Manta Industries Ltd. v. Law et al

Filing 153

ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for sanctions and entry of default judgment, (dkt. no. 75), is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the Defendants' Answer, (dkt. no. 41), and to enter default judgment against Defendants Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova. A damages hearing will take place on December 17, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 12A, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007. SO ORDERED. ( Status Conference set for 12/17/2024 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 12A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Loretta A. Preska.) (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 11/22/2024) (tg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Manta Industries Ltd.,
Plaintiff,

No. 16-cv-8308 (LAP)

-against-

ORDER

Yogesh M. Anand and Kum S.
Casanova,
Defendants.

LORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against
Defendants Yogesh Anand, Jonathan Anand, and Kum Casanova. 1

For

the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED with
respect

to

Yogesh

Anand

and

Kum

Casanova

(hereinafter

“Defendants”). 2

(See Notice of Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Mot.”), dated
July 8, 2019 [dkt. no. 75]; Decl. of B. Shamus O’Donniley in Supp.
of Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions (“O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.”),
dated July 8, 2019 [dkt. no. 76]; Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of
Mot. for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Br.”), dated July 8, 2019 [dkt.
no. 77]; Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n, dated Aug. 21, 2024 [dkt.
no. 152-1]; Pl.’s Letter, dated Aug. 21, 2019 [dkt. no. 152]; Decl.
of B. Shamus O’Donniley in Reply to Defs.’ Response (“O’Donniley
Decl. in Reply”), dated Aug. 30, 2019 [dkt. no. 90].)
1

On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint and
voluntarily dismissed its claims against Defendant Jonathan Anand
due to his pending bankruptcy proceedings. (See dkt. no. 142.)
The Court granted the motion and, on December 11, 2023, terminated
Jonathan Anand as a party in this case.
(See dkt. no. 144.)
Consequently, the Court construes the present motion as brought
against only the remaining Defendants, Yogesh Anand and Kum
Casanova. Any discussion of Defendants’ opposition refers only to
dkt. no. 152, the letter from Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova, and
(continued on next page)
2

I.

Background
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 25, 2016, bringing

claims

for,

among

others,

(1) piercing

the

corporate

veil,

(2) fraudulent conveyance, (3) breach of a fiduciary duty, and, as
applied to Defendant Kum Casanova, (4) aiding and abetting breach
of

a

fiduciary

duty

based

on

Defendants’

alleged

fraudulent

transfer of assets to avoid an unfavorable judgment in a related
case.

(See dkt. no. 8.)

progressed.

Since its filing, this action has barely

Plaintiff

first

served

discovery

requests

on

Defendants more than six years ago, and the parties have made no
progress since.
A.

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 5-9.)

Discovery Efforts

On August 18, 2017, the parties jointly filed a discovery
plan with scheduled deadlines.

(See dkt. no. 42.)

Defendants

missed all deadlines therein, and, on June 5, 2018, the Court
ordered

Defendants,

for

the

first

time,

to

comply

with

the

discovery deadlines.

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.

¶¶ 5-7; dkt. no. 47.)

In total, the Court issued four orders to

compel Defendants’ discovery production.
52, 53.)

(See dkt. nos. 47, 49,

Defendants defied each order in its entirety.

According

to Plaintiff, to date, Defendants have produced no documents and

not dkt. no. 86, the Declaration of Jonathan Anand’s attorney in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
2

have refused to appear for their depositions.

(See Pl.’s Letter

at 1; O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 9.)
The following recitation recounts Defendants’ noncompliance
in greater detail beginning with the first Court order:
On June 5, 2018, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation,
which set out that “Defendants will respond to Plaintiff’s demand
for production of documents . . . dated April 7, 2018 [by] June 15,
2018.”

(See dkt. no. 47.)

amended

notices

of

Plaintiff then drafted its second

deposition

and

confirmed

with

Defendants’

counsel that Defendants were available on the proposed dates. (See
O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 12-13; see also Pl.’s Mot.,
Ex. 8.)

Defendants and their counsel failed to appear for the

scheduled depositions.

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot.

¶ 14.)
On August 1, 2018, the Court entered a second order extending
the discovery deadline for responses to the April 7, 2018 demands
to September 8, 2018, with Defendant Kum Casanova’s deposition to
take place on October 15th and Defendant Yogesh Anand’s deposition
to take place on October 18th.

