Ruiz v. Keratin Bar
Filing
158
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: re: 152 MOTION for Michael J. Borrelli to Withdraw as Attorney and for a Charging Lien filed by Angel Ruiz. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Borrelli's motion to withdraw as attorney of record and to af fix a charging lien on any verdict, settlement, judgment, or final order in this case. Plaintiff may proceed pro se, but the Court encourages Plaintiff to seek new counsel to represent him at trial. To the extent Plaintiff continues with this action pro se, Plaintiff is encouraged to register on the Court's electronic filing system (ECF) so that he may more efficiently receive notice of any orders and submit any necessary filings. To the extent Plaintiff does not register on ECF, he must su bmit all filings to the Court's Pro Se Intake Unit. Plaintiff must also keep the Court informed of his current mailing address. Plaintiff may access more information on the Pro Se Intake Unit by calling (212) 805-0175 or accessing the website at : https://nysd.uscourts.gov/prose/role-of-the-prose-intake-unit/contact.The final pretrial conference and trial remain adjourned sine die due to the difficulties of conducting a jury trial given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The parties will be give n at least one month notice of their new trial date. The Court defers ruling on the amount of the lien until such time as the amount to be recovered by Plaintiff, if any, has been finally determined. Borrelli must send a copy of the Court's orde r to Plaintiff at his mailing address and by email. Not later than January 8, 2021, Plaintiff must either (1) retain new counsel and have that counsel file a notice of appearance; (2) register as a user on ECF; or (3) file a letter through the Pro Se Intake Unit that provides his mailing address. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the open motion at Dkt. 152. SO ORDERED., Attorney Michael John Borrelli terminated. (Signed by Judge Valerie E. Caproni on 12/03/2020) (ama)
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 1 of 12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
ANGEL RUIZ,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-against:
:
KERATINBAR INC. and 1976 HAIRCARE INC., :
:
:
Defendants. :
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: 12/3/2020
17-CV-2216 (VEC)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff’s counsel, Borrelli & Associates, P.L.L.C. (“Borrelli”), moved to withdraw as
counsel of record for Plaintiff Angel Ruiz and to affix a charging lien. For the following
reasons, Borrelli’s motion is GRANTED, with the amount of the charging lien to be determined
pending the final outcome in this case.
BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff, then pro se, commenced this action against his former
employer, Defendant Keratin Bar, Inc. (“Keratin Bar”), bringing claims pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq. See Dkt. 2. Plaintiff, a hairdresser, alleges
that Keratin Bar violated Title VII and the ADA by discriminating against him due to his sex and
sexual orientation and by failing to accommodate his disability, Celiac Sprue. See Second Am.
Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 1–5, Dkt. 98. After Keratin Bar filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on
July 3, 2017, see Notice of Mot., Dkt. 10, Plaintiff retained Borrelli on a contingency fee basis to
represent him. See Declaration of Michael J. Borrelli (“Borrelli Decl.”) ¶ 5, Dkt. 153; Retainer
Page 1 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 2 of 12
Agreement, Dkt. 153-1. Borrelli’s attorneys noted their appearances on August 25, 2017. Dkt.
15; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 17.
Over the ensuing three years, this case wound its way through the stages of litigation, and
Borrelli served as counsel to Plaintiff throughout. Shortly after Borrelli commenced its
representation, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, adding several individual defendants as
well as claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). See Am. Compl.,
Dkt. 26; Borrelli Decl. ¶ 6. On April 27, 2018, the Court granted in part then-Defendants’
motion to dismiss, dismissing the NYCHRL claims and all claims against the individual
defendants. See Order, Dkt. 50. The parties completed discovery by November 2018, Borrelli
Decl. ¶ 9, after which Keratin Bar filed a motion for summary judgment, see Corrected Notice of
Mot., Dkt. 76. Along with his opposition to Keratin Bar’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to amend the complaint and join a new party. Notice of CrossMot., Dkt. 85. On July 1, 2019, the Court denied Keratin Bar’s motion for summary judgment
and granted Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the complaint to add 1976 Haircare Inc. as a
Defendant. See Order, Dkt. 97.
