

2015, asking the arbitration panel to order Mr. Ackerman to list
each of the transactions on which he believes he was not
adequately paid and requesting that the panel hold a hearing on
7

this motion. See Pet. Br. at 23; Amended Notice of Removal ,
~-

Exhibit 3. Petitioners further contend that the panel improperly
admitted Mr. Ackerman's calculations and spreadsheets, reporting
on unpaid wages, made at various allegedly tardy intervals: a
464-page spreadsheet, produced for the first time on September
21, 2015, identifying approximately 1,250 transactions for which
Mr. Ackerman was claiming unpaid wages; a "summary sheet"
produced on October 5, 2015 claiming to establish about $4.1
million in unpaid wages; and new wage damages models produced
for the first time during the testimony of Mr. Ackerman's expert
on the last day of the hearing. See Pet. Br. at 10, 12, 16.
Petitioners also argue that the arbitration panel did not
allow them sufficient opportunity to protest Mr. Ackerman's late
identification of damages claims at the beginning of the
hearing, to review the documents presented on the last day of
the arbitration, or to question Mr. Ackerman and his expert
adequately on their calculations. See id. at 13, 16-18.
Petitioners also fault the panel for not granting applications
to adjourn parts of the hearing, made both in a letter dated
September 28, 2015, and during the last day of the hearing. See
id. at 11-12, 26-27. The denial of Petitioners' applications to
postpone parts of the hearing constitute, in Petitioners' view,
an additional ground for vacatur. See Pet. Br. at 26.
8

In the Court's view, however,

Petitioners have not shown

that the arbitration panel engaged in the kinds of violations of
fundamental fairness that would warrant vacating the arbitration
award on grounds of misconduct. For example, in the Court's
view, the panel did not "ignor[e]" Petitioners' motion regarding
Respondent's newly-produced materials, made on September 23,
2015. Rather, on October 1, 2015, the Chair of the arbitration
panel indicated that she had not previously received this motion
and that the panel would address Respondent's allegedly tardy
identification of trades at the hearing itself, see Amended
Notice of Removal, Exhibit 4. Despite the invitation,
Petitioners' counsel failed to make any specific request to take
up this matter at the outset of the hearing. See Aloe
Declaration, Exhibit 31

(Respondent's Transcript of Arbitration

Proceedings), at 6. Nonetheless, on the last day of the hearing,
in response to Petitioners' objection to the introduction of a
"new calculation formula," the Chair of the arbitration panel
stated:
I
know we have heard this complaint before from
[Petitioners], in fact asked to postpone the hearing
because of it, the panel has discussed it
We
think respondents did have the outline of what Mr.
Ackerman was claiming
At least when you got the
pre
hearing
brief,
and
the
exhibits,
which
are
customer based, and so you chose to craft your defense
the way you have, which is fine, but we do not think
you were deprived of the opportunity to confront his
claims.
. we think [Petitioners] have all the data
9

in your control. It was burdensome in your view to dig
into it, but we do not see prejudice and so we are
going to hear this.
See Aloe Declaration, Exhibit 31, 795-96.
According to the arbitration panel, therefore,

Petitioners

had access to information about the trades that Mr. Ackerman had
executed and could have analyzed these transactions to determine
whether, and to what degree, Mr. Ackerman was underpaid. This
determination by the arbitrators also affected their willingness
to allow Mr. Ackerman and his expert to present their damages
calculations at several junctures soon before and during the
hearing, as well as the arbitrators' view that Petitioners were
not deprived of a sufficient opportunity to respond to Mr.
Ackerman's damages claims.
The Court finds that the arbitrators, in making these
determinations, engaged in no conduct rising to the level of a
violation of "fundamental fairness." Tempo Shain Corp., 120 F.3d
at 20. For instance, the parties vociferously contest
responsibility for Respondent's identification of the relevant
trades only on September 21, 2015.

6

While the Court does not find

Respondent to be blameless in the timing of his production,
6

Respondent Ackerman cites delays by Petitioners in providing him with access
to discovery allegedly necessary to complete his trades analysis, see Resp.
Br. at 8, while Petitioners argue that Mr. Ackerman had access to all the
relevant information at the time he left Odeon's employ. See Reply in Support
of Petition to Vacate and in Opposition to Cross-Motion to Confirm
Arbitration Award ("Pet. Reply Br.u), Dkt. 11, at 4.

10

Petitioners appear to have been on notice that Respondent
Ackerman was contesting compensation for a wide array of trades
since Respondent answered Petitioner's first request for
production of information. There, Mr. Ackerman was asked to
"[i]dentify any and all transactions for which you allege that
[Petitioners]

failed to provide you with proper commission

compensation," and he responded that he "believes improper
commission compensation was pervasive, however he will need to
review [Petitioners'] documents and records to be specific." See
Amended Notice of Removal, Exhibit 2. Against this background,
the Court finds that the arbitrators did not make a "bad faith"
or "gross" error, United Paperworkers Int'l Union,

484 U.S. at

40, in determining that Petitioners were not deprived of the
opportunity to challenge Respondent's damages claims.

