Gupta v. Headstrong, Inc. et al

Filing 197

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 191 MOTION to Vacate 177 Memorandum & Opinion, 182 Judgment on Attorney Fees, . filed by Arvind Gupta. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to vacate the judgment is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at docket number 191 and to mail a copy of this Order to Gupta. (Signed by Judge Ronnie Abrams on 7/19/2022) (ate)

Case 1:17-cv-05286-RA Document 197 Filed 07/19/22 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

USDC-SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:
DATE FILED: 07/19/2022

ARVIND GUPTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEADSTRONG, INC., GENPACT
LIMITED, and SECRETARY OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

No. 17-CV-5286 (RA)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants.
RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Arvind Gupta, proceeding pro se, brought this action against Defendants
Headstrong, Inc. and Genpact Limited (collectively, “Headstrong”) for wages allegedly owed to
him under the H-1B provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and for judicial review,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, of orders of the Department of Labor dismissing his
administrative claims against Headstrong. In response, Headstrong argued that any wage claims
Gupta had were extinguished by a settlement agreement that had been executed between the
parties. The Court granted Headstrong’s motion to dismiss, which the Second Circuit affirmed.
Gupta and Headstrong subsequently filed cross-motions for attorneys’ fees; the Court denied
Gupta’s motion, but granted Headstrong $105,081.05 in fees based on the settlement agreement’s
provision that any party that breached that contract by filing a lawsuit would pay any fees incurred
by the opposing party in defending against such suit. Gupta again appealed, and the Circuit again
affirmed. Days later, Gupta filed the instant motion to vacate the judgment. For the reasons that
follow, the motion is denied.

Case 1:17-cv-05286-RA Document 197 Filed 07/19/22 Page 2 of 4

LEGAL STANDARD
A court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons: “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b). “Motions under Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and
are generally granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Mendell ex rel. Viacom,
Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990). 1 The burden of proof on a Rule 60(b) motion is
on the party seeking relief from the earlier judgment or order, who “has an onerous standard to
meet.” United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391-92 (2d Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural history of this case.
Gupta seeks relief under two distinct provisions of Rule 60(b): section (4) and section (5).
First, he argues that the judgment is void because this Court had neither subject matter jurisdiction
over the attorneys’ fees motion nor personal jurisdiction over him for purposes of that motion,
because the Court deprived him of due process, and because the statute of limitations has passed
on any claim Headstrong could bring based on Gupta’s breach of the settlement agreement.
Second, he argues that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the amount
he owes in attorneys’ fees is less than the amount Headstrong owes him in unpaid wages. Finally,

1

Unless otherwise noted, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, alterations, and footnotes.

2

Case 1:17-cv-05286-RA Document 197 Filed 07/19/22 Page 3 of 4

he contends that the judgment is not equitable because he is unable to pay the fee award.
Gupta’s arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, due process,
and the statute of limitations misapprehend the nature of the attorneys’ fees proceeding. The fees
that the Court awarded to Headstrong stem not from some hypothetical breach of contract claim
that Headstrong may have brought against Gupta, but from the instant case that Gupta filed, which
Headstrong was compelled to defend for several years. The Court’s jurisdiction over this action
supplied it with jurisdiction to award Headstrong the attorneys’ fees that it incurred in litigating
the action. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Reed Smith LLP, 919 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(“Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it retains ancillary jurisdiction
after dismissal to adjudicate collateral matters such as attorney’s fees.”). Moreover, the Court’s
fee award was consistent with the settlement agreement between the parties, in which Gupta agreed
to pay any reasonable attorneys’ fees Headstrong incurred as a result of Gupta’s breach of the
agreement. Because Gupta consented to this Court’s personal jurisdiction over him by filing this
case, he necessarily consented to this Court’s personal jurisdiction over him for purposes of the
attorneys’ fees motion. Similarly, he was not deprived of due process because he has been afforded
ample opportunity to litigate both the underlying action he initiated and the subsequent attorneys’
fees motion.
Gupta’s argument that the judgment has been discharged because Headstrong owes him
unpaid wages in an amount that exceeds the attorneys’ fees award fails by virtue of the findings of
the administrative law judge, this Court, and the Second Circuit that the settlement agreement
extinguished Headstrong’s obligation to pay him wages or any other expenses.
Finally, Gupta argues that the financial burden the fee award poses makes the judgment
“inequitable.” The Second Circuit has instructed courts to consider a party’s ability to pay when

3

Case 1:17-cv-05286-RA Document 197 Filed 07/19/22 Page 4 of 4

awarding attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson v.
New York City Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Having considered this
factor, the Court declines to further reduce the attorneys’ fees award. Any financial burden the
award may pose does not outweigh Headstrong’s right to be compensated for its years-long
defense against Gupta’s serial, if not frivolous, litigation. Nor has Gupta “presented any evidence
of [his] own financial condition to justify” a reduction in the award, U.S. ex rel. Fox Rx, Inc. v.
Omnicare, Inc., No. 12-CV-0275 (DLC), 2015 WL 1726474, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015), in
spite of the fact that establishing inability to pay is his evidentiary burden to meet and not
Headstrong’s, see HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of New York, 523 F. Supp. 3d 573, 587 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2021).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to vacate the judgment is denied. The Clerk of Court
is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at docket number 191 and to mail a copy of this
Order to Gupta.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

July 19, 2022
New York, New York
Ronnie Abrams
United States District Judge

4