S.N. v. The City Of New York et al
Filing
95
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, to enter judgment in favor of Defendants, and to close this case. SO ORDERED. re: 84 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by David Terrell, City Of New York. (Signed by Judge Gregory H. Woods on 8/7/2018) (rjm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------------X
SHAWN NARDONI,
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: 08/07/2018
:
Plaintiff,
-v -
:
:
:
THE CITY OF NEW YORK and
DETECTIVE DAVID TERRELL.
1:17-cv-2695-GHW
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Defendants. :
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Shawn Nardoni fell victim to gun violence as a young teenager. In September 2015,
he was shot in the leg in his neighborhood in the Bronx, after which he was hospitalized for several
days. Following his release from the hospital, Plaintiff was handcuffed and detained by officers of
the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and brought to a local police precinct. At the
precinct, Plaintiff was interrogated by Defendant Detective David Terrell about the identity of
Plaintiff’s shooter. Plaintiff later sued Detective Terrell and the City of New York, bringing claims
for false arrest and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Defendants now
move for summary judgment. Because it is undisputed that Detective Terrell was not involved in
Plaintiff’s arrest, summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim. And because
Plaintiff points to no evidence in the record of a policy or custom by the City of New York to
support his Monell claim, summary judgment is GRANTED on that claim as well.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
On or about September 1, 2015, Plaintiff was shot in the leg. Pl.’s Rule 56.1
Counterstatement (ECF No. 90) (“Pl.’s 56.1”) ¶ 1.2 He was admitted to a hospital for treatment. Id.;
Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 54) (“SAC”) ¶ 8. Plaintiff spent approximately three days in the
hospital before being released. Declaration of Joseph Gutmann (ECF No. 86), Ex. B (“Pl.’s Dep.”)
at 64:17-23.3 Shortly after being released from the hospital, on either September 4 or 5, 2015,
Plaintiff was sitting outside of his apartment building in the Bronx with a friend when he was
arrested by two or three members of the NYPD. Pl.’s Dep. at 66:13-15, 77:12-20; SAC ¶¶ 9-10. A
“brown-skinned” female NYPD officer “grabbed [his] hands and put [him] in handcuffs” and then
drove Plaintiff to the 42nd Precinct. Pl.’s Dep. at 77:9-11, 79:8-9, 82:23-83:9.
Once at the 42nd Precinct, Plaintiff was placed in a cell. Pl.’s Dep. at 83:10-11. At some
point after that, Detective Terrell took Plaintiff from his cell to another room where Detective
Terrell questioned Plaintiff. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl.’s Dep. at 83:10-13, 84:8-16. According to Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony, Detective Terrell kept Plaintiff in this room for three or four hours and
“badgered” Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit from him the name of the individual who shot him.
Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl.’s Dep. at 85:1-8. Despite Plaintiff’s response that he did not know his shooter’s
The following facts are drawn from the parties’ Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements and other submissions in
connection with this motion and are undisputed or taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, unless
otherwise noted.
1
References to “Def.’s 56.1” and “Pl.’s 56.1” are to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement and Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1
counterstatement, respectively, submitted in connection with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
ECF No. 85; ECF No. 90. Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 counterstatement incorporates both the statement of facts
from Defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement and Plaintiff’s responses. Defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement cites
primarily to the allegations made in the second amended complaint (ECF No. 54) and does not contest those
allegations.
2
The parties’ 56.1 statements contain limited facts. The Court cites to additional facts in the record for
purposes of providing a more fulsome background.
3
2
identity, Detective Terrell “tried to force [Plaintiff] to say it was some kid,” Pl.’s Dep. at 84:20-21,
and “kept on repeating the same stuff trying to force [Plaintiff] to say something that [Plaintiff] did
not know,” id. at 85:1-3. During the interrogation, Detective Terrell also threatened to kick
Plaintiff’s head through the wall and punch Plaintiff in the face. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.’s Dep. at 84:21-22.
Following the interrogation, Detective Terrell returned Plaintiff to his cell. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 7.
Plaintiff was not taken to court or to central booking in connection with his arrest. Pl.’s Dep. at
101:15-18, 125:7-126:8.
