Barreto et al. v. Jec II, LLC et al
OPINION & ORDER re: 27 MOTION to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation, filed by Laurent Nicoud, 30 MOTION to Compel Arbitration , filed by The One Group Hospitality, Inc., Jec II, LLC, The One Group, LLC. The Cou rt GRANTS defendants' motions to compel arbitration. All defendants except defendant Laurent Nicoud have also moved this Court for an award of attorneys' fees. (See The One Group Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motio n to Compel, ECF No. 26, at 15-16; ECF No. 29.) Plaintiffs have not opposed this request. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motions as unopposed. Defendants' motions to compel arbitration are GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 27, 29, and 30 and to terminate this case, and as further set forth herein. (Signed by Judge Katherine B. Forrest on 7/25/2017) (ras)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
RENATO BARRETO and DAVID KANT,
JEC II, LLC, BRAND ESSENCE
HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC, BAGATELLE
AMERICA LLC, THE ONE GROUP
HOSPITALITY, INC., THE ONE GROUP, LLC :
& BAGATELLE LITTLE WEST 12th LLC, all :
individually and d/b/a BAGATELLE NY, and :
KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: July 25, 2017
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiffs Renato Barreto and David Kant filed the instant action on
December 20, 2016, alleging that defendants engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination and retaliation against plaintiffs under, among other statutes, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On April 21, 2017, defendants moved this court
to stay this litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreements
that plaintiffs signed and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motions, arguing that although they signed arbitration
agreements, such agreements are invalid because they are unconscionable.
Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that even if the agreements are enforceable, they are
not enforceable against certain defendants who were not parties to the agreements.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the agreements are not
unconscionable and bind plaintiffs to arbitrate their underlying disputes in this
action against all defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions
to compel arbitration.
Plaintiffs Renato Barreto and David Kant were both employed as
servers/waiters by defendants at the restaurant Bagatelle, located on Little West
12th street in New York, NY. (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 8, 11, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff
Barreto began his employment at Bagatelle in 2012. (Id. ¶11.) In or around that
time, Barreto and approximately 30 newly-hired employees attended a staff
meeting where they were given a copy of an employee-handbook, which contained as
an appendix an arbitration agreement. (Affidavit of Renato Barreto (“Barreto Aff.”)
¶ 2, ECF No. 34-1; see ECF Nos. 24-3, 24-4.) The arbitration agreement is titled
“(BAGATELLE LITTLE WEST 12TH LLC)’s Mandatory Arbitration Policy and
Procedure for Resolving Disputes Arising Out of Its Employees’ Employment or
Termination of Employment” and provides:
In the event of any dispute, claim or controversy including, but not
limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy seeking compensatory
and/or punitive damages (“claims”) arising out of any employees’
employment or cessation of such employment with (BAGATELLE
LITTLE WEST 12TH LLC), any such claims, on an individual or
class basis, shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration.”
(ECF No. 24-4 at 1.) (emphasis in original) According to plaintiff Barreto, the
employees were instructed to sign the documents and were told that they would
not be able to work for Bagatelle unless they did so. (Barreto Aff. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
Barreto states that the employees were not provided with further instructions
and were given approximately five minutes to sign and return the documents
and were not told that they could take the employee handbook home.1 (Id. ¶¶ 3,
5-6, 8.) Barreto signed the arbitration agreement on May 9, 2012. (ECF No. 244 at 7.)
Plaintiff Kant began his employment at Bagatelle in 2015. (Compl. ¶11.) At
the commencement of his employment, Kant was also provided with an employee
handbook, which contained as an appendix an arbitration agreement. (ECF Nos.
24-1, 24-2.) The arbitration agreement is titled “The Company’s Mandatory
Arbitration Policy and Procedure for Resolving Disputes Arising Out of Its
Employees’ Employment or Termination of Employment” and provided:
In the event of any dispute, claim or controversy including, but not
limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy seeking compensatory
and/or punitive damages (“claims”) arising out of any employees’
employment or cessation of such employment with The Company,2
any such claims, on an individual or class basis, shall be submitted to
final and binding arbitration. . . . Any claim Employee has or may
bring against The One Group, LLC, or any affiliated, subsidiary, or
agent of the One Group, LLC, arising out of the employee’s
employment or termination of employment shall be subject to the
requirements of this Arbitration Agreement.”
