Pearson Education, Inc. et al v. Does 1-100

Filing 278

OPINION & ORDER: re: 268 MOTION to Serve by Email filed by Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publishing Group, LLC d/b/a Macmillan Learning, Cengage Learning, Inc., McGraw Hill LLC, Pearson Education, Inc., Elsevier Inc. For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to serve by email with respect to the U.S. Defendants and the India Defendants. Such service shall be completed within three days of the date of this Order. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion to serve by email with respect to the U.K. Defendants. The Clerk is respectfully directed to close ECF 268. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kimba M. Wood on 8/26/2022) (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------X

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: __________________
DATE FILED: 8/26/2022

PEARSON EDUCATION, INC., ELSEVIER
INC., BEDFORD, FREEMAN & WORTH
PUBLISHING GROUP, LLC d/b/a
MACMILLAN LEARNING, CENGAGE
LEARNING, INC., and MCGRAW HILL LLC,
Plaintiffs,
17-CV-203 (KMW)
-againstSAURABH AGGARWAL, ASHOK
KUMAR, AYUSH AGGARWAL,
SHIKHA AGGARWAL, NATASHA
AGGARWAL, SAVITA AGGARWAL,
ABC PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS
PVT. LTD., ABCPD INTERNATIONAL
LTD., ACADEMICBOOKS INC.,
ACUITY CORP., AEGIS TRADING
CORP., AGGARWAL BOOK CENTRE,
AGGARWAL OVERSEAS, ALLEGIS
CORP., AMACO CORP., APPLEBEE'S
CORP., ASPYR CORP., ASPYR
INTERNATIONAL LTD., BIRDWELL
CORP., BOOKMOR CORP., BOOKMAX
CORPORATION, BOOKPORT CORP.,
BOOKREX CORP., BOOKSNESENCE,
BOWLMOR CORP., BOYD BRANDS
INC., BRUKER INTERNATIONAL
CORP., COLECO CORP., COLUMBIA
BOOK CORP., CONS MED
DISTRIBUTORS CORP., CYNA
TRADING, DENBURY CORP.,
DESCRIBINGBOOKS INC., DIPPIN
CORP., DYNERGY MEDIA INC., EBF
CORP. LTD., ENCORE CORP. LTD.,
FANAKA TRADING INC., FLEXI
TRADING CORP, FRASCA CORP.,
GOGREEN BOOKS CORP.,
GOODWILLBOOKS INC., GRAN
BOOKS INC., HELIOSBOOKS INC.,
IVORY BOOKS CORP., KROGER
CORP., LIBERTY BOOKS, INC.,
LOVEFREIGHT LTD., MAGNA WORLD

OPINION & ORDER

CORPORATION, MITTEL INC.,
NATWORLD CORP., NORTEL CORP.,
QUATTRO TRADING INC., REGENT
INTERNATIONAL, RENNICS
BOOKSHOP AFRICA LTD., SALVIA
CORP., SASHA INTERNATIONAL,
LLC, SIERRA BOOKWORLD LIMITED,
SIGNA CORP., TRANSGLOBALBOOKS
CORP., TURBOBOOKS CORP.,
UNIWORLDBOOKS INC., VARAHA
CORP., VEDI BOOKS PVT. LTD.,
WHITE LEAF CORP.,
YOUBOOKWORLD INC., and ZETTA
CORP.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------X
KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs allege that they have been unable to serve certain corporate defendants1 in this
suit and move the Court to authorize service by email pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4. For the reasons set below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED with respect to
Defendants located in the United States (“U.S. Defendants”) and India (“India Defendants”).
Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED with respect to Defendants located in the United Kingdom (“U.K.
Defendants”), without prejudice to renewal.

1

Plaintiffs address three cohorts of corporate defendants for purposes of this motion: (1) entities registered in the
United States whose registered agents declined to accept service (“U.S. Defendants”), (2) entities registered in the
United Kingdom, and (3) entities registered in India (together, “Foreign Defendants”). The U.S. Defendants are
identified in footnote 2 of Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Serve by Email. (See Pls.’
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. to Serve by Email [hereinafter Pls.’ Mem of Law], ECF No. 269.) The Foreign
Defendants are identified in footnote 3 of Pls.’ Mem. of Law. “Individual Defendants” refers to Saurabh Aggarwal,
Ashok Kumar, Ayush Aggarwal, Shikha Aggarwal, Natasha Aggarwal, and Savita Aggarwal. Plaintiffs move to
serve Mittel Inc. by email but did not provide an affidavit of non-service in the Declaration accompanying their
motion. (See Decl. of Danae Tinelli in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to Serve by Email [hereinafter Tinelli Decl.], ECF No.
270.) In addition, Plaintiffs name the following Defendants in this suit but did not request an issuance of summons
for them with respect to the Third Amended Complaint: Heliosbooks, Inc., Lovefreight Ltd., and Salvia Corp. (See
ECF No. 228.)

