Abraham v. Leigh et al

Filing 554

ORDER: Plaintiff focuses entirely on reconsideration of the Court's October 22,2019 decision imposing sanctions on Plaintiff, and does not offer anyindependent basis for reconsideration of the Court's September 14, 2020Opinion and Order i mposing attorneys' fees and costs on her. (See generallyPl. Br.; Pl. Decl.). Because, as explained above, the Court declines toreconsider its October 22, 2019 decision to sanction Plaintiff, and becausePlaintiff has offered no additional reason for reconsideration of the fees andcosts imposed in the Court's September 14, 2020 Opinion and Order, Plaintiff'smotion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2020 Opinion and Order isalso denied and further set forth in this Order. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 10/1/2020) (rro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBYN ABRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
17 Civ. 5429 (KPF)

v.
ABBY LEIGH, as Executrix of the Estate of Mitch
Leigh,

ORDER

Defendant.
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge: 1
The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff Robyn Abraham’s motion for
reconsideration of its October 22, 2019 oral decision sanctioning Plaintiff and
its September 14, 2020 Opinion and Order imposing attorneys’ fees and costs
on Plaintiff. (Dkt. #548-552). 2 The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s
submissions and is not persuaded that it overlooked controlling legal authority
or factual data that would change its decision, or that reconsideration is
needed to prevent manifest injustice. Plaintiff’s motion is therefore denied.
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the
sound discretion of the district court.” In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 2d
383, 403 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Patterson v. United States, No. 04 Civ.
3140 (WHP), 2006 WL 2067036, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006)). Under Local
Rule 6.3, the moving party must “point to controlling decisions or data that the

1

The caption has been modified to reflect the parties to the instant application.

2

For convenience, the Court refers to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as “Pl. Br.” (Dkt. #548), and Plaintiff’s Affirmation
in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as “Pl. Decl.” (Dkt. #549).

court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected
to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70
F.3d 255, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (noting that the
standard for granting motions for reconsideration is “strict”); accord Van
Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019).
Compelling reasons for granting a motion for reconsideration are limited
to “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Kolel Beth Yechiel
Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2013).
A motion for reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues,
presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple[.]’” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v.
Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa Corp. v.
GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Under Local Rule 6.3, a motion for reconsideration “shall be served
within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Court’s determination of the
original motion.” Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s October 22, 2019 decision nearly a year after the
Court’s determination of the underlying motion. (See Dkt. #409 (transcript);
see also Dkt. #371 (order memorializing oral decision)). Courts in this Circuit
have consistently held that the untimeliness of a motion for reconsideration is

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reason enough to deny the motion. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings,
LLC v. Mathrani, 293 F. Supp. 3d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Cyrus v.
City of N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 4685 (ARR) (RLM), 2010 WL 148078, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2010) (collecting cases). Plaintiff offers no justification for her delay in
filing the motion for reconsideration. (See generally Pl. Br.; Pl. Decl.). This is
reason enough to deny her motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
October 22, 2019 decision.
Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
lacks merit. Plaintiff offers no new evidence and points to no change in
controlling law that would justify reconsideration of either of the Court’s
orders. Instead, claiming manifest injustice, Plaintiff repeats several
conspiracy theories about her former counsel that she argues are bases for
reconsideration. (See Pl. Br. 20-23; see also id. at 13-29). Plaintiff has already
advanced these specious theories, and the Court has already carefully
explained, in several prior opinions, why Plaintiff’s theories are meritless and
unsupported by the factual record. See, e.g., Abraham v. Leigh, No. 17 Civ.
5429 (KPF), 2020 WL 5512718 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020); Abraham v. Leigh,
No. 17 Civ. 5429 (KPF), 2020 WL 3833424 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020),
reconsideration denied, No. 17 Civ. 5429 (KPF), 2020 WL 5095655 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2020). Plaintiff’s argument regarding the withdrawal of Defendants
Honig and Wasserman (see Pl. Br. 20), has similarly been considered and
rejected. See Abraham v. Leigh, 2020 WL 5512718, at *6. A motion for
reconsidering is not “an occasion for repeating old arguments previously

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rejected.” Stone v. Theatrical Inv. Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 505, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
2015). Because Plaintiff has advanced these spurious theories on several
occasions before the Court, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the
October 22, 2019 decision is properly denied. 3
Plaintiff focuses entirely on reconsideration of the Court’s October 22,
2019 decision imposing sanctions on Plaintiff, and does not offer any
independent basis for reconsideration of the Court’s September 14, 2020
Opinion and Order imposing attorneys’ fees and costs on her. (See generally
Pl. Br.; Pl. Decl.). Because, as explained above, the Court declines to
reconsider its October 22, 2019 decision to sanction Plaintiff, and because
Plaintiff has offered no additional reason for reconsideration of the fees and
costs imposed in the Court’s September 14, 2020 Opinion and Order, Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2020 Opinion and Order is
also denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

3

October 1, 2020
New York, New York

__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge

Plaintiff appears to advance one new theory relating to Plaintiff’s participation in civil
litigation in federal court in Florida more than 20 years ago. (See Pl. Br. 22). To the
extent Plaintiff alleges that her former attorney in this case received documents from
her former attorney in the Florida litigation, the allegation, even if true, is completely
irrelevant to the Court’s decisions to sanction Plaintiff for fabricating documents and
perjuring herself (see generally Dkt. #409 (transcript)), and to impose attorneys’ fees
and costs on Plaintiff for her sanctioned behavior (see Dkt. #539).

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