Manta Industries Ltd. v. Law et al
Filing
153
ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for sanctions and entry of default judgment, (dkt. no. 75), is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the Defendants' Answer, (dkt. no. 41), and to enter default judgment against Defendants Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova. A damages hearing will take place on December 17, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12A, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007. SO ORDERED. ( Status Conference set for 12/17/2024 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Loretta A. Preska.) (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 11/22/2024) (tg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Manta Industries Ltd.,
Plaintiff,
No. 16-cv-8308 (LAP)
-against-
ORDER
Yogesh M. Anand and Kum S.
Casanova,
Defendants.
LORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against
Defendants Yogesh Anand, Jonathan Anand, and Kum Casanova. 1
For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED with
respect
to
Yogesh
Anand
and
Kum
Casanova
(hereinafter
“Defendants”). 2
(See Notice of Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Mot.”), dated
July 8, 2019 [dkt. no. 75]; Decl. of B. Shamus O’Donniley in Supp.
of Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions (“O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.”),
dated July 8, 2019 [dkt. no. 76]; Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of
Mot. for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Br.”), dated July 8, 2019 [dkt.
no. 77]; Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n, dated Aug. 21, 2024 [dkt.
no. 152-1]; Pl.’s Letter, dated Aug. 21, 2019 [dkt. no. 152]; Decl.
of B. Shamus O’Donniley in Reply to Defs.’ Response (“O’Donniley
Decl. in Reply”), dated Aug. 30, 2019 [dkt. no. 90].)
1
On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint and
voluntarily dismissed its claims against Defendant Jonathan Anand
due to his pending bankruptcy proceedings. (See dkt. no. 142.)
The Court granted the motion and, on December 11, 2023, terminated
Jonathan Anand as a party in this case.
(See dkt. no. 144.)
Consequently, the Court construes the present motion as brought
against only the remaining Defendants, Yogesh Anand and Kum
Casanova. Any discussion of Defendants’ opposition refers only to
dkt. no. 152, the letter from Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova, and
(continued on next page)
2
I.
Background
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 25, 2016, bringing
claims
for,
among
others,
(1) piercing
the
corporate
veil,
(2) fraudulent conveyance, (3) breach of a fiduciary duty, and, as
applied to Defendant Kum Casanova, (4) aiding and abetting breach
of
a
fiduciary
duty
based
on
Defendants’
alleged
fraudulent
transfer of assets to avoid an unfavorable judgment in a related
case.
(See dkt. no. 8.)
progressed.
Since its filing, this action has barely
Plaintiff
first
served
discovery
requests
on
Defendants more than six years ago, and the parties have made no
progress since.
A.
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 5-9.)
Discovery Efforts
On August 18, 2017, the parties jointly filed a discovery
plan with scheduled deadlines.
(See dkt. no. 42.)
Defendants
missed all deadlines therein, and, on June 5, 2018, the Court
ordered
Defendants,
for
the
first
time,
to
comply
with
the
discovery deadlines.
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.
¶¶ 5-7; dkt. no. 47.)
In total, the Court issued four orders to
compel Defendants’ discovery production.
52, 53.)
(See dkt. nos. 47, 49,
Defendants defied each order in its entirety.
According
to Plaintiff, to date, Defendants have produced no documents and
not dkt. no. 86, the Declaration of Jonathan Anand’s attorney in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
2
have refused to appear for their depositions.
(See Pl.’s Letter
at 1; O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 9.)
The following recitation recounts Defendants’ noncompliance
in greater detail beginning with the first Court order:
On June 5, 2018, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation,
which set out that “Defendants will respond to Plaintiff’s demand
for production of documents . . . dated April 7, 2018 [by] June 15,
2018.”
(See dkt. no. 47.)
amended
notices
of
Plaintiff then drafted its second
deposition
and
confirmed
with
Defendants’
counsel that Defendants were available on the proposed dates. (See
O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 12-13; see also Pl.’s Mot.,
Ex. 8.)
Defendants and their counsel failed to appear for the
scheduled depositions.
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.
¶ 14.)
On August 1, 2018, the Court entered a second order extending
the discovery deadline for responses to the April 7, 2018 demands
to September 8, 2018, with Defendant Kum Casanova’s deposition to
take place on October 15th and Defendant Yogesh Anand’s deposition
to take place on October 18th.
