National Football League Management Council v. National Football League Players Association

Filing 51

OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, the NFLPA's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. Enforcement of this Order is STAYED for 24 hours, to afford the parties an opportunity to consider their appellate options. (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 10/30/2017) (tn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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:
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NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS
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ASSOCIATION,
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Defendant.
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:
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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: October 30, 2017
______________

17 Civ. 6761 (KPF)
OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Invoking his authority under the operative Collective Bargaining
Agreement (the “CBA”) and related Personal Conduct Policy (the “PCP”), Roger
Goodell, the Commissioner of the National Football League (the “NFL”), imposed
a six-game suspension on Ezekiel Elliott, a running back with the Dallas
Cowboys, in August of this year after a league-sponsored investigation into
allegations of domestic violence. The National Football League Players
Association (the “NFLPA”) appealed this decision to an arbitrator, who upheld
the Commissioner’s decision in September.
Unsurprisingly, the National Football League Management Council (the
“NFLMC”) seeks confirmation of the arbitral award, while the NFLPA seeks its
vacatur. Equally unsurprisingly, both parties to this action have staked out
litigation positions with specific reference to last year’s decision by the Second
Circuit in National Football League Management Council v. National Football

League Players Association (Brady II), 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016): While the
NFLMC argues that Brady II compels affirmance of the arbitrator’s decision, the
NFLPA contends with equal force that the “fundamental fairness” argument left
open by Brady II both applies to the arbitrator’s decision and compels its
reversal.
Pending before the Court is the NFLPA’s motion for a preliminary
injunction to block enforcement of the six-game suspension. After reviewing
the parties’ comprehensive written submissions and hearing extensive oral
argument earlier today, the Court concludes that, on this record, the NFLPA
has failed to demonstrate a substantial question warranting the extraordinary
remedy of injunctive relief or a balance of hardships that decidedly weighs in
its favor. While reasonable minds could differ on the evidentiary decisions
made by the arbitrator, the proceedings in their totality accorded with the CBA
and the PCP — and, to the extent such an inquiry applies, with precepts of
fundamental fairness. The arbitrator gave Mr. Elliott ample opportunity, in
terms of both proceedings and evidence, to challenge the Commissioner’s
decision before the arbitrator; the arbitrator’s ultimate decision against Mr.
Elliott does not render these proceedings any less fair. Accordingly, the Court
dissolves the temporary restraining order that has been in place since October
17, 2017, and denies the NFLPA’s motion.

2

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background 1
The essential facts are undisputed, and the Court therefore draws from

the record before it. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Realty Advisory Bd. on Labor
Relations, 107 F.3d 979, 984 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Generally, the district court is not
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction when essential facts are not in dispute.” (citations omitted)).
1.

The Parties and the Relevant Labor Agreements

A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) defines the professional
relationship between the NFL and its players. (Compl. ¶ 5). The NFLMC
operates as the bargaining representative of the NFL’s member clubs (Compl.
¶ 3; Answer ¶ 19), while the NFLPA is a nonprofit corporation acting as the
union and bargaining representative of all NFL players (Compl. ¶ 4; Answer
¶ 20). One such player is Ezekiel Elliott, a running back for the Dallas
Cowboys who is now in his second season in the NFL. (Answer ¶ 22). During
his first season, he enjoyed notable success, including being named Offensive
Rookie of the Year, first team All-Pro, and a Pro Bowl player. (Id.). But Elliott’s

1

The Court will refer to the parties’ submissions in the following manner: The NFLPA’s
memorandum of law in support of its motion for injunctive relief will be referred to as
“NFLPA Br.” (Dkt. #32); the NFLMC’s memorandum of law in opposition to the motion
as “NFLMC Br.” (Dkt. #37); the exhibits appended to the Declaration of Jeffrey L.
Kessler, submitted as an attachment to the NFLPA’s answer, as “Kessler Decl., Ex [ ]”
(Dkt. #29); and the transcript of the August 29-31, 2017 arbitration proceeding as
“Kessler Decl., Ex. C at [ ] ([Date of Transcript])” (Dkt. #29-105). References to the oral
argument held earlier today are from the Court’s notes because the Court lacked a
certified transcript of the proceedings.

3

rookie season was also notable for allegations of off-the-field misconduct,
prompting an internal investigation.
Article 46 of the CBA imparts disciplinary authority to the NFL
Commissioner, or his designee, for conduct that is “detrimental to the integrity
of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football[.]” (Kessler Decl.,
Ex. A-58). The Commissioner issues an annual Personal Conduct Policy
(“PCP”) that identifies behavior he considers “detrimental to the league and
professional football” and provides procedures for imposing discipline. (Id. at
Ex. A-16). Under the operative PCP, issued in 2016, where such conduct does
not result in criminal conviction, the Commissioner may impose discipline “if
the credible evidence establishes that [a player] engaged in conduct prohibited
by” the PCP. (Id.). 2 Article 46 of the CBA specifies the exclusive procedures for
resolving “[a]ll disputes” over such discipline imposed by the Commissioner,
and it provides players the right to a hearing to appeal their discipline. (Id. at
Ex. A-58).
2.

The Investigations into Elliott’s Alleged Domestic Abuse

In July 2016, the Columbus (Ohio) Police Department investigated claims
by Tiffany Thompson, with whom Elliott had previously had an intimate
relationship, that Elliott had physically abused her on five occasions during the
week of July 16, 2016. (See Kessler Decl., Ex. A-24, A-44). By July 22, 2016,
law enforcement officers investigating Thompson’s allegations had concluded

2

As the Court noted during its colloquy with counsel for the NFLPA, