Quinones v. City Of New York et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER for 34 Report and Recommendations: Having adopted the Report in full, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 15. (Signed by Judge George B. Daniels on 2/28/2017) (jwh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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WALLEY QUINONES,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
16 Civ. 0985 (GBD) (DF)

CITY OF NEW YORK; CO JOHN DOE,
Defendant.

------------------------------------x
GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge:
Prose Plaintiff Walley Quinones initially filed this action against City of New York (the

"City") and a C.O. [correction officer] "John Doe" (collectively, "Defendants") on February 8,
2016. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks $100 million in damages.

(Id.~

42.) He alleges that

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Defendants violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of adequate medical care at
Bellevue Hospital ("Bellevue") while he was in the custody of the New York City Department of
Correction ("DOC") in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.

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33-39.) Plaintiff alleges that a

laser lithotripsy and follow-up procedure resulted in the insertion and unsuccessful removal of a
long slender tool into his urethra, (id.

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23), causing chronic urethral pain, urinary problems,

sexual dysfunction, mental anguish, and depression. (Id., at 12

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32 - 13

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34.) Plaintiff alleges

that these injuries resulted from Correction Officer John Doe's decision to interrupt his medical
care pursuant to a City "policy" that requires permission before an individual in DOC can
receive surgery, even in an emergency. (Pl.'s Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp."),
ECF No. 24, at 1-2); see also Pl. 's Sur-Reply, ECF No. 32, at 1-2.)

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It is unclear from Plaintiffs pleading whether, at the time of the alleged events, he was in custody as a
pretrial detainee, or had been convicted of a crime and was serving a sentence of incarceration.

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman on February 11, 2016.
(ECF No. 3.) Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Freeman's Report and Recommendation,
("Report," ECF No. 34), recommending that this Court deny Defendants' motions to dismiss and
deem Plaintiffs Complaint amended to include supplemental allegations contained in his
opposition and sur-reply submissions.

(Id. at 26.) 2

This Court is satisfied that the Report

contains no clear error of law and adopts the Report in full.
I. LEGAL ST AND ARD

This Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or m part, the findings and
recommendations set forth within the Report.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C).

When no

objections to a Report are made, the Court may adopt the Report if "there is no clear error on the
face of the record." Adee Motor Cars, LLC v. Amato, 388 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citation omitted).
The pleadings of parties appearing pro se are generally accorded leniency and should be
construed "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." See Belpasso v. Port Auth. of
NY & NJ, 400 F. App'x 600, 601 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d

276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Even after
Twombly .. .we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally."). This leniency is

especially true in the context of civil rights complaints. See Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691
(2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a court must be "mindful of the care exercised in this Circuit to avoid
hastily dismissing complaints of civil rights violations.").
Magistrate Judge Freeman advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the
Report would constitute a waiver of those objections on appeal. (Report, at 27); see also 28
2

The relevant procedural and factual background is set forth in greater detail in the Report and is
incorporated herein.

2

U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). As of the date of this Order, no party has filed
objections.
II. DELIBERATE-INDIFFERENCE CLAIM3 AGAINST JOHN DOE

Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs claim against Correction Officer John Doe failed
to establish a sufficiently serious medical condition caused by Doe's conduct. (See Mem. of
Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Def. Mem."), ECF No. 17, at 3-6.) According to Defendants,
Plaintiff only suffered a "transient moment" of "excruciating pain" while the doctors at Bellevue
Hospital tried to remove a tool from his urethra. (See id. at 4.) Defendants further allege that
this "excruciating pain" cannot be associated with Defendants' act or failure to act, as Doe was
not present during this time, and Plaintiff does not allege that the pain continued while awaiting
the follow-up procedure. (See id. at 4-5.)
At the outset, Plaintiffs Complaint plausibly articulates a sufficiently serious medical
condition by demonstrating that he was experiencing extreme pain. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011); see, e.g., White v. Ulloa, No. 15cv8875, 2016 WL 7351895, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss deliberate-indifference claim where
plaintiff alleged that defendant's deprivation of medical care caused an infection and swelling
"so painful that it was difficult or impossible for [him] to sleep during the three weeks he was not
treated"); Rivera v. Goard, 119 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding allegations
of deprivation of pain medication for "severe," "unbearable," and "great" pain to be sufficient at
the pleading stage where the side effects included migraine headaches, infections, severe burning
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"[l]n order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant 'knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [plaintiff's] health or safety and that she
was both aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm existed, and also drew the inference."' Smith v. City of New York, No. l 5cv79 l 0, 2016 WL
7471334, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016) (citations omitted).

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in his eyes, impaired vision, and partial loss of hearing). Plaintiffs Complaint similarly alleges
excrutiating pain, bleeding, and urination from the stent remaining in his urethra. (Compl.

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23-

30.) There is no support found in Plaintiffs Complaint for Defendants' characterization that this
pain was merely a "transient moment" lasting only during the procedure. (See Def. Mem., at 5.)
Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he screamed in pain in front of Doe after the initial surgery
occurred. (Pl.'s Sur-Reply, at 1-2 ("the C.O. was there[,] [and] saw me and heard me").) While
this information was not initially in Plaintiffs Complaint, "where a pro se plaintiff has submitted
other papers to the [c]ourt, such as legal memoranda, the [c]ourt may consider statements in such
papers to supplement or clarify the plaintiffs pleaded allegations."). Sommersett v. City of New
York, No. 09cv5916, 2011 WL 2565301, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011).