Defendants dispute plaintiffs’ account of these facts. According to defendants, a presentation was
given in which a Senior Director for Operations of the One Group, LLC reviewed the employee
handbook and arbitration agreement with plaintiff Barreto (and the other employees present at the
meeting) section-by-section. (Affidavit of Stacey Perrone in Support of the One Group Defendants’
Motion to Compel Arbitration ¶¶ 7-8 (“Stacey Aff.”), ECF No. 40-1.) Defendants further state that
plaintiffs were permitted to ask questions and were expected to take home copies of the employee
handbook and arbitration agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) For the purpose of this motion, the Court
accepts plaintiffs’ recitation of the facts as true. As discussed below, even accepting such facts as
true, defendants’ are entitled to compel arbitration as a matter of law.
“The Company” is not defined in the agreement, but appears from the front of the employee
handbook to include, inter alia, Little West 12th LLC and JEC II LLC d/b/a Bagatelle. (See ECF No.
24-1 at 1.) As discussed below, plaintiffs do not dispute that all defendants are parties to this
(ECF No. 24-2 at 1, 3.) (emphasis in original) Similarly to plaintiff Barreto,
plaintiff Kant alleges that he was allocated only approximately five minutes
sign and return the documents.3 (Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Mem. in Opp.), ECF No. 34 at 5.)
Kant signed the arbitration agreement on March 2, 2015. (ECF No. 24-2 at 6.)
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on December 20, 2016, alleging
that defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New York City Administrative Code § 8-107, and
New York Executive Law § 296. (Compl. ¶¶ 136-68.) On April 21, 2017, defendants
moved the court to stay this litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration agreements signed by plaintiffs and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (ECF Nos. 27, 29, 30.) Defendants argue that plaintiffs executed
binding arbitration agreements, which compel them to arbitrate the instant dispute
concerning their employment with and/or termination from Bagatelle restaurant.
Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motions, arguing that neither plaintiff entered into a
valid and binding arbitration agreement because the agreements were
The Court notes that plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain any factual allegations regarding the
circumstances under which plaintiff Kant was presented with and signed the arbitration agreement.
In addition, unlike plaintiff Barreto, plaintiff Kant did not submit a declaration attesting to such
circumstances. The only statements regarding the circumstances under which plaintiff Kant was
presented with and signed the arbitration agreement are contained in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. As stated below, this alone is
grounds to grant defendants’ motion as to plaintiff Kant. Nevertheless, as discussed below, even
accepting these factual allegations as true, defendants are entitled to compel arbitration as a matter
unconscionable. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that even if the agreements are
enforceable, they are not enforceable against the defendants who were not parties to
“[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way
to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943,
(1995). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., “creates a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to arbitration agreements . . .
affecting interstate commerce.” Alliance Bernstein Inv. Research & Mgmt., Inc. v.
Schaffran, 445 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
parties do not dispute that the agreements at issue here affect interstate commerce
and, accordingly, that the FAA applies.
The Second Circuit has noted that “it is difficult to overstate the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration, and it is a policy we have often and
emphatically applied.” Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a dispute should be arbitrated
depends on “(1) whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate at all under the
contract in question . . . and if so, (2) whether the particular dispute sought to be
arbitrated falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 135
(2d Cir. 1996)). The FAA provides that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Accordingly, “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements.” Ragone v. Atlantic Video at Manhattan Ctr.,
595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996)).
In deciding a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, “the court applies
a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.”
Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). “[W]here the undisputed
facts in the record require the matter of arbitrability to be decided against one side
or the other as a matter of law, we may rule on the basis of that legal issue and
avoid the need for further court proceedings.” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. VCG
Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The party seeking to compel arbitration “must make a prima facie initial
showing that an agreement to arbitrate existed before the burden shifts to the party
opposing arbitration to put the making of that agreement ‘in issue.’” Hines v.
