Chowdhury et al v. Cruz et al
Filing
67
OPINION AND ORDER re: 1 Complaint. I approve the settlement in this matter. In light of the settlement, the action is dismissed with prejudice and without costs. The Clerk is respectfully requested to mark this matter closed, and as further set forth in this order. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman on 11/29/2017) Copies Transmitted By Chambers. (ras)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------x
SOHEL CHOWDHURY, et al.,
16 Civ. 344
(HBP)
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
AND ORDER
-againstBRIONI AMERICA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------x
PITMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before me on the parties' joint application to approve their settlement.
All parties have consented to
my exercising plenary jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
636 (c).
Plaintiffs Sohel Chowdhury and Ali Liakat were employed
as deliverymen at defendants' menswear shops located in New York,
New York (First Amended Complaint dated Jan. 23, 2017
Item ("D.I.")
49)).
(Docket
Plaintiffs seek by this action to recover
unpaid overtime premium pay.
Fair Labor Standards Act
The action is brought under the
(the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
and the New York Labor Law (the "NYLL").
§§
201 et
..§§_g.,
Plaintiffs also assert
claims based on defendants' failure to provide wage statements as
required by the NYLL and unlawful discrimination pursuant to the
New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Administra-
tive Code.
Although the action was cormnenced as a collective
action with respect to the FLSA claims, the collective allegations were omitted from plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (D.I.
49) •
Plaintiffs claim that they each worked approximately 53
hours per week, but never received overtime premium pay (Letter
of Louis Pechman, Esq., to the undersigned, dated Sept. 15, 2017
(D.I. 64)
("Pechman Letter")).
Plaintiffs claim that defendants'
records will support their allegations.
of plaintiffs' claims.
Defendants dispute all
Defendants contend that plaintiffs
received all of the overtime premium pay to which they were
entitled.
Moreover, defendants claim that they utilized a third-
party delivery service to make many of the same deliveries that
plaintiffs claim to have made, which undercuts plaintiffs'
assertion concerning the number of overtime hours they worked.
I held an in-person settlement conference with the
parties, which was unsuccessful.
However, the parties reached an
agreement with respect to the essential terms of settlement
during a subsequent telephone conference, over which I presided.
The parties submitted the proposed settlement agreement for
approval on November 13, 2017. 1
1
The parties have agreed to
The parties' joint letter (Letter of Francis J. Giambalvo,
(continued ... )
2
resolve the dispute for a total settlement of $172,579.20.
The
parties have also agreed that $58,836.59 of that amount will go
to plaintiffs' counsel for out-of-pocket expenses and fees.
remaining $113,733.61 will be paid to plaintiffs.
The
The amount
claimed by each plaintiff 2 and the net amount that each
plaintiff 3 will receive after deduction of legal fees and costs
are as follows:
Net Settlement Amount
Plaintiff
Length of
Employment
Amount
Claimed
Sahel Chowdhury
9.8 years
$83,278.20
$45,581.71
Ali Liakat
17 years
$105,659.80
$68,160.90
By Opinion and Order, dated November 1, 2017
(D.I. 66),
I declined to approve the previously proposed settlement agreement because it contained several impermissible provisions
1
( • • • continued)
Esq., to the undersigned, dated Nov. 13, 2017 ("Giambalvo
Letter")) requesting judicial approval of the proposed settlement
agreement, appended to the letter as Ex. 1, has not yet been
filed on the public docket.
2
The amount claimed by each of the plaintiffs includes
allegedly unpaid overtime premium pay and liquidated damages,
exclusive of interest, statutory damages for defendants' alleged
failure to provided wage statements and damages for plaintiffs'
non-wage related claims, including their discrimination claims.
3
The net settlement amounts listed in the text are the total
amounts to be paid to each plaintiff to settle FLSA and non-FLSA
claims.
The parties have further stipulated that $34,186.27 of
the net settlement amount being paid to Chowdhury and $45,581.70
of the amount being paid to Liakat are being paid to settle their
FLSA claims (Pechman Letter).
3
(Pechman Letter, Ex. 1)
First, the settlement agreement con-
tained an impermissible general release
6).
(Pechman Letter, Ex. 1
~
Second, it contained an unjustified clause requesting that
the Court afford confidential treatment to the settlement agreement
(Pechman Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
Third, the settlement agree-
ment contained a clause barring plaintiffs from re-employment, or
applying for re-employment, with defendants
1
~
(Pechman Letter, Ex.
5) . 4
The parties have submitted a renewed application
requesting approval of their revised proposed agreement
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1).
