Perez v. Doe #1 et al

Filing 105

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 76 MOTION for Summary Judgment . filed by Wilson, Douglas, Martinez, Mayo, Stanley, Castro, Baugh, Young, 71 MOTION for Summary Judgment . filed by Leon, J. Roberts. The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments are either moot or without merit. For the reasons explained above, the defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgement dismissing this action with prejudice. The Clerk is also directed to close all pending motions and to close this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 11/30/2019) (ks) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
FELIPE PEREZ,
Plaintiff,
- against -

17-cv-5200 (JGK)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

CAPTAIN STANLEY, ET AL.,
Defendants.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The pro se plaintiff, Felipe Perez, brings this action
against the defendants, employees of the City of the New York.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights approximately ten times while he was
incarcerated on Rikers Island and at the Manhattan Detention
Complex. Several defendants move for summary judgment arguing
that the plaintiff signed a general release of liability that
bars him from pursuing his claims. 1 Two defendants filed a
separate motion for summary judgment. 2 However, all the
defendants make the same arguments in their motions. For the
reasons explained below, the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment are granted.
1

These defendants are: Assistant Deputy Warden Douglas, Assistant Deputy
Warden Martinez, Captain Stanley, Captain Baugh, Correction Officer Castro,
Correction Officer Young, Correction Officer Wilson, and Correction Officer
Mayo. At the request of the counsel for these defendants, the Court allows
Captain Rivera, Captain Williams, Correction Officer Cruz, Correction Officer
Aponte, Correction Officer Caesar, Correction Officer Carelli, and Correction
Officer Anacacy to join this motion for summary judgment.
2 These defendants are: Correction Officer Jasmine Roberts and Correction
Officer Diante Leon.

I.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
The plaintiff is an inmate who was incarcerated on Rikers
Island and at the Manhattan Detention Complex at all relevant
times. Nunez-Figueroa Decl. Ex. A at 7-19. On February 7, 2017
and February 15, 2017, the plaintiff filed personal injury
claims with the City of New York Office of the Comptroller. City
Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 2. The plaintiff claimed that on November 29, 2016
he was assaulted by an officer and suffered a fractured hand.
Id.; Castro Decl. Ex. B.
On February 20, 2018, the parties settled the plaintiff’s
claims stemming from the November 29, 2016 incident. City Defs.’
56.1 ¶¶ 4-5. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the plaintiff
received $7,500 in exchange for signing a general release of
liability. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. The release states that the plaintiff:
forever discharges the City of New York, and
all past and present . . . employees . . .
of the City of New York, . . . from any and
all liability, claims, or rights of action
alleging a violation of civil rights and any
and all claims, causes of action, suits,
administrative proceedings . . . known or
unknown, . . . which [the plaintiff] . . .
had, now has or hereafter can, shall, or may
have . . . against the [City of New York and
any of its employees] for, upon or by reason
of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever
that occurred through [February 20, 2018].
Nunez-Figueroa Decl. Ex. E at 1. The release was notarized after
the plaintiff signed it on February 20, 2018. Id. at 2. The

2

plaintiff was represented by counsel when he signed the release.
Nunez-Figueroa Decl. Exs. C, D; City Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 3. The
release also states, “[t]he undersigned has read the foregoing
release and fully understands it.” Nunez-Figueroa Decl. Ex. E at
2.
On July 10, 2017, the plaintiff filed the complaint in this
case. Dkt. No. 2. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants
violated his civil rights by assaulting him on a variety of
occasions in 2015 and 2016. Nunez-Figueroa Decl. Ex. A at 7-19.
The plaintiff’s claims allege use of excessive force, deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, failure to protect,
failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference to conditions
of confinement. Id.; City Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 1.
Various defendants filed motions for summary judgment on
December 27, 2018 and December 28, 2018. The plaintiff was
ordered to respond to the motions by February 1, 2019. Dkt No.
64. The motions contained the necessary notice, pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 56.2, to a pro se litigant with regard to
responding to a motion for summary judgment. Dkt No. 80. After
an initial extension that the plaintiff did not receive, the
Court extended the plaintiff’s time to respond to the motions to
October 19, 2019. Dkt No. 101. No response to the motions has
been received and the time for filing any response has passed.

3

II.
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d
1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he trial court’s task at the
summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully
limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of
material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in
short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not
extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving
party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court
of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it
believes demonstrate[s] the absence of genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary
judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from

4

any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs.
Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets
its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the
record and “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on
contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not
credible.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532
(2d Cir. 1993).
Courts should afford pro se litigants “special solicitude”
on motions for summary judgment. See Graham v. Lewinski, 848
F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988); Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8
(2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Courts should “read the pleadings
of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them ‘to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” McPherson v. Coombe,
174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14
F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)); see Monterroso v. Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP, 591 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting
that courts should read the pleadings, briefs, and oppositions
from a pro se plaintiff liberally). This liberal pleading
standard, however, “does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to
meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d
Cir. 2003). “[A] pro se party’s ‘bald assertion,’ completely
unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion

5

for summary judgment.” Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting Carey v. Crescenzi, 923
F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Carter v. Ponte, No. 17CV-1830 (VSB), 2018 WL 4680995, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018).
III.
The February 20, 2018 release bars the plaintiff’s claims
in this case. The terms of the release are clear and
unambiguous. “Under New York law, a release that is clear and
unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily
entered into will be enforced.” Pampillonia v. JR Nabisco Inc.,
138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998). Interpreting an unambiguous
contract is a matter of law, making summary judgment an
appropriate means to resolve this case. See, e.g., Seiden
Assoc., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 429 (2d Cir.
1992). Language releasing the City and employees from any and
all claims up to the date of the release “has routinely been
held to bar claims brought in a separate action that is not the
subject of the settlement, as long as those claims were brought
prior to the date of the release.” Smith v. City of New York,
No. 12 Civ. 3303 (CM), 2013 WL 5434144, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2013); see also Roberts v. Doe 1, No. 14 Civ. 9174 (AJP),
2015 WL 670180, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (collecting
cases).

6

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his
civil rights by assaulting him on various occasions in 2015 and
2016. The release was signed on February 20, 2018 and provided
that the plaintiff released the City and its employees from any
claims “alleging a violation of [his] civil rights.” NunezFigueroa Decl. Ex. E at 1. Because the release expressly
provides that it includes incidents that occurred through the
date it was signed, the violations alleged in the complaint are
covered by the release.
In Carter, a plaintiff signed a release containing the same
language as the release that the plaintiff signed in this case.
See 2018 WL 4680995, at *2. The court found that the release
“plainly bars Plaintiff from bringing any future claims or
causes of action against the City of New York or any of its
officers for any civil rights claims arising prior to the date
it was executed.” Id. at *5. The Court held that the release,
which was signed in April, 2017, barred the plaintiff’s claims
that arose out of an incident in February, 2015. Id.
There is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff,
represented by counsel, did not knowingly and willingly enter
into the release. The fact that the plaintiff was represented by
counsel underscores the validity of the release. See Gracia v.
City of New York, No. 16-CV-7329 (VEC), 2017 WL 4286319, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff should

7

have understood the scope of a general release because she was
represented by counsel).
Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims in this case are barred
by the release. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment are
granted and the plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties. To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments
are either moot or without merit. For the reasons explained
above, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted
and the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The
Clerk is directed to enter judgement dismissing this action with
prejudice. The Clerk is also directed to close all pending
motions and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
November 30, 2019
_____________/s/_______________
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge

8