Moreover, Plaintiffs Complaint articulates a plausible connection between Defendants'
conduct and Plaintiffs extreme pain, as Plaintiff contends that Defendants' decision to interrupt
his care to seek approval for treatment caused the injuries underlying his claims. (Pl. 's SurReply, at 1.) See, e.g., Jones v. Westchester Cty. Dep 't of Corr. Med. Dep 't, 557 F. Supp. 2d
408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding it plausible that prison officials' refusal to allow plaintiff to
undergo surgery "caused [plaintiff] to suffer, or at least exacerbated, a 'serious medical
condition"'); cf Law v. Corizon Med. Serv., No. 134cv5286, 2014 WL 2111675, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 9, 2014) (noting that, where the basis of a plaintiffs deliberate-indifference claim is a
"temporary delay or interruption in the provision of otherwise adequate medical treatment, it is
appropriate to focus on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the
prisoner's underlying medical condition alone" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Therefore, irrespective of whether Doe originally caused Plaintiffs harm, an interruption in
medical treatment can plausibly prolong or add to the injuries suffered. (See Report, at 16.)

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Defendants argue that even if this Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint satisfies the first
element of deliberate-indifference, Plaintiff fails to establish the second element: that Defendant
acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" in depriving Plaintiff of medical treatment.
(See Def. Mem., at 5.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged any

statement or explanation purporting to demonstrate Doe's motives for preventing the follow-up
procedure. (Id.) However, Plaintiff plausibly articulates Defendants' culpable state of mind by
alleging that Defendant: (1) heard his screams as he was bleeding, (Pl.'s Sur-Reply, at 1-2); (2)
was told by a doctor that the situation was an emergency, (Pl.'s Opp., at 1); (3) was told that
"they had to correct the problem immediately," (Pl.'s Sur-Reply, at 1); and (4) Defendant "did
not care." (Pl.'s Opp., at 1.) Instead, Defendant acted to prevent the surgery from occurring
promptly.

With allegations that Defendant possessed this information, Plaintiffs Complaint

plausibly alleges that Doe acted knowingly in depriving Plaintiff of necessary medical treatment.
(Report, at 19.)
At this early pleading stage, Plaintiffs claim supports a plausible inference of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, this Court accepts

Magistrate Judge Freeman's recommendations that Plaintiffs Complaint be deemed to include
allegations from the opposition and sur-reply, and that Defendants' motion to dismiss against the
John Doe Correction Officer be denied. (Id. at 20.)
III. CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY
Defendants claim that the Complaint fails to "specify, reference, or even allude to a
policy, practice or custom causally connected to an alleged deprivation of his civil rights." (Def.
Mem., at 7.) See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (A
municipal entity may be held liable under Section 1983 where a plaintiff demonstrates that the

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constitutional violation complained of was caused by a municipal "policy or custom."). While
Plaintiffs Complaint alone fails to establish any policy under which Defendant was operating,
Plaintiff asserts in his opposition brief that the Correction Officer stated he "had to ask for
permi[ss]ion" before Plaintiff received treatment.

(Pl.'s Opp., at 1.)

Burgess v. Goard,

98cv2077, 1999 WL 33458, at* 1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999) (explaining that "the mandate to
read the papers of pro se litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider plaintiffs
additional materials, such as his opposition memorandum" to supplement the allegations in the
complaint); see also, e.g., Goldson v. Kral, Clerkin, Redmond, Ryan, Perry & Van Etten, LLP,
No. 13cv2737, 2014 WL 4061157, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2014) (amended report and
recommendation).
From the Correction Officer's language, Plaintiff argues that allowing the surgery to
occur without permission would have violated an implied policy, practice, or custom. (Pl. 's SurReply, at 2.) Liberally construed, the Complaint can be read to allege that the City had no
protocol or inadequate procedures in place for emergency medical care situations. (See Pl.' s
Opp., at 2.) While Plaintiff alleges only one incident involving the Defendant, "[p ]roof of a
single incident of unconstitutional activity" may be sufficient to establish Monell liability where
"proof of the incident includes proof it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal
policy."

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985).

The Correction Officer's

statement serves as a sufficient allegation that a policy requiring permission and restricting
independent judgment of doctors to treat certain patients was in place, thereby limiting the ability
to move ahead with Plaintiffs follow-up surgery.
At this early stage, the Complaint and opposition papers together "allege facts tending to
support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom exists."

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Santos v. NY, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Therefore, Plaintiff should be

allowed to seek discovery regarding what "permission," if any, City policy required Defendant to
obtain before appropriate medical treatment could be administered. (Report, at 23.) This Court
accepts Magistrate Judge Freeman's recommendations that the Complaint be deemed to include
allegations from the opposition and sur-reply and that the motion to dismiss claims against the
City be denied. 4 (Id. at 24.)
III. CONCLUSION
Having adopted the Report in full, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. 5
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 15.

Dated: New York, New York
February __ , 2017

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4

While this Court could grant Plaintiff leave to amend his pleading, it is doubtful that the prose Plaintiff,
without discovery, could add any further detail than what has already been articulated in his Complaint,
Opposition, and Sur-Reply.
5

Although not at issue with Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs Complaint also alleges that "the
jail gave me bad tre[a]tment for months." (Comp!., at 3 ~ II(D).) Plaintiff has pleaded no facts to support
this allegation and this Court dismisses this claim sua sponte. Furthermore, this Court need not address
Defendants' argument regarding lack of supplemental jurisdiction because Defendants' motions to
dismiss were denied, and viable federal claims remain before this Court.

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