7

The arbitrators' decision not to postpone the hearing also
does not rise to the level of misconduct required to vacate an
arbitration award.

For example, while it appears that the

arbitrators may have refused a request to postpone crossexamination of Mr. Ackerman's expert on the final day of the
hearing,

see Pet. Br. at 7-8,

Declaration in Support of Petition

7 Petitioners note that the Chair of the arbitration panel stated that the
panel did not "want to hear testimony about the minutia of any trade.u
Amended Notice of Removal, Exhibit 4 (Petitioners' transcript of part of the
arbitration hearing). See Pet. Br. at 16. This statement does not, however,
vitiate the arbitrators' view that Petitioners could have crafted their
defense to provide an alternative to Mr. Ackerman's damages assessment.
11

to Vacate and in Opposition to Cross-Motion to Confirm
Arbitration Award,

Dkt.

12, Exhibit B,

Petitioners'

counsel

voluntarily ended his cross-examination of Mr. Ackerman's
expert. See Aloe Declaration, Exhibit 31, at 822, see also id.
at 824. The instant case presents nothing like the circumstances
in a case Petitioners cite, Tube & Steel Corp. of Am. v. Chicago
Carbon Steel Products,
Pet. Br. at 27.

319 F. Supp.

1302

(S.D.N.Y. 1970); see

In that case, an arbitration award was vacated

when the arbitrators, having been advised that one of the
parties could not attend a hearing on a certain date, moved the
hearing to that date and then held the hearing without that
party present

(though the party was invited to submit a written

statement). See Tube & Steel,

319 F. Supp. at 1302-03.

In sum, the arbitrators did not necessarily make the same
determinations on the admission of evidence and timing that this
Court would have made if considering the issues de novo. But a
petition to vacate is not an occasion for de novo review. See
Wallace,

378 F.3d at 189.

As to Petitioners' contention that the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law,

in order for this doctrine to

apply the "governing law alleged to have been ignored by the
arbitrators

[must have been] well defined, explicit, and clearly

applicable," and "[t]he arbitrator must appreciate the existence
12

of a clearly governing legal principle but decide to ignore or
pay no attention to it." Westerbeke Corp. v.
304 F.3d 200, 209

(2d Cir. 2002)

Daihatsu Motor Co.,

(internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). An arbitration award "should be enforced,
despite a court's disagreement with it on the merits, if there
is a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached."
Wallace,

378 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, no showing of manifest disregard has
been made. Though Petitioners argue that the wage award was
"speculative," see Pet. Br. at 28-30, the arbitrators did not
manifestly disregard any settled legal principle in rendering
it. See Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Sys., 573 F.2d 739, 740
( 2d Cir. 197 8)

("Arbitrators are not required to disclose the

basis upon which their awards are made

In the absence of

any indication that the award was made in manifest disregard of
the law,

courts will not look beyond the lump sum award in

an attempt to analyze the reasoning processes of the arbitrators
If a ground for the arbitrator's decision can be inferred
from the facts of the case, the award should be confirmed.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) . 8 The Court cannot find that
the arbitrators here lacked a "barely colorable justification"

s In this case,

it does not appear that either party requested a reasoned
award from the arbitrators. See Resp. Br. at 17; Aloe Declaration, Exhibit
31, at 854; Tr. 40:1-14.

13

for awarding Mr. Ackerman $1,102,193 as compensation for his
unpaid wages.
Further, the panel did not manifestly disregard the law in
selecting November 1, 2012 - roughly a midpoint in Mr.
Ackerman's employment with Odeon - as a "reasonable intermediate
date" from which to award prejudgment interest. See CPLR §
SOOl(b); Arbitration Award at 3. The same is true of the
attorneys'

fees award.

Petitioners argue that the arbitration

panel manifestly disregarded the law by awarding all attorneys'
fees requested by Mr. Ackerman's counsel at Kudman Trachten Aloe
LLP, even though Mr. Ackerman recovered on only one damages
claim out of eleven causes of action.

See Pet. Br. at 30.

However, "[a] crucial factor underlying the determination
whether a full award of attorney's fees is appropriate where a
party has succeeded on only some of his claims, is the degree to
which the meritorious claims are clearly separable from the
unsuccessful ones." McCann v. Coughlin,

698 F.2d 112, 129-30

Cir. 1983). The arbitration panel had at least a "barely
colorable justification," Wallace,

378 F.3d at 190, for

concluding that Mr. Ackerman's claims were not clearly
separable.
In their reply brief,

Petitioners contend that the

arbitration award should be modified to clarify that Mr.
14

(2d

Ackerman must seek payment from Odeon (a Limited Liability
Corporation) before pursuing payment from LLC members Mr. Van
Alstyne and Mr. Schwartzberg. See Pet. Reply Br. at 8-9, citing
New York Limited Liability Corporation Law§ 609(c). However,
"new arguments may not be made in a reply brief." Ernst Haas
Studio,

Inc. v.