(See dkt. no. 49.)
Again,
Defendants and their counsel failed to appear for the scheduled
depositions.
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 20.)
On February 11, 2019, the Court issued a third order setting
new deposition dates for Defendants Kum Casanova and Yogesh Anand
on
April
24,
2019
and
April
26,
3
2019,
respectively.
(See
dkt. no. 52.)
Plaintiff drafted its third amended notice of
deposition, reiterating its document requests and incorporating
the deposition dates set out in the third Court order.
(See
O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10.)
On April 24, 2019, the Court held a telephone conference,
later memorialized in a fourth order, that, among other things,
required Plaintiff to obtain proposals for remote depositions of
Defendants and required Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s prior
document requests.
(See dkt. no. 53.)
The Court also ordered
Defendants to retrieve documents relevant to Plaintiff’s requests
from their prior counsel, Mr. Suri.
(See id. at 2.)
The Court
warned three times in the same order that a “failure to comply may
result in sanctions.”
(See id.)
On May 8, 2019, Defendant Yogesh Anand emailed Plaintiff his
sole response to the April 7, 2018 discovery requests, stating the
following:
“1) Request denied for exhibits 1 through 5, already
produce and/or not related to Manta v Rich Kids.
2) Request Denied for documents requested already
produce and/or not related to Manta v Rich Kids from
Jon and Kum Casanova.
Request denied for any other evidence which is not
related to Manta v Rich Kids Jeans.
After closing of the case Manta v Rich Kids and
Judgment entered Rich Kids Jeans company was stoped
business and closed the warehouse, every thing was
dispose off.”
(Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 14.)
4
On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff contacted Defendants with an
estimate for the cost of remote depositions and, alternatively,
proposed dates and locations for in-person depositions.
Ex. 15.)
(Id.,
Defendants never agreed to new deposition dates or
substantively responded again other than to oppose this motion.
(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n at 1.)
To date, neither the documents
nor evidence of Defendants’ communications with Mr. Suri have
surfaced.
B.
Motion for Sanctions
On
July
8,
2019,
Plaintiff
filed
the
instant
motion,
requesting that the Court strike Defendants’ pleadings and enter
a default judgment against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 37(b)(2).
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of
Mot. ¶ 32; Pl.’s Br. at 1.)
On July 24, 2019, the Court ordered Defendants to respond to
the instant motion no later than August 23, 2019.
no. 80.)
(See dkt.
Again, the Court warned Defendants that any “failure to
respond timely may result in the imposition of sanctions.”
On
August
21,
2019,
Defendants
sent
the
Court
a
(Id.)
letter
opposing Plaintiff’s motion and attributing their noncompliance to
an interstate move and medical issues. (See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n
at 1.)
Defendants then contended that they would “make all
diligent efforts to appear for suitably scheduled depositions” and
5
that
they
believed
“[P]laintiff
[had]
Discovery from the [D]efendants.”
(Id.)
obtained
Defendants have failed to make any efforts.
all
required
According to
Plaintiff, in the more than five years since Defendants submitted
their opposition, “[n]o documents have been produced[,]” and “[n]o
depositions have occurred.”
II.
(Pl.’s Letter at 1.)
Applicable Law
Plaintiff moves for sanctions under Rules 37(b)(2)(A)(iii),
37(b)(2)(A)(vi), and 55(b)(2), requesting that the Court strike
Defendants’ pleadings and enter default judgment against them.
(See Pl.’s Mot. at 1.)
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
Pursuant to Rule 37, a district court may impose sanctions on
a party for disobeying a discovery order.
P. 37(b)(2).
See Fed. R. Civ.
Possible sanctions include, among others, striking
pleadings or rendering a default judgment against the disobedient
party.
See id.
Although the decision to impose Rule 37 sanctions rests
soundly within a district court’s discretion, see John B. Hull,
Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prod., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1176
(2d Cir. 1988), dismissal or default judgment under Rule 37 is “a
drastic
penalty
circumstances.”
which
should
be
imposed
only
in
extreme
See Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1132 (2d
Cir. 1986) (quoting Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Standard
6
Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Default judgment
under Rule 37 is warranted, however, where a party disobeys a
court’s discovery orders willfully, in bad faith, or through fault.
