Federal Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al
Filing
53
OPINION & ORDER re: 41 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transit Authority. For the reasons stated above, MTA and NYCTA's Motion to Dismiss the first cause of action is GRANTE D. As this is the Plaintiff's only claim against these two defendants, they must also be removed from this case. Federal's claims against Defendant Landmark, however, are to proceed. To that end, Federal and Landmark are ordered to atte nd an initial conference before the Court on December 5, 2018 at 11 a.m. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion docketed at ECF No. 41 and remove Defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York City Transit Authority from this case. SO ORDERED. (Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York City Transit Authority terminated.) (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 10/24/2018) (anc)
Case 1:09-md-02013-PAC Document 57
Filed 09/30/10 Page 1 of 45
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: 10/25/2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
------------------------------------- X
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
:
-----------------------------------------------------------x
:
In re FANNIE MAE 2008 SECURITIES
:
08 Civ. 7831 (PAC)
Plaintiff,
:
LITIGATION
:
09 MD 2013 (PAC)
:
:
-against:
::
OPINION & ORDER
No. 17 Civ. 3425 (JFK)
-----------------------------------------------------------x
OPINION & ORDER
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
:
AUTHORITY, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT
:
AUTHORITY, and LANMARK GROUP, INC.,
:
:
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
Defendants.
:
:
------------------------------------- X
BACKGROUND1
APPEARANCES
The early years of this decade saw a boom
FOR PLAINTIFF FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY in home financing which was fueled, among
Jonathan S. Bondy
other things, by Lepelstat
Marc Richard low interest rates and lax credit conditions. New lending instruments, such as
CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC
subprime mortgages (high credit risk loans) and Alt-A mortgages (low-documentation loans)
FOR DEFENDANTS METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND NEW
kept the boom AUTHORITY
YORK CITY TRANSITgoing. Borrowers played a role too; they took on unmanageable risks on the
Ira Jonathan Lipton
assumption Melzer
Marc Aaron that the market would continue to rise and that refinancing options would always be
HOGUET NEWMAN REGAL & KENNEY, LLP
available in the future. Lending discipline was lacking in the system. Mortgage originators did
JOHN F. not hold these high-risk States loans. RatherJudge: the rising risk on their books, the
KEENAN, United mortgage District than carry
Before the Court is a motion under Federal Rules of Civil
originators sold their loans into the secondary mortgage market, often as securitized packages
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) by Defendants Metropolitan
known as mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”). MBS markets grew almost exponentially.
Transportation Authority (“MTA”) and New York City Transit
But then the housing bubble burst. In 2006, the demand for housing dropped abruptly
Authority (“NYCTA”) to dismiss Plaintiff Federal Insurance
and home prices began to fall. In light of the changing housing market, banks modified their
Company’s (“Federal”) first cause of action for rescission and
lending practices and became unwilling to refinance home mortgages without refinancing.
declaratory judgment.
For the reasons stated below, MTA and
NYCTA’s 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references cited as “(¶ _)” or to the “Complaint” are to the Amended Complaint,
motion is granted.
dated June 22, 2009. For purposes of this Motion, all allegations in the Amended Complaint are taken as true.
1
1
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts and allegations are taken from the
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) unless otherwise noted.
Federal
is a corporation organized and existing pursuant to Indiana law,
with principal place of business in Whitehouse Station, New
Jersey. (First Am. Comp., ¶ 1, ECF No. 13 (filed May 22, 2017)
[hereinafter “FAC”].)
MTA and NYCTA are both public benefit
corporations organized and existing pursuant to New York law,
with principal places of business in New York City. (Id. ¶¶ 23.)
Lanmark Group, Inc. (“Lanmark”)—a defendant that is not
involved in the instant motion—is a corporation organized and
existing pursuant to New York law with principal place of
business in New York City. (Id. ¶ 4.)
