Trustees for The Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund and Training Program Fund et al v. Briscoe Sunrise Corp.
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners' motion for summary judgment to confirm the Award is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for Petitioners, terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining dates, an d close this case. SO ORDERED. re: 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Trustees for The Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund and Training Program Fund. (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 5/2/2017) (rjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
TRUSTEES FOR THE MASON TENDERS
:
DISTRICT COUNCIL WELFARE FUND,
:
PENSION FUND, ANNUITY FUND, AND
:
TRAINING PROGRAM FUND, and ROBERT :
BONANZA,
:
:
Petitioners, :
:
v.
:
:
BRISCOE SUNRISE CORPORATION,
:
:
Respondent. :
:
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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: May 2, 2017
______________
16 Civ. 7680 (KPF)
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Petitioners Trustees for the Mason Tenders District Council Welfare
Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, and Training Program Fund (the “Funds”)
and Robert Bonanza (together, “Petitioners”) have filed a motion for summary
judgment to confirm an arbitration award (the “Award”) under Section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185. Respondent Briscoe Sunrise Corporation did not appear in the
underlying arbitration (the “Arbitration”). Nor has it appeared in the instant
action. And because the undisputed facts of this case establish that the Award
must be confirmed, the Court grants Petitioners’ motion.
BACKGROUND 1
A.
Factual Background
The case arises out of a labor dispute over a collective-bargaining
agreement: the Project Labor Agreement Covering Specified Construction Work
Under the Capital Improvement Program for Fiscal Years 2014-2019 (the “SCA
PLA”). The Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York and Long
Island is a labor union under the LMRA and “a member of the Building and
Construction Trades Council of Greater New York and Vicinity” (the “BCTC”).
(Pet’r 56.1 ¶ 2). Bonanza is the union’s Business Manager. (Id. at ¶ 3). The
“Funds are ‘employee benefit plan[s]’ as defined in Section 3(3) of [the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’)], 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) and
‘multiemployer plan[s]’ within the meaning of Section 3 (37)(A) of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. §[ ] 1002(37)(A).” (Id. at ¶ 1).
The SCA PLA is an agreement between the BCTC and the New York City
School Construction Authority. (Pet’r 56.1 ¶ 4; SCA PLA art. 1, § 1). It sets
terms “for rehabilitation and renovation work performed on New York City
Public Schools.” (SCA PLA, art. 3, § 1). As relevant here, the SCA PLA requires
1
This Opinion draws on facts from the Declaration of Haluk Savci, Esq. (“Savci Decl.”
(Dkt. #11)) and to several exhibits attached thereto: the Project Labor Agreement
Covering Specified Construction Work Under the Capital Improvement Program for
Fiscal Years 2014-2019 (“SCA PLA” (Dkt. #11-1)); the Funds’ Trust Agreements (“Trust
Agreements” (Dkt. #11-2)); various letters concerning the payroll audit that triggered
this lawsuit (“[Date] Letter” (Dkt. #11-2)); the Funds’ Notice of Intention to Arbitrate
(“Arbitration Notice” (Dkt. #11-2)); and the Opinion and Default Award that Petitioners
are seeking to confirm (“Award” (Dkt. #11-2)). This Opinion also cites to Petitioners’
Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“Pet’r 56.1” (Dkt. #12)).
For ease of reference, the Court refers to Petitioner’s brief in support of its motion for
summary judgment as “Pet’r Br.” (Dkt. #10).
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contractors performing work pursuant to it “to pay wages and benefit
contributions … to [ ] applicable jointly trusted employee benefit fund[s]” (like
the Funds here). (Pet’r 56.1 ¶ 8). And to this end, the SCA PLA also requires
such contractors to make benefit contributions pursuant to the terms of the
benefit funds’ “Trust Agreements.” (SCA PLA, art. 11, § 2(C)).