See S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 144 (2d
Cir. 2010); John B. Hull, Inc., 845 F.2d at 1176.
Courts in this Circuit apply a four-factor test to determine
whether entry of a harsher sanction, such as default, is warranted.
These factors assess (1) the reason for noncompliance or the
willfulness of the noncompliant party; (2) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions; (3) the duration of the noncompliance; and (4) whether
the noncompliant party was warned of the potential consequences.
See Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.
2009).
to
Still, the presiding court may look beyond these factors
consider
sanction.
B.
the
full
record
when
selecting
the
appropriate
See S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55
A party may rely upon Rule 55 to support entry of a default
judgment based on the same conduct alleged to support entry of a
default judgment under Rule 37.
Pursuant to Rule 55, a party
“default[s]” by failing “to plead or otherwise defend” the case at
hand.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
The Court of Appeals has
“embraced a broad understanding of the phrase ‘otherwise defend.’”
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 129 (2d
Cir. 2011); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d
7
Cir.
1981)
(“failing
to
appear
for
a
deposition,
dismissing
counsel, giving vague and unresponsive answers to interrogatories,
and failing to appear for trial” each constitute a failure to
“otherwise defend”).
Although similar to the standard under
Rule 37, the standard under Rule 55 differs some.
To determine
whether a party has failed to answer or “otherwise defend” an
action, a district court considers:
conduct,
(2) whether
the
defaulting
(1) the willingness of the
party
has
a
meritorious
defense, and (3) any prejudice to the non-defaulting party.
Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. US Mortg. Corp., 2023 WL 11899890, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have willfully disregarded
the Court’s discovery orders and Plaintiff’s discovery efforts,
such that entry of a default judgment is warranted under Rules 37
and 55.
(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 32.)
Defendants
argue only that their move from New York to Virginia and Defendant
Kum Casanova’s multiple surgeries in 2019 prevented their prior
compliance with the Court’s discovery orders.
in Opp’n at 1.)
(See Defs.’ Letter
For the following reasons, the Court finds that
8
imposition of Rule 37 sanctions and entry of default judgment under
Rule 55 are warranted.
A.
Rule 37 Sanctions
Plaintiff moves first, under Rule 37, for the Court to strike
Defendants’ Answer and to enter a default judgment against them.
The Court considers the relevant factors under Rule 37 below.
i.
Willfulness of Noncompliant Party
The first factor of the Court’s analysis is the willfulness
of a noncompliant party.
Noncompliance is willful “when the
court’s orders have been clear, when the party has understood them,
and when the party’s non-compliance is not due to factors beyond
the party’s control.”
See Nieves v. City of New York, 208 F.R.D.
531, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). A party’s “persistent
refusal
to
willfulness.
comply”
with
discovery
See id. (quoting
orders
is
evidence
of
Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P.,
148 F.R.D. 500, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
Moreover, courts also
construe a party’s half-hearted attempt at compliance as willful.
See Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, 333 F.R.D. 30, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Defendants’
willful.
noncompliance
in
this
litigation
is
clearly
Their participation in the discovery process has been
nominal at best.
They have blatantly and repeatedly ignored Court
orders and discovery deadlines both while represented by counsel
and pro se.
See Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302 (quoting Minotti v.
Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]ll litigants,
9
including
pro
orders[.]”)
ses,
have
an
obligation
to
comply
with
court
Specifically, (1) Defendants entirely disobeyed the
June 5, 2018 stipulation & order directing them to appear for
scheduled depositions in July 2018 and to provide responses to
Plaintiff’s April 7, 2018 requests for document production and
interrogatories
before
June 15,
2018;
(2) Defendants
entirely
disobeyed the August 1, 2018 order directing them to appear for
depositions on October 15 and 18, 2018 and to provide responses to
Plaintiff’s April 7, 2018 and June 30, 2018 requests for document
production
and
interrogatories
before
September 8,
2018;
(3) Defendants entirely disobeyed the February 11, 2019 order to
appear for depositions on April 24 and 26, 2019, respectively, and
to provide Plaintiff with IRS Form 4506 authorizing the release of
tax returns; and (4) Defendants entirely disobeyed the April 24,
2019 order to arrange for and appear at video depositions, to
provide the aforementioned IRS Form, and to provide documents
responsive to Plaintiff’s prior document requests.