On or around December 5, 2014, MTA—acting by and through
NYCTA—entered into a contract with Lanmark (the “Contract”)
whereby Lanmark was to perform various rehabilitations and
upgrades to 130 Livingston Place, Brooklyn, New York (the
“Building”), which houses NYCTA’s headquarters. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.)
Relevant to this motion, the Contract’s Article 8.03 sets forth
alternative dispute resolution procedures under which either the
NYCTA’s Chief Engineer or its Contractual Disputes Review Board
(“CDRB”) renders final and binding decisions in contractual
disputes. (Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A
2
at Art. 8.03(A) & (B), ECF No. 23-1 (filed Sept. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter “Contract”].)
Additionally, the Contract is to be
“governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of New York except to the extent that” federal law
supersedes it. (Id. at Art. 8.05(B).)
On or around September 19, 2014, before the Contract was
executed, Federal and Lanmark executed a performance bond (“the
Bond”), obligating Federal to complete the Contract in the event
that Lanmark fails to do so. (FAC ¶ 9.)
The Bond attached a
copy of the Contract and incorporated it “as though herein set
forth in full.” (FAC Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 13-1 (filed May 22,
2017) [hereinafter “Bond”].)
It is unclear when construction began, but on November 22,
2016, NYCTA advised Lanmark and Federal of ten separate alleged
events of default, many relating to work on the building’s
façade. (FAC ¶ 24.)
On January 2, 2017, Lanmark responded to
each of the allegations in the NYCTA letter in detail, denying
that Lanmark was in material breach of the Contract. (Id. ¶ 25.)
On April 19, 2017, NYCTA notified Lanmark that it was
terminating the Contract as it believed Lanmark was in material
breach. (Id. ¶ 35.)
The termination notice demanded Federal
complete the Contract under the Bond notwithstanding that
Federal had previously advised NYCTA that the Building’s
3
“masonry veneer system” was in violation of New York City’s
Building Code. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.)
In an April 28, 2017 letter, Federal advised NYCTA that
neither Federal nor any other party would be able to perform the
Contract as written because the Contract fails to comply with
applicable New York City and New York State building code
requirements. (Id. ¶ 38.)
The letter attached a report by an
engineering firm detailing how the both the Building’s
deficiencies and the terms of the Contract to improve them
violated the building code in effect at the time of the façade’s
original construction and the current building code. (Id. ¶¶ 3940.)
On April 29, 2017, Lanmark filed a dispute notice with
NYCTA, pursuant to Article 8.03 of the Contract, contending that
NYCTA’s termination was wrongful and constituted a breach of the
Contract. (Id. ¶ 45.)
B. Procedural History
On May 22, 2017, Federal filed the FAC which includes a
single cause of action against the MTA and NYCTA seeking (1) a
judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that Federal
has no obligation to complete the Contract under the Bond and
(2) an injunction enjoining MTA and NYCTA from compelling
Federal to complete the Contract. (Id. ¶ 47-67.)
4
The FAC also
includes four causes of action against Defendant Lanmark only.
(Id. ¶¶ 68-80.)
On September 28, 2017, MTA and NYCTA filed the instant
motion, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), to dismiss the
Plaintiff’s sole claim against them.
On December 13, 2017, the
Court heard oral argument on this motion.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires that an
action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when
a district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d
110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
The party “asserting subject matter
jurisdiction carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence that it exists.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at
113).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the
Court accepts all material factual allegations in the complaint
as true, but does not draw inferences from the complaint
favorable to the plaintiff. J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent.
Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Shipping Fin.
Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)).
In
deciding such a motion, the Court may consider evidence outside
of the pleadings, such as affidavits, to resolve the disputed
5
jurisdictional fact issues. Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. Ltd. v.
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000).
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Court’s charge
in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “is merely to assess the
legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of
the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” GVA
Market Neutral Master Ltd. v. Veras Capital Partners Offshore
Fund, Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 2d 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting
Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of
N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)).
The Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, “taking its factual allegations to be true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court,
however, is not required to credit “mere conclusory statements”
or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A complaint that offers such “labels
and conclusions” or naked assertions without “further factual
enhancement” will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
6
MTA and NYCTA fashion the instant motion as a motion to
dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) recognizing that
where a “dismissal motion is based on the existence of
arbitration or an ADR procedure, it is unsettled whether the
correct procedural vehicle” is Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).
(Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 13 n.8, ECF
No. 42 (filed Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter “Supp.”] (citing
Tyler v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 3620, 2006 WL 1329753, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) (collecting cases variously dismissed
under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”))).)
The Court, following the example of its sister
courts, declines to resolve that ambiguity here as the result in
this case “would be the same under nearly any of the available
mechanisms.” Veliz v. Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc., No. 10 Civ.
6615 (RJH), 2011 WL 4444498, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011);
see also Hamzaraj v. ABM Janitorial Northeast Inc., No. 15 Civ.
2030 (ER), 2016 WL 3571387, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2016);
Greene v. Am. Bldg. Maint., No. 12 Civ. 4899 (DLI)(LB), 2013 WL
4647520, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013).
III. Discussion
MTA and NYCTA argue that Federal’s claim is subject to
Article 8.03 which, they allege, requires that all claims
concerning the Contract be brought in arbitration before either
the Chief Engineer or the CDRB. (Supp. at 13-17, 19.)
7
Therefore, they argue, this Court is not the appropriate venue
for this claim, and it must be dismissed. (Id. at 20.)
In
opposition, Federal argues that Article 8.03 is inapplicable as
(1) it only controls Lanmark’s claims or challenges against the
MTA or NYCTA, not Federal’s, and (2) Federal’s claim arises out
of a dispute over the enforceability of the Bond which requires
Federal to carry out an illegal contract, a separate dispute
from those which Article 8.03 requires be heard in arbitration.
(Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 22-24,
ECF No. 44 (Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter “Opp.”].)
Accordingly, the Court must decide (1) whether Federal is
subject to Article 8.03’s arbitration clause and, if so, (2)
whether the Court is the appropriate venue for what is
essentially a dispute over the arbitrability of Federal’s claim.
A. Whether Federal is Subject to Article 8.03
1. Is Article 8.03 an Arbitration Clause?
It is undisputed that Federal did not execute the Contract
which contains Article 8.03.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act
(the “FAA”) and New York law, however, Federal may still be
subject to Article 8.03 since a “nonsignatory to an agreement
containing an arbitration provision can be compelled to
arbitrate when the nonsignatory is a party to a separate
contractual relationship with the signatory to the arbitration
agreement which incorporates the existing arbitration clause.”
8
Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Lan, 152 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Koeltl, J.) (citing Maritime S.A. v. Marinera,
S.A., No. 96 Civ. 1888 (DC), 1999 WL 46721, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
1, 1999), aff’d, 201 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 1999)); Matter of Int’l
Fidelity Ins. Co. (Saratoga Springs Public Library), 653
N.Y.S.2d 729, 730-31 (App. Div. 1997).
Accordingly, the first
relevant inquiry is whether Article 8.03’s procedures constitute
“arbitration” such that it could be considered an arbitration
clause under the FAA.
In Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London
Issuing Certificate No. 0510135, the Second Circuit held that
Federal common law—not state law—provides the definition of
“arbitration” under the FAA. 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013).
In so holding, the Second Circuit endorsed the district court’s
reliance on two cases that analyzed the contours of
“arbitration” under the FAA. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Fin.
Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir.
1988); AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
Those courts held that “[n]o magic words such
as ‘arbitrate’ . . . are needed to obtain the [FAA’s] benefits.”
AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460; see also McDonnell Douglas, 858 F.2d
at 830.