After Plaintiff filed the SAC on July 12, 2019, Dkt. 98, the parties filed their motions in
limine; the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion in limine and granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ motion in limine. See Order, Dkt. 117. Before proceeding to trial, the Court
ordered the parties to participate in the Court-annexed Mediation Program, see id., but the parties
were unable to settle, see Borrelli Decl. ¶ 19. Although the parties had filed all pretrial
submissions by March 2020, the Court was forced to adjourn the trial sine die in light of the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. See Borrelli Decl. ¶ 20; Order, Dkt. 139. In a last-ditch effort to
settle this case while further proceedings were stayed, the parties participated in a settlement
Page 2 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 3 of 12
conference before Magistrate Judge Fox on July 14, 2020, but, again, the parties were unable to
reach agreement. See Order, Dkt. 144; Borrelli Decl. ¶ 22.
On September 17, 2020, Plaintiff called chambers and raised concerns about his
relationship with Borrelli. See Order, Dkt. 145. In response, the Court held a conference with
Plaintiff, Borrelli, and defense counsel to ascertain the nature of Plaintiff’s complaints and to
advise him of his options, to the extent he no longer wished to be represented by Borrelli. See
id.; Order, Dkt. 146. After informing the Court of its intention to do so, Borrelli filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel of record and seeking a charging lien in the amount of $193,638.19. See
Notice of Mot., Dkt. 152. In support of its motion, Borrelli submitted the Declaration of Michael
J. Borrelli, appended to which are a copy of Plaintiff’s retainer agreement with Borrelli and
Borrelli’s billing and expense records. See Borrelli Decl. Plaintiff filed two letters, purportedly
in response to Borrelli’s motion, which at times appear to oppose Borrelli’s attempt to withdraw
while simultaneously expressing distrust of and displeasure with Borrelli. See Dkt. 156; Dkt.
157.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 1.4, “[a]n attorney who has appeared as attorney of record
for a party may be relieved or displaced only by order of the Court and may not withdraw from a
case without leave of the Court granted by order.” S.D.N.Y. Local R. 1.4. Further, a court may
grant such an order “only upon a showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons for
withdrawal or displacement.” Id. Courts within this circuit have found “satisfactory reasons” to
include “a client’s lack of cooperation—including lack of communication—with counsel, and the
existence of an irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client.” Naguib v. Pub. Health Sols.,
No. 12-CV-2561, 2014 WL 2002824, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014) (quoting Diarama Trading
Page 3 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 4 of 12
Co. v. J. Walter Thompson U.S.A., No. 01-CIV-2950, 2005 WL 1963945, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
15, 2005)). Similarly, “[i]t is well-settled that a lawyer may seek to withdraw when the client
‘renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out [such] employment effectively.’”
United States v. Lawrence Aviation Indus., No. 06-CV-4818, 2011 WL 601415, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting Stephen Eldridge Realty Corp. v. Green, 174 A.D.2d 564, 566 (2d Dep’t
1991)); see also N.Y. R. Pro. Conduct 1.16(c)(7) (providing that a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client when “the client fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders
the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively”).
To the extent irreconcilable differences exist between attorney and client, even in instances in
which the client would prefer the attorney to continue his or her representation, courts may still
permit counsel to withdraw. See, e.g., Marciano v. DCH Auto Grp., No. 11-CV-9635, 2016 WL
11703590, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2016) (permitting attorney to withdraw over client’s objection
due to “complete rupture” in attorney-client relationship); Benvenisti v. City of New York, No.
04-CV-3166, 2006 WL 44039, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 6, 2006) (“Although [the client] opposes the
application to withdraw it is clear that the attorney-client relationship has broken down, and that
the attorney and client lack a certain amount of trust in each other. Under these conditions a
termination of the relationship would be in the best interest of both.”); McGuire v. Wilson, 735 F.
Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that attorney “cannot be expected to continue to
represent” client when client’s own submissions demonstrate “lack of trust between counsel and
client”).