On January 6, 2016, Plaintiff was interrogated by Detective Corinne MacLennan at the 42nd
Precinct in another attempt to discover the name of the individual who shot him.4 Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 20;
Declaration of Chukwuemeka Nwokoro (ECF No. 88) (“Nwokoro Decl.”), Ex. A at 47. During
that interrogation, Plaintiff stated that “he ha[d] no idea who shot him.” Nwokoro Decl., Ex. A at
47.
It is undisputed that Detective Terrell did not arrest Plaintiff on either September 4 or 5,
2015. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 9. It is also undisputed that Detective Terrell did not order, instruct, plan, or
facilitate an arrest of Plaintiff on either September 4 or 5, 2015. Id. ¶ 10.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff’s mother, Patrice Nelson, initiated this action on Plaintiff’s behalf on April 14, 2017.
ECF No. 1. At the time of the filing of the initial complaint, Plaintiff was a minor. The complaint
asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983 against Detective Terrell
and the unidentified female officer who arrested Plaintiff. Id. The complaint also alleged that the
City of New York bears responsibility for such violations under Monell v. Department of Social Services,
4 The parties dispute the manner in which Plaintiff arrived at the 42nd Precinct for the January 6, 2016
interrogation. Plaintiff alleges that he was “brought to the 42nd Precinct,” Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 20, whereas
Defendants respond that it is not clear from the police report that Plaintiff was brought to the 42nd Precinct
as opposed to having appeared there voluntarily, ECF No. 93 ¶ 20. This dispute is immaterial to Defendants’
summary judgment motion.
3
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. In the original complaint, the female officer who arrested Plaintiff was not
named because Plaintiff knew only that she was female and was an officer assigned to investigate
Plaintiff’s September 1, 2015 shooting. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 11.
On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff amended his complaint to name Detective MacLennan as the
defendant previously identified as a Jane Doe officer. ECF No. 37. Detective MacLennan was
added to the amended complaint based upon discovery identifying her as a female officer assigned
to investigate Plaintiff’s shooting. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 11.
Plaintiff amended the complaint once again on February 9, 2018, still asserting claims against
Detective MacLennan, Detective Terrell, and the City of New York. ECF No. 54. In the second
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Detective MacLennan, acting in concert with Detective
Terrell, improperly arrested and detained Plaintiff under false pretenses. SAC ¶ 22. Detective
MacLennan is a Caucasian female. Def.’s 56.1 ¶ 12. When deposed on February 7, 2018, Plaintiff
testified that the officer who arrested him was a “brown-skinned” female. Id. ¶ 11; Pl.’s Dep. at
77:9-11. In light of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, on May 31, 2018, Plaintiff agreed to the
dismissal with prejudice of the false arrest claim against Detective MacLennan. ECF No. 83.
Plaintiff also voluntarily dismissed his malicious prosecution claims. Id. On June 6, 2018,
Defendants Detective Terrell and the City of New York moved for summary judgment on the
remaining false arrest and municipal liability claims. ECF No. 84.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on a claim if they can “show[] that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgement
is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
4
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c))). A
genuine dispute exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party,” while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact,” and, if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present “evidence
sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant—in this case, Plaintiff—“must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts”
will not suffice.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). A plaintiff “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, and “may not rely on conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d
Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is
“required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party
against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal citation omitted). The Court’s job is not to “weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact.”
Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep’t of
Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In applying th[e] [summary judgment] standard, the court
should not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.”). “Assessments of credibility and
5
choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on
summary judgment.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-54 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation
omitted). “[T]he judge must ask . . . not whether . . . the evidence unmistakably favors one side or
the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence
presented.” Id. at 553 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); see also Battino v. Cornelia Fifth Ave., LLC,
861 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“To avoid summary judgment, all that is required of the
non-moving party is a showing of sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute as to
require a . . . jury’s resolution of the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” (citing Kessler v.
Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2006))).
III.
DISCUSSION
To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that there has been a denial of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the
deprivation of such right occurred under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Section 1983 does not in and of itself create substantive rights; rather, a
plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must demonstrate a violation of an independent federal
constitutional or statutory right.” Watts v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 100 F. Supp. 3d 314, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (citing Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)).