Overstock.com, Inc., 380 Fed. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2010). The moving party need
not “show initially that the agreement would be enforceable, merely that one
existed.” Id. (emphasis in original). Subsequently, the party “seeking to avoid
arbitration generally bears the burden of showing the agreement to be inapplicable
or invalid.” Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.—Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000)).
It is uncontested that the parties’ underlying dispute in this action falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreements at issue.4 Rather, plaintiffs argue
that the dispute should be litigated in this Court (and not in arbitration) because
the arbitration agreements signed by plaintiffs are invalid on the ground of
unconscionability.5 For the reasons discussed below, this Court disagrees.
Under New York law, an unconscionable contract is one which “is so grossly
unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of
the time and place as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms.” Gillman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988). “Generally, there
must be a showing that such a contract is both procedurally and substantially
unconscionable.” Ragone, 595 F.3d at 121 (citation omitted); see also Gillman, 534
The arbitration agreements signed by plaintiffs provide that “any dispute, claim or controversy
including, but not limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy seeking compensatory and/or punitive
damages (‘claims’) arising out of any employees’ employment or cessation of such employment” are
subject to arbitration. (ECF Nos. 24-2 at 1, 24-4 at 1.) The agreements further specify that such
“claims include, but are not limited to, any federal, state or local statutory claims  including . . .
claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .” (ECF Nos. 24-2 at 1, 24-4 at 1.)
As defendants have put forth the signed arbitration agreements entered into by both plaintiffs,
they have made the initial prima facie showing that agreements to arbitration existed. See Hines,
380 Fed. App’x at 24; Victorio v. Sammy’s Fishbox Realty Co., LLC, 14-cv-8678 CM, 2015 WL
2152703, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (“By supplying the Court with copies of each Plaintiff’s
signed arbitration agreement (Docket # 81), the Defendants satisfied their initial burden of
establishing agreements to arbitrate.”) Plaintiffs do not dispute that they signed the arbitration
agreements submitted by defendants.
N.E.2d at 824. “The procedural element of unconscionability concerns the contract
formation process and the alleged lack of meaningful choice;6 the substantive
element looks to the content of the contract, per se.” Ragone, 585 F.3d 115 (citation
omitted). Stated differently, plaintiffs here must make “some showing of an
‘absence of meaningful choice . . . together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.’” Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 824 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs first assert7 that the arbitration agreements are procedurally
unconscionable because plaintiffs “lacked a ‘meaningful choice’” concerning
arbitration. (Mem. in Opp. at 34.) Specifically, plaintiffs state that they were never
told about the contents of the agreements that they were signing; they were
instructed to sign the agreements if they wanted to continue being employed at
Bagatelle; and they were given less than ten minutes to review and sign the
employee handbooks and arbitration agreements.8 (Id.)
To determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, the Court will examine, among
other things “whether the party seeking to enforce the contract has used high pressure tactics or
deceptive language in the contract and whether there is inequality of bargaining power between the
parties.” Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1989); see Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 828.
As noted above, plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain any factual allegations regarding plaintiff
Kant’s arbitration agreement and plaintiff Kant did not submit a declaration in opposition to
defendants’ motions to compel. Because defendants have met their initial prima facie burden of
showing that an agreement to arbitrate existed, plaintiff Kant’s failure to put the making of that
agreement at issue is alone enough to grant defendants’ motion as to him. Nonetheless, as discussed
below, even accepting the factual assertions made by plaintiffs’ in their brief alone, defendants are
entitled to compel arbitration as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs also argue that the handbooks and arbitration agreements are misleading and difficult to
discern. (See Mem. in Opp. at 34.) Plaintiffs point out that the employee handbook contains the
word “guide” and the signature page on the arbitration agreements are contained on a nearly blank
Accepting plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, the Court finds that the
arbitration agreements may have been presented in a procedurally unconscionable
manner. However, as discussed below, the Court finds that even accepting
plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, the arbitration agreements are not
substantively unconscionable as a matter of law. Thus, they are binding and
enforceable upon plaintiffs.
