BMaddox Enterprises LLC v. Milad Oskouie, Osko M Ltd., and Platinum Avenue Holdings Pty, Ltd.

Filing 178

OPINION AND ORDER. For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motions for sanctions are denied, and defendants' cross-motion for sanctions is denied. No later than October 21, 2019, defendants are to produce to plaintiff all documents re sponsive to plaintiff's document requests. No later than October 21, 2019, defendants are to respond fully to plaintiff's interrogatories. Defendants are warned that an unjustified failure to comply with this Order will result in the imposi tion of sanctions, which may include the entry of a default judgment against all defendants. This Order does not affect the stay currently in place in this action. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to mark Docket Items 55, 112, 128, 13 7 and 161 closed. So ordered. re: 55 MOTION for Sanctions filed by BMaddox Enterprises LLC, Brandon Lane Maddox, 112 SECOND MOTION for Sanctions filed by BMaddox Enterprises LLC, Brandon Lane Maddox, 137 THIRD MOTIO N for Sanctions filed by BMaddox Enterprises LLC, Brandon Lane Maddox, 128 CROSS MOTION for Sanctions filed by Milad Oskouie, Osko M Ltd., Platinum Avenue Holdings Pty, Ltd., 161 SECOND MOTION for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 filed by BMaddox Enterprises LLC, Brandon Lane Maddox. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman on 9/30/2019) Copies transmitted and emailed By Chambers. (rjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------x
BMADDOX ENTERPRISES LLC,
17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (HB

Plaintiff,

OPINION
AND ORDER

-againstMILAD OSKOUIE, et al.,
Defendants.

-----------------------------------x
PITMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:

I.

Introduction
By notice of motion dated September 7, 2017, plain iff

BMaddox Enterprises LLC ("BMaddox") and plaintiff's principa

and

counterclaim defendant Brandon Maddox (collectively "plainti fs")
seek an Order imposing sanctions on defendants Milad Oskouie
Osko M Ltd. and Platinum Avenue Holdings Pty, Ltd. pursuant
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Plaintiff

o
&

Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Against
&

nts

Counterclaimants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, dated Sept.

2017

(Docket Item ("D.I.") 55)).

By notice of motion dated

arch

13, 2018, plaintiffs also seek an Order imposing sanctions o
defendants pursuant to the Court's inherent power (Plaintiff

&

Counterclaim Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions, dated

ar.

13, 2018

(D.I. 112)).

By notice of motion dated March 29, 20 8,

defendants cross-move for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff
(Notice of Motion, dated Mar. 29, 2018

(D.I. 128)).

of

motion dated April 5, 2018, plaintiffs seek a second Order
imposing sanctions on defendants pursuant to the Court's inh

ent

power (Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Third Motion for
Sanctions, dated Apr. 5, 2018

(D.I. 137)).

By notice of

dated June 18, 2018, plaintiffs seek a second Order for Rule 11
sanctions against defendants

(Plaintiff

&

Counterclaim Defen

dants' Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants

&

Counterclai

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, dated June 18, 2018

(D.I. 161))

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motio s
are denied, and defendants' cross-motion is denied.

I I.

Background 1

BMaddox commenced this action on March 14, 2017,
asserting claims for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U S.C.
§§

501 e t ~ - , violation of the Digital Millennium Copyrigh

Act

1

The facts underlying this action are summarized in my
September 8, 2017 Report and Recommendation.
BMaddox Enters
v. Oskouie, 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (HBP), 2017 WL 9534738 (S.D.N.Y
Sept. 8, 2017) (Pitman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation),
adopted at, 2017 WL 479706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2017) (Abrams,
D.J.).
Familiarity with that Report and Recommendation is
assumed.
I recite only those facts relevant to resolving th
present motions.
2

LLC

pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), false and misleading advertis ng
pursuant to Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125,
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030(g), common law misappropriation of trade secrets and deeptive trade practices pursuant to New York General Business L

§

349 (Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated Mar. 14,
(D. I. 6)

<J[<J[

63-140).

On July 25, 2017, defendants filed

answer and counterclaims against plaintiffs (Verified Answer to
Complaint and Counterclaims, dated July 25, 2017
( "Ans . " ) ) .

(D.I. 32)

Defendants' counterclaims include claims for vio a-

tions of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act purs ant
to 15 U.S.C. §§ 8131 and 1125(d), defamation

Q§..£

se and tract

libel, false advertising pursuant to Section 43 of the Lanha
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, unfair competition, tortious interfer nee
with contractual relations and prospective contractual relat ons,
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030(g), violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,

7

U.S.C. § 512(f), monopolization and attempted monopolization in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, tr spass to chattels, intentional infliction of emotional distre s,
invasion of privacy under South Dakota law and violation of
York Civil Rights Law§§ 50-51 (Ans.