Two provisions in the Funds’ Trust Agreements bear mention here. 2
First, Section 9.7 empowers the Funds to “audit payroll, employment, and any
other pertinent records of any” contractor-employer bound by the Trust
Agreements. (Trust Agreements, § 9.7). Second, Section 9.8 provides that the
Funds may initiate arbitration proceedings against contractor-employers who
“fail[ ] to make required contributions to the” Funds. (Id., § 9.8).
Respondent, a subcontractor, entered into the SCA PLA in February
2013, in order to perform work at Staten Island Technical High School. (Savci
Decl., Ex. 2 at 1-2). In October 2014, the Funds authorized an accounting firm
to audit Respondent’s “books and records” for the period between “February
15, 2013[,] through August 31, 2014 (the ‘Audit Period’).” (Id. at ¶ 19; 4/13/15
Letter). In a letter the Funds received on April 13, 2015, the accounting firm
reported to the Funds that Respondent had failed to make required
contributions during the Audit Period. (4/13/15 Letter). Consequently, the
2
Petitioners write that Briscoe is bound by “Trust Agreements,” although only one
excerpted Trust Agreement appears in the record. (Savci Decl., Ex. 3; see Pet’r 56.1
¶¶ 11-14). Given that there are multiple Funds at issue in this case, the Court
assumes that a separate Trust Agreement governs each Fund, and that the relevant
language of these Trust Agreements is identical.
3
Funds sent Respondent two certified letters demanding repayment for its
outstanding balance. (4/22/15 Letter; 5/26/15 Letter).
Respondent did not pay that balance. (Savci Decl., ¶ 20). On August 20,
2015, the Funds sent to Respondent and Joseph Harris, an arbitrator, a Notice
of Intention to Arbitrate. (Arbitration Notice 1-2). 3 In that Notice, the Funds
wrote that they intended to seek repayment from Respondent for its delinquent
payments during the Audit Period, as well as other delinquent payments from a
separate, later period in time. (Id. at 1). On August 25, 2015, Arbitrator Harris
mailed his own letter to the Funds and Respondent, writing that he intended to
hold an arbitration hearing on September 21, 2015. (Savci Decl., ¶ 21; Award
1). Arbitrator Harris sent that letter to both parties by USPS First-Class Mail.
(Award 1). He received no response from Respondent; nor was his letter to
Respondent returned by the USPS. (Id.).
The Arbitration proceeded as scheduled on September 21, 2015.
(Award 1). Respondent did not appear. (Id.). The Funds did, although they
“amended their [arbitration] claim to cover only the issue of payment covering
the Audit Period.” (Savci Decl., ¶ 23). And in support of that claim, the Funds
introduced into evidence the results of their 2015 payroll audit. (Award 2). On
the basis of that audit, the Funds argued that Respondent had failed to pay
$15,504.08 in required benefit contributions, and also owed thousands of
dollars in other dues, costs, interest, and liquidated damages. (Id.; see also
3
In his Declaration, Attorney Savci writes that the Funds sent their Notice of Intention to
Arbitrate to an entity called “Premier.” (Savci Decl., ¶ 20). The Court assumes that this
is a typographical error.
4
Trust Agreements, § 9.9 (permitting Petitioners to recover, inter alia, liquidated
damages and attorney’s fees “[i]n any legal action for [u]npaid [c]ontributions”)).
In total, the Funds sought $26,309.37. (Award 2). On the basis of “the
substantial and credible evidence” the Funds presented at the Arbitration,
Arbitrator Harris issued an Opinion and Default Award for the full amount that
the Funds sought on October 1, 2015. (Id.).
B.
Procedural Background
Petitioners filed a Complaint against Respondent on September 30, 2016.
(Dkt. #1). 4 In response to an Order of this Court dated October 5, 2016 (Dkt.
#6), Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting papers on
October 19, 2016 (Dkt. #9-12). Respondent has not appeared in this action.
DISCUSSION
A.
Applicable Law
“The LMRA establishes a federal policy of promoting ‘industrial
stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement,’ with particular
emphasis on private arbitration of grievances.” Nat’l Football League Mgmt.
Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960)). 5 In turn, judicial “review of an arbitration award under the LMRA
4
The Complaint’s caption listed John J. Virga as a plaintiff in this case. (Dkt. #1).
