Martinez v. Lexington Gardens Associates et al
Filing
74
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re: 54 MOTION for Summary Judgment. filed by Blanca Martinez, 59 MOTION for Summary Judgment. filed by Manhattan North Management Co. Inc., LA E quities Corp., Dennis Ovalle, Lex Gardens TP4 LLC, Lexington Gardens Associates. For the reasons stated in this opinion, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted; defendant's cross motion for summary judgment is denied. The clerk is instructed to terminate the motions (ECF 54, 59). As the prevailing party, plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). Plaintiff shall file any such motion no later than September 7, 2018. (Signed by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein on 8/28/2018) (ne) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.
f usnc SDNY
UNITED STATES DISTR ICT COUR T
SOUTHERN DISTR ICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
BLAN CA MARTINEZ, by her next friend, Thelm a
Martinez,
Plaintiff,
-againstLEXIN GTON GARDENS ASSOCIATES,
DENNIS OVALLE, L.A. EQUITIES CORP.,
MANH ATTA N NORT H MANA GEME NT CO.,
INC., AND LEX GARDENS TP4, LLC,
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
-----:---1---+-Il ATE FILED:
--'-ill.. r-=w~- 1--,A
OPINION AND ORDE R
GRANTING PLAI NTIF F'S
MOT ION FOR SUMM ARY
JUDG MENT
17 Civ. 4005 (AKH)
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------- X
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.:
Plaint iff Blanca Martinez, by her next friend, Thelm a Martinez ("Plai
ntiff'), filed
this case on May 26, 2017. Plaint iff claims that Lexington Gardens
et al. ("Lexington Gardens"
or "Defendants") discriminated against Blanca on the basis of her disabi
lity by refusing to allow
Thelma, her sister and primary caretaker, to live in Blanc a's apartment.
The complaint, which
was amended on July 24, 2017, alleges violations of Fair Housing Act
("FHA "), see 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f), the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the New
York State and City Huma n
Rights Laws ("NYS HRL" and "NYC HRL," respectively), see N.Y.
Exec. Law.§ 296 et seq.;
N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-107(5).
Blanca Martinez has been living in the apartment in question under federa
l
Section 8 subsidies for over thirty years. She is severely mentally handic
apped and cannot live
alone. After the death of their mother, Thelma Martinez became Blanc
a's primary caretaker and
requested that Lexington Gardens allow her to move into the apartm
ent to care for her sister full
time. Defendants have refused to allow Thelm a to do so, largely on
the ground that she has poor
credit history and a housing court record. Plaintiff seeks
a reasonable accommodation under
federal, state, and local disability law to allow Thelma
to live with and care for her sister.
Discovery is now complete. Now before the Court are
the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment. The facts of the case are not disputed; the
sole issue is whether Lexington Gardens
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. For the
reasons stated on the record and
supplemented herein, plain tiffs motion for summary
judgment is granted; defendant's motion
for summary judgment is denied.
Background
Blanca Martinez is a 58-year-old woman. She is intel
lectually and
developmentally disabled and has been diagnosed with
Cerebral Palsy. She is unable to care for
herself and requires around-the-clock assistance with
everyday tasks including cooking, eating,
using the restroom, and dressing herself. Plain tiffs
diagnosis is supported by numerous medical
evaluations, and there is no genuine dispute about her
condition, the care she requires, and the
practical reality she cannot live alone.
Plaintiff receives federal Section 8 housing benefits
and has lived in the disputed
apartment for over thirty years. Plain tiffs mother, Mari
a, was plain tiffs primary caretaker until
her death in 2016. When their mother died, plain tiffs
sister, Thelma, assumed the role of
plain tiffs full-time caretaker. Although Blanca and
Thelma apparently have other siblings, none
is willing and able to care for plaintiff. Thelma appli
ed for and was granted guardianship of
plaintiff by the New York Surrogate's Court in 2017
, and she manages virtually every aspect of
plain tiffs life, including her finances and daily medi
cal care. There is also no genuine dispute
that defendants have been aware of plain tiffs disability
for years. Blan ca's condition was listed
on the family's original housing application in 1984,
and her status was noted on yearly Section
2
8 recertification paperwork filed by her mother. Plainti ffs disability was also
specifically raised
at least four times during Thelma and her mother 's attempts to have Thelma added
to the family
composition.