A contract is substantively unconscionable when the terms of the contract are
unreasonably favorable to the party against whom unconscionability is claimed.
See Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable
on two grounds: First, they claim that the arbitration agreements unreasonably
favor defendants because the terms of the agreements “allow them to unilaterally
modify the contract at any time, thus binding employees to a contract they may
never have seen.” (Mem. in Opp. at 10.) Second, plaintiffs claim that the
arbitration agreements unreasonably favor defendants because they were drafted
by Bagatelle, “a sophisticated business entity,” and were imposed on plaintiffs
without an opportunity for plaintiffs to “read, understand, or negotiate them.” (Id.)
Both of these arguments are without merit.
First, the arbitration agreements—according to their explicit terms—are not
subject to unilateral modification by defendants. The agreements state that they
cannot be modified except in writing signed by both parties. (See ECF No. 24-2 at 4
(“This policy cannot be modified except in writing signed by both the employee and
the president of The Company . . . .”); ECF No. 24-4 at 5 (“This policy cannot be
modified except in writing signed by both the employee and the president of
(BAGATELLE LITTLE WEST 12TH LLC)).)”
Second, “[e]ven where there is some disparity in bargaining power, there is
no inherent unfairness or unconscionability in an arbitration clause if both parties
are bound by it and know of its existence.” JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA,
387 F.3d 163, 170 n.5. (2d Cir. 2004); see also Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 207 (holding
arbitration clause in form contract on which employment was conditioned not
unconscionable contract of adhesion because it bound both parties). The Court
notes that the arbitration agreements at issue here bind both plaintiffs and
defendants; provide that plaintiffs shall have the right to assert any claims or
defenses in arbitration that could be raised in court; provide that the arbitrator
shall have the authority to award such relief as may be available in court (including
attorneys’ fees); and provide that defendants will bear the majority of the
arbitration fees. (See ECF Nos. 24-2, 24-4.) In short, the arbitration agreements do
not unreasonably favor defendants and are not substantively unconscionable.9 See
Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 207; Isaacs v. OCE Bus. Servs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“When both an employer and its employees are bound to an
agreement to arbitrate, when the terms of the agreement are equally applicable to
Plaintiffs’ argument concerning a lack of opportunity to “read, understand, or negotiate [the
arbitration agreements]” relates to the procedural, not substantive, nature of the agreements.
Plaintiffs also rely heavily on Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Brennan is distinguishable, however. In that case, the employer possessed the power to unilaterally
modify the arbitration agreement and the arbitration agreement barred plaintiff from proceeding on
her sexual harassment claim. See id. at 384. No similar restrictions are present in this case.
both parties, and when the employer bears any unreasonable cost of the arbitration,
the arbitration agreement is not unreasonably favorable to the employer.”)
As stated above, to show that a contract is unconscionable, there must
generally “be a showing that such a contract is both procedurally and substantially
unconscionable.” Ragone, 595 F.3d at 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 824. Here, the arbitration
agreements are not substantively unconscionable as a matter of law; thus, plaintiffs
have not met their burden of showing that the agreements are unenforceable or
invalid on the ground of unconscionability.
Applicability of Barreto’s Agreement to All Defendants
As stated in the Factual Background above, plaintiff Barreto’s arbitration
agreement is between plaintiff Barreto and defendant Bagatelle Little West 12th
LLC and plaintiff Kant’s arbitration agreement is between plaintiff Kant and “The
Company” as well as The One Group, LLC. Plaintiff Barreto argues that even if the
arbitration agreement that he signed is enforceable, it is not enforceable against the
defendants who were not parties to the agreement.10 (Mem. in Opp. at 10.)
Defendants argue that Barreto should be compelled to arbitrate his claims against
all defendants under equitable estoppel principles. The Court agrees.
As the Second Circuit has explained, “[u]nder principles of estoppel, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that agreement to
arbitrate a dispute where a careful review of ‘the relationship among the parties,
Plaintiff Kant does not dispute that all defendants are parties to the arbitration agreement that he
signed. (See Mem. in Opp. at 10-12.)
the contracts they signed . . ., and the issues that had arisen’ among them discloses
that ‘the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined
with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.’” Ragone, 595 F.3d at 12627 (quoting Choctaw Generation Ltd. P’ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d
403, 406 (2d. Cir. 2001)). The Second Circuit has further noted, however, that this
does not mean “that whenever a relationship of any kind may be found among the
parties to a dispute and their dispute deals with the subject matter of an arbitration
contract made by one of them, that party will be estopped from refusing to arbitrate.
. . . [I]n addition to the ‘intertwined’ factual issues, there must be a relationship
among the parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which
agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be estopped from denying an
obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary which is not a party to
the arbitration agreement.” Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d 354,
359 (2d. Cir. 2008).
The Court finds that consistent with the applicable Second Circuit precedent,
in this case there are sufficiently intertwined factual issues and a sufficient
relationship between all defendants to compel arbitration between plaintiff Barreto
and all defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants are intertwined with
the arbitration agreement, which provides that all claims “arising out of” plaintiffs’
employment with Bagatelle are subject to arbitration.” (See ECF No. 24-4 at 1.)
Importantly, plaintiffs raise the same discrimination and retaliation claims against
all defendants and do not distinguish between defendants in any manner. See
Ragone, 595 F.3d at 128 (“In this case, there is likewise no question that the subject
matter of the dispute between Ragone and AVI is factually intertwined with the
dispute between Ragone and ESPN. It is, in fact, the same dispute . . . .”). In their
complaint, plaintiffs allege that all of the defendants own and operate Bagatelle
(Compl. ¶ 8) and state that “[a]t all times material, all of the named Defendants
were joint employers of the Plaintiffs.” (id. ¶ 26). Plaintiffs also allege that all
defendants “could take tangible employment actions against the Plaintiffs.”
(Compl. ¶ 26.) It is clear that plaintiffs considered defendants to be co-employers.
Plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true, support that when plaintiff Barreto entered
into his arbitration agreement, he reasonably believed he was agreeing to arbitrate
his claims against all defendants. In short, the facts presented here support
equitable estoppel. See Victorio v. Sammy’s Fishbox Realty Co., LLC, 14-cv-8678,
2015 WL 2152703, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (“Where a plaintiff treats all
defendants as a single unit in his complaint, it further supports estopping that
plaintiff from shielding himself from arbitrating with certain defendants.” (citing
Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198
F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 1999)); Donner v. GFI Capital Res. Grp., 16-cv-9581, 2017 WL
2271533, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2017) (compelling arbitration of claims against
non-signatory supervisor of defendant employer).
All defendants except defendant Laurent Nicoud have also moved this Court
for an award of attorneys’ fees. (See The One Group Defendants’ Memorandum of
Law in Support of Their Motion to Compel, ECF No. 26, at 15-16; ECF No. 29.)
Plaintiffs have not opposed this request. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motions
as unopposed. In all events, the plain text of the arbitration agreements provide for
attorneys’ fees here. The agreements state: “If any party is required to file a
lawsuit to compel arbitration pursuant to this policy, or defend against a lawsuit
filed in court contrary to the policy’s mandatory arbitration provision, such party, if
successful, shall be entitled to recover his/her or its reasonable costs and attorneys’
fees incurred in such an action, including costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in any
appeal.” (ECF No. 24-2 at 4, ECF No. 24-4 at 5.)
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motions to compel arbitration are
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos.
27, 29, and 30 and to terminate this case.11
New York, New York
July 25, 2017
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
Defendants have requested that the Court compel arbitration and stay this case. The Court
declines to stay this case and finds that given the early procedural posture, it is appropriate to
terminate this action. In the event that a future award is obtained in arbitration, a separate action
can be filed to enforce the award at that time.
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