(See dkt. no. 49.)

Again,

Defendants and their counsel failed to appear for the scheduled
depositions.

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 20.)

On February 11, 2019, the Court issued a third order setting
new deposition dates for Defendants Kum Casanova and Yogesh Anand
on

April

24,

2019

and

April

26,
3

2019,

respectively.

(See

dkt. no. 52.)

Plaintiff drafted its third amended notice of

deposition, reiterating its document requests and incorporating
the deposition dates set out in the third Court order.

(See

O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 10.)
On April 24, 2019, the Court held a telephone conference,
later memorialized in a fourth order, that, among other things,
required Plaintiff to obtain proposals for remote depositions of
Defendants and required Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s prior
document requests.

(See dkt. no. 53.)

The Court also ordered

Defendants to retrieve documents relevant to Plaintiff’s requests
from their prior counsel, Mr. Suri.

(See id. at 2.)

The Court

warned three times in the same order that a “failure to comply may
result in sanctions.”

(See id.)

On May 8, 2019, Defendant Yogesh Anand emailed Plaintiff his
sole response to the April 7, 2018 discovery requests, stating the
following:
“1) Request denied for exhibits 1 through 5, already
produce and/or not related to Manta v Rich Kids.
2) Request Denied for documents requested already
produce and/or not related to Manta v Rich Kids from
Jon and Kum Casanova.
Request denied for any other evidence which is not
related to Manta v Rich Kids Jeans.
After closing of the case Manta v Rich Kids and
Judgment entered Rich Kids Jeans company was stoped
business and closed the warehouse, every thing was
dispose off.”
(Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 14.)
4

On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff contacted Defendants with an
estimate for the cost of remote depositions and, alternatively,
proposed dates and locations for in-person depositions.
Ex. 15.)

(Id.,

Defendants never agreed to new deposition dates or

substantively responded again other than to oppose this motion.
(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n at 1.)

To date, neither the documents

nor evidence of Defendants’ communications with Mr. Suri have
surfaced.
B.

Motion for Sanctions

On

July

8,

2019,

Plaintiff

filed

the

instant

motion,

requesting that the Court strike Defendants’ pleadings and enter
a default judgment against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 37(b)(2).

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of

Mot. ¶ 32; Pl.’s Br. at 1.)
On July 24, 2019, the Court ordered Defendants to respond to
the instant motion no later than August 23, 2019.
no. 80.)

(See dkt.

Again, the Court warned Defendants that any “failure to

respond timely may result in the imposition of sanctions.”
On

August

21,

2019,

Defendants

sent

the

Court

a

(Id.)
letter

opposing Plaintiff’s motion and attributing their noncompliance to
an interstate move and medical issues. (See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n
at 1.)

Defendants then contended that they would “make all

diligent efforts to appear for suitably scheduled depositions” and

5

that

they

believed

“[P]laintiff

[had]

Discovery from the [D]efendants.”

(Id.)

obtained

Defendants have failed to make any efforts.

all

required

According to

Plaintiff, in the more than five years since Defendants submitted
their opposition, “[n]o documents have been produced[,]” and “[n]o
depositions have occurred.”
II.

(Pl.’s Letter at 1.)

Applicable Law
Plaintiff moves for sanctions under Rules 37(b)(2)(A)(iii),

37(b)(2)(A)(vi), and 55(b)(2), requesting that the Court strike
Defendants’ pleadings and enter default judgment against them.
(See Pl.’s Mot. at 1.)
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37

Pursuant to Rule 37, a district court may impose sanctions on
a party for disobeying a discovery order.
P. 37(b)(2).

See Fed. R. Civ.

Possible sanctions include, among others, striking

pleadings or rendering a default judgment against the disobedient
party.

See id.

Although the decision to impose Rule 37 sanctions rests
soundly within a district court’s discretion, see John B. Hull,
Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prod., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1176
(2d Cir. 1988), dismissal or default judgment under Rule 37 is “a
drastic

penalty

circumstances.”

which

should

be

imposed

only

in

extreme

See Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1132 (2d

Cir. 1986) (quoting Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Standard
6

Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1977)).

