Beckford et al v. City Of New York et al
Filing
97
OPINION AND ORDER: The Defendants' November 2, 2018 partial motion for summary judgment is granted in part. Any claim for negligent supervision against defendant Chavis is dismissed. The claims that remain for trial are the Plaintiffs' ma licious prosecution claims under New York law, false arrest claims under New York and federal law, excessive force claims under New York and federal law, and failure to intervene claim under federal law. The Plaintiffs' claims for municipal liability have been severed. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 4/1/2019) (jca)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
TASHA BECKFORD, DAWNETTE BECKFORD, and :
NICOLE BECKFORD,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-v:
:
CITY OF NEW YORK, SGT. MALCOM CHAVIS, :
individually and in his official
:
capacity as an HRA sergeant, P.O.
:
WILLIAM DAVILA, individually and in his:
official capacity as an HRA police
:
officer, P.O. CHRISTOPHER PHELPS,
:
individually and in his official
:
capacity as an HRA police officer, P.O.:
RUSSELL BACKUS, individually and in his:
official capacity as an HRA police
:
officer, P.O.
:
SUMIKA WHITMORE, and “JOHN AND JANE
:
DOES,” first names being fictitious and:
presently unknown, believed to
:
represent individual officers, peace
:
officers, guards, security officers,
:
staff, personnel and employees of CITY :
OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY HUMAN
:
RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION and/or FJC
:
SECURITY SERVICES, both individually
:
and in their official capacities,
:
Defendants.
:
:
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APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs:
Derek S. Sells
Stephanie R. Correa
Tracey Lyn Brown
The Cochran Firm
55 Broadway 23rd, Floor
New York, NY 10006
For Defendants:
Melanie M. Speight
16cv7486(DLC)
OPINION AND ORDER
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Tasha, Dawnette, and Nicole Beckford
(collectively “Plaintiffs”), who are sisters, assert that their
civil rights were violated during a visit to a New York City
Human Resource Administration office (“HRA Office”) on January
12, 2016.
On September 25, 2016, they filed this action against
the City of New York and HRA police officers Malcolm Chaviz
(“Chaviz”), William Davila (“Davila”), Christopher Phelps
(“Phelps”), Russell Backus (“Backus”), and Sumika Whitmore
(“Whitmore”) (collectively, “Defendants”). 1
The Defendants have
moved for partial summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ state
malicious prosecution claim and any negligent supervision claim
against Chavis.
For the reasons set forth below, the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to the
malicious prosecution claim and granted as to any negligent
supervision claim.
The Plaintiffs also sued a private security guard, Raul
Martinez, and his employer, FJC Security Services. On November
28, 2018, the claims against these defendants were voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice.
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1
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed or taken in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, unless otherwise noted.
The
parties dispute most of what transpired between the Plaintiffs
and the HRA police officers at the HRA Office.
It is undisputed
that Officer Chavis directed Officers Backus, Davila, and Phelps
to issue two summonses to each of the Plaintiffs.
Each
plaintiff received a summons for disorderly conduct in violation
of New York Penal Law § 240.20 and a summons for trespassing in
violation of New York Penal law § 140.05.
After these summonses
were issued, the Plaintiffs were released from the HRA Center.
When the Plaintiffs appeared in court on March 9, 2016, in
response to the summonses, the summonses were dismissed.
Each
summons was stamped with the words “SAP Dismissal.”
The Plaintiffs served a Notice of Claim against the HRA and
the City of New York on February 4 and 9, 2016, respectively.
The Plaintiffs commenced this action on September 26, 2016.
The
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on April 13,
2018.
On November 2, 2018, following the conclusion of discovery,
the Defendants filed a partial motion for summary judgment.
On
November 30, the parties entered into a stipulation and order to
dismiss and withdraw with prejudice several of the Plaintiffs’
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claims (the “Stipulation”).
In light of the Stipulation, only
two of the claims that are addressed in the Defendants’ November
2 motion for summary judgment remain to be resolved: the
Plaintiffs’ state law claims for malicious prosecution and what
they now assert is a negligent supervision claim against Chavis.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may not be granted unless all of the
submissions taken together “show[ ] that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Summary
judgment is appropriate when the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party.”
Smith v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.
2015) (citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a material factual question, and in
making this determination, the court must view all facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992);
Gemmink v. Jay Peak Inc., 807 F.3d. 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2015).
“[W]here the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does
not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment
must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is
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presented.”
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight
Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
Once the moving party has asserted facts showing that the
non-movant’s claims or affirmative defenses cannot be sustained,
“the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the
allegations or denials of his pleading; rather his response, by
affidavits or otherwise as provided in the Rule, must set forth
specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”
Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
“[C]onclusory statements, conjecture, and
inadmissible evidence are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment,” Ridinger v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 651 F.3d 309, 317
(2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), as is “mere speculation or
conjecture as to the true nature of the facts.”
Hicks v.
Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Only disputes over material facts will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
“An issue of fact is genuine and material
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Cross Commerce Media, Inc. v.
Collective, Inc., 841 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Malicious Prosecution under New York Law
The Defendants seek summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ New
York malicious prosecution claim. 2
To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New
York law, a plaintiff must prove (1) the initiation or
continuation of a criminal proceeding against
plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in
plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for
commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a
motivation for defendant's actions.
Stampf v. Long Island R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
“[F]or malicious prosecution claims brought
under New York law, federal courts must faithfully apply New
York tort law.”
Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 28
(2d Cir. 2018).
