Vega v. HSBC Securities USA et al

Filing 199

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 193 Motion. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to proceed as Christopher Vega, Docket Entry No. 193, is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption of this action to reflect that the name of the plaintiff is Richard Stryker. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox on 6/4/2019) Copies Mailed By Chambers to Richard Stryker. (anc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------------------X
CHRISTOPHER VEGA,
Plaintiff,
V.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC, HSBC
BANK USA, N.A., AND ANDREW
IRELAND, DANIEL ANNIELLO,
SHALINI GUGLANI AND PETER
FOGLIO,

16-CV-9424 (JGK) (KNF)

Defendants.

----------------------------------------------------X
KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Christopher Vega, proceeding pro se, filed an affidavit, stating: "On July 19th
2019 a San Diego Superior Court Judge granted plaintiff, Christopher Vega pro se request to
change his legal name to Richard Stryker." The plaintiffs affidavit was accompanied by a copy
of the "Court Order granting the name change." Before the Court is the plaintiffs unopposed
"Motion to Proceed as Christopher Vega," in which the plaintiff contends, inter alia, that "[i]fthe
pro se Plaintiff is required to change his name in the caption he is concerned about the ...
adverse impact it will have on his continued search for employment." The plaintiff asserts that:
(i) "[p ]rospective employers may screen out the Plaintiff solely based on his filing a complaint
against his former employer"; (ii) "[p]rospective employers may discover the Plaintiff was
formerly disabled, though that is protected, confidential health information"; (iii) "[p ]rospective
employers may deny his employment solely ... based on his former disability status"; (iv)
"[p]rospective employers may discover the nature of the Plaintiffs [sic] disability, screen him out
and deny him an interview or employment solely for the category of disability"; and (v)

1

"[r]equiring the Plaintiff to change his name will do further damage to his professional
reputation."
The plaintiff changed his name, amid the litigation, from Christopher Vega to Richard
Stryker. As of July 19, 2019, Christopher Vega is no longer the plaintiffs legal name.
Effectively, the plaintiff seeks to proceed under a pseudonym, "[a] fictitious name or identity."
Pseudonym, Black's Law Dictionary (9 th ed. 2009), to preserve the anonymity of his identity

under the name Richard Stryker.
Pursuant to Rule lO(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he title of [a]
complaint must name all the parties." This requirement, though seemingly
pedestrian, serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial
proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly. Certainly, "[i]dentifying the
parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have
a right to know who is using their courts." Courts have nevertheless "carved out a
limited number of exceptions to the general requirement of disclosure [of the names
of parties], which permit plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. Indeed, we have
approved of litigating under a pseudonym in certain circumstances.
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant # 1, 537 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted).
When determining whether to permit a party to proceed under a pseudonym, courts must
perform "a balancing test that weighs the plaintiffs need for anonymity against
countervailing interests in full disclosure." Id. at 189. The following, non-exhaustive list
of factors should be considered: (1) "whether the litigation involves matters that are
'highly sensitive and [of a] personal nature"; (2) "whether identification poses a risk of
retaliatory physical or mental harm" to the movant or "to innocent non-parties";
(3) "whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of those harms";
(4) "whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure,
particularly in light of his age"; (5) "whether the suit is challenging the actions of the
government or that of private parties"; (6) "whether the defendant is prejudiced by
2

allowing the plaintiff to press his claims anonymously"; (7) "whether the plaintiffs
identity has thus far been kept confidential"; (8) "whether the public's interest in the
litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his identity"; (9) "whether,
because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an
atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants' identities"; and (10) "whether
there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff."
Id. at 189-90.
The plaintiffs grounds for seeking to proceed under his former legal name and
his "concern about the ... adverse impact [that changing the case caption to reflect his
current legal name] will have on his continued search for employment" are speculative
and baseless, as they are premised on conjecture: the plaintiffs surmise that prospective
employers may act in violation of statutes prohibiting employment discrimination. No
basis exists to presume that prospective employers would violate the law and, even if
they do, the law provides remedies to the plaintiff for such violations. In balancing the
interests at stake, and considering the enumerated factors, the Court finds that: ( 1) the
plaintiff asserted employment discrimination ba~ed on disability, the action does not
involve matters that are "highly sensitive" and the only matter of a personal nature in this
action was asserted by the plaintiff in the complaint, namely, in 2015 and 2016, the
plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and attention deficit disorder;
(2) the plaintiffs speculative assertions respecting prospective employers' violations of
law do not demonstrate that the plaintiffs identification poses a risk of retaliatory
physical or mental harm and the plaintiff does not assert any harm to innocent nonparties; (3) the plaintiffs speculative assertions do not show that the plaintiffs

3

identification presents other harms; (4) the plaintiff does not contend, and no basis exists
to find, that he is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, including
particularly because of his age; ( 5) the plaintiff is challenging the actions of private
parties; ( 6) the defendants do not .assert any prejudice would attend them by allowing the
plaintiff to proceed under his former legal name; (7) the plaintiff has not kept his former
or new identity confidential, as he filed numerous documents signed under his current
legal name and identified himself as the same person as the person whose previous legal
name in this litigation was Christopher Vega; (8) the public interest is furthered by
requiring the plaintiff to proceed under his current legal name, in this circumstance,
because no basis exists that warrants protecting his identity and the requirement of Rule
l0(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "cannot be set aside lightly," id. 189-90; (9)
nothing in the circumstance of this case makes the public's interest in knowing the
litigants atypically weak; and (10) no alternative mechanism for protecting the
confidentiality of the plaintiff is warranted in the circumstance of this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion to proceed as Christopher Vega,
Docket Entry No. 193, is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption of
this action to reflect that the name of the plaintiff is Richard Stryker.
Dated:

SO ORDERED:

New York, New York
June 4, 2019

KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copy mailed to:
Richard Stryker

4