Default judgment

under Rule 37 is warranted, however, where a party disobeys a
court’s discovery orders willfully, in bad faith, or through fault.
See S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 144 (2d
Cir. 2010); John B. Hull, Inc., 845 F.2d at 1176.
Courts in this Circuit apply a four-factor test to determine
whether entry of a harsher sanction, such as default, is warranted.
These factors assess (1) the reason for noncompliance or the
willfulness of the noncompliant party; (2) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions; (3) the duration of the noncompliance; and (4) whether
the noncompliant party was warned of the potential consequences.
See Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.
2009).
to

Still, the presiding court may look beyond these factors

consider

sanction.
B.

the

full

record

when

selecting

the

appropriate

See S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55

A party may rely upon Rule 55 to support entry of a default
judgment based on the same conduct alleged to support entry of a
default judgment under Rule 37.

Pursuant to Rule 55, a party

“default[s]” by failing “to plead or otherwise defend” the case at
hand.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

The Court of Appeals has

“embraced a broad understanding of the phrase ‘otherwise defend.’”
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 129 (2d
Cir. 2011); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d
7

Cir.

1981)

(“failing

to

appear

for

a

deposition,

dismissing

counsel, giving vague and unresponsive answers to interrogatories,
and failing to appear for trial” each constitute a failure to
“otherwise defend”).

Although similar to the standard under

Rule 37, the standard under Rule 55 differs some.

To determine

whether a party has failed to answer or “otherwise defend” an
action, a district court considers:
conduct,

(2) whether

the

defaulting

(1) the willingness of the
party

has

a

meritorious

defense, and (3) any prejudice to the non-defaulting party.

Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. US Mortg. Corp., 2023 WL 11899890, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have willfully disregarded
the Court’s discovery orders and Plaintiff’s discovery efforts,
such that entry of a default judgment is warranted under Rules 37
and 55.

(See O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 32.)

Defendants

argue only that their move from New York to Virginia and Defendant
Kum Casanova’s multiple surgeries in 2019 prevented their prior
compliance with the Court’s discovery orders.
in Opp’n at 1.)

(See Defs.’ Letter

For the following reasons, the Court finds that

8

imposition of Rule 37 sanctions and entry of default judgment under
Rule 55 are warranted.
A.

Rule 37 Sanctions

Plaintiff moves first, under Rule 37, for the Court to strike
Defendants’ Answer and to enter a default judgment against them.
The Court considers the relevant factors under Rule 37 below.
i.

Willfulness of Noncompliant Party

The first factor of the Court’s analysis is the willfulness
of a noncompliant party.

Noncompliance is willful “when the

court’s orders have been clear, when the party has understood them,
and when the party’s non-compliance is not due to factors beyond
the party’s control.”

See Nieves v. City of New York, 208 F.R.D.

531, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). A party’s “persistent
refusal

to

willfulness.

comply”

with

discovery

See id. (quoting

orders

is

evidence

of

Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P.,

148 F.R.D. 500, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).

Moreover, courts also

construe a party’s half-hearted attempt at compliance as willful.
See Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, 333 F.R.D. 30, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Defendants’
willful.

noncompliance

in

this

litigation

is

clearly

Their participation in the discovery process has been

nominal at best.

They have blatantly and repeatedly ignored Court

orders and discovery deadlines both while represented by counsel
and pro se.

See Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302 (quoting Minotti v.

Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]ll litigants,
9

including

pro

orders[.]”)

ses,

have

an

obligation

to

comply

with

court

Specifically, (1) Defendants entirely disobeyed the

June 5, 2018 stipulation & order directing them to appear for
scheduled depositions in July 2018 and to provide responses to
Plaintiff’s April 7, 2018 requests for document production and
interrogatories

before

June 15,

2018;

(2) Defendants

entirely

disobeyed the August 1, 2018 order directing them to appear for
depositions on October 15 and 18, 2018 and to provide responses to
Plaintiff’s April 7, 2018 and June 30, 2018 requests for document
production

and

interrogatories

before

September 8,

2018;

(3) Defendants entirely disobeyed the February 11, 2019 order to
appear for depositions on April 24 and 26, 2019, respectively, and
to provide Plaintiff with IRS Form 4506 authorizing the release of
tax returns; and (4) Defendants entirely disobeyed the April 24,
2019 order to arrange for and appear at video depositions, to
provide the aforementioned IRS Form, and to provide documents
responsive to Plaintiff’s prior document requests.

(See dkt. nos.

47, 49, 52, 53.)
Additionally,
“already

produce

willfulness

Defendants’

only

and/or

related”

because

not

Defendants

never

discovery
further

produced

responses

of

demonstrate
documents

detailed efforts taken to locate or obtain “related” files.

or
(See

Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 14; Pl.’s Letter at 1); see, e.g., Ramgoolie, 333

10

F.R.D. at 36 (considering “half-hearted” efforts to comply with
discovery orders as evidence of willfulness).
In response to Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, Defendants
attempt to recast their noncompliance as “neither intentional nor
deliberate,”

attributing

delay

to

Defendant Kum Casanova’s surgeries.

their

interstate

move

and

(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n

at 1.)
Still, Defendants’ excuses fail to explain their complete
noncompliance with multiple Court orders over the past six years,
let alone evince anything other than willfulness.

At no point did

Defendants

any

discovery

deadline, an adjournment, or any other form of relief.

Nor did

move

the

Court

for

an

extension

of

they offer an explanation as to why they failed to comply with
each discovery order until they were facing a motion for sanctions.
(See Pl.’s Br. at 3); see also S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at
148

(finding

that

failure

to

provide

an

explanation

for

the

noncompliance was evidence of willfulness).
Defendants also contend that their May 8, 2019 response to
Plaintiff’s interrogatories puts them in full compliance with the
outstanding discovery orders.

(See Defs.’ Letter in Opp’n at 1.)

But Defendants fail to address the fact that they have never
produced

any

documents,

making

their

responses

completely

noncompliant with the Court’s orders and Plaintiff’s requests.
(See

id.;

O’Donniley

Decl.

in
11

Supp.

of

Reply

¶¶

27,

32.)

Defendants claim their prior counsel, Mr. Suri, is in receipt of
their responsive documents.

(See dkt. no. 53 at 2.)

However, to

date, neither Mr. Suri nor Defendants have produced said documents
despite efforts by Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court’s orders.
(See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15 at 4.)
Accordingly,

the

Court

finds

that

Defendants

have

acted

willfully, and this factor favors sanctions.
ii.

Efficacy of Lesser Sanctions

Turning to the second factor, the Court must consider whether
lesser sanctions are available as effective alternatives.

See

Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302. Under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), courts may impose
the following sanctions:

directing designated facts be taken as

established, prohibiting support of claims or defenses, striking
pleadings, staying proceedings, dismissing the action, rendering
default judgment, or treating disobedience as contempt of court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).

Additionally, courts may impose

monetary sanctions as they see fit to compel compliance.

See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also Funk v. Belneftekhim, 861 F.3d
354, 373 (2d Cir. 2017).
Defendants’ actions demonstrate that the imposition of lesser
sanctions will likely not be effective because they have already
disobeyed numerous discovery orders.
remote

deposition

cost

estimates

Moreover, after receiving
and

alternative

in-person

deposition dates from Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendants have done
12

nothing for over five years.
at 1.)

(See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 15; Pl.’s Letter

Consequently, lesser enforcement mechanisms are unlikely

to be effective at this juncture because, for nearly six years,
they have not been effective.

This factor favors imposition of

harsher sanctions.
iii.

Duration of Period of Noncompliance

The duration of Defendants’ noncompliance also counsels in
favor of sanctions.

Indeed, courts in this district have found

that noncompliance for a period of several months is sufficient to
warrant dismissal or default.

See, e.g., Embuscado v. DC Comics,

347 F. App’x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (three
months); Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 303 (six months); Urbont v. Sony Music
Ent., 2014 WL 6433347, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014) (six months).
Defendants began to flout Court orders in 2018.
no. 47 O’Donniley Decl. in Supp. of Mot. ¶¶ 17-19.)
duration

of

Defendants’

noncompliance

is

(See dkt.

The multi-year

sufficient

to

favor

imposition of a harsher sanction.
iv.

Sufficiency of the Warnings

The final factor also favors sanctions given the multiple
verbal

and

written

warnings

possibility of sanctions.

Defendants

received

as

to

the

Entries of default judgment against pro

se litigants require sufficient notice.

