Taylor v. Trigeno et al

Filing 293

ORDER denying 290 Motion re: 290 MOTION REQUEST TO OBJECT & TO RECONSIDER ORDERING PAY PER DIEM BASIS MONETARY PENALTIES FOR CURRENT EVASIVENESS & FUTURE PENALTIES. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. Th e Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 44445 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 290 and mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff.. (Signed by Judge Gregory H. Woods on 3/5/2024) (rro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
ROY JOAQUIN TAYLOR,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
:
:
Defendants. :
:
----------------------------------------------------------------- X
GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge:

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: 3/5/2024

1:16-cv-01143-GHW
ORDER

Plaintiff Roy Joaquin Taylor, proceeding pro se, previously moved for sanctions against
counsel for Defendant Officer Quayyum for a purported misrepresentation in discovery responses.
Dkt. No. 284. Plaintiff argued that, in response to his interrogatory on “whether the Defendant
Quayyum ever were involved in the use of chemical agent against any other detainee in the past,”
Officer Quayyum had falsely answered “no.” Id. In response, Defendants (on behalf of the City of
New York and Officer Quayyum) disputed Plaintiff ’s characterization, noting that the record plainly
shows, and Defendants have not disputed, that Officer Quayyum used a chemical agent spray
against another inmate. Dkt. No. 286 at 2. Defendants also noted that Plaintiff had
mischaracterized his interrogatory and provided the relevant text of the interrogatory and response
of the parties. Id. Having considered the parties’ briefing on the issue, as well as Plaintiff ’s
interrogatory and Officer Quayyum’s responses in relevant part, the Court denied Plaintiff ’s motion
on December 26, 2023. Dkt. No. 288.
Plaintiff has now filed a “motion request to object & to reconsider ordering pay per diem
basis monetay [sic] penalties for current evasiveness & future penalties,” objecting to the Court’s
December 26 order and arguing that Officer Quayyum’s interrogatory response was “evasive.” Dkt.
No. 290. Defendants the City of New York and Officer Trigeno oppose, arguing that Plaintiff ’s

motion is an improper motion for reconsideration. Dkt. No. 291. The Court also construes
Plaintiff ’s filing as a motion to reconsider the Court’s December 26 order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court to “relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged . . . ; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Local
Rule 6.3 of the Southern District of New York permits parties to, within 14 days of a court’s order,
file “a notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument” of that motion.
“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bartlett v.
Tribeca Lending Corp., No. 18-cv-10279, 2019 WL 1595656, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2019) (noting that
a party moving for reconsideration of a previous order must demonstrate that the Court overlooked
“controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it). “A motion to
reconsider will not be granted where the moving party is merely trying to relitigate an already
decided issue,” Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 636 F. Supp. 2d 256, 258–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), because
“reconsideration of a previous order by the Court is an extraordinary remedy to be employed
sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v.
Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Ultimately, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within ‘the sound
discretion of the district court.’” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Triazz Asset Mgmt. LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d
242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009)).
2

Motions filed by pro se litigants are liberally construed and interpreted “to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . .” (citation
omitted)); Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . the complaint was filed pro se, it
must be construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” (quoting Walker v. Schult,
717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013))). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does
not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”
Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[D]ismissal of a pro se
complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading
requirements.” (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997))).
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff ’s motion and the arguments contained within with the
special solicitude afforded to pro se litigants. Nonetheless, the Court finds no legal or factual error or
other grounds to reconsider its original conclusion from the December 26 order. Plaintiff takes
issue with Officer Quayyum’s “evasive” interrogatory response, arguing Officer Quayyum should
have responded directly to Plaintiff ’s interrogatory rather than raising an objection to it. Dkt. No.
290 at 1. Even under the Court’s liberal construction of Plaintiff ’s arguments, Plaintiff does not
raise any new or overlooked law, facts, or other details that affects the Court’s analysis and
conclusion in the December 26 order.
Further, Plaintiff ’s motion must be denied for the separate reason that it is untimely.
Plaintiff ’s motion comes almost two months after the Court’s December 26 order and significantly
exceeds the 14 days permitted by the Local Rules. See Local Rule 6.3; see also SBC 2010-1, LLC v.
Morton, 552 F. App’x 9, 11–12 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (affirming denial of motion for
3

reconsideration in part because, “[t]o the extent that the motion was brought under the local rule, it
was time-barred”). Plaintiff ’s objections are also untimely because discovery—and therefore, the
time to raise discovery-related disputes—is long over: the deadline for the completion of fact
discovery was over two years ago, on January 14, 2022, Dkt. No. 195, and the Court has ruled on
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment arising out of events surrounding Officer Quayyum’s
actions at issue, Dkt. Nos. 231, 282. Plaintiff ’s time to raise discovery-related disputes to this Court
has long since expired. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Lab’ys., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8250
(DLC), 2006 WL 83112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) (denying motion in limine as “an untimely
discovery dispute” given fact discovery had already closed and party had raised arguments during
discovery period). See generally McDonald v. Head Criminal Court Supervisor Officer, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d
Cir. 1988) (“[W]hile pro se litigants may in general deserve more lenient treatment than those
represented by counsel, all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders.
When they flout that obligation they, like all litigants, must suffer the consequences of their
actions.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff ’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not
be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 290 and mail a
copy of this order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 5, 2024
New York, New York

___
________
____
__
____
____
___
_______
____
____
_ __
__
____
___
__________________________________
GREG
GOR
RY H.
H WOODS
GREGORY
United States District Judge

4