Court approval of an FLSA settlement is appropriate
"when [the settlement] [is] reached as a result of
contested litigation to resolve bona fide disputes."
Johnson v. Brennan, No. 10 Civ. 4712, 2011 WL 4357376
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011).
"If the proposed
settlement reflects a reasonable compromise over
contested issues, the court should approve the
settlement." Id. (citing Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v.
United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 n.8 (11th Cir.
1982).
Agudelo v. E & D LLC, 12 Civ. 960
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013)
(HB), 2013 WL 1401887 at *1
(Baer, D.J.)
4
(alterations in original).
The settlement agreement also contained a severability
clause that precluded me from modifying or striking the
impermissible provisions without triggering an unlawful general
release by plaintiffs of claims unrelated to wage and hour issues
against defendants and a broad array of other persons and
entities (Pechman Letter, Ex. 1 ~ 14).
4
"Generally there is a strong presumption in favor of finding a
settlement fair,
[because] the Court is generally not in as good
a position as the parties to determine the reasonableness of an
FLSA settlement."
Lliguichuzhca v. Cinema 60, LLC,
2d 362, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
marks omitted).
(Gorenstein M.J.)
948 F. Supp.
(internal quotation
"Typically, courts regard the adversarial nature
of a litigated FLSA case to be an adequate indicator of the
fairness of the settlement."
Beckman v. KeyBank, N.A., 293
F.R.D. 467, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Ellis, M.J.), citing Lynn's Food
Stores, Inc. V. United States, supra 679 F.2d at 1353-54.
In Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 332,
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the Honorable Jesse M. Furman, United States
District Judge, identified five factors that are relevant to an
assessment of the fairness of an FLSA settlement:
In determining whether [a] proposed [FLSA]
settlement is fair and reasonable, a court should
consider the totality of the circumstances,
including but not limited to the following
factors:
(1) the plaintiff's range of possible
recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will
enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and
expenses in establishing their respective claims and
defenses; ( 3) the seriousness of the litigation risks
faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement
agreement is the product of arm's-length bargaining
between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of
fraud or collusion.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
fies these criteria.
5
The settlement here satis-
First, although the net settlement represents approximately 40% of plaintiffs' claimed damages, that fact does not
Defendants deny that plaintiffs
render the settlement deficient.
are entitled to any overtime premium pay.
Moreover, defendants
claim that plaintiffs could not have worked the number of overtime hours that they allege because defendants utilized a thirdparty delivery service to make many of the same deliveries
plaintiffs claim to have made.
As discussed in more detail
below, given the risks these issues present, the settlement
amount is reasonable.
Second, the settlement will entirely avoid the burden,
expense and aggravation of litigation.
place yet.
No depositions have taken
If the case were to proceed, several depositions
would need to be taken.
The settlement avoids the necessity of
conducting this discovery.
Third, the settlement will enable plaintiffs to avoid
the risks of litigation.
As noted above, defendants dispute the
number of hours plaintiffs claim to have worked, citing defendants' use of a third-party delivery service.
Plaintiffs,
therefore, face the risk that a fact finder may credit defendants.
Moreover, defendants take the position that they compen-
sated plaintiffs fully for all work performed.
Thus, whether
plaintiffs would recover at trial is far from certain.
6
See Bodon
v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 09-CV-2941 (SLT), 2015 WL 588656 at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015)
(Report
&
Recommendation)
("[T]he
question [in assessing the fairness of a class action settlement]
is not whether the settlement represents the highest recovery
but whether it represents a reasonable one in
possible
light of the many uncertainties, the class faces
" (inter-
nal quotations marks omitted)), adopted sub nom . .Qy, Bodon v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 2015 WL 588680 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2015);
Massiah v. MetroPlus Health Plan, Inc., 11-cv-05669 (BMC), 2012
WL 5874655 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012)
("[W]hen a settlement
assures immediate payment of substantial amounts to class members, even if it means sacrificing speculative payment of a
hypothetically larger amount years down the road, settlement is
reasonable .
"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Fourth, because I presided over the settlement conference and the telephone conference that preceded the settlement, I
know that the settlement is the product of arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel.
Both counsel represented their
clients zealously at the settlement conference.
Fifth, there are no factors here that suggest the
existence of fraud.
The settlement was reached after a mediation
before the Court, further negating the possibility of fraud or
collusion.
7
The settlement agreement also contains a mutual general
release (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
6).
In my Opinion and Order
dated November 1, 2017, I concluded that the general release
contained within the previously proposed settlement agreement
"[w]as not truly mutual'' because plaintiffs did not receive a
release from all persons and entities to whom they provided a
release from a broad array of claims.