Here, there is ample evidence from which the Court can conclude that the attorney-client
relationship between Plaintiff and Borrelli has completely broken down such that continued
representation would be unreasonably difficult if not impossible. The Court therefore readily
Page 4 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 5 of 12
finds that “satisfactory reasons” exist justifying Borrelli’s withdrawal as counsel of record. As
detailed during the September 18, 2020, conference and in Borrelli’s and Plaintiff’s papers, each
accuses the other of conduct that is at best unprofessional and at worst utterly abhorrent.
According to Borrelli, for years Plaintiff has “verbally abused and insulted several
employees,” and, despite multiple warnings, Plaintiff continues to berate Borrelli attorneys and
staff. Borrelli Decl. ¶¶ 24–32. In addition, Plaintiff has allegedly threatened to report Borrelli to
this Court and the New York State Bar Association for alleged misconduct and incompetence.
See id. ¶¶ 26, 32, 37. Finally, Plaintiff has reportedly instructed Borrelli to contact him only via
mail, rather than by email or phone, rendering communication between attorney and client
exceedingly difficult, especially given the trial-ready posture of this case. Id. ¶ 32.
For his part, Plaintiff accuses Borrelli of a variety of wildly inappropriate conduct,
including, among other allegations: pressuring him to settle for well-below Borrelli’s original
estimate of Plaintiff’s likely recovery or to otherwise be forced to pay Borrelli’s fee, counter to
their retainer agreement; negligently and intentionally endangering Plaintiff’s life and causing
him to suffer significant medical incidents including seizures and near-fatal allergy attacks; and
threatening to report Plaintiff to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Dkt. 156; Dkt.
157; Borrelli Decl. ¶ 28. While the Court is unwilling to credit many of Plaintiff’s allegations,
the seriousness of these claims depicts an attorney-client relationship wholly beyond repair.
Further, it is unclear the extent to which Plaintiff actually opposes Borrelli’s attempt to
withdraw. In his letters, Plaintiff notes that he “believe[s] Mr. Borrelli is the most appropriate
and qualified to fight for [his] case”; in those same letters, however, Plaintiff expresses his belief
that Borrelli is accountable for “millions of dollars” worth of damage that the firm has caused
him, noting that “these lawyers are robbing everything from me.” Dkt. 157. It is difficult to
Page 5 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 6 of 12
reconcile Plaintiff’s interest in having Borrelli continue its representation with such statements.
In any event, the Court finds that, even if Plaintiff wishes to continue his relationship with
Borrelli, granting Borrelli’s motion to withdraw is necessary due to the overwhelming proof of a
“complete rupture” of the attorney-client relationship. Marciano, 2016 WL 11703590, at *2.
II. Motion for a Charging Lien
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to New York statute, a discharged attorney is entitled to a charging lien on any
monetary recoveries obtained by the former client in the case to the extent the attorney rendered
legal services. See N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475 (McKinney 2013) (“From the commencement of an
action . . ., the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his or her client’s cause of action,
claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement,
judgment or final order in his or her client’s favor . . . .”); see also Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing that N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475
governs attorneys’ charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York). “However, it is wellsettled that an attorney loses his right to enforce a charging lien if the attorney withdraws or is
discharged for cause.” Antonmarchi v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 678 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Petition of Harley &
Browne, 957 F. Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). In the event of an attorney’s withdrawal,
whether to fix a charging lien is a decision that lies solely within the discretion of the Court. See
Joffe v. King & Spalding LLP, 337 F. Supp. 3d 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Nandi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
While an attorney discharged “for cause” — occasioned by “a significant breach of legal
duty” or the like — is not entitled to a charging lien, “[d]ischarge on account of personality
conflicts, misunderstandings or differences of opinion having nothing to do with any impropriety
Page 6 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 7 of 12
by . . . the lawyer, does not amount to discharge ‘for cause.’” Kovach v. City Univ. of N.Y., No.
13-CV-7198, 2015 WL 3540798, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). To establish that an attorney breached a legal duty, “[a] client must show that
his former attorney’s conduct ‘constituted a failure to properly represent his interests.’”