<Jl<Jl

140-94, 203-48).

dants also seek declarations of the invalidity of plaintiff'
3

ew

copyrights and of their non-infringement of any copyrights owed
by plaintiffs

(Ans.

~~

195-202).

Plaintiffs filed their first motion for sanctions
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 on September 7,

t

2017,

defendants wilfully misrepresented facts in their initial fil
ings, asserted frivolous legal arguments in their motion for
temporary restraining order and asserted frivolous countercl
plaintiffs sought dismissal of defendants' counterclaims

(Pl

tiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Against
Defendants & Counterclaimants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, d
Sept. 7, 2017

(D.I. 55)).

Plaintiffs subsequently moved to

dismiss defendants' counterclaims on the merits

(Counterclai

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Count rclaims, dated Sept. 27,

2017

(D.I.

67)).

That motion remain

pending.
On March 6, 2018, after an in-court discovery conf rence,

I ordered defendants to produce all documents that are

responsive to plaintiff's November 6,
later than March 20,

2018

2017 document request

(Order, dated Mar.

6,

2018

(D.I.

o
1 1)).

A week later, on March 13, 2018, plaintiffs filed their seco d
motion for sanctions

(Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' S cond

Motion for Sanctions, dated Mar. 13, 2018

(D.I. 112)), seeki g

relief pursuant to the Court's inherent power for defendants'
4

alleged harassment of plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel and thi d
parties

(Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Brief in Suppor

Their Second Motion for Sanctions, dated Mar. 13, 2018
113)).

of

(D.I.

After filing a motion to stay the action for six mont s

(Notice of Motion, dated Mar. 14, 2018

(D.I. 116)), defendant

cross-moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11
Motion, dated Mar. 29, 2018

(Notic

of

(D.I. 128)).

Plaintiffs filed their third motion for sanctions
April 5, 2018

(Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Third Mo

for Sanctions, dated Apr. 5, 2018

(D.I. 137)), again seeking

sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent power for defenda
allegedly meritless filings and frivolous legal arguments,
including defendants' March 29, 2018 cross-motion for sancti ns
(Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Memorandum in Support
Their Third Motion for Sanctions, dated Apr. 5, 2018

f

(D.I. 1 8)).

After an in-court discovery conference on May 2, 2018, I ord red
plaintiffs to file a supplemental submission that set out de endants' discovery defaults

(Order, dated May 3,

2018

(D.I. 14 ));

plaintiffs filed their supplemental memorandum of law and an
accompanying declaration by counsel on May 16, 2018

(Plainti f &

Counterclaim Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support
Their Third Motion for Sanctions, dated May 16, 2018
Declaration of Anderson J. Duff, dated May 16, 2018
5

of]

(D.I. 1 3);
(D.I. 15 )) .

On May 11, 2018, defendants' counsel moved to withd aw
from his representation of defendants (Notice of Motion, date
May 11, 2018

(D.I. 149)).

The Honorable Ronnie Abrams, Unite

States District Judge granted defendants' counsel's motion to
withdraw on August 30, 2018 and stayed the
5, 2018, by which time Oskouie was ordered to advise the Cour
whether he had obtained new counsel or would be proceeding
(Order, dated Aug. 30, 2018

(D.I. 169)).

5, 2018, Oskouie advised the Court that he would be proceedi

III.

Analysis

A.

Applicable
Legal Standards

1.

Sanctions Pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11

Rule 11 provides that
A motion for sanctions must be made separately fro any
other motion and must describe the specific conduc
that allegedly violates Rule ll(b). The motion mus be
served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed orb
presented to the court if the challenged paper, cl im,
defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or app opriately corrected within 21 days after service or
within another time the court sets.
Fed. R. Ci v. P. 11 ( c) ( 2) .

6

Rule 11 and principles of due process require that 'the
subject of a sanctions motion be informed of: ( 1) t ~e
source of authority for the sanctions being conside~ed;
and (2) the specific conduct or omission for which ~he
sanctions are being considered so that the subject )f
the sanctions motion can prepare a defense."
Star Mark Mamt .. Inc. v. Koon Chun Hina Kee Sov
Ltd.,

682 F.3d 170, 175

Schlaifer Nance

&

(2d Cir. 2012)

&

Sauce Facto~v.

(per curiam), quoting

Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334

(2d

Cir. 1999).
"[T]he 'safe-harbor provision [of Rule 11] is a strict
procedural requirement' and ' [a] n informal warning .