The general release
contained in the revised proposed settlement agreement now before
me is truly mutual, as plaintiffs receive reciprocal general
releases from all persons and entities to whom plaintiffs provide
a general release (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1,
~~
6(a), (b).
"A
general release of the kind proposed in this case, with .
former employee[s] who ha[ve] no ongoing relationship with the
employer, makes sense to bring complete closure."
Geskina v.
Admore Air Conditioning Corp., 16 Civ. 3096 (HBP), 2017 WL
1743842 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2017)
(Pitman, M.J.), citing Souza
v. 65 St. Marks Bistro, 15-CV-327 (JLC), 2015 WL 7271747 at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015)
(Cott, M.J.); accord Cionca v. Interac-
tive Realty, LLC, 15 Civ. 5123 (BCM), 2016 WL 3440554 at *3-*4
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2016)
(Moses, M.J.); Lola v. Skadden, Arps,
Meagher, Slate & Flom LLP, 13 Civ. 5008
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2016)
(RJS), 2016 WL 922223 at
(Sullivan, D.J.). "Additionally,
because the provision was negotiated by competent counsel for
8
both sides, the mutual release is permissible in this case."
Geskina v. Admore Air Conditioning Corp., supra, 2017 WL 1743842
at *3, citing Souza v. 65 St. Marks Bistro, supra, 2015 WL
7271747 at *5; accord Cionca v. Interactive Reality, LLC, supra,
2016 WL 3440554 at *4; Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Meagher, Slate &
Flom LLP, supra, 2016 WL 922223 at *2.
The proposed agreement omits the unjustified confidentiality clause that the previous agreement contained (Pechman
Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
However, in its place, the parties have
inserted a non-publication clause (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
In pertinent part, the non-publication clause provides
Plaintiffs and [p]laintiffs' [c]ounsel agree that
they will not in any manner publicize the terms of this
Settlement Agreement, which includes notifying any
member of the media regarding the terms and conditions
of the Settlement Amount or Agreement and posting or
disseminating the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Amount or Agreement on any social media .
. Such prohibition extends to dissemination of any
information, whether oral, electronic or in any
document form .
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
If asked, plaintiffs "may state
that the matter[] has been settled to the satisfaction of the
parties"
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
The clause also provides
that "nothing herein shall preclude plaintiffs from divulging any
information to any agency of the federal,
9
state or local govern-
II
ment or court pursuant to court order and/or subpoena .
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
In Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
supra, 2016 WL 922223 at *2, plaintiffs and their counsel agreed
to a similar provision; the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan, United
States District Judge, concluded that it was permissible.
5
Stating as a preliminary matter that "the fairness of restrictions on the parties' ability to disclose details of a settlement
depends on the particular circumstances of any case," Judge
Sullivan found it significant that the non-disclosure provision
did not "unduly restrict plaintiff's ability to discuss the
settlement" because the settlement was available on the public
docket and the plaintiffs were "free to decline commenting on the
case in response to any future inquiries by the press or otherwise."
Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, supra,
2016 WL 922223 at *2; accord See Flores v. Studio Castelano
Architect, P.C., 15-cv-9158 (TPG), 2017 WL 4417697 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017)
(Griesa, D.J.)
5
(finding non-disclosure
In Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, supra,
2016 WL 922223 at *2, plaintiffs and their counsel agreed that
they would "not contact the media or utilize any social media
regarding th[e] [s]ettlement or its terms," and that, in the
event they were contacted, they would "respond 'no comment' or be
limited solely to words to the following effect:
The matter has
been resolved."
10
provision permissible where it had "none of the hallmarks of the
overly-broad provisions rejected by courts in this Circuit, such
as an all-encompassing non-disparagement clause"), citing Ramirez
v. Greenside Corp., 16-civ-729 (HBP), 2017 WL 880878 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2017)
(Pitman, M.J.).
Judge Sullivan also
found it significant that the non-disclosure clause was the
result "of fair bargaining between well-represented parties and
embodies reasonable compromise."
Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Meagher,
Slate & Flom LLP, supra, 2016 WL 922223 at 2.
Similar circumstances here also lead to the conclusion
that the non-disclosure clause in the proposed settlement agreement does not conflict with the FLSA's remedial purposes
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
The settlement agreement will be
available on the public docket to anyone with an interest in
reading it.
Plaintiffs are also free to decline commenting on
the case if members of the press should inquire (Giambalvo
Letter, Ex. 1
~
3).
Additionally, under the non-disparagement
clause, discussed in greater detail below, plaintiffs are permitted to make truthful statements about the parties' experiences in
litigating their claims and defenses
7(d)).
