Smith v. Centerlight Healthcare, Inc. et al
Filing
62
OPINION AND ORDER re: 50 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Centerlight Healthcare, Inc., Glenn Courounis, Centerlight Health System, Inc. The defendants' March 16, 2018 motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent of dismissing the federal claims from this action with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for the defendants on the federal claims, and to remand the remaining claims in the action to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 6/21/2018) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (rro)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------- X
:
CELESTE SMITH,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
CENTERLIGHT HEALTHCARE, INC.,
:
CENTERLIGHT HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., and
:
GLENN COUROUNIS,
:
Defendants.
:
:
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17cv2135 (DLC)
OPINION AND ORDER
APPEARANCES:
For the plaintiff:
Celeste Smith, pro se
111 DeHaven Drive
Unit 119
Yonkers, New York 10703
For the defendants:
Diane Windholz
Damon W. Silver
Jackson Lewis P.C. (NY)
666 Third Avenue
29th Floor
New York, New York 10017
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
This is an employment discrimination and retaliation action
by Celeste Smith against her former employers, Centerlight
Healthcare System, Inc. (“CLHS”), her former supervisor at CLHS,
Glenn Courounis, and a related company, Centerlight Healthcare,
Inc. (“CLHC”).
She has brought claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”),
as well as various state law causes of action.
The defendants
have moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff has failed to
oppose the motion.
For the following reasons, the motion is
granted to the extent of dismissing the federal law claims.
The
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims.
BACKGROUND
The following describes the evidence which is either
undisputed or taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.1
CLHS provides long-term healthcare services through
its member company, CLHC.
CLHC is a managed care provider that
serves patients in New York City, Westchester, and Long Island.
In July 2006, plaintiff Celeste Smith, a Black female, was hired
as a Director of Human Resources for CLHS.
In 2010 and 2012,
Smith received promotions, to Corporate Human Resources
Director, and Corporate Vice President of Human Resources,
respectively.
As Corporate Vice President of Human Resources,
Smith received a salary of $190,000 per year and was eligible
As described below, because the summary judgment motion is
unopposed, “unresponded-to statements of undisputed facts
proffered by the movant” may be deemed admitted. Jackson v.
Federal Exp., 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014). Each such
statement, however, must be “supported by record evidence
sufficient to satisfy the movant’s burden of production even if
the statement is unopposed.” Id. In describing the evidence
here, each statement is supported by record evidence sufficient
to meet defendants’ burden of production on a motion for summary
judgment.
1
2
for a bonus and other benefits.
Smith claims, however, that she
did not receive a car allowance and did not begin receiving an
11% pension contribution until 2014, despite allegedly being
eligible for those benefits upon her 2012 promotion.
In 2013, Smith claims that she was subjected to a
“personality assessment” by an outside consultant for the fourth
time, after previously taking the assessment three times over
the course of her employment.
According to Smith, the questions
on the assessment were demeaning and discriminatory, and she was
the only female required to take it four times.
In 2013 and early 2014, Smith, as part of her role as
Corporate Vice President of Human Resources, participated, along
with her then-supervisor, in two internal investigations into
the behavior of a CLHS executive.
Smith claims that after the
subject of the investigation found out about her involvement,
the executive “coached” her to leave CLHS.
Smith raised her
concerns about the “coaching” to the then-president of CLHS, and
he did not indicate that plaintiff’s employment would be
terminated.
Glenn Courounis began his tenure as CLHS’s Senior Vice
President of Human Resources on April 27, 2015.
At around the
same time, the Centerlight companies began experiencing severe
financial difficulties.
Courounis was brought in to restructure
CLHS’s human resources department.
3
Courounis was 59-years-old
at the time, 9 years older than his predecessor and 7 years
older than plaintiff.
At the start of Courounis’s tenure,
CLHS’s human resources department employed 24 full-time
employees, and Courounis decided that he needed to downsize the
department.
At a staff meeting shortly after he took the
position, he announced this decision to the staff, so that they
would be able to begin searching for other employment.
The
number of full-time employees was reduced from 24 to 18.5 by the
beginning of 2016, and to 10.5 by July 2016.
Of the remaining
positions, four were filled by Black employees, four were filled
by Hispanic employees, and 2.5, including Courounis, were White.
Approximately 60% of the remaining staff was over 40 years of
age, and 81% of the remaining staff were female.
During
Courounis’s tenure, Courounis hired five new employees for
lower-level positions:
two of them Black, two White, and one
Asian; four of the five were female, and two were over 47 years
of age.
He also terminated the employment of five employees,
two of whom were Asian, two of whom were Black, and one was
White (out of the two White employees in the department at the
time); two were older than Smith and two were younger, and three
of the five were male.
The layoffs were not limited to the human resources
department.
CLHS has laid off over 200 employees since January
2015, including 26 with the title of Vice President or above.