A. False Arrest Claim Against Detective Terrell
A false arrest claim under Section 1983, premised on an individual’s right under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures, “is substantially the same as a claim for false
arrest under New York law.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under New York law, a plaintiff seeking to
establish a cause of action for false arrest must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the
plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the
6
confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged, such as by probable cause or a
warrant. Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Broughton v. State of New York,
37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)).
To survive summary judgment on this claim, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence
that, among other things, shows a genuine dispute regarding Detective Terrell’s personal
involvement in Plaintiff’s arrest. The “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47,
67 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Second Circuit has
defined “personal involvement” to mean direct participation, such as “personal participation by one
who has knowledge of the facts that rendered the conduct illegal,” or indirect participation, such as
“ordering or helping others to do the unlawful acts.” Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155
(2d Cir. 2001). “With respect to a claim for false arrest, this means that each individual must have
been personally involved in the arrest in order to be held liable.” Garnett v. City of New York, No. 13cv-7083 (GHW), 2014 WL 3950904, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d
865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also id. (granting summary judgment in favor of an undercover agent on
grounds that the agent was not personally involved in the plaintiff’s arrest when the agent had no
interaction with the plaintiff during the narcotics transaction that led to the arrest, did not transmit
any information about plaintiff to arresting officers, and “was not involved in apprehending or
arresting” the plaintiff); see also Pittman v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-4140 (ARR) (RLM), 2014 WL
7399308, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2014) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s false
arrest claims against the non-arresting NYPD officer defendants because “[n]one of [those]
defendants physically participated in plaintiffs’ detention”); Travis v. Vill. of Dobbs Ferry, 355 F. Supp.
2d 740, 752-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting summary judgment in favor of officers who were merely
present at scene of arrest and therefore not “personally involved”).
7
In addition, a plaintiff does not have a claim for false arrest under Section 1983 if, at the
time of his arrest, he was already in custody. See, e.g., Walker v. Sankhi, No. 10-cv-6669 (AKH), 2011
WL 13176089, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011) (holding that because plaintiff was already in custody
at the time of his alleged false arrest, his false arrest claim could not succeed), aff’d, 494 F. App’x 140
(2d Cir. 2012); Goncalves v. Reynolds, 198 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Since plaintiff
would have been in custody anyway, he cannot state a claim for false arrest.”).
Here, Plaintiff points to no evidence of Detective Terrell’s personal involvement in his
arrest. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
No dispute exists as to whether Detective Terrell was involved with Plaintiff’s initial seizure and
transportation to the precinct: both parties agree that he was not involved. It is also undisputed
that Detective Terrell did not order, instruct, plan, or facilitate an arrest of Plaintiff on either
September 4 or 5, 2015. While Detective Terrell interacted with Plaintiff at the precinct, that
interaction took place after Plaintiff’s arrest. Because Plaintiff was already in custody at the time of
his interaction with Detective Terrell, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for false arrest based on
Detective Terrell’s actions. See Garnett, 2014 WL 3950904, at *7; Walker, 2011 WL 13176089, at *2.
In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Detective Terrell’s interrogation—
which lasted over three hours and during which Detective Terrell “attempted to coerce [Plaintiff]
into giving false testimony”—leads to a reasonable inference that Detective Terrell “arranged the
false arrest.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 89) (“Pl.’s Opp’n”)
at 6. First, this argument is contrary to the undisputed facts asserted in the 56.1 statements, that
Detective Terrell did not “order, instruct, plan or facilitate” Plaintiff’s arrest. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 10. More
fundamentally, though, an interrogation subsequent to an arrest is itself not an arrest. “A lengthy
interview . . ., without more, does not support a claim for false imprisonment.”5 Lee v. Bankers Tr.