Defendants began receiving requests to allow Thelm a to move into the apartm
ent
as early as 2014, when Maria' s heath began to fade and she became less able
adequately to care
for Blanca. At least five requests followed the first, including one from the New
York City
Human Resources Administration's Adult Protective Services. See Pl. Rule 56.1
Statement, ECF
56, at~ 57; see also Deel. of Christine Clarke, ECF 58, Ex. 16 (requesting that
Thelma be
allowed to move into the apartment "because it would be in the overwhelming
ly best interest of
her sister Blanca"). Defendants have denied every request. Although defend
ants' justification
has shifted in this litigation, when pressed, defendants have principally cited Thelm
a's poor
credit and rental history as the basis for the denial. Specifically, it appears that
a prior landlord
obtained a housing court judgme nt against Thelma in 2011, which was later conver
ted into a
civil judgme nt and subsequently vacated by the court. 1
Despite defendants' refusal to grant an exception, when Maria' s illness became
severe in early 2016, Thelma moved into the apartment to care for Blanca. Maria
died in March
2016 and, facing no viable alternatives to care for Blanca, Thelma remained in
the apartment. In
the months following their mother 's death, Thelma paid plainti ffs monthly rent
on time and
1 After
her request to move into the apartment was initially denied, Thelma provided
a full explanation of this
incident to defendants. Thelma claims that the housing court judgmen t stemmed
from her withholding rent due to
the unsafe conditions of an apartment in which she lived. After appearing unrepres
ented in housing court, the
landlord agreed to waive any past-due rent if Thelma moved out by a certain date.
Despite this resolution, the
landlord then obtained a default judgmen t against Thelma in civil court, which
was subsequently vacated and the
case was discontinued. Defendants have not disputed this account, but the particula
r circumstances of Thelma's
prior housing issues do not materially affect the outcome of this case. Even assumin
g that Thelma has a somewhat
poor rental and credit history, and would therefore not typically be considered
a desirable tenant for Lexington
Gardens, the question remains: Is Lexington Gardens required to make an exceptio
n as a reasonable accommodation
to Blanca's disability? The law mandates that Lexington Gardens do so.
3
without incident until October 2016, when defendants commenc ed eviction proceedings in New
York Housing Court and refused to accept further payments. With eviction proceedings
ongoing, plaintiff filed this case under the FHA.
The parties also raise a handful of tangential issues that have arisen over the
course of this litigation, none of which is material. First, defendants attempt to reframe the case
by arguing that they have not received monthly rental payments from Blanca or Thelma since
October 2016. But the record is clear that the only reason that rent has not been paid is because
defendants commenc ed eviction proceedings and refused to accept further payments. The cited
reason for the eviction -that Thelma was living in the apartmen t without authoriz ationcollapses back into the central issue in the case: whether allowing Thelma to live with her sister
is a reasonab le accommo dation under the statute.
Relatedly, defendants also claim that Thelma has failed in her responsibilities as
Blanca's guardian because she has not filed Blanca's recertification paperwor k with the
Departme nt of Housing and Urban Developm ent ("HUD") , which must be refiled yearly to
maintain Blanca's Section 8 housing benefits. This too is misleading. Because she is disabled
and unable to work, plaintiff receives federally funded Section 8 housing benefits. Section 8,
also known as the Housing Choice Voucher program, is a federally funded program administered
by HUD that provides low-inco me families with federal assistance to purchase rental housing on
the private market. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; 24 C.F.R. § 5.601 et seq. The amount that a family is
eligible to receive depends on the family's income and composition, but the subsidy typically
equals the difference between the rent for the unit and 30% of the family's adjusted gross
income. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.628; see also Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136
F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1998) ("When a Section 8 certificate holder finds an apartment that meets
4
the applicable rent guidelines, and the landlord has agreed to participate in the Section 8
program, the tenant pays in rent an amount not exceeding 30% of the tenant's gross income, and
the government contracts with the private landlord to pay a subsidy equal to the remainder of the
market rent."). Because the federal subsidy varies depending on the family's ability to pay,
Lexington Gardens will receive the same rent whether Thelma is permitted to move into the unit
or not. Id.; see also Deposition ofR. Colon, ECF 58, Ex. 8, at 161:2-23. As part of the
program, voucher recipients are required to complete an annual recertification and report family
changes-i.e. , who lives in the rental unit and their combined income-to calculate the value of
the program subsidy. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.657. 2 The recertification process is a cooperative one,
requiring owners and program participants to certify the family's structure and income. See 24
C.F.R. § 982.55l(b)(2) ("The family must supply any information requested by the PHA or HUD
for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of family income and
composition in accordance with HUD requirements.").