“Rather, what is important is that the parties clearly
intended to submit some disputes to their chosen instrument for
the definitive settlement of certain grievances under the
9
agreement.” Seed Holdings, Inc. v. Jiffy Int’l AS, 5 F. Supp. 3d
565, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 858 F.2d at
830 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Bakoss, 707 F.3d at 142-44 (finding a clause calling for a third
physician to determine the plaintiff’s disability constituted an
“arbitration agreement”); Cummings v. Consumer Budget
Counseling, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 3989 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 4328637,
at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2012) (finding a clause calling for
disputes to be submitted to mediation and resolved in accordance
with Florida law is an arbitration agreement under the FAA).
Here, under Article 8.03, “the parties to th[e] Contract”
agreed to submit disputes “arising out of, under, or in
connection with” the Contract to a specified third party, either
the Chief Engineer or the CDRB, whose decision shall be “final
and binding.” (Contract at Art. 8.03(B)(1)&(2).)
These
procedures are clearly the type of dispute settlement that
federal common law considers an arbitration. See, e.g, Seed
Holdings, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 577.
Accordingly, Article 8.03
constitutes an arbitration clause under the FAA. 1
1
Although, as mentioned, Bakoss emphasized the primacy of
federal common law in this inquiry, the result would be the same
under New York state law as New York courts have found
provisions with substantially similar wording to Article 8.03 to
be arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
New York City Transit Auth., 82 N.Y.2d 47 (1993); Lovisa Constr.
Co. Inc. v. Metropolitan Tranp. Auth., 225 A.D.2d 740, 740-41
10
2. Does the Bond Incorporate Article 8.03?
As the Court has found Article 8.03 to be an “arbitration”
clause, the next relevant inquiry is whether the Bond
incorporated Article 8.03. Clarendon, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (“A
nonsignatory to an agreement containing an arbitration provision
can be compelled to arbitrate when the nonsignatory is a party
to a separate contractual relationship with the signatory to the
arbitration agreement which incorporated the existing
arbitration clause.”).
While, as previously mentioned, Federal was not a party to
the Contract which includes Article 8.03, the Bond, to which
Federal was party, attaches the Contract and incorporates it “as
though herein set forth in full.” (Bond at 2-3.)
contains no language limiting that incorporation.
The Bond
As such, the
Bond incorporates the Contract and thus Article 8.03.
This, however, does not end the inquiry.
“Notwithstanding
the existence of a separate contract between the signatory and
the nonsignatory incorporating the arbitration agreement by
reference, the nonsignatory still cannot be compelled to
arbitrate unless the arbitration clause itself contains language
broad enough to allow nonsignatories’ disputes to be brought
(2d Dep’t 1996); Phoenix Marine Co. v. New York City Transit
Auth., 4 Misc. 3d 1014(A), at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
11
within its terms.” Maritime, 1999 WL 46721, at *5 (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Courts in this Circuit have long held that “a broadlyworded arbitration clause which is not restricted to the
immediate parties may be effectively incorporated by reference
into another agreement.” Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. Ltd. v. M/T
Beffen, 475 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Progressive
Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela,
991 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1993)).
However, “an arbitration
agreement restricted to the immediate parties does not bind a
non-party, notwithstanding words of incorporation or reference
in a separate contract by which the non-party is bound.”
Progressive, 991 F.2d at 47.
Here, the language of Article 8.03 states that the “parties
to the Contract hereby authorize and agree to the resolution of
all Disputes arising out of, under, or in connection with, the
Contract” in accordance with procedures that call for either the
Chief Engineer or the CDRB to arbitrate. (Id. at Art. 8.03(B).)
This language does not precisely mirror the paradigmatic “broad”
arbitration clause, but it does make arbitration the only means
for the parties to the Contract to resolve any dispute in
connection with the Contract.
Accordingly, it is sufficiently
broad to bind Federal to arbitration. See Ibeto, 475 F.3d at 59,
63 (“Any and all differences and disputes of whatsoever nature
12
arising out of this Charter shall be put to arbitration” is
sufficiently broad to require a nonsignatory to go to
arbitration); Progressive, 991 F.2d at 48 (finding the language
“[a]ny question or dispute arising between the contracting
parties concerning the interpretation of this agreement”
sufficiently broad to require a nonsignatory to go to
arbitration).