5“False
arrest and false imprisonment are synonymous causes of action because the elements of false arrest
8
Co., 96-cv-8153 (DAB), 1998 WL 107119, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1998); see also Niemann v. Whalen,
911 F. Supp. 656, 666-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Niemann is on point. The New York State Police
investigator defendant in Niemann interacted with the plaintiff only after the plaintiff arrived at the
precinct. Niemann, 911 F. Supp. at 661-62. The extent of the defendant’s interaction with the
plaintiff was his interrogation of the plaintiff regarding the theft of money from the bank where the
plaintiff worked. Id. at 661-62. The plaintiff subsequently filed a Section 1983 action against the
defendant, alleging that the defendant conspired to falsely arrest and falsely imprison the plaintiff.
Id. at 663. The false imprisonment and false arrest claims premised on “the fact that [the plaintiff]
was interviewed” were dismissed on summary judgment. Id. at 666-67.
Here, it is undisputed that Detective Terrell interviewed Plaintiff. However, like the
investigator in Niemann, Detective Terrell was not involved in seizing Plaintiff, in bringing him to the
precinct, or in confining him.6 Detective Terrell merely interrogated Plaintiff after his arrest.
Plaintiff has conceded in his response to Defendants’ 56.1 statement that Detective Terrell did not
“order, instruct, plan or facilitate” Plaintiff’s arrest. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 10. Nor has Plaintiff presented any
evidence to support his argument that Detective Terrell “arranged” the arrest. “In the fact finding
process a trier is authorized to draw reasonable inferences from known or proven facts. But the
inference, to qualify as a fact found, must be reasonable, and, in the context of the known facts, be
one that springs readily and logically to mind and is not one of two or more inferences, both or all
and false imprisonment claims are identical under New York law.” Murray v. Williams, No. 05-cv-9438
(NRB), 2007 WL 430419, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2007) (citing Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 125
(2d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff’s opposition, for the first time in this litigation, asserts that his false arrest claim is not based on a
formal arrest, but instead on Plaintiff’s unlawful detention. Pl.’s Opp. at 5. Yet, Plaintiff has provided no
evidence that Detective Terrell was personally involved in Plaintiff’s detention, formal or otherwise. It is
undisputed that, following the interrogation, Plaintiff was returned to his cell by Detective Terrell. Pl.’s 56.1 ¶
7. Plaintiff does not argue, however, that merely returning Plaintiff to his cell constituted false arrest. For the
reasons noted above, such an argument would be unavailing.
6
9
of which are about equally probable.” Frankel v. Slotkin, 984 F.2d 1328, 1335 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 474 (2d Cir. 1976)). “Permissible inferences must still
be within the range of reasonable probability . . . and it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case .
. . when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture.”
Id. (citing Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972)). Further, “an
inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed
fact exists on the basis of another fact [that is known to exist].” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999)). The inference
that Plaintiff asks this Court to make does not “spring[ ] readily and logically to mind.” Frankel, 984
F.2d at 1335 (internal citation omitted). Instead, it is merely one of multiple inferences that may be
drawn. Another equally, if not more, probable inference is that Detective Terrell, because of his
position as a detective, routinely questioned arrestees, while Plaintiff’s arresting officer did not. See,
e.g., United States v. Tirado, No. 17-cr-668 (GHW), 2018 WL 3432040, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2018)
(criminal defendant arrested by officers then taken to another precinct to be interviewed by
detectives). Plaintiff has developed no further facts, other than the fact of Detective Terrell’s
interrogation, to suggest that the detective was the driving force behind Plaintiff’s arrest. And he
has expressly conceded that Detective Terrell did not “order, instruct, plan or facilitate” Plaintiff’s
arrest.
Furthermore, to hold Detective Terrell liable for false arrest on this record would open up
the door for false arrest claims by arrestees against any person with whom the arrestee has contact
while incarcerated. If a non-arresting officer were to remove an arrestee from his cell to have him
fingerprinted, for example, that officer might then be liable for false arrest. Or if an officer merely
transports an arrestee from a precinct to central booking, that officer might be liable for false arrest.
Plaintiff points to no legal authority that supports such a rule. Absent supporting authority, the
10
Court will not hold that an arrestee may sustain a false arrest claim in these circumstances.