2

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, educational book publishers, sue online retailers for copyright and trademark
infringement. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants imported, distributed, or sold counterfeit versions
of Plaintiffs’ textbooks via online marketplaces. (See Third Am. Comp. (“TAC”), ECF No.
225.) The procedural history of this case is lengthy and does not bear repeating in detail. Only
the pertinent portions of this history are summarized below.
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on January 11, 2017 against Doe Defendants. (ECF No.
1.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed the First Amended Complaint on February 7, 2017, naming
thirty-one individual or corporate Defendants and ten Doe Defendants. (First Am. Compl.
(“FAC”), ECF No. 28.) After a series of voluntary dismissals, default judgments, and severed
defendants, the Court took several actions to clarify the state of the docket on March 4, 2022.
(ECF No. 211.) Following additional discovery, Plaintiffs were granted leave to again amend
the complaint and name additional parties. (ECF. No. 221.) Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended
Complaint on April 6, 2022. (ECF No. 225.)
Plaintiffs received waivers of service from fourteen Defendants named in the TAC,
including Individual Defendants. (ECF No. 230.) The Court then directed Plaintiffs to serve all
remaining U.S.-based Defendants by July 5, 2022. (ECF No. 233.) Since then, Plaintiffs have
actively attempted to serve the remaining U.S. Defendants. (ECF No. 236.) Fourteen of the
remaining U.S. Defendants were successfully served but did not timely respond to the TAC.
(See ECF No. 259.) Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court entered a Certificate of Default for
these Defendants on July 26, 2022. (ECF No. 264.) Plaintiffs were granted an additional thirty
days to serve the remaining U.S. Defendants named in the TAC, with service due by August 4,
2022. (ECF No. 257.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to thirteen U.S.-based

3

defendants on August 4, 2022. (ECF No. 267.) Plaintiffs filed this motion to serve by email that
same day. (ECF No. 268.)

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs move for service by email with respect to three groups of corporate Defendants:
(1) those located in the United States, (2) those located in the United Kingdom, and (3) those
located in India. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h) governs service of process on corporate
defendants and provides different procedures for service upon corporate defendants within and
outside of the United States. The Court considers each procedure in turn.
I.

Service on Corporate Defendants in the U.S.
Rule 4(h)(1) governs service of process on corporate defendants within the U.S. and