. wi tr out

service of a separate Rule 11 motion is not sufficient.'"
v. Kwo Shin Chang,

599 F. App'x 18, 19 (2d Cir. 2015)

Cl-Iona

(summa1y

order), quoting Star Mark Mamt .. Inc. v. Koon Chun Hina Kee' ov &
Sauce Factory, Ltd., supra,

682 F.3d at 175; accord Sarachek v.

Aaronson, 18 Civ. 8393

(NSR), 2019 WL 3456888 at *3

July 31, 2019)

D.J.)

(Roman,

(S.D.N.Y

("A movant's failure to comply

the procedural requisites will result in the denial of the
motion."); Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 16 Civ. 5508
(VSB), 2019 WL 1437019 at *14
(Broderick,

D. J.)

York, 17 Civ. 2695
Feb. 12, 2019)

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019)

(collecting cases); Nardoni v. City of New
(GHW) (GWG), 2019 WL 542349 at *4

(Gorenstein, M. J.)

7

(Report

&

(S.D.N.Y

Recommendation),

1

ith

adopted at, 2019 WL 952333 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019)

(Woods,

D.J.).

2.

Sanctions Pursuant to
the Court's Inherent Power

An award of sanctions under the Court's inherent p

vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons."

er

Chambers

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991); accord Star Mark Mm.
Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy

Sauce Factory, Ltd., supra,

&

F.3d at 178; In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218
115 (2d Cir. 2000)

(party seeking sanctions under court's in

ent power must make showing sufficient to support "a finding of
conduct constituting or akin to bad faith").

Sanctions unde

the

Court's inherent power may also be imposed made where a liti ant
has perpetrated a fraud upon the Court.

McMunn v. Mem'l

Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 191 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (S.D.N Y.
2002)

(Buchwald, D.

J.)

("

[A] fraud upon the court occurs whe e it

can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party

as

sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculat d to
interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to
adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or

8

unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's c aim
or defense."

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

"[B]ad faith may be inferred only if actions are so
completely without merit as to require the conclusion that thy
must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as
I

delay."

Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp.,

Cir. 2012)

675 F.3d 138, 143 (2d

(internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis adde ) .

"When a lower court sanctions a litigant for bad faith,

the

must outline its factual findings with 'a high degree of spe
ficity. '"

Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 897 F.3d 4, 53

(2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1282

(2019),

uotin

Virginia Props., LLC v. T-Mobile Northeast LLC, 865 F.3d 110

113

(2d Cir. 2017); accord Milltex Indus. Cor . v. Jae uard Lace Co.
Ltd., 55 F.3d 34, 38
F.2d 1265, 1272

(2d Cir. 1995); Oliveri v. Thompson, 80

(2d Cir. 1986); Rates Tech. Inc. v. Broadvox

Holding Co., LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 515, 527
(Scheindlin, D.J.).
of bad faith conduct.

(S.D.N.Y. 2014)

In addition, there must be "clear evide ce"
Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v.

Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 114

(2d Cir. 2009).

9

B.

Application of the
Foregoing Principles

1.

Sanctions Pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11

Plaintiffs have twice moved for sanctions pursuant

o

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (D.I. 55, 161), and defendants have cross-mo

d

for Rule 11 sanctions (D.I. 128).

However, none of

have demonstrated sufficient compliance with the procedural
requirements of Rule 11, and, therefore, their motions must
denied.
Although plaintiffs claim in their notices of moti n
and their memoranda of law that they complied with Rule ll's
safe-harbor provision (Plaintiff

&

Counterclaim Defendants'

Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants & Counterclaimants
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, dated Sept. 7, 2017

(D.I. 55);

Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants' Brief in Support of The r
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, filed Sept. 7, 2017
Plaintiff
Defendants

(D. I. 56);

1

Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Ag inst

&
&

June 18, 2018

Counterclaimants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, d ted
(D.I. 161); Plaintiff

&

Counterclaim Defendant '

Memorandum in Support of Their Second Motion for Rule 11 San tions, dated June 18, 2018

(D.I. 162)), they do not provide

evidence of such compliance.

ny

"An attorney's unsworn stateme ts
10

in a brief are not evidence."
298

(2d Cir. 2009)

Kulhawik v. Holder,

571 F.3d 2 6,

(per curiam), citing INS v. Phinpathya, 46

U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); accord Griffin v. Sheeran, 767
App'x 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2019)
674 F. App'x 79, 81

(summary order); Kumar v.

(2d Cir. 2017)

(summary order);

Syracuse Police Dep't, 467 F. App'x 31, 34
mary order).