(See dkt. nos.
47, 49, 52, 53.)
Additionally,
“already
produce
willfulness
Defendants’
only
and/or
related”
because
not
Defendants
never
discovery
further
produced
responses
of
demonstrate
documents
detailed efforts taken to locate or obtain “related” files.
or
(See
Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 14; Pl.’s Letter at 1); see, e.g., Ramgoolie, 333
10
F.R.D. at 36 (considering “half-hearted” efforts to comply with
discovery orders as evidence of willfulness).
In response to Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, Defendants
attempt to recast their noncompliance as “neither intentional nor
deliberate,”
attributing
delay
to
Defendant Kum Casanova’s surgeries.
their
interstate
move
and
(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n
at 1.)
Still, Defendants’ excuses fail to explain their complete
noncompliance with multiple Court orders over the past six years,
let alone evince anything other than willfulness.
At no point did
Defendants
any
discovery
deadline, an adjournment, or any other form of relief.
Nor did
move
the
Court
for
an
extension
of
they offer an explanation as to why they failed to comply with
each discovery order until they were facing a motion for sanctions.
(See Pl.’s Br. at 3); see also S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at
148
(finding
that
failure
to
provide
an
explanation
for
the
noncompliance was evidence of willfulness).
Defendants also contend that their May 8, 2019 response to
Plaintiff’s interrogatories puts them in full compliance with the
outstanding discovery orders.
(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n at 1.)
But Defendants fail to address the fact that they have never
produced
any
documents,
making
their
responses
completely
noncompliant with the Court’s orders and Plaintiff’s requests.
(See
id.;
O’Donniley
Decl.
in
11
Supp.
of
Reply
¶¶
27,
32.)
Defendants claim their prior counsel, Mr. Suri, is in receipt of
their responsive documents.
(See dkt. no. 53 at 2.)
However, to
date, neither Mr. Suri nor Defendants have produced said documents
despite efforts by Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court’s orders.
(See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15 at 4.)
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
that
Defendants
have
acted
willfully, and this factor favors sanctions.
ii.
Efficacy of Lesser Sanctions
Turning to the second factor, the Court must consider whether
lesser sanctions are available as effective alternatives.
See
Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302. Under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), courts may impose
the following sanctions:
directing designated facts be taken as
established, prohibiting support of claims or defenses, striking
pleadings, staying proceedings, dismissing the action, rendering
default judgment, or treating disobedience as contempt of court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
Additionally, courts may impose
monetary sanctions as they see fit to compel compliance.
See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also Funk v. Belneftekhim, 861 F.3d
354, 373 (2d Cir. 2017).
Defendants’ actions demonstrate that the imposition of lesser
sanctions will likely not be effective because they have already
disobeyed numerous discovery orders.
remote
deposition
cost
estimates
Moreover, after receiving
and
alternative
in-person
deposition dates from Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendants have done
12
nothing for over five years.
at 1.)
(See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15; Pl.’s Letter
Consequently, lesser enforcement mechanisms are unlikely
to be effective at this juncture because, for nearly six years,
they have not been effective.
This factor favors imposition of
harsher sanctions.
iii.
Duration of Period of Noncompliance
The duration of Defendants’ noncompliance also counsels in
favor of sanctions.
Indeed, courts in this district have found
that noncompliance for a period of several months is sufficient to
warrant dismissal or default.
See, e.g., Embuscado v. DC Comics,
347 F. App’x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (three
months); Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 303 (six months); Urbont v. Sony Music
Ent., 2014 WL 6433347, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014) (six months).
Defendants began to flout Court orders in 2018.
no. 47 O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 17-19.)
duration
of
Defendants’
noncompliance
is
(See dkt.
The multi-year
sufficient
to
favor
imposition of a harsher sanction.
iv.
Sufficiency of the Warnings
The final factor also favors sanctions given the multiple
verbal
and
written
warnings
possibility of sanctions.
Defendants
received
as
to
the
Entries of default judgment against pro
se litigants require sufficient notice.