After her mother's death, Plaintiff, aided by her sister and their lawyer, supplied
defendants with an interim family recertification packet that included Thelma, her wife Denei,
and her stepson Ronnald Mendez to the family composition plan. See Deel. of Christine Clarke,
ECF 58, Ex. 36. Defendants responded by letter, stating that "[t]he Landlord will not process
these documents are [sic] presented" and instructing plaintiff to ''resubmit the package with only
Blanca Martinez in the family composition." Deel. of Christine Clarke, ECF 58, Ex. 42. This, of
course, put plaintiff and her sister in an impossible position. Either Thelma would have to leave
her sister without the care she requires, or commit fraud by submitting an inaccurate family
recertification form to HUD, causing HUD to incorrectly calculate the value of plaintiff's federal
2
The parties refer to this portion of the recertification as the "family composition plan."
5
subsidy. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(4) ("Any information supplied by the family must be true
and complete."); id § 982.55 l(k) ("The members of the family must not commit fraud, bribery
or any other corrupt or criminal act in connection with the programs."). The record is clear that
the delay in recertifying plaintiffs Section 8 benefits has been caused by defendants' obstruction
and refusal to comply with federal discrimination law. In any event, this saga is secondary to the
central question of the case, which turns on whether defendants denied plaintiff a reasonable
accommodation. The recertification process is merely an offshoot of that underlying question.
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
Under the well-established summary judgment standard, a "court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "ifthe
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, ... draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and ... eschew credibility
assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004).
Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable is "a fact-specific, case-bycase inquiry not only into the benefits of the accommodation but into its costs as well." Fulton v.
Goard, 591 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Austin v.
Town of Farmington, 826 F.3d 622,630 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Reasonableness analysis is 'highly fact-
6
specific, requiring a case-by-case determination ."' (quoting Hovsons, Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 89
F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d Cir. 1996))).
B.
Reasonable Accommodation Law
"To establish discrimination under either the [FHA] or the ADA, plaintiffs have
three available theories: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact;
and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation." Tsombanidis v. W Haven Fire Dep 't, 352
F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003). This case involves only the third of these statutory theories.
By its text, the FHA makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any ... renter because of a handicap." 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l). The FHA then defines "discrimination" to include "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."
§ 3604(f)(3)(B). As the Second Circuit has explained, this subsection does not "require[] that the
denial of modifications or accommodations be the result of a discriminatory animus toward the
disabled." Austin, 826 F.3d at 627. Instead, a plaintiff need only show "that the requested
modification or accommodati on [is] reasonable and that the denial(s) result ... in so diminishing
that person's use and enjoyment of the premises as to constitute a denial of equal opportunity."
Id. To establish a claim based on denial of a reasonable accommodation, "a plaintiff with an
alleged disability must establish that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA, (2) the
defendant knew or should have known of this fact, (3) an accommodation may be necessary to
afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) such accommodati on is
reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation." Tuman v. VL
GEM LLC, No. 15 CIV. 7801 (NSR), 2017 WL 781486, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017). In
7
other words, plaintiffs "must show that, but for the accommodati on, they likely will be denied an
equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice." Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 578 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Through the reasonable accommodati on requirement, "the law 'imposes an
affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons."'
Picaro v. Pelham 1135 LLC, No. 14-CV-7398 JPO, 2014 WL 4678265, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
19, 2014) (quoting United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th
Cir. 1994)). In general, a landlord is required to make a reasonable accommodati on provided
that doing so does not impose an undue hardship or burden. Austin, 826 F.3d at 630 ("A
requested accommodati on is reasonable where the cost is modest and it does not pose an undue
hardship or substantial burden on the rule maker."); Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140,
156 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Requested accommodati ons are reasonable where the cost is modest and
they do not pose an undue hardship or a substantial burden on the housing provider.");
Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 578 ("A defendant must incur reasonable costs and take modest,
affirmative steps to accommodate the handicapped as long as the accommodati ons sought do not
pose an undue hardship or a substantial burden."). 3
In addition to her FHA claim, plaintiff also raises claims under the federal
Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws,
3
The parties--especia lly defendants-ma ke passing reference to the burden shifting framework developed in the
Title VII context. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell-Douglas
framework, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the stated rational is pretextual. See Reg'/ Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v.