Palm Press,

Inc.,

164 F.3d 110, 112

(2d Cir.

1999). Even beyond this point, the Court is not persuaded that
the process set out in Section 609 of the New York LLC statute
applies to Petitioners Van Alstyne and Schwartzberg, who are
being held liable based on their status as Mr. Ackerman's
"employers" within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. See
Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Cross-Motion to
Confirm Arbitration Award ("Resp. Reply Br.")

at 8-9; N.Y. Lab.

Law § 190 (3).
Petitioners next seek to amend their petition to vacate to
include the argument that the arbitration award was "procured by
corruption,

fraud,

or undue means." 9 U.S.C. § lO(a); Pet.

Letter. But an arbitration award should "stand unless it is made
abundantly clear that it was obtained through corruption,

fraud,

or undue means." Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d
32, 34

(2d Cir. 1951)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In

particular, in order to establish that an arbitration award was
procured through fraud,

Petitioners must show that Respondent
15

"engaged in fraudulent activity"; "that the fraud was material
to an issue in dispute during the arbitration"; and "that [they]
could not have discovered the fraud before or during the
arbitration proceeding through the exercise of due diligence."
Hakala v.

Deutsche Bank AG, No. 01-cv-3366, 2004 WL 1057788, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004).
According to Petitioners, Mr. Ackerman committed perjury in
front of the arbitration panel by testifying,

in response to the

arbitrators' questions, that a FINRA investigation into some of
his bond transactions was not still pending, and that FINRA took
no action regarding these trades. See Pet. Letter at 3-4. In
fact,

Petitioners state, the FINRA investigation was still

pending, and on February 22, 2016, Mr. Ackerman executed a
Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent with FINRA, in which he
acknowledged that he had refused to appear for testimony in
front of FINRA and agreed to be barred "from association with
any FINRA member in any capacity." See Pet. Letter at 4; Pet.
Letter, Exhibit A,

Dkt. 23-1. Petitioners assert that Mr.

Ackerman's allegedly false testimony bolstered his credibility
in front of the arbitration panel, making them more likely to
accept his assessment of the compensation he believed he was
owed. See Pet. Letter at 5. Respondent challenges Petitioners'
view that Mr. Ackerman's testimony was perjurious, contending
16

that Mr. Ackerman believed at the time of the arbitration
hearing that the FINRA investigation was over,

since he had not

heard from FINRA since April 2014. See Resp. Letter at 2-3.
Respondent also contends that the Acceptance, Waiver and Consent
"has no bearing on the arbitration award." Resp. Letter at 3.
In the Court's view, the crucial issue is whether any
allegedly false testimony by Mr. Ackerman was material to the
arbitration panel's award of damages for unpaid wages, which
Petitioners are contesting in the instant petition to vacate the
award. The Court finds that Mr. Ackerman's testimony regarding
the FINRA investigation was not material to the award.
particular, the Court finds implausible Petitioners'

In

suggestion

that Mr. Ackerman's responses to questions about the FINRA
investigation materially bolstered Mr. Ackerman's credibility in
making an unpaid wages claim to which the FINRA matter does not
relate. The Court therefore declines to permit Respondent to
amend its petition to include as a ground that the arbitration
award was procured by means of fraud.

The Court hence denies

Petitioners' petition to vacate the award in its entirety. Since
the Court has decided not to vacate or modify the arbitration
award,

the Court must grant Respondent's petition to confirm the

award, and so it hereby does. See 9 U.S.C.

§

Respondent seeks an award of attorneys'
17

9.
fees and costs

incurred in the current proceeding to confirm the arbitration
award. See Resp. Br. at 25. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d) (1), the Court awards Respondent costs; but since
Petitioners did not act "without justification" in seeking to
vacate the arbitration award, the Court denies Respondent's
request for an award of attorneys'

fees incurred in seeking the

arbitration award's confirmation. See Int'l Chem. Workers Union,
Local No. 227 v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 774 F.2d 43,

47

(2d Cir.

1985). Accordingly, Respondent's counsel is directed to submit,
within three business days, a calculation of prejudgment
interest and a tabulation of costs incurred in responding to the
instant motion to vacate. Petitioner's counsel may submit any
response three business days afterward. After reviewing these
submissions, the Court will enter final judgment.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close docket entries 6
and 22.
Dated:

New York, NY
April 25, 2016

18