B. Municipal Liability
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against the City of New
York is also granted. “To hold a city liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its
employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom
that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Wray v. City of
New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
Accordingly, “a municipality cannot be made liable [under § 1983] by application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986), but rather the plaintiff must
“demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the
alleged injury,” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
An underlying constitutional violation is a required predicate for municipal liability. See City
of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). “It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff must
obtain a judgment against the individual tortfeasors in order to establish the liability of the
municipality. It suffices to plead and prove against the municipality that municipal actors committed
the tort against the plaintiff and that the tort resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality.”
Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013). “In fact, the plaintiff need not sue the
individual tortfeasors at all, but may proceed solely against the municipality.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The evidence before the Court might support a claim that the officer who arrested
Plaintiff—although not named as a defendant here—did so without probable cause. Even if
Plaintiff had shown a dispute of fact with respect to the underlying constitutional violation,
however, he has not pointed to evidence of a policy or custom sufficient to withstand summary
11
judgment. A plaintiff may satisfy the “policy or custom” prong in one of four ways: by proving the
existence of (1) a formal policy, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; (2) actions taken or decisions made by
final municipal policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff’s rights, see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
483-84; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a “custom or usage” and
implies the constructive knowledge of policymakers, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; or (4) a failure to
properly train or supervise municipal employees that amounts to “deliberate indifference to the
rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact,” City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Moray v. City of Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In addition,
a plaintiff must show that there is a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Triano v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385); see Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72,
80 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A plaintiff must also demonstrate a sufficient causal relationship between the
violation and the municipal policy or practice.” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95)).
Plaintiff asserts that the City is liable because (1) the City failed to adequately supervise or
discipline its officers when they made arrests without probable cause in order to satisfy unofficial
arrest quotas, SAC ¶ 63-64; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8; and (2) the City knew, or should have known, of
Detective Terrell’s “propensity to engage in misconduct of the types alleged herein including false
arrest, use of physical threats and threat of improper criminal prosecution to suborn false testimony,
and filing of false official statements.” SAC ¶ 78; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-9. The Court addresses each
argument in turn.
1. Deliberate Indifference
To succeed on a theory of liability based on either the City’s failure to supervise or failure to
discipline, a plaintiff must make three showings to establish the requisite “deliberate indifference”:
First, to reach the jury, the plaintiff must offer evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that a policy-maker knows to a moral
12
certainty that her employees will confront a given situation. Next, the
plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with
a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less
difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the
situation. Finally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the
city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s
constitutional rights.
Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Walker v. City of N.Y., 974 F.2d 293,
297-98 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the City had notice—be it “actual or
constructive”—that such inadequacy or failure to supervise was causing civil rights violations. Id.
“Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can
hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of
constitutional rights.” Id. at 62. The Second Circuit has recognized that the “stringent causation
and culpability requirements” applicable to a claim premised on a city’s failure to train its employees
“have been applied to a broad range of supervisory liability claims,” including claims based on a
failure to discipline. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Amnesty Am. v. Town
of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2004)).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence that the City of New York had
notice—either actual or constructive—of any deficiencies in its supervision and discipline of its
officers prior to Plaintiff’s arrest in September 2015.7 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim that the City was
deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations that resulted from the City’s failure to supervise
As discussed above, Plaintiff cites to the class action settlement in Stinson as evidence supporting his Monell
claim. To the extent that Plaintiff relies on the Stinson settlement as evidence that the City was on notice of
the practice of issuing unfounded summonses to fill quotas, that reliance is misplaced. The Stinson settlement
was not approved until June 2017. See 256 F. Supp. 3d 283 (filed June 12, 2017). Plaintiff’s alleged false
arrest occurred in September 2015—almost two years prior to the settlement.
7
13
or discipline police officers fails. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
Plaintiff cites to a class action settlement against the City of New York, Stinson v. City of New
York, 256 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), “as direct proof of NYPD’s . . . tacitly encouraging false
arrests.” SAC ¶ 71; see Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Therefore, it appears that, in addition to his deliberate
indifference theory, Plaintiff relies on a widespread practice theory of liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
690-91. To establish the existence of a widespread custom of constitutional violations, Plaintiff cites
to Stinson and two other cases brought against the City. See SAC ¶¶ 62-63. None of those cases,
either individually or considered together, sufficiently shows a persistent and widespread practice.