The issuance of a summons initiates a criminal proceeding.
It is true that New York courts have not yet held that a summons
initiates a criminal proceeding.
But, in determining that the
issuance of a desk appearance ticket (“DAT”) initiates a
criminal prosecution, courts have assumed that a summons does as
well.
For instance, in first holding that the issuance of a DAT
commences a prosecution for purposes of the tort of malicious
prosecution, the Second Circuit reasoned:
In their opposition brief, the Plaintiffs clarify that their
malicious prosecution claim is not brought against defendant
Whitmore, who was not involved in the issuance of the summonses.
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2
The Appearance Ticket may have an impact on the
accused just as severe as that of a summons. When
either instrument is issued the accused bears the
inconvenience and expense of appearing in court and,
perhaps more important, is subject to the anxiety
induced by a pending criminal charge. Moreover, if
others learn that charges have been lodged against the
accused, his character is no less traduced because the
accusation is contained in an Appearance Ticket rather
than in a summons.
Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10,
I.L.G.W.U., 605 F.2d 1228, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis
supplied).
Under New York law, a proceeding may be deemed to have
terminated in a plaintiff’s favor even in the absence of a
disposition of the criminal proceeding that demonstrates the
plaintiff’s innocence.
The New York Court of Appeals has held
that “’any termination of a criminal prosecution, such that the
criminal charges may not be brought again, qualifies as a
favorable termination, so long as the circumstances surrounding
the termination are not inconsistent with the innocence of the
accused.’”
Lanning, 908 F.3d at 27 (citing Cantalino v. Danner,
96 N.Y.2d 391, 395 (2001)). 3
Thus, even where a prosecution is
not terminated through adjudication of the defendant’s
In malicious prosecution claims brought under federal law,
however, favorable termination requires “an affirmative
indication that the person is innocent of the offense charged.”
Lanning, 908 F.3d at 28.
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3
innocence, it may be characterized as a favorable termination
for New York malicious prosecution purposes where dismissal of
the charges is final.
“A dismissal without prejudice qualifies
as a final, favorable termination if the dismissal represents
the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the public
prosecutor.”
Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 198 (2000)
(citation omitted).
For example, the Second Circuit found in
Stampf that a declination of prosecution stating that
“[f]ollowing a review of the evidence and interviews with
several witnesses, including the complaining witness, the People
conclude that the case cannot be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt” constituted a favorable termination under New York law
“notwithstanding that the prosecutor is theoretically capable of
resurrecting the prosecution.”
761 F.3d at 200, 201.
“Under New York law, malice does not have to be actual
spite or hatred, but requires only that the defendant must have
commenced the criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper
motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice
served.”
Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir.
2017) (citation omitted).
While lack of probable cause to institute a criminal
proceeding and proof of actual malice are independent
and indispensable elements of a malicious prosecution
action, the absence of probable cause does bear on the
malice issue, and probable cause to initiate a
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criminal proceeding may be so totally lacking as to
reasonably permit an inference that the proceeding was
maliciously instituted.
Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 761–62 (2016) (citation
omitted).
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs’ malicious
prosecution claim must be dismissed because there is
insufficient evidence of either a favorable termination or
malice.
The parties agree that the existence of probable cause
in this case presents a material question of fact not properly
decided at the summary judgment phase.
As already noted, the issuance of a summons initiates a
criminal proceeding.
The plaintiffs have also shown a
termination of proceedings in their favor.
The summonses were dismissed by the criminal court’s
Summons All Purpose (“SAP”) Part.
While the “SAP Dismissal”
stamp provides no indication of any reason for these dismissals
and nothing else in the record indicates the reasons for the
dismissal, under New York law, “any termination of a criminal
prosecution, such that the criminal charges may not be brought
again, qualifies as a favorable termination, so long as the
circumstances surrounding the termination are not inconsistent
with the innocence of the accused.”
(emphasis added).
Cantalino, 96 N.Y.2d at 395
The Defendants point to no evidence that the
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circumstances around the dismissal of these summonses were
inconsistent with the Plaintiffs’ innocence, or that the
summonses could be reissued once dismissed.
Years have passed
since the events at issue, and there has been no reissuance of
the summonses.
Because, as the parties concede, there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the Defendants had probable cause
to issue the summonses, a material factual dispute also exists
as to malice.
“Malice may be inferred . . . from the absence of
probable cause.”
Dufort, 874 F.3d at 353.
The Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to the New York malicious
prosecution claim is therefore denied.
Negligent Supervision
The SAC asserts a claim of negligent hiring, training, and
supervision against the City of New York. 4
The parties have
since stipulated to the dismissal of this claim.
In their
opposition brief, however, the Plaintiffs argue that their
“claims of Negligent Supervision against Defendant Chavis”
survive the parties’ stipulated dismissal and the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
claim against Chavis.
The SAC did not include such a
In any event, negligent supervision
This cause of action was also asserted against FJC Security
Services.
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4
claims may only be brought against an employer.
Papelino v.
Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 94 (2d
Cir. 2011).
CONCLUSION
The Defendants’ November 2, 2018 partial motion for summary
judgment is granted in part.
Any claim for negligent
supervision against defendant Chavis is dismissed.
The claims
that remain for trial are the Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution
claims under New York law, false arrest claims under New York
and federal law, excessive force claims under New York and
federal law, and failure to intervene claim under federal law.
The Plaintiffs’ claims for municipal liability have been
severed.
SO ORDERED:
Dated:
New York, New York
April 1, 2019
________________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge
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