(2d Cir. 2012)

Plaintiffs' counsel merely attached to plainti

memoranda of law letters that he purportedly sent to
counsel with an enclosed notice of motion (Plaintiff &
claim Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Motion for Rule
Sanctions, filed Sept. 7, 2017

(D.I. 56), Ex. l; Plaintiff

1
&

Counterclaim Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Seco d
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, dated June 18, 2018
A).

(D.I. 162)

Ex.

However, an exhibit attached to a memorandum of law wit out

an accompanying affidavit attesting to the document's authen icity and accuracy also does not constitute "evidence."

Dorch ster

Fin. Holdings Corp. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 11 Civ. 1529 (KMW) (K F),
2014 WL 3747160 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2014)
Betterson v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A.,
(W.D.N.Y. 2015).

(Fox, M.J.); a cord

139 F. Supp.

3d 572, 582

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motions for Rule

1

sanctions are denied because they have offered no evidence
showing that they complied with the safe-harbor provision of Rule
11.
11

Defendants have similarly failed to support their
cross-motion for Rule 11 sanctions with evidence of complianc
with Rule ll's safe-harbor provision.

Defendants' filings

contain no mention whatsoever of any efforts to comply with
ll's procedural requirements.

le

Accordingly, defendants' cross

motion for sanctions is also denied.

2.

Sanctions Pursuant to
the Court's Inherent Power

Plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions pursuant to the
Court's inherent power accuses defendants' of engaging in a
pattern of harassment of plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel and
several third parties

(Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants'

rief

in Support of Their Second Motion for Sanctions, dated Mar.
2018

(D. I.

113)).

3,

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defen ants

posted negative reviews of and false complaints about BMaddo

on

Google and other websites, launched two email phishing attac sat
plaintiffs' counsel, posted false complaints and salacious
allegations online concerning plaintiffs' counsel,

falsely

reported plaintiffs' counsel to the New York Police Departme t
for human-trafficking and arms-dealing and posted salacious
allegations online regarding a journalist who published an

1

i
I

article about this action in an Australian newspaper (Plaint f f

12

&

Counterclaim Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Second Mot'on
for Sanctions, dated Mar. 13, 2018

(D.I. 113) at 2-5).

allegations against defendants, if true, are disturbing, and

ome

of the alleged conduct may even be illegal.
described is not sufficiently connected to this litigation t
warrant the imposition of sanctions.

A court's inherent pow

to

impose sanctions ''derives from a court's need to manage its
affairs so as to achieve an orderly and expeditious resoluti
cases."

Bowler v. INS,

901 F. Supp. 597, 605

of

(S.D.N.Y. 1995)

(Sotomayor, then D.J., now Sup. Ct. Justice), citing United
States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
1991).

948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d c·r.

Thus, in assessing an application for sanctions purs ant

to the Court's inherent power, a court must
distinguish between .
. activities that may lead
substantive liability, but are otherwise unrelated
litigation, and litigation-related bad faith condu
The former conduct may be significant in determini
whether a fee award is appropriate.
The court's i
ent power, however, is properly directed toward th
latter conduct, by which a party may attempt to un
mine the court's authority by, for example, attemp
to mislead the court or skirt its orders, or use t
judicial process as an instrument of abuse by, for.
example, filing a frivolous action or asserting a
frivolous defense for the purpose of harassing his
opponent.
Sherman, LLC v. DCI Telecomm., Inc., 03 Civ. 855
21692763 at *4

(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003)

to
to
t.
g
herering
e
1

(LBS), 2003 WL

(Sand, D.J.).

The

alleged conduct on which plaintiffs base their motion simply is
13

not misconduct in this litigation.

Even if true, the conduct

alleged does not impact the ability of the Court to manage it
affairs.
Furthermore, at least with respect to plaintiffs'
claims of online harassment by defendants, their factual all

a-

tions do not attribute the conduct to defendants with suffic'ent
specificity.

Although defendants may have motive to harass

plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel or third parties in a misgui
attempt to derail plaintiffs' prosecution of this action, th
is no substantial evidence that the anonymous emails, negati e
online reviews or complaints or other harassing conduct can
attributed to defendants.

As noted above, the imposition of

sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent power requires "c ear
evidence'' of bad faith conduct.

Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs.

v. Scivantage, supra, 564 F.3d at 114.

1

Inc.

Accordingly, plainti fs'

first motion for sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent

ower

must be denied.
The core allegation of plaintiffs' second motion f r
sanctions pursuant to the Court's inherent power is that def ndants' cross-motion for Rule 11 sanctions is a meritless fil'ng
(Plaintiff

&

Counterclaim Defendants' Memorandum in Support

Their Third Motion for Sanctions, dated Apr. 5, 2018

f

(D.I. 1 8))

Although defendants failed to comply with Rule ll's procedur 1
14

requirements, as explained above, plaintiffs have not provide
clear evidence of defendants' bad faith in filing their cross
motion for sanctions.