4
Of the laid off Vice Presidents, 21 were White, two were Black,
two were Hispanic, and one was Asian.
The laid-off individuals
eventually included Courounis himself.
In October 2015, plaintiff made complaints to CLHS’s Chief
Compliance Officer and its Chief Administrative Officer that
Courounis sent her information about a job opening in Virginia
or Washington, D.C., and had hired employees for the human
resources department that she believed did not have the
appropriate qualifications.
Later that month, Smith made a
complaint to CLHS’s then-president about Courounis alleging that
he made inappropriate comments concerning various employees.
Courounis, however, did not learn about either set of complaints
until plaintiff’s deposition in this action.
In December 2015, Smith had a conversation with Courounis
in which they discussed certain medical problems that Smith was
experiencing.
The two of them came up with a plan under which
Smith would be permitted to take intermittent leave.
Smith also
went on a vacation to the Caribbean in late December 2015 to
early January 2016.
On January 13, 2016, Courounis, along with CLHS’s thenChief-Information-Officer, met with Smith to advise her that
CLHS was eliminating her position.
Courounis informed Smith
that he had delayed terminating her employment until after
January 1, 2016 so that she would be eligible for a new
5
severance plan that CLHS had implemented as of that date.
Courounis had decided that CLHS’s financial condition mandated
her discharge well before her termination.
After the discussion
turned to Smith’s job performance, Courounis told Smith that he
had been dissatisfied with her handling of a particular matter,
but after Smith disputed Courounis’s view, Courounis looked into
the matter and sent plaintiff a letter apologizing for his
mistake.
Courounis reiterated that Smith’s job performance was
not a factor in his decision to eliminate her position, and thus
that his decision was unchanged.
CLHS has not reinstated
Smith’s position to date.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Smith filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 9, 2016.
EEOC issued a right-to-sue-letter on November 22, 2016.
The
This
civil action was filed, through counsel, in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, Bronx County, on February 15, 2017.
March 24, 2017, the action was removed to this Court.
On
On August
25, 2017, an initial conference with counsel was held before
this Court.
On December 6, 2017, counsel for plaintiff moved to
withdraw, citing difficulties communicating with his client.
After providing Smith with an opportunity to respond, and
receiving none, counsel’s motion was granted as of December 15.
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Plaintiff has been proceeding pro se since that date.
While pro
se, plaintiff had significant difficulties in complying with the
deadlines in this matter, particularly regarding the scheduling
of her deposition.
summary judgment.
On March 16, 2018, defendants moved for
Plaintiff had until April 6, 2018 to respond.
With no response received, an April 12 Order sua sponte extended
the deadline to April 18, 2018, but indicated that no further
extensions would be granted.
Plaintiff has still not responded
to the defendants’ summary judgment motion.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may not be granted unless all of the
submissions taken together “show[] that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The
moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a
material factual question, and in making this determination, the
court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.
2015).
Gemmink v. Jay Peak, 807 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.
If the moving party makes this initial showing, the
burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact.
El-Nahal v. Yassky, 835 F.3d 248,
252, 256 (2d Cir. 2016).
When a summary judgment motion is unopposed, a court may
not grant summary judgment by default.
7
Jackson v. Federal Exp.,
766 F.3d at 194.
But, provided that the moving party has
succeeded in making its initial showing, the failure to respond
may be deemed an admission of that fact.
Id.
I. Claims for Employment Discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA
Under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful conduct.
See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2)
(ADEA).
Smith’s charge was filed on June 9, 2016.
Therefore,
Smith has timely stated a claim under these statutes only as to
conduct occurring after August 14, 2015.
In employment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has
set out a burden-shifting framework at the summary judgment
stage.
Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that she is a member
of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for employment
in the position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) some minimal evidence suggesting an inference
that the employer acted with discriminatory motivation.
Doe v.
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2016).
It is undisputed that plaintiff is a member of a protected
class for her race, age, and gender discrimination claims, and
that she was qualified for employment in her position.
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It is
also not in dispute that the discharge from her employment was
an adverse employment action.
Smith fails to establish a prima
facie case with respect to any of the claims related to her
termination, however, because she has failed to come forward
with even minimal evidence suggesting that CLHS acted with
discriminatory motivation.
There is no direct evidence that Courounis was motivated by
any prohibited characteristic in choosing to discharge Smith.
As for indirect evidence, that evidence shows that Courounis’s
layoffs actually increased the percentage of Black employees in
the human resources department (from 33% to 40%), increased the
percentage of women in the department (from 75% to 81%), and
minimally decreased the percentage of the staff that was over 40
years of age (from 63% to around 60%).
As it is undisputed that
Courounis was the sole decisionmaker responsible for eliminating
Smith’s position, there is not even minimal evidence to suggest
that CLHS acted with discriminatory intent in eliminating
Smith’s position.
