Davalloo v. Kaplan

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM ORDER: For the above reasons the Court concludes that respondent has made a meritorious motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Nevertheless, the Court will delay issuing an order to transfer until after July 17, 2017, to allow Davalloo to move for a stay in the event she seeks review of this Memorandum Order pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the absence of an order granting such a stay, however, the Court will, on or after July 10, 2017, direct the Clerk by separate order to effectuate the transfer. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein on 6/22/2017) Copies Sent By Chambers. (ama)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SHEILA DAVALLOO,
:
Petitioner,

:
MEMORANDUM ORDER

-v.-

:

SABINA KAPLAN, Superintendent,
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, and
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General of the State
of Connecticut,

:

17 Civ. 1484 (GBD) (GWG)

:
:

Respondents.
:
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GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. BACKGROUND
In this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, petitioner Sheila Davalloo challenges her
2012 conviction in Connecticut state court. See Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of
Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, dated Nov. 24, 2016 (Docket # 1). The
Connecticut conviction was for a 2002 murder that took place in Stamford, Connecticut. State v.
Davalloo, 101 A.3d 355, 360-64 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014), aff’d, 128 A.3d 492 (Conn. 2016).
Davalloo was sentenced to 50 years in prison on that conviction, to run consecutive to a sentence
she had previously received for a conviction in New York State court. Id. at 364. The New
York conviction is not challenged in the petition.
Davalloo’s custodian, respondent Sabrina Kaplan, has now moved to transfer this case to
the District of Connecticut. See Letter from Michelle Maerov, dated June 1, 2017 (Docket # 11).
George Jepsen, the Attorney General of Connecticut and the other respondent in this action,
supports the transfer. See Letter from David M. Kutzner, dated June 20, 2017 (Docket # 14).
Davalloo opposes transfer. See Letter from Sheila Davalloo, dated June 12, 2017 (Docket # 13).

II. DISCUSSION
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides in relevant part: “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.” In applying this statute, courts conduct a
two-step inquiry. At the first step, a court must determine whether the case could have been
brought in the other district. If the first step is satisfied, a court then weighs a number of factors
to determine if transfer is appropriate. See, e.g., Winter v. Am. Inst. of Med. Scis. & Educ.,
2017 WL 1063459, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2017); Pence v. Gee Grp., Inc., 2017 WL
629470, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017); Bacuku v. Shanahan, 2016 WL 1162330, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016).
Here, the first step is satisfied. The terms of the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2), permit a civil proceeding to be brought in a judicial district “in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Given that the crime, trial and
conviction took place in Connecticut, the action could have been brought in Connecticut.1
Additionally, the Supreme Court has specifically held that a habeas corpus petition may be
brought in the state in which the conviction took place. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493-94 (1973); accord Bagdasaryan v. Swarthout, 2012 WL 6203113, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012) (“[T]he general rule with regard to habeas applications is that both the
United States District Court in the district where petitioner was convicted and the District Court
where petitioner is incarcerated have jurisdiction over the claims.”); Verissimo v. I.N.S., 204 F.
Supp. 2d 818, 820 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[A] habeas corpus petition may be transferred to the district

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The more specific venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) does not apply in this case
because Connecticut does not have “two or more Federal judicial districts.”
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court of the state in which the petitioner was sentenced and convicted, even if the petitioner was
transferred to prison in a different state.”); see also United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York,
426 F.2d 1176, 1183 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that “the sentencing district may properly
assume jurisdiction over” a habeas petition). Therefore, we next consider the factors governing
whether transfer is appropriate.
The Second Circuit has identified seven factors that a court should consider at step two of
the § 1404(a) transfer analysis:
(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the
location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4)
the convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of
process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative
means of the parties.
N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted); accord Bacuku, 2016 WL 1162330, at *1. Courts in this district have also considered
“(8) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law, and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of
justice.” Fellus v. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
accord Tlapanco v. Elges, 207 F. Supp. 3d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); AIG Fin. Prods. Corp. v.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 675 F. Supp. 2d 354, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “There is no rigid formula for
balancing these factors and no single one of them is determinative. Instead, weighing the
balance is essentially an equitable task left to the Court’s discretion.” Citigroup Inc. v. City
Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Tlapanco, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 328 (citation omitted).
Here, the analysis squarely points to transfer. While Davalloo’s choice of forum is
entitled to some weight, the convenience of witnesses plainly favors Connecticut, which is the
state where the crime, its investigation, and its prosecution took place. The same is true for the
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location of any relevant documents. The locus of operative facts as well as the forum’s
familiarity with the governing law also point to Connecticut for venue. The remaining factors do
not favor either forum. In other words, the only factor that disfavors transfer is the fact that
Davalloo would prefer to have her case heard in New York. We find this insufficient to deny
transfer. We note that courts have commonly transferred a habeas corpus petition to a federal
court located in the state where the conviction took place. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Erickson, 484
F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1973) (allowing transfer of habeas corpus case from the District of South
Dakota to the District of Montana because “Montana, the state of conviction and sentencing,
[was] the most convenient forum because of the availability of witnesses and records”);
Meadows, 426 F.2d at 1178, 1183 & n.9 (upholding transfer of Georgia prisoner’s habeas
petition to a federal court in New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) where the petition challenged
a New York state conviction); Palubicki v. Minnesota, 2016 WL 7350494, at *3-5 (D. Vt. Dec.
19, 2016) (Vermont prisoner’s habeas petition could be transferred to Minnesota where the
petition sought review of a Minnesota conviction).
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the Court concludes that respondent has made a meritorious
motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
Nevertheless, the Court will delay issuing an order to transfer until after July 17, 2017, to allow
Davalloo to move for a stay in the event she seeks review of this Memorandum Order pursuant
to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the absence of an order granting such a
stay, however, the Court will, on or after July 10, 2017, direct the Clerk by separate order to
effectuate the transfer.
SO ORDERED.
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