B. Whether the Court Can Decide Arbitrability
Having decided that Federal is subject to the Contract’s
arbitration clause, the Court must now decide whether it is the
appropriate venue for the parties’ arbitrability dispute.
The question of arbitrability “is an issue for judicial
determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise.” T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply,
Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)); see also First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); AT
& T Techs. Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643,
649 (1986).
This presumption in favor of judicial determination
of arbitrability may be overcome where the parties have entered
into a separate agreement that (1) employs language stating “any
and all” controversies are to be determined by arbitration or
(2) expressly incorporates the provisions of a tribunal that
requires questions of arbitrability to be decided in
13
arbitration. Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. ForstmannLeff Assocs., LLC,
No. 06 Civ. 1510 (WHP), 2006 WL 2331009, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citing John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 55
(2d Cir. 2001)).
As detailed above, the Contract specifies that the “parties
to this Contract hereby authorize and agree to the resolution of
all Disputes arising out of, under, or in connection with, the
Contract” are to take place in arbitration. (Id. at Art.
8.03(B)(1) & (2) (emphasis added).)
As detailed in the previous
section, this is exactly the sort of language that subjects any
and all controversies to arbitration.
Indeed, the Contract
specifies that the relevant state and federal courts should only
be involved after the arbiter has made its final decision on the
dispute and, even then, the such a court’s review “shall be
limited to the question of whether or not the Arbiter’s
determination is arbitrary, capricious or lacks a rational
basis.” (Id. at Art. 8.05.)
Accordingly, Federal, MTA, and
NYCTA “clearly and unmistakably” provided that arbitrability is
an issue for the Contract’s specified arbiters—not this Court—to
decide. T.Co Metals, 592 F.3d at 344.
As such, this
arbitrability dispute must be arbitrated.
C. Dismissal v. Stay
Had MTA and NYCTA so requested, the Court would have been
prepared to stay this claim pending arbitration rather than
14
dismiss. Denson v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 18-cv2690 (JMF), 2018 WL 4568430, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018)
(citing Katz c. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“We join those Circuits that consider a stay of proceedings
necessary after all claims have been referred to arbitration and
a stay requested.” (emphasis added))).
Here, however, as in
Denson, MTA and NYCTA have requested dismissal, not a stay, and
Plaintiff has neither opposed that relief nor requested a stay.
Id.
Further, this is the only claim Plaintiff has made against
the MTA and NYCTA as all other claims are against Defendant
Lanmark.
Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed. Id. (citing
Spencer-Franklin v. Citigroup/Citibank N.A., No. 06-CV-3475
(GBD)(GWG), 2007 WL 521295, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 21, 2007),
report and recommendation adopted, 2006 WL 1052451 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 5, 2007) (noting that “where all the issues raised in the
Complaint must be submitted to arbitration” and “defendants have
sought dismissal rather than a stay, the courts in this district
have granted dismissal” (collecting cases) (internal quotations
and brackets omitted)).
Because the Court finds this claim can be dismissed on
these grounds, it does not need to analyze MTA and NYCTA’s
remaining grounds for dismissal.
15
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, MTA and NYCTA's Motion to
Dismiss the first cause of action is GRANTED.
As this is the
only claim against these two defendants, they must
Pl~intiff's
also be removed from this case.
Federal's claims against Defendant Landmark, however, are
To that end,
to proceed.
Federal and Landmark are ordered to
attend an initial conference before the Court on December 5,
2018 at 11 a.m.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate
the motion docketed at ECF No.
41 and remove Defendants
Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York City Transit
Authority from this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
October2.Lf, 2018
~'1W[~
~
John F. Keenan
United States District Judge
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?