Accordingly, Smith’s employment
discrimination claims related to her discharge must be
dismissed.
Smith’s other employment discrimination claims are
meritless and/or time-barred.
Smith’s contentions regarding the
car allowance are entirely speculative, and her claims regarding
the pension contribution are inadequately supported and time-
9
barred.
Smith’s own deposition testimony relaying the hearsay
statements of others is insufficient to create a triable issue
of fact on whether CLHS denied her a pension contribution or car
allowance because of her race or gender.
Smith’s claims
regarding the personality assessments are time-barred as
involving conduct which took place outside the 300-day statute
of limitations.
Accordingly, Smith’s employment discrimination
claims under Title VII and the ADEA must be dismissed.
II. Claims for Interference and Retaliation under the FMLA
Smith also contends that her rights under the FMLA were
interfered with and that she was retaliated against for engaging
in activity protected by the FMLA.
To prevail on a claim of
interference with FMLA rights, a plaintiff must establish:
1) that she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; 2)
that the defendant is an employer as defined by the
FMLA; 3) that she was entitled to take leave under the
FMLA; 4) that she gave notice to the defendant of her
intention to take leave; and 5) that she was denied
benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA.
Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir.
2016).
To prevail on a claim of retaliation under the FMLA, a
plaintiff must establish that “1) [s]he exercised rights
protected under the FMLA; 2) that [s]he was qualified for [her]
position; 3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4)
the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent.”
Potenza v.
City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
Once the
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plaintiff meets her burden on a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate reason for its
actions; if the defendant does so, the burden again shifts to
the plaintiff to show that the proffered explanation is
pretextual.
See Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 430.
Smith’s claims under the FMLA fail, at the very least,
because no reasonable juror could find that Smith has proven
that the defendants’ reason for her termination was pretextual.
By Smith’s own testimony, she had a conversation with Courounis
about certain medical problems she was experiencing, in which
Courounis was sympathetic, and worked out a plan with her under
which Courounis would permit her to take intermittent FMLA
leave.
Even though there is some degree of temporal proximity
between her conversation with Courounis about taking FMLA leave
and her termination, the record is simply devoid of any evidence
that her termination was otherwise connected to her exercise or
attempted exercise of rights under the FMLA.
To the contrary,
it is undisputed that Courounis was supportive of Smith’s
medical needs.
In addition, Courounis has submitted an
unrebutted declaration that he had decided to eliminate Smith’s
position long before December 2015.
In light of the significant showing that defendants have
made demonstrating that Smith’s discharge was part of a costcutting measure affecting many officers and employees across the
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company and in the human resources department specifically, no
reasonable juror could find that plaintiff has rebutted that
explanation and shown that the real reason for the termination
was to prevent Smith from, or retaliate against Smith for,
taking FMLA leave or otherwise exercising rights protected under
the FMLA.
Accordingly, Smith’s claims under the FMLA must be
dismissed.
III. Claims for Retaliation Under the Title VII and the ADEA
Smith’s final set of federal claims is for retaliaton
arising from her participation in the 2013-14 investigation of
the senior executive, and her October 2015 internal complaints
regarding Courounis.
To establish a prima facie case for
retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must show
“(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the
defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
McMenemy
v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2001).
Smith’s retaliation claims fail because her participation
in the investigations and her internal complaints lack any
causal nexus to her discharge, and the remaining aspects of the
claims fail because Smith did not suffer an adverse employment
action, they are time-barred, and/or they are purely
speculative.
Her participation in the investigations took place
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well outside the 300-day statute of the limitations, and she was
not terminated from her employment until January 2016, rendering
any inference of retaliatory motivation impossible to find on
this record.
And it is undisputed that Courounis, the sole
decisionmaker in her termination, did not learn about the
internal complaints until plaintiff’s deposition, which defeats
the possibility of retaliatory motivation.
The remaining claims, such as for the denial of a car
allowance and the pension contribution, are entirely unsupported
outside plaintiff’s own testimony.
No inference can be drawn
between her participation in the investigations and the denial
of a car allowance, and the claims regarding the pension
contribution are time-barred and entirely speculative.
Accordingly, the federal retaliation claims must be dismissed.
IV. State Law Claims
Having dismissed all of the plaintiff’s federal law claims,
the Court declines to continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. Saint Vincent
Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc.,
712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (“It is well
to recall that in the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial
13
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.”).
As this case was removed from the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, Bronx County, the matter shall be
remanded to that Court.
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ March 16, 2018 motion for summary judgment
is granted to the extent of dismissing the federal claims from
this action with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment for the defendants on the federal claims, and to
remand the remaining claims in the action to the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, Bronx County.
SO ORDERED:
Dated:
New York, New York
June 21, 2018
____________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge
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Copy mailed to:
Celeste Smith
111 DeHaven Drive
Unit 119
Yonkers, New York 10703
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