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
See Flores v. Studio Castelano Architect, P.C., supra,
2017 WL 4417697 at *3 (finding that one of the "hallmarks'' of an
11
impermissible non-disclosure provision is an "all-encompassing
non-disparagement clause").
The settlement agreement also contains a clause prohibiting plaintiffs from re-employment, and seeking re-employment,
with defendant Brioni America, Incorporated ( "Brioni")
Letter, Ex. 1
~
(Giambalvo
5)
In my Opinion and Order dated November 1, 2017, I found
that a similar provision was impermissible because it was highly
restrictive and in conflict with the remedial purposes of the
FLSA (D.I. 66).
See Fu v. Mee May Corp., 15 Civ. 4549 (HBP),
2017 WL 2172910 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017)
(Pitman,
M. J.) ("Even if the parties have irreconcilable differences as
they claim, a provision limiting plaintiffs' employment opportunities is unacceptable."
(internal quotation marks omitted));
Baikin v. Leader Sheet Metal, Inc., 16 Civ. 8194
1025991 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2017)
(ER), 2017 WL
(Ramos, D.J.)
(concluding
that a provision making plaintiff ineligible for rehire with
defendants as "highly restrictive" and in "strong tension with
the remedial purposes of the FLSA").
The parties argue that the revised provision is permissible because plaintiffs have agreed to it in consideration of
12
their resolution of plaintiffs' discrimination claims only.
6
The
revised provision states, in pertinent part, that plaintiffs
"understand that this provision is intended to protect Brioni
from allegations of retaliation and .
. is being agreed to only
in consideration of the parties' resolution of discrimination
claims made by plaintiffs"
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
5).
In
addition, the provision expressly states that plaintiffs "shall
not be prevented from seeking work or employment with any of
Brioni's other affiliates or parent companies," which includes
named defendant Brioni America Holding,
Inc.
6
The parties also argue that, because plaintiffs can seek
re-employment with Brioni's parent and affiliate companies, the
provision is sufficiently narrow such that it can be reconciled
with the FLSA's remedial purposes.
Some Courts in this Circuit
have held that a provision in an FLSA settlement that makes
plaintiff ineligible for re-hire at some, but not all, of
defendant's establishments creates only a "minimal impact" on
plaintiff's future career opportunities and, therefore, is
permissible.
See Carino v. B.A. Deli Mart, Inc., 15 Civ. 9854
(ER), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105360 at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 5,
2017) (Ramos, D. J.) (finding similar provision permissible where
ban on plaintiff's re-hire applied to only one of several of
defendants' delis); Flores v. Food Express Rego Park, Inc., 15 CV
1410 (KAM) (SMG), 2016 WL 386042 at *2 (E. D. N. Y. Feb. 1, 2016)
(finding similar provision minimally impacted plaintiff's future
employment opportunities where defendant represented that
plaintiff was prohibited from re-hire at one of defendant's two
restaurants).
The parties have not provided sufficient information to
enable me to determine whether such a provision would only
minimally impact plaintiffs' future career opportunities.
The
parties have made no representations concerning the nature of
Brioni's parent and affiliate businesses.
13
Plaintiffs' discrimination claims, unlike their FLSA
claims, do not require judicial approval.
See Santos v. Yellow-
stone Properties, Inc., 15 Civ. 3986 (PAE), 2016 WL 2757427 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2016)
(Engelmayer, D.J.).
Judges in this
District routinely approve "bifurcated settlement agreement[s],
in which the parties submit their FLSA agreement for court review
and approval
. but enter into a separate [agreement]" that
addresses the non-FLSA claims,
which does not require judicial
and may contain provisions that would be impermissible under
Cheeks.
Ortiz v. Breadroll, LLC, 16-CV-7998
(JLC), 2017 WL
2079787 at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017); accord Yunda v. Safi-G,
Inc. 15-CV-8861 (HBP), 2017 WL 1608898 at *2
2017)
(Pitman, M. J.)
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28,
(approving the submission of two settlement
agreements, one resolving plaintiff's FLSA claims that required
court approval under Cheeks and the other resolving plaintiff's
claims under the NYLL that did not require approval under Cheeks
and containing a confidentiality clause); Santos v. Yellowstone
Properties, Inc., supra, 2016 WL 2757427
(Engelmayer, D. J.)
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2016)
(approving the submission of two settlement
agreements, one resolving plaintiffs FLSA claims and the other
resolving plaintiff's discrimination claims and containing a
general release); Abrar v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 14-CV-6315 (ADS) (AKT),
14
2016 WL 1465360 at *l (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016)
(approving similar
structure).