Defendants' cross-motion alleges that

plaintiff has engaged in a pattern of harassment directed at
Oskouie and third parties, including that plaintiffs wrote a
letter to Oskouie's parents containing the parents' private
financial information, hired a hacker to disrupt defendants'
website that is the subject of this action and established a
website containing Oskouie's personal information and deroga
accusations about Oskouie.

If plaintiffs' and defendants'

respective allegations are true, all that has been shown is
both sides have engaged in conduct outside the litigation de
signed to harass the other, and, therefore, any sanctions wold
have to be imposed bilaterally.

Such an exercise would acco -

plish nothing and only further delay this action.

3.

Discovery Sanctions

Pursuant to my May 3, 2018 Order (D.I. 148), plain iffs
filed a supplemental memorandum of law (Plaintiff & Counterc aim
Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support [of] Their Th'rd
Motion for Sanctions, dated May 16, 2018
accompanying declaration by counsel
Duff, dated May 16, 2018

(D.I. 153)) and an

(Declaration of Anderson J.

(D.I. 154)), describing defendants''
15

failures to respond to interrogatories and requests for the
production of documents.

Specifically, plaintiffs claim that

defendants refused to respond to interrogatories on the groun
that the "production of documents and/or depositions are more
practical methods of obtaining the information sought," citi
Local Rule 33.3(b), but that defendants never produced the
responsive documents, and that defendants have failed to pro
documents pertaining to the allegedly infringing website, de
dants' email newsletter, their financial information and the
whereabouts of Oskouie (Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendants'
I

Supplemental Memorandum in Support [of] Their Third Motion f r
Sanctions, dated May 16, 2018

(D.I. 153) at 4-16).

Defendan s

have not responded to plaintiffs' allegations of discovery
misconduct.
Assuming the truth of plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants have failed to participate meaningfully in discov ry,
defendants' conduct would merit severe sanctions.

However,

Second Circuit has held that "a court abuses its discretion

he
fit

dismisses a case without first warning a prose party of the
consequences of failing to comply with the court's discovery
orders."

Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444,

(2d Cir. 2013).

Furthermore,

452

"[n]o sanction should be impos d

without giving the disobedient party notice of the particula
16

sanction sought and an opportunity to be heard in opposition
its imposition."

SEC v. Razmilovic,

738 F.3d 14, 24

o

(2d Cir.

2013).
Here, although defendants were indisputably on not· e
with respect to their discovery obligations as early as my M
6, 2018 Order, the record does not disclose that defendants
adequately warned of the potential consequences of their fai
to comply.

Defendants' counsel failed to appear at the May

2018 discovery conference (Order, dated May 3, 2018

(D.I. 14

at

1 n.l), and as of May 10, 2018, six days before plaintiffs f'led
their supplemental memorandum of law, defendants' counsel wa
longer in contact" with defendants

"no

(Certification of Saul Ro fe,

Esq. In Support of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, dated May

0,

2018

e is

(D.I. 152)).

Oskouie has since advised the Court that

now proceeding Q£Q se.

Thus, an explicit warning is require

before the Court imposes severe sanctions, such as the dismi sal
of counterclaims or the entry of a default judgment.

Accord

ingly, plaintiffs' motion for sanctions for defendants' alle ed
discovery misconduct is denied without prejudice to renewal
1

I

should defendants fail to comply with the Order set out i n t e
following paragraph.

17

IV.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' moti ns
for sanctions are denied, and defendants' cross-motion for
sanctions is denied.

No later than October 21, 2019, defend nts

are to produce to plaintiff all documents responsive to plai I

tiff's document requests.

No later than October 21, 2019,
I

defendants are to respond fully to plaintiff's interrogatori s.
I

Defendants are warned that an unjustified failure to comply

ith

this Order will result in the imposition of sanctions, which may
include the entry of a default judgment against all defendan s.

This Order does not affect the stay currently in

ace

in this action.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested
mark Docket Items 55, 112, 128, 137 and 161 closed.

Dated: New York, New York
September 30, 2019

SO ORDERED

HENRY
United States Magistrate
Copy transmitted to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs

18

udge

Copy emailed to:
[e-mail]
Copy mailed to:
Mr. Milad Oskouie
Tehran Province
Tehran
#20/4 West Seventh Street
Ajoudaniye Avenue
Iran

19