provides:
Unless federal law provides otherwise or the defendant’s waiver has been
filed, a domestic or foreign corporation . . . must be served . . . in a judicial
district of the United States:
(A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual; or
(B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer,
a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by
statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy of each to the
defendant . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). Rule 4(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “an individual . . . may be
served in a judicial district of the United States by . . . following state law for serving a summons
in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located
or where service is made . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). As this action was brought in New York,
New York law applies.
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their attempts to serve process pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B)
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by serving the U.S. Defendants via their registered agents. (Tinelli Decl. Ex. 1.) Accordingly,
Rule 4(h)(1)(A), which directs plaintiffs to Rule 4(e)(1), is the relevant governing rule with
respect to the corporate Defendants located in the U.S.
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
Rule 4(e)(1) allows service on a U.S. corporation to be effectuated in accordance with
state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In New York, personal service upon a corporation is governed by
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 311. Section 311 requires personal service upon a
domestic corporation, unless personal service is “impracticable,” in which case the court may
authorize an alternative means of service. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §311. Pursuant to § 311(a)(1), the
summons shall be delivered:
upon any domestic . . . corporation, to an officer, director, managing or
general agent, or cashier or assistant cashier or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service.
Id. § 311(a)(1). And “[i]f service upon a domestic . . . corporation within . . . one hundred
twenty days . . . is impracticable under [311(a)(1)] . . . service upon the corporation may be made
in such manner, and proof of service may take such form, as the court, upon motion without
notice, directs.” Id. § 311(b).
1. Personal Service Pursuant to Section 311(a)
Section 311(a)(1) identifies individuals upon whom personal service may be made,
including an “officer, director, managing or general agent.” Id. §311(a). Plaintiffs attempted
personal service upon the registered agents for each of the U.S. Defendants, but were
unsuccessful. (Tinelli Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs also sought waivers of service for the U.S.
Defendants from counsel for the Individual Defendants, who are directors or managers of the
U.S. Defendants. (Id. ¶ 3.) Counsel for Individual Defendants does not represent U.S.
Defendants and declined to provide these waivers to Individual Defendants in their capacity as
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directors or managers of the U.S. Defendants. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs were unable to
perfect service pursuant to § 311(a)(1). As stated above, when service via § 311(a)(1) is
foreclosed, § 311(b) provides for court-ordered alternate means.
2. Impracticability and Section 311(b)
Before a court may direct alternate means of service under 311(b), it must determine that
service pursuant to 311(a)(1) is “impracticable.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §311(b). “A plaintiff can
demonstrate that service by conventional means is ‘impracticable’ by making diligent, albeit
unsuccessful efforts to obtain information regarding a defendant’s current residence, business
address or place of abode.” GP Acoustics (US), Inc. v. J&V Audio, Inc., No. 17-CV-05305, 2017
WL 11570459, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017) (Hellerstein, J.) (quoting Snyder v. Alternate
Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Civ. Ct. 2008)). Impracticability “does not require proof of
due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the
statute.” Shamoun v. Mushlin, No. 12-CV-03541, 2013 WL 91705, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2013) (Nathan, J.).
In this action, Plaintiffs have shown that they made actual attempts to serve the U.S.
Defendants. Plaintiffs attempted to serve U.S. Defendants via their registered agents, but service
was rejected. (See Tinelli Decl. ¶ 4.) The facts do not indicate that these defendants may be
reached at addresses other than those listed in their public registrations. Indeed, many of these
defendants appear to have been dissolved. (Id. Ex. 1.) Accordingly, personal service pursuant to
311(a) is “impracticable,” and the Court may direct another means of service.
Due Process
Before authorizing email as a means of service, the Court must determine that this means
satisfies due process. Due process requires any means of service to be “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
6

them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Service by email has been authorized where a plaintiff has
“supplied . . . some facts indicating that the person to be served would be likely to receive the
summons and complaint at the given email address.” NYKCool A.B. v. Pac. Int’l Servs., Inc., 66
F. Supp. 3d 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Kaplan, J.); see also Elsevier, Inc. v. Siew Yee Chew, 287
F. Supp. 3d 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y 2018) (Gorenstein, M.J.). Service via email can be “particularly
appropriate” where the “defendants engage in online business and regularly communicate with
customers through functional email addresses.” Elsevier, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 379.
Plaintiffs have identified email addresses for each of the U.S. Defendants. (See Tinelli
Decl. Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs assert that these defendants “have interchangeably used similar, if not
identical, email addresses to conduct their businesses” online. (Tinelli Decl. ¶ 5.) The U.S.
Defendants are thus likely to receive the summons and complaint at these email addresses.
Moreover, Individual Defendants, who are directors or managers of the U.S. Defendants, are
aware of this suit. Therefore, service to these email addresses satisfies the due process
requirement.
II.

Service on Corporate Defendants Outside the U.S.
Rule 4(h)(2) governs service of process on corporate defendants outside of the U.S. and

provides that service may be made “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an
individual, except personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). Rule 4(f) provides
that service of process on foreign individuals may be made:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international
agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is
reasonably calculated to give notice . . . ; or
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(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court
orders.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
Court-Order Service Pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3)
A plaintiff is not required to attempt service through the other provisions of Rule 4(f)
before the Court may order service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). See Elsevier, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 377
(quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002)). “Service
under subsection [4(f)](3) is ‘neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief. It is merely one means
among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.’” Advanced
Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11-CV-9505, 2012 WL 299959, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2012) (Carter, J.) (quoting Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1015).
“The decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule
4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v.
SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Leisure, J.) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Although not expressly required by Rule 4, district courts in
this Circuit “generally impose two additional threshold requirements before authorizing service
under Rule 4(f)(3): (1) a showing that the plaintiff has reasonably attempted to effectuate service
on the defendant, and (2) a showing that the circumstances are such that the court’s intervention
is necessary.” Devi v. Rajapaska, No. 11-CV-6634, 2012 WL 309605, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2012) (Buchwald, J). A court-ordered means of service under Rule 4(f)(3) must also “comport []
with constitutional notions of due process.” S.E.C. v. Anticevic, No. 05-CV-6991, 2009 WL
361739, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009) (Wood, J.).
1. Not Prohibited by International Agreement
A court may not order a means of service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) that is prohibited by
8

international agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). The Court must thus determine whether an
international agreement applies, and if so, whether that agreement bars email as a means of
service. The relevant agreement here is the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”), which is
specifically referenced in Rule 4(f).
a. Whether the Hague Convention Applies
The United States Supreme Court has held that “compliance with the [Hague]
Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988). Article 1 of the Hague Convention provides that “[t]his
Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not
known.” Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters [hereinafter Hague Convention], opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965.
“Courts in this Circuit have found an address is ‘not known’ if the plaintiff exercised reasonable
diligence in attempting to discover a physical address for service of process and was
unsuccessful in doing so.” Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm’r, LLC v. Shen, No.
14-CV-1112, 2018 WL 4757939, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2018) (Broderick, J.) (noting that
plaintiffs “conducted an investigation”; engaged investigators who “also conducted additional
investigation, without success”; “researched . . . websites[,] . . . completed multiple Internetbased searches, called known phone numbers, and conducted in-person visits where
reasonable.”); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06-CV-2988, 2007 WL
725412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (Daniels, J.) (noting how plaintiff “catalogued diligent
efforts to locate defendants”).
Plaintiffs have not shown that they were unable to obtain address information after
exercising reasonable diligence. Plaintiffs “have obtained [purported] addresses for the Foreign
9

Defendants from corporate filings or other public documents,” but argue that those addresses
should not be considered valid because the U.S. Defendants’ address information is unreliable.
(Pls.’ Mem. of Law at 5, 10.) Before concluding that they “do not have confirmed physical
addresses for the Foreign Defendants,” Plaintiffs should state what steps they took to try to
confirm them. (Id. at 10 (emphasis added)). But they have not, and the fact remains that
Plaintiffs have addresses for the Foreign Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot rely on
Article 1 of the Hague Convention to escape its application.
b. Whether the Hague Convention Bars Service by Email
Because the Hague Convention applies, the Court now considers whether it bars email as
a means of service, which would render email unavailable as a court-ordered means pursuant to
Rule 4(f)(3). Article 10 of the Hague Convention states that, “[p]rovided the State of destination
does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with . . . the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” Hague Convention art. 10. Both the
United Kingdom and India have consented to be bound by the Hague Convention. See Status
Table, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 (last visited Aug.
10, 2022).
The United Kingdom has also not objected to Article 10. See Declarations, https://
www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid=427&disp=resdn (last
visited Aug. 10, 2022). Accordingly, a plaintiff may serve a defendant in the United Kingdom
“directly” by “postal channels” or any other method not barred by the Convention, including
email. See Hague Convention art. 10.
Unlike the U.K., India “is opposed to the methods of service provided in Article 10.”
Reservations, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/
?csid=984&disp=resdn (last visited Aug. 10, 2022). But Article 10 does not mention email, and
10

courts “have declined to extend countries’ objections to specific forms of service permitted by
Article 10 of the Hague Convention, such as postal mail, to service by other alternative means,
including email.” Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co. Ltd., 312 F.R.D. 329, 331
(S.D.N.Y 2015) (Rakoff, J.). Thus, email may be an appropriate means of effecting service to
Defendants in India. Because email is available as a means of service for Defendants located in
both India and the U.K., the Court must then determine whether such means is appropriate.
2. Email as a Means of Service
To determine whether email is an appropriate means, the Court considers two threshold
requirements and whether the use of email comports with due process. The “two additional
threshold requirements [often imposed] before authorizing service under Rule 4(f)(3) [are]: (1) a
showing that the plaintiff has reasonably attempted to effectuate service on the defendant, and
(2) a showing that the circumstances are such that the court’s intervention is necessary.” Devi,
2012 WL 309605, at *1. Plaintiffs have met these requirements with respect to the India
Defendants, but not with respect to the U.K. Defendants.
a. India Defendants
Plaintiffs have shown that they meet the first threshold requirement to “reasonably
attempt[] to effectuate service” on the India Defendants. Because India has objected to Article
10 of the Hague Convention, Plaintiffs could not rely on postal mail as a means of service for the
India Defendants. Thus, in the absence of other means of service, Plaintiffs attempted to request
Individual Defendants, who control or manage the India Defendants, to execute waivers of
service on behalf of the India Defendants. This was reasonable.
Plaintiffs have also shown that they meet the second threshold requirement—that “the
circumstances are such that the court’s intervention is necessary”—with respect to the India
Defendants. Plaintiffs originally filed this case on January 11, 2017 and have since “been
11