The parties have expressly allocated a portion of the
settlement funds for the resolution of plaintiffs' non-FLSA
damages, including damages related to plaintiffs' discrimination
claims.
Specifically, $11,395.44 and $22,579.20 of the net
settlement amount to be paid Liakat and Chowdhury, respectively,
represents payment for non-FLSA damages, including damages
related to their claims of unlawful discrimination (Giambalvo
Letter, Ex. 1
c:JI
l(a)(i)-(v)).
Furthermore, plaintiffs have
explicitly agreed to refrain from seeking re-employment with
Brioni "in consideration of the [p]arties' resolution of the
discrimination claims" only (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
c:JI
5).
The
mere fact that the parties have memorialized the settlement of
their FLSA and non-FLSA claims in a single document should not
render that settlement deficient.
The formalism of two agree-
ments does not play a significant role in "prevent[ing] abuses by
unscrupulous employers [or] remedy[ing] the disparate bargaining
power between employers and employees," especially where, as
here, plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel.
Freeport Pancake House, Inc., supra, 796 F.3d at 207.
Cheeks v.
Accord-
ingly, the provision deeming plaintiffs ineligible for re-hire at
Brioni's menswear shops does not require my approval.
15
The proposed agreement also contains a mutual nondisparagement clause (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
7).
It provides
that plaintiffs agree not to "publish or communicate to any
person or entity, or direct others to publish or communicate to
any person or entity, any Disparaging Remarks concerning Defendants"
(Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
7).
The provision also pro-
vides that "[t]ruthful statements about the parties' experiences
in litigating their claims and defenses" do not fall under the
definition of "Disparaging Remarks," for purposes of the settlement (Giambalvo Letter, Ex. 1
~
7).
Where, as here, a mutual
non-disparagement clause includes a carve out for truthful
statements about the litigation, it is permissible.
See Romero
v. ABCZ Corp., 14 Civ. 3653 (HBP), 2017 WL 2560004 at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017)
Cabria, LLC,
(Pitman, M.J.); Lopez v. Nights of
96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 180 n.65 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(Kaplan, D.J.); accord Weng v. T&W Rest., Inc., 15 Civ. 8167
(PAE) (BCM), 2016 WL 3566849 at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016)
(Moses, M.J.); see Lopez v. Ploy Dee, Inc., 15 Civ. 647
2016 WL 1626631 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2016)
(AJN),
(Nathan, D.J.).
Finally, pursuant to a retainer agreement signed by
plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel will receive one third of the
settlement proceeds, exclusive of counsel's out-of-pocket costs,
for contingency fees.
Contingency fees of one-third in FLSA
16
cases are routinely approved in this Circuit.
Tepeyac Butcher Shop Inc., 15 Civ. 814
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015)
Santos v. EL
(RA), 2015 WL 9077172 at
(Abrams, D.J.)
("[C]ourts in this
District have declined to award more than one third of the net
settlement amount as attorney's fees except in extraordinary
circumstances."), citing Zhang v. Lin Kumo Japanese Rest. Inc.,
13 Civ. 6667 (PAE), 2015 WL 5122530 at *4
Aug. 31, 2015)
(Engelmayer, D.J.) and Thornhill v. CVS Pharm.,
Inc., 13 Civ. 507
2014)
(JMF), 2014 WL 1100135 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
(Furman, D.J.); Rangel v. 639 Grand St. Meat & Produce
Corp., 13 CV 3234
2013)
(S.D.N.Y.
(LB), 2013 WL 5308277 at *l (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19,
(approving attorney's fees of one-third of FLSA settlement
amount, plus costs, pursuant to plaintiff's retainer agreement
and noting that such agreement "is routinely approved in this
Circuit"); Febus v. Guardian First Funding Grp., LLC, 870 F.
Supp. 2d 337, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(Stein, D.J.)
("[A] fee that is
one-third of the fund is typical" in FLSA cases); accord Calle v.
Elite Specialty Coatings Plus, Inc., 13-CV-6126 (NGG) (VMS), 2014
WL 6621081 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014); Palacio v. E*TRADE
Fin. Corp., 10 Civ. 4030
(LAP) (DCF), 2012 WL 2384419 at *6-*7
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2012)
(Freman, M.J.).
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I approve
the settlement in this matter.
In light of the settlement, the
17
action is dismissed with prejudice and without costs.
The Clerk
is respectfully requested to mark this matter closed
Dated:
New York, New York
November 29, 2017
SO ORDERED
)
HENR~
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies transmitted to:
All Counsel
18
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