City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to claim of
intentional discrimination brought under the FHA). This framework is not applicable here. Plaintiffs claim is
premised not on intentional discrimination, where the burden shifting framework is applied, but to the alleged failure
of Lexington Gardens to provide a reasonable accommodation. See Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 573; see also 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
8
see N.Y. Exec. Law.§ 296 et seq.; N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-107(5). Their inclusion does not
alter the Court's analysis. First, "Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits programs and
activities receiving federal financial assistance from excluding, denying benefits to, or
discriminating against 'otherwise qualified' disabled individuals." McElwee v. Cty. of Orange,
700 F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). "Because the standards adopted
by the two statutes are nearly identical, [courts] consider the merits of [FHA and Rehabilitation
Act] claims together." Id. Housing discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are
similarly analyzed under the same framework as claims brought under the FHA. See Olsen, 759
F.3d at 153; see also Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
Although FHA and NYCHRL claims were once analyzed concurrently, the
NYCHRL was amended by the 2005 Restoration Act and is no longer considered "coextensive
with its federal and state counterparts." Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N Am., Inc., 715
F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local
L. No. 85. In light of the 2005 amendment, the Second Circuit requires courts to "analyze
NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims." Id. at
109; see also Pena-Barrero v. City ofNew York, No. 14-CV-9550 (VEC), 2017 WL 1194477, at
* 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (analyzing claims separately). "In amending the NYCHRL,
the City Council expressed the view that the NYCHRL had been 'construed too narrowly,"'
Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109, and sought to expand its scope through two rules of construction:
First, it created a one-way ratchet, by which interpretations of state
and federal civil rights statutes can serve only as a floor below
which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall. Second, it
amended the NYCHRL to require that its provisions be construed
liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and
remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New
York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with
9
provisions comparably-w orded to provisions of [the Restoration
Act], have been so construed.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted). As discussed below, this
distinction does not affect the analysis in this case, for defendants' conduct violates both the
FHA and its state and local analogs.
C.
Plaintiff's Requested Accommodation is Reasonable
To establish a reasonable accommodati on claim under the FHA, plaintiff must
demonstrate each of the following: (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA, (2)
that defendants knew or should have known this fact, (3) that the accommodati on may be
necessary to afford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, (4) that the
requested accommodati on is reasonable, and (5) that defendants refused to make the requested
accommodation. Tuman, 201 7 WL 781486, at *5. Because I find that no genuine dispute of
material fact exists as to any of these elements, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
granted.
1.
Disability, Notice, and Denial
As an initial matter, Defendants concede that plaintiff is disabled within the
meaning of the FHA. Conceded or not, there is no genuine dispute on this point. The FHA
defines "handicap" as "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). 4 Blanca suffers from Cerebral
Palsy and her treating physician has stated that she "suffers from intellectual and developmental
4
The other statutes at issue in this case have similar definitions. The Rehabilitation Act defines disability by
reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, which provides that "[t]he term 'disability'
means ... a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual." 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B). The NYSHRL defines the term "disability" as "a physical, mental or medical
impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise
of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques."
NY Exec. Law.§ 292(21). Finally, the NYCHRL defines "disability" as "any physical, medical, mental or
psychological impairment, or a history of such impairment." N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-102(16)(a).
10
disabilities that impair her ability for speech communication, and comprehension." Deel. of
Christine Clarke, ECF 58, Ex. 15, at 2. She is also "incapable of understanding the nature and
consequences of medical, legal, or economic decisions." Id. Another physician has explained
that Blanca is intellectually disabled, is "incapable of managing ... herself," and has an IQ of 52.
Deel. of Christine Clarke, ECF 58, Ex. 14, at 2. According to her doctors, Blanca requires "one
to one supervision at all times and needs assistance in many basic self care skills such as bathing
and dressing." Id. at 1. Her condition is considered permanent. There is no genuine dispute that
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the relevant statutes and that she requires full-time
care. And as explained above, defendants do not dispute that they were on notice of plaintiffs
disability and nonetheless refused to allow Thelma to leave in the apartment as a reasonable
accommodation.
2.
Necessity
Having conceded these elements, defendants instead focus on the necessity and
reasonableness of the requested accommodation. As to necessity, the FHA provides that a
landlord must "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person with equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Defendants contest this element by
arguing that adding Thelma to the family composition and allowing her to live in the apartment
is not necessary because Blanca can "remain in the Apartment and have another family member
or friend apply to take care of her." Memorandum of Law, ECF 60, at 9. Defendants' position
ignores reality and the law of the Second Circuit.