diligent in seeking to move this action forward.” (Op. & Order at 11, ECF No. 221.)2 Plaintiffs
have engaged in extensive discovery to ascertain the identities of the Foreign Defendants and
have reasonably attempted to serve the India Defendants through Individual Defendants, as
directors or managers of the Foreign Defendants. Because those attempts failed, court
intervention is necessary to avoid any further delays in service, which would unnecessarily
prolong resolution of this action. Accordingly, email is an appropriate means of service pursuant
to Rule 4(f)(3) if the due process requirement is satisfied.
b. U.K. Defendants
Plaintiffs have not shown that they “reasonably attempted to effectuate service” on the
U.K. Defendants. The U.K. has not objected to Article 10’s provision for use of “postal
channels” to effect service. See Declarations, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
status-table/notifications/?csid=427&disp=resdn (last visited Aug. 10, 2022). Thus, regular
postal channels are available to Plaintiffs as a means of service. But Plaintiffs do not state that
they have attempted service pursuant to Article 10 at the U.K. Defendants’ known addresses.
Even though use of postal channels to effect service for U.K Defendants is not a requirement, see
In re GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec. Litig., 287 F.R.D. 262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Gorenstein, J.)
(“nothing in Rule 4(f) itself or controlling case law suggests that a court must always require a
litigant to first exhaust the potential for service under the Hague Convention before granting an
order permitting alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3)”), it is reasonable for Plaintiffs to first
attempt to serve the U.K. Defendants pursuant to Article 10 before moving for authorization to
effectuate service by email. Therefore, with respect to the U.K. Defendants, Plaintiffs have not

2

Pearson Education, Inc. v. Heliosbooks, Inc., No. 17-CV-203, 2022 WL 970454, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022)
(Wood, J.).

12

met the threshold requirements generally imposed before a court authorizes email as a means of
service. The Court denies this portion of Plaintiffs’ motion, without prejudice to it being
renewed.
c. Due Process
The due process analysis considers whether a means of service is “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Plaintiffs have
identified email addresses that the India Defendants have used to conduct their online businesses.
Moreover, Individual Defendants, who Plaintiffs allege are directors or managers of these
Foreign Defendants, are aware of this suit, thus raising the likelihood that the Foreign
Defendants are apprised of the pendency of this action. See, e.g., Anticevic, 2009 WL 361739, at
*4 (“[An alternative means of service satisfies due process because Defendant] may already have
actual knowledge of this case. While actual knowledge is no substitute for service,
[Defendant’s] actual knowledge may increase the likelihood that published service will
ultimately come to his attention, at minimum, through his increased awareness of and
attentiveness to any information about the lawsuit.”). Therefore, service to these email addresses
satisfies the due process requirement.
III.

Extension of Time
Plaintiffs have requested an extension of time to effect service by email. (Pls.’ Mem. of

Law at 13.) As an initial matter, the ninety-day time limit for service “does not apply to service
in a foreign country.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiffs are thus not time-barred from serving the
India Defendants (or the U.K. Defendants), although “the amount of time allowed for foreign
service is not unlimited.” Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 293 F.R.D. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Furman, J.) (quoting Nylok Corp. v. Fastener World Inc., 396 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2005)).
13

As for the U.S. Defendants, Plaintiffs have made a good-faith but unsuccessful effort to serve
them by traditional means pursuant to Rule 4. Plaintiffs request three days to effect service by
email, which is reasonable.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to serve by email
with respect to the U.S. Defendants and the India Defendants. Such service shall be completed
within three days of the date of this Order. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to serve by
email with respect to the U.K. Defendants.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to close ECF 268.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
August 26, 2022

/s/ Kimba M. Wood
KIMBA M. WOOD
United States District Judge

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