Although Virga appears as a party on this case’s electronic docket, Petitioners’ motion
for summary judgment and supporting submissions do not identify Virga as a “plaintiff”
or “petitioner.” (See, e.g., Pet’r Br. 1).
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The LMRA, not the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), governs this Court’s review of
Petitioner’s motion to confirm. “[I]n cases brought under Section 301 of the [LMRA] …
the FAA does not apply.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers
Union Local 812 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2001). And Section
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is … ‘very limited.’” Id. (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)). “[U]nless the award is procured through fraud or
dishonesty, a reviewing court is bound by the arbitrator’s factual findings,
interpretation of the contract[,] and suggested remedies.” Trustees of the N.Y.
City Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. High Performance Floors Inc.,
No. 15 Civ. 781 (LGS), 2016 WL 3194370, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2016)
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 196 F.3d
117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999)), reconsideration denied, 2016 WL 3911978 (S.D.N.Y.
July 15, 2016). And in turn, a court may not “review the arbitrator’s decision
on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or
misinterprets the parties’ agreement, but” instead may “inquire only as to
whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority as defined by the
collective bargaining agreement.” Nat’l Football League, 820 F.3d at 536.
Accordingly, a reviewing court’s “task is simply to ensure that the
arbitrator was ‘even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority’ and did not ‘ignore the plain language of the
contract.’” Nat’l Football League, 820 F.3d at 537 (quoting United Paperworkers
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). “As long as the
301 of the LMRA “serves as the foundation for a substantive body of federal law that is
‘analytically distinct from the [FAA].’” 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E. v. Lily
Pond Nursing Home, No. 07 Civ. 408 (JCF), 2008 WL 4443945, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2008) (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 221 (2d Cir.
2002)). Nonetheless, “the FAA is useful as a source of principles to guide the
development of law under LMRA § 301 … particularly [ ] in the context of a petition to
confirm or vacate an arbitration award.” Id. Both statutes call for courts to be
“extremely deferential” when reviewing arbitration awards. Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo,
568 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not
merely the arbitrator’s own brand of industrial justice, it must be confirmed.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
In turn, “[c]onfirmation of a labor arbitration award under LMRA § 301 is
a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration
award a judgment of the Court.” Trustees for the Mason Tenders Dist. Council
Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund & Training Program Fund v. Odessy
Constructioncorp, No. 14 Civ. 1560 (GHW), 2014 WL 3844619, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 1, 2014) (quoting N.Y. Med. Ctr. of Queens v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare
Workers East, No. 11 Civ. 4421 (ENV), 2012 WL 2179118, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
June 13, 2012)). “When a petition to confirm an arbitration award is
unopposed, courts should generally treat ‘the petition and accompanying
record ... as akin to a motion for summary judgment.’” Id. (quoting D.H. Blair
& Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2006)). “Thus, like unopposed
summary judgment motions, unopposed confirmation petitions ‘must fail
where the undisputed facts fail to show that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110).
B.
Analysis
Viewed in light of the LMRA, the undisputed facts of this case make plain
that the Court must confirm the Award. The SCA PLA required Respondent to
make benefit contributions to the Funds in accordance with the Trust
Agreements. The Trust Agreements entitled Petitioners to pursue arbitration if
Respondent failed to make those contributions. On the basis of a detailed
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audit — which Arbitrator Harris reviewed — Petitioners determined that
Respondent had not made required contributions during the Audit Period.
When their demands for repayment went unanswered, Petitioners arbitrated
their dispute. And after considering Petitioners’ “substantial and credible
evidence,” Arbitrator Harris rendered the Award, which reflects the delinquent
payments, dues, fees, costs, damages, and interest that Respondent owes
Petitioners.
Put simply, Arbitrator Harris construed and applied the SCA PLA when
he issued the Award. The LMRA, in turn, requires the Court to confirm the
Award.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment to confirm the Award is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment for Petitioners, terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining
dates, and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
May 2, 2017
New York, New York
__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
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