The reasonableness and necessity of a requested accommodation requires a factintensive, case-by-case analysis, see Austin, 826 F.3d at 630, and "the duty to make reasonable
11
accommodations is framed by the nature of the particular handicap," Salute, 136 F.3d at 301. In
the particular circumstances of this case, it is abundantly clear that allowing Thelma to live in the
apartment is the only way for Blanca to have an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy" the
apartment. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Blanca cannot live alone and requires around-the-clock
care. Now that her parents have passed, she has no other family or friends willing and able to
care for her. Either Thelma is allowed to move into the apartment to care for her sister, or
Blanca will have to move out. There is no genuine dispute that the requested accommodation is
necessary.
3.
Reasonableness
The next issue is whether the accommodation plaintiff seeks is reasonable. Based
on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, I so hold.
As explained above, "[a] requested accommodation is reasonable where the cost
is modest and it does not pose an undue hardship or substantial burden on the rule maker."
Austin, 826 F.3d at 630. Blanca suffers from Cerebral Palsy, cannot communicate verbally, and
requires full-time care. There is no dispute that she cannot care for herself or live alone.
Balanced against this reality is the cost of granting the accommodation and the hardship on
defendants, neither of which withstands meaningful scrutiny.
To support their refusal to grant the requested accommodation, defendants largely
rely on Thelma's poor credit and rental history. This reason is spurious and, indeed, for the
reasons previously discussed, may be only an inaccurate pretext. First, defendants concede that,
under Section 8, Lexington Gardens will receive the same rent regardless of whether Thelma
moves into the unit. Salute, 136 F.3d at 296. Second, because Thelma is responsible for
managing Blanca's finances and social security payments, Thelma would be required to pay
12
Blanca' s rent regardless. Third, Thelma has paid monthly rent on time and without incident
until
defendants commenced eviction proceedings and refused to accept further payments. There
is no
concrete reason to believe that Thelma will be unable to make rental payments. Plaintif
fs
immediate, urgent medical condition and need for care make it reasonable that Thelma live
in the
apartment.
Defendants also argue that its renter screening policies, which consider credit
scores and rental history, were adopted "pursuant to" HUD guidance on administering Section
8
properties. See Memora ndum of Law, ECF 60, at 10. This too is misleading. Although
HUD
regulations and guidance allow landlords participating in Section 8 to screen applicants
based on
credit and rental history, that same guidance also instructs participating landlords that "[a]ll
screening criteria" must be "consistently applied to all applicants in a non-discriminatory
fashion
and in accordance with all applicable fair housing and civil rights laws." See HUD Handbo
ok
Section 4350.3 § 4.7. More specifically, HUD's regulations and Occupancy Handbook
instruct
that participating owners must make reasonable accommodations "in rules, policies, practice
s, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped person
equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit." 24 C.F.R. § 100.204; see also HUD Handbo
ok
Section 4350.3 § 2-5(C) ("[A]n owner may have to modify rules, policies, practices, procedu
res
and/or services to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the
housing."). Any suggestion that defendants' screening polices are required by federal law,
regardless of a need for modification to afford equal opportunity to a disabled person, is
simply
incorrect.
Boiled down, defendants' central argument is as follows: "Blanca 's request to
have Thelma reside in the apartment [stet], is unreasonable because it would require Lexingt
on
13
Gardens to violate its own policies adopted pursuant to federal regulations, namely, its policy
of
denying tenancy to individuals with history of rent delinquency and poor credit." See
Memorandum of Law, ECF 60, at 10. The problem, of course, is that requiring a landlord
to
"violate its own policies" is precisely what a reasonable accommodation may be and what
federal law requires. The plain text of§ 3604(f)(3)(B) requires landlords "to make reasonab
le
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may
be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained in the ADA context:
"[b]y definition any special 'accomm odation ' requires the employer to treat an employee
with a
disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference in treatment violates
an
employ er's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act's
potential reach." US. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,397 (2002). Defendants' argumen
t
misstates Lexington Gardens' obligations under federal law, which expressly require deviatio
ns
from neutral rules when necessary and reasonable under the circumstances.