Antonmarchi, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (quoting Costello v. Kiaer, 278 A.D.2d 50, 50 (1st Dep’t
2000)). Courts have found that a discharge for cause occurs in situations in which “the attorney
has engaged in some kind of misconduct, has been unreasonably lax in pursuing a client’s case,
or has otherwise improperly handled the case.” Garcia v. Teitler, No. 04-CV-832, 2004 WL
1636982, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004). “When counsel is granted leave to withdraw by the
court, the discharge is not for cause.” Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, Inc., No. 06-CIV3707, 2009 WL 1505174, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2009).
“[A]ttorneys who terminate their representation are still entitled to enforce their charging
liens, as long as the attorney does not withdraw without ‘good cause’ and is not discharged for
‘good cause.’” Stair v. Calhoun, 722 F. Supp. 2d 258, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). While the
“satisfactory reasons” justifying a court’s decision to permit an attorney’s withdrawal may
suffice to establish “good cause” justifying the affixing of a charging lien, some courts have
found that the “good cause” required for a court to fix a charging lien entails a higher standard
than the “satisfactory reasons” inquiry under Local Civil Rule 1.4. See id. at 268 (collecting
cases). To the extent it finds that “the good cause threshold has been satisfied,” however, the
Court need not consider whether such a potential distinction is relevant to counsel’s motion. Id.;
see also Joffe, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 369 n.4.
In determining the amount of a charging lien, the Court must consider as the “overriding
criterion” that the amount be “fair,” as the charging lien is “equitable in nature.” Sutton v. N.Y.C.
Page 7 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 8 of 12
Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 2006). Although New York law provides that an
attorney’s “right to recover in quantum meruit accrues immediately upon discharge,” such that
courts ordinarily calculate the amount of quantum meruit compensation at the time of discharge,
the Second Circuit has held that a court does not “necessarily abuse[] its discretion by
postponing the determination of the fair and reasonable value of an attorney’s services” to avoid
unnecessary delay or to the extent a more accurate determinate can be made at a later date.
Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino & Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 263–64
(2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
B. Application
After reviewing all the evidence in the record and having assessed the credibility of
Plaintiff and Borrelli, the Court finds that Borrelli is entitled to a charging lien affixed to
Plaintiff’s eventual recovery, if any. As an initial matter, because the Court granted its motion to
withdraw as attorney of record, Borrelli’s discharge is not “for cause.” See Katz, 2009 WL
1505174, at *1. Further, because Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support his outlandish
claims of misconduct by Borrelli, the Court is unable to find that there was a significant breach
of a legal duty or significant misconduct committed by Borrelli. On the other hand, because the
evidence supports a finding that the attorney-client relationship is permanently broken, the Court
finds that good cause exists for Borrelli’s withdrawal.
It strains credulity to believe that Borrelli intentionally attempted to harm Plaintiff or
intentionally placed him in a situation that would exacerbate his medical issues. See Dkt. 156;
Dkt. 157. Similarly, the Court can think of no reason why Borrelli would mock its own client or
threaten to report him to law enforcement for alleged immigration violations. See Dkt. 156; Dkt.
Page 8 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 9 of 12
157. Without any proof of such implausible claims, the Court simply cannot afford them any
weight.
Plaintiff’s claims regarding Borrelli’s “threats” to drop his case or hold him liable for its
fees if he refused to accept a settlement offer below his preferred payout are also unsubstantiated.
Even in a potentially “problematic” contingency-fee-based attorney-client relationship, see
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 803 (2002), absent more, an attorney’s recommendation to
settle for a smaller sum than initially expected at the outset of a years-long case does not rise to
the level of a breach of a legal duty. Borrelli could reasonably have found that valid reasons —
the merits of the case, the demonstrated psychological difficulties Plaintiff experiences when
placed in a stressful situation, 1 the possibility that Plaintiff would walk away with nothing after
trial, the timing of any possible recovery — rendered a guaranteed, albeit smaller, payout a
preferable option for Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff disagreed, he was free to seek out counsel
that placed a greater value on his case than Borrelli. Ultimately, Borrelli has conducted diligent
and meritorious work on Plaintiff’s behalf throughout the course of its engagement; Borrelli has
briefed and argued successful motions and fended off Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, guiding Plaintiff’s case to its present trial-ready posture. See, e.g., Dkt. 97; Dkt. 117.