In Stinson, the court approved a settlement of $75 million in favor of a class of plaintiffs who
brought false arrest claims after they were served with criminal summonses that were later dismissed
for lack of probable cause. Stinson, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 287, 297. A review of the Stinson settlement
reveals that “the parties have reached a settlement agreement . . . without admitting any fault or
liability.” See ECF No. 319-1 at 3, No. 10-cv-4228 (RWS).8 Similarly, the parties in Matthews v. City of
New York, another case cited by Plaintiff, reached a settlement prior to trial. See ECF No. 67, No.
12-cv-1354 (PAE) (“Matthews Settlement”); see also SAC ¶ 63.9 That settlement agreement specifically
provides that “[n]othing contained herein shall be deemed to be an admission by any of the
While Plaintiff only cites to the settlement in Stinson, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to attach the actual
settlement itself to the documents submitted to the Court. Further, the Court conducted additional research
on the settlement and found that neither the settlement—which references earlier proceedings in the case—
nor the earlier case proceedings contains reference to any substantiated claims against the NYPD through the
Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) that would have effectively put the City of New York on notice
regarding any potential constitutional violations on behalf of the NYPD. Although Plaintiff does not cite to
any other earlier proceedings except the June 7, 2017 settlement, such earlier proceedings themselves and
complaints associated therewith do not constitute the requisite “actual or constructive notice” necessary to
establish the deliberate indifference for a Monell claim. See Harrison v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-4141
(RWS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152166, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2017) (granting the motion to dismiss on
deliberate indifference claims, denying the plaintiff’s argument that lawsuits, notices of claims and complaints
constituted notice of insufficient training and supervision).
8
Plaintiff cites to the Second Circuit’s review of an order granting summary judgment in Matthews. See SAC ¶
63. The Second Circuit vacated summary judgment and remanded the case to the district court. See generally
779 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2015). After remand, the parties settled. See ECF No. 67, No. 12-cv-1354 (PAE).
9
14
defendants that they have in any manner or way violated plaintiff’s rights, or the rights of any other
person or entity, as defined in the constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of the
United States, the State of New York, or the City of New York . . . .” Matthews Settlement ¶ 4.
Because neither of these cases resulted in an admission or finding of liability, those cases do nothing
to prove that the alleged constitutional violations were in fact committed. Therefore, these cases are
insufficient to establish Plaintiff’s Monell claim. See Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F. App’x 18, 22-23
(2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (“[Plaintiff’s] citation to various lawsuits involving inmate claims for
the excessive use of force is not probative of the existence of an underlying policy that could be
relevant here.”); Walker v. City of New York, 12-cv-5902 (PAC), 2014 WL 1259618, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2014) (“A lawyer’s citations to actions she has brought and subsequently settled without
adjudication or admission of liability is clearly an insufficient basis for a Monell claim.” (citing
Rasmussen v. City of New York, 766 F. Supp. 2d 399, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2011))); Jones v. City of New York,
No. 12-cv-3658, 2013 WL 6047567, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013) (“[T]he existence of other
lawsuits against the City alleging similar violations of constitutional rights also does not establish a
policy or custom as necessary under Monell.”).