Defendants' other justifications fare not better. For instance, defendants claim
that they learned through Thelma 's deposition that she previously subleased an apartment
without authorization. But such a sublease has no support in the record. Defendants claim
also
that Thelma moved into the apartment without authorization, thereby violating the terms
of the
lease. But Thelma did so only after their mother died, and only because her sister needed
care.
This merely reframes the central question in the case-w hether plaintiff's requested
accommodation is reasonable. Defendants also cite the fact that Thelma 's wife and step-son
moved into the apartment with her, but this too merely distracts from the central issue in
the
case. Defendants never raised any objection to Thelma 's family moving in until after this
14
litigation began, and the landlord previously allowed up to six people on the lease. See Def. Rule
56.1 Statement, ECF 61, at ,r 17. In any event, Thelma's wife and step-son moved out of the
apartment in February 2018 and have no plans to return. See Pl. Rule 56.1 Statement, ECF 56, at
,r 13-14.
None of these peripheral objections is compelling.
Defendants also rely heavily on Williams v. New York City Housing Authority,
879 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), but the case is distinguishable. In Williams, an
allegedly disabled plaintiff sought to succeed his mother, who had recently died, as the tenant of
record in the apartment in which he had once lived as a child. Id. at 330-31. At the time of her
death, the plaintiffs mother was the only tenant of record. Id. at 331. Consistent with the NYC
Housing Authority's "extensive rules and regulations that serve to limit tenants' ability to add
residents to their households," which were implemented according to a federal consent decree,
the plaintiffs request was denied. Id. In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the
court explained that requiring the requested accommodation "would be patently unreasonable,"
for "the [NYC Housing] Authority would find itself whipsawed between the conflicting
obligations of the federal consent decree and the requirements of the FHA and its state and city
analogs." Id. at 338. Nothing similar is at play here. Defendants do not face the choice between
violating federal law and complying with a requested accommodation. And moreover, the
plaintiff in Williams did not seek to move into the apartment to care for an ailing family member,
but applied to be added to the lease only after she passed away.
Although not perfectly analogous, courts have consistently held that landlords are
typically required to make reasonable accommodations to otherwise neutral policies, such as
allowing tenants to own a service animal, and waiving a first-come, first-serve policy on parking
spots for tenants with limited mobility. 24 C.F.R. § 100.24(b); see also, e.g., Tuman, 2017 WL
15
781486, at *5-7. Allowing Thelma to live in Blanca' s apartment in spite defendants' generall
y
applicable rental policies is comparable to these well-established examples, and plaintiff
's
request, in light of the circumstances of this case, is eminently reasonable. 5
As stated on the record, this holding does not require that Thelma 's name be
added to the lease, with the succession rights attendant thereto, provided that Thelma be
permitted to live in the apartment unimpeded and that Lexington Gardens cooperate fully
in the
yearly Section 8 recertification process. Thelma shall be permitted to live in the disputed
apartment only during Blanca' s life as a reasonable accommodation to Blanca' s disabilit
y.
In sum, defendants are required by the FHA and its state and local counterparts to
permit Thelma Martinez to live in the disputed apartment to care for her disabled sister.
Without
such an accommodation, Blanca will be deprived of an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a
dwelling," to which she is entitled by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). By refusing
to do
so, defendants have violated the FHA, along with its state and local analogs.
5
This case is also distinguishable from the so-called "economic accommodation" cases, which
hold that "an
accommodation is not 'necessary' to afford a disabled person access to equal housing opportuni
ty when the
accommodation sought does not directly ameliorate an effect of the disability." Marks v.
BLDG Mgmt. Co., No. 99
CIV. 5733 (THK), 2002 WL 764473, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2002); Salute, 136 F.3d at
301 ("[I]t is fundamental
that the law addresses the accommodation of handicaps, not the alleviation of economic
disadvantages that may be
correlated with having handicaps."). Unlike in cases like Salute, plaintiff is not seeking to
force Lexington Gardens
to participate in a voluntary federal assistance program under the guise of the reasonable
accommodation provisions
of federal discrimination statutes. Salute, 136 F.3d at 301.
16
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
granted; defendant's cross motion for summary judgment is denied. The clerk is instructed to
terminate the motions (ECF 54, 59). As the prevailing party, plaintiff is also entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). Plaintiff shall file any such
motion no later than September 7, 2018.
SO ORDERED .
Dated:
t; v. ~ =
ALVINK.
Augus~ 018
New York, New York
LLERSTEIN
United States District Judge
17
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