That Borrelli drafted and submitted all pretrial filings and stood ready to represent Plaintiff at
trial before the present delays occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic further undercuts any
claim by Plaintiff that Borrelli threatened to drop his case or hold him liable for all legal fees if
he refused to accept a settlement offer that was lower than originally hoped.
1
For example, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for mediation to occur at a private office rather than at
the courthouse to accommodate Plaintiff’s concerns that the courthouse would be too stressful an environment for
him. See Order, Dkt. 117.
Page 9 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 10 of 12
This is not to say that Borrelli is entirely without fault for the deterioration of the
relationship between attorney and client; in fact, the Court does not doubt that Plaintiff, to whom
this case certainly means considerably more than to Borrelli, was not afforded VIP-level
treatment by Borrelli. See, e.g., Borrelli Decl. ¶¶ 51–82 (demonstrating that up to seven
attorneys at Borrelli have been responsible for Plaintiff’s case). Nevertheless, absent evidence
that Borrelli was “unreasonably lax in pursuing” Plaintiff’s case or otherwise mishandled the
case in some material way, Borrelli’s failure to prioritize Plaintiff’s case to the extent Plaintiff
desired does not give rise to the breach of a legal duty. See Garcia, 2004 WL 1636982, at *5.
Ultimately, the Court reiterates its finding that there has been a complete and total
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, which, in this case, compels the conclusion that
Borrelli had good cause to withdraw. And while the Court is unable to find any support for
Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court need not look any further than Plaintiff’s own letters to bolster
Borrelli’s claims concerning Plaintiff’s behavior. See, e.g., Dkt. 156 (“Every time I hear his
voice I lo[]se my temper. I’m sorry I regret what I said.”); Dkt. 157 (requesting his complete file
from this case to use in a separate action against Borrelli for the “millions of dollars” in damage
Borrelli has caused him). As other courts have found, while the client plays the role of “master”
in any attorney-client relationship, “that role does not mean that a client may run roughshod over
his attorney and engage in inappropriate behavior.” Joffe, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 370. The role
Plaintiff has played in the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, and the breakdown
itself, demonstrate that Borrelli had good cause to withdraw as Plaintiff’s attorney of record.
Although Borrelli seeks a charging lien in the amount of $193,638.19, the Court exercises
its discretion to defer ruling on the amount of the charging lien until the amount to be recovered
Page 10 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 11 of 12
by Plaintiff, if any, has been finally determined. See id. (citing Raji v. Societe Generale Ams.
Sec. LLC, 15-CV-1144, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175919, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Borrelli’s motion to withdraw as attorney
of record and to affix a charging lien on any verdict, settlement, judgment, or final order in this
case. Plaintiff may proceed pro se, but the Court encourages Plaintiff to seek new counsel to
represent him at trial. To the extent Plaintiff continues with this action pro se, Plaintiff is
encouraged to register on the Court’s electronic filing system (ECF) so that he may more
efficiently receive notice of any orders and submit any necessary filings. To the extent Plaintiff
does not register on ECF, he must submit all filings to the Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit. Plaintiff
must also keep the Court informed of his current mailing address. Plaintiff may access more
information on the Pro Se Intake Unit by calling (212) 805-0175 or accessing the website at:
https://nysd.uscourts.gov/prose/role-of-the-prose-intake-unit/contact.
The final pretrial conference and trial remain adjourned sine die due to the difficulties of
conducting a jury trial given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The parties will be given at least
one month notice of their new trial date. The Court defers ruling on the amount of the lien until
such time as the amount to be recovered by Plaintiff, if any, has been finally determined.
Borrelli must send a copy of the Court’s order to Plaintiff at his mailing address and by email.
Not later than January 8, 2021, Plaintiff must either (1) retain new counsel and have that
counsel file a notice of appearance; (2) register as a user on ECF; or (3) file a letter through the
Pro Se Intake Unit that provides his mailing address.
Page 11 of 12
Case 1:17-cv-02216-VEC Document 158 Filed 12/03/20 Page 12 of 12
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the open motion at Dkt. 152.
SO ORDERED.
________________________
VALERIE CAPRONI
United States District Judge
Date: December 3, 2020
New York, New York
Page 12 of 12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?