See Guggenheim Cap., LLC
v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding sufficient
notice for an entry of default under Rule 37 sanctions where
13
numerous verbal and written warnings were given to a party “both
while represented by counsel and not . . . .”)); see also Agiwal,
555 F.3d at 303 (finding sufficient notice for dismissal pursuant
to Rule 37 against a pro se litigant where multiple court orders
concerning discovery warned of the possibility of sanctions).
Notice is sufficient so long as it warns the disobedient party
that serious sanctions are imminent.
See, e.g., Guggenheim, 722
F.3d at 452-53; see also Ramgoolie, 333 F.R.D. at 38 (“Warnings
need not mention the phrase ‘default judgment’; regular warnings
that
noncompliance
may
result
in
discovery
sanctions
are
adequate.” (citing Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 452)).
Defendants have received several warnings that sanctions may
apply.
First, in its February 11, 2019 order, the Court cautioned
Defendants
that
“failure
to
appear
depositions] will be defaulted[.]”
[for
scheduled
(Dkt. no. 52.)
video
Second, in its
April 24, 2019 order, the Court stated three times that “[f]ailure
to comply may result in sanctions.”
(See dkt. no. 53 at 2.)
Thus,
the Court finds that the warnings afforded here were sufficient to
give Defendants notice, and the final factor also weighs in favor
of sanctions.
Because all factors favor sanctions, the Court finds that
they are warranted under Rule 37.
This case has been at a
standstill for years due to Defendants’ inaction, something they
refuse to change.
Consequently, the Court finds it appropriate to
14
strike Defendants’ Answer and to enter a default judgment pursuant
to Rule 37.
B.
Default Judgment under Rule 55
The Court also finds it appropriate to enter default judgment
against Defendants under Rule 55.
A party may be found to have
“consciously abandoned” its defense when it fails to respond to
discovery
requests,
comply
counsel, among other things.
with
Court
orders,
or
retain
new
Buffalo Laborers Welfare Fund v.
Elliott, 2008 WL 907385, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (striking
defendant’s answer and entering default judgment); see also Au Bon
Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 65 (defendant failed to “otherwise defend”
by “failing to appear for a deposition, dismissing counsel, giving
vague and unresponsive answer to interrogatories, and failing to
appear for trial”).
The Court finds that Defendants failed to defend because they
(1) acted willfully, (2) have no meritorious defense, and (3) their
default presents no prejudice to Plaintiff.
First, as discussed
above, Defendants record of noncompliance evinces willfulness.
See Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 455 (“[T]he willful violations of the
district court’s discovery orders may be construed as a failure to
defend
[against
default
judgement.]”).
Second,
Defendants’
defense is not meritorious because they provide no legal defense
against the substance of this litigation, the enforcement of a
prior judgment against Defendants.
15
(See Second Amended Complaint
¶¶ 11-12, dated May 31, 2019 [dkt. no. 62]); see also Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 2023 WL 11899890, at *11-12 (finding a meritorious
defense
where
a
party
consistently
denied
liability
through
plausible legal theory and did not evince willfulness or bad
faith).
Finally, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the default;
rather, after nearly six years, a default permits Plaintiff to
take one step forward toward accessing the requested relief.
Therefore, given the record of Defendants’ noncompliance and
the litigation’s stagnant condition, the Court finds Defendants to
have “consciously abandoned” their defense and concludes that
entry of a default judgment under Rule 55 is appropriate.
See
Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 455 (affirming default judgment under
Rule 55
where
defendant
willfully
defaulted
and
presented
no
meritorious defense); see also Theodosia Billie Sts. v. Mangena,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190142, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2024),
report
and
recommendation
adopted,
Theodosia
Billie
Sts.
v.
Mangena, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204489 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2024)
(doing the same where defendant ignored two court orders and failed
to appear at a conference); Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Safe Chain Sols.
LLC, 2024 WL 222697, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3949982 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024)
(party ignored four court orders and failed to appear at a status
conference).
16
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions
and
entry
of
default
judgment,
(dkt.
no. 75),
is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the
Defendants’ Answer, (dkt. no. 41), and to enter default judgment
against Defendants Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova.
A damages
hearing will take place on December 17, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 12A, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New
York, New York 10007.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
November 22, 2024
New York, New York
___________________________________
LORETTA A. PRESKA
Senior United States District Judge
17
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