Finally, Plaintiff cites to Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), as
evidence of the NYPD’s alleged policy or practice of performing baseless arrests and issuing
unfounded criminal summonses in order to meet monthly quotas. See SAC ¶ 62. In Floyd, the court
evaluated evidence of unconstitutional stops and frisks that occurred between January 2004 and June
2012. 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 555. The court held that the City of New York was liable for violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of plaintiffs—blacks and Hispanics who were stopped by
police—because the City was deliberately indifferent to the police department’s “unconstitutional
stops, frisks, and searches” which were based on racial profiling. Id. at 658-59. The court also
found sufficient evidence of a widespread practice of those unconstitutional stops and frisks. Id. at
15
659-60. While the findings of that court may be evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional stops and
frisks, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence showing any connection between that practice and a
widespread practice of unconstitutional arrests. Even if the practice of the unlawful stops were
applicable here, Floyd only assessed the practice as it existed between 2004 and 2012. Plaintiff has
produced no evidence that such a practice was still in place in September 2015 when he was
arrested. See Rodriguez v. County of Westchester, No. 15-cv-9626 (PAE), 2017 WL 118027, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017) (dismissing Monell claim where evidence relied upon to prove widespread
practice “was too remote in time because the report was written more than six years before the
events in question occurred”); Melvin v. County of Westchester, No. 14-cv-2995 (KMK), 2016 WL
1254394, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (“Allegations that a defendant acted pursuant to a policy
or custom[,] without any facts suggesting the policy’s existence, are plainly insufficient.” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show that a genuine issue of fact
exists with respect to, a “direct causal link,” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385, between the unlawful
stop-and-frisk practice and his arrest over three years later. His Monell claim based on a persistent
and widespread practice is, therefore, dismissed. See Mitchell, 841 F.3d at 80 (“A plaintiff must also
demonstrate a sufficient causal relationship between the violation and the municipal policy or
practice.” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95)).
2. Detective Terrell’s History of Misconduct
Plaintiff also relies on Detective Terrell’s alleged history of misconduct as evidence of a
pattern or practice. SAC ¶¶ 77-87; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-10. Specifically, Plaintiff describes a February 9,
2005 incident in which Detective Terrell falsely arrested Peter Thomas and used excessive force
against him, SAC ¶ 80; a June 2006 incident in which Detective Terrell “falsely arrested and
physically brutalized Taisha Carter,” id. ¶ 81; a February 2009 incident in which Detective Terrell
“brutally assaulted” a fifteen-year-old girl, id. ¶ 82; a March 2011 incident in which Detective Terrell
16
“brutalized Charmaine Dixon and her infant son, then falsely arrested Ms. Dixon and charged her
with bogus crimes,” id. ¶ 83; a January 2012 incident in which Detective Terrell and other officers
falsely arrested and “brutalized” a teenager, id. ¶ 84; and a June 2015 incident in which Detective
Terrell “made a false official statement and abused process by failing to show a search warrant,” id. ¶
85. The false arrest allegations are stated in conclusory fashion, and the only evidence outside of the
pleadings that Plaintiff cites to is a short excerpt of Detective Terrell’s deposition testimony. In that
testimony, Detective Terrell describes a 2009 incident in which he hit a fifteen-year-old girl twice
and received no disciplinary action as a result. Nwokoro Decl., Ex. B at 62:3-63:22. No lawsuits,
complaints, or claims resulted from that incident. Id. at 62:16-63:3. This evidence is insufficient to
support a claim that the City is liable for Plaintiff’s false arrest here. See Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691
F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that three incidents “fell far short of showing a policy, custom, or
usage of officers”); Giaccio v. City of New York, 308 F. App’x 470, 472 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
four constitutional violations “falls far short of establishing a practice that is ‘so persistent or
widespread’ as to justify the imposition of municipal liability”); White v. City of New York, 206 F.
Supp. 3d 920, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding six incidents over five years insufficient to plausibly
allege the existence of a municipal policy); see also Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 13-cv-4178 (KMK),
2015 WL 1379652, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (“[T]he fact that there were allegations of
thirteen instances of excessive force during arrests over four years (none of which involved findings
or admissions of culpability) during which hundreds, if not thousands, of arrests were made does
not plausibly demonstrate that the use of excessive force during arrest was so frequent and pervasive
as to constitute a custom”).
Even if these incidents were sufficient to establish a widespread pattern of misconduct by
Detective Terrell, Plaintiff shows no causal link between that pattern and his arrest. As the Court
has explained, Detective Terrell did not participate in Plaintiff’s arrest, and the only constitutional
17
violation for which Plaintiff has filed this suit is false arrest. And there is no evidence in this record
to even hint that whatever past misconduct Detective Terrell is guilty of was the cause of Plaintiff’s
alleged false arrest in September 2015. See Triano, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 531. Summary judgment is
accordingly granted on Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in
its entirety.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, to enter judgment in favor
of Defendants, and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 7, 2018
New York, New York
_____________________________________
GREGORY H. WOODS
United States District Judge
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?