See Guggenheim Cap., LLC

v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding sufficient
notice for an entry of default under Rule 37 sanctions where
13

numerous verbal and written warnings were given to a party “both
while represented by counsel and not . . . .”)); see also Agiwal,
555 F.3d at 303 (finding sufficient notice for dismissal pursuant
to Rule 37 against a pro se litigant where multiple court orders
concerning discovery warned of the possibility of sanctions).
Notice is sufficient so long as it warns the disobedient party
that serious sanctions are imminent.

See, e.g., Guggenheim, 722

F.3d at 452-53; see also Ramgoolie, 333 F.R.D. at 38 (“Warnings
need not mention the phrase ‘default judgment’; regular warnings
that

noncompliance

may

result

in

discovery

sanctions

are

adequate.” (citing Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 452)).
Defendants have received several warnings that sanctions may
apply.

First, in its February 11, 2019 order, the Court cautioned

Defendants

that

“failure

to

appear

depositions] will be defaulted[.]”

[for

scheduled

(Dkt. no. 52.)

video

Second, in its

April 24, 2019 order, the Court stated three times that “[f]ailure
to comply may result in sanctions.”

(See dkt. no. 53 at 2.)

Thus,

the Court finds that the warnings afforded here were sufficient to
give Defendants notice, and the final factor also weighs in favor
of sanctions.
Because all factors favor sanctions, the Court finds that
they are warranted under Rule 37.

This case has been at a

standstill for years due to Defendants’ inaction, something they
refuse to change.

Consequently, the Court finds it appropriate to
14

strike Defendants’ Answer and to enter a default judgment pursuant
to Rule 37.
B.

Default Judgment under Rule 55

The Court also finds it appropriate to enter default judgment
against Defendants under Rule 55.

A party may be found to have

“consciously abandoned” its defense when it fails to respond to
discovery

requests,

comply

counsel, among other things.

with

Court

orders,

or

retain

new

Buffalo Laborers Welfare Fund v.

Elliott, 2008 WL 907385, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (striking
defendant’s answer and entering default judgment); see also Au Bon
Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 65 (defendant failed to “otherwise defend”
by “failing to appear for a deposition, dismissing counsel, giving
vague and unresponsive answer to interrogatories, and failing to
appear for trial”).
The Court finds that Defendants failed to defend because they
(1) acted willfully, (2) have no meritorious defense, and (3) their
default presents no prejudice to Plaintiff.

First, as discussed

above, Defendants record of noncompliance evinces willfulness.
See Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 455 (“[T]he willful violations of the
district court’s discovery orders may be construed as a failure to
defend

[against

default

judgement.]”).

Second,

Defendants’

defense is not meritorious because they provide no legal defense
against the substance of this litigation, the enforcement of a
prior judgment against Defendants.
15

(See Second Amended Complaint

¶¶ 11-12, dated May 31, 2019 [dkt. no. 62]); see also Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 2023 WL 11899890, at *11-12 (finding a meritorious
defense

where

a

party

consistently

denied

liability

through

plausible legal theory and did not evince willfulness or bad
faith).

Finally, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the default;

rather, after nearly six years, a default permits Plaintiff to
take one step forward toward accessing the requested relief.
Therefore, given the record of Defendants’ noncompliance and
the litigation’s stagnant condition, the Court finds Defendants to
have “consciously abandoned” their defense and concludes that
entry of a default judgment under Rule 55 is appropriate.

See

Guggenheim, 722 F.3d at 455 (affirming default judgment under
Rule 55

where

defendant

willfully

defaulted

and

presented

no

meritorious defense); see also Theodosia Billie Sts. v. Mangena,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190142, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2024),
report

and

recommendation

adopted,

Theodosia

Billie

Sts.

v.

Mangena, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204489 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2024)
(doing the same where defendant ignored two court orders and failed
to appear at a conference); Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Safe Chain Sols.
LLC, 2024 WL 222697, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3949982 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024)
(party ignored four court orders and failed to appear at a status
conference).

16

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions

and

entry

of

default

judgment,

(dkt.

no. 75),

is

GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the
Defendants’ Answer, (dkt. no. 41), and to enter default judgment
against Defendants Yogesh Anand and Kum Casanova.

A damages

hearing will take place on December 17, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in
Courtroom 12A, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New
York, New York 10007.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

November 22, 2024
New York, New York
___________________________________
LORETTA A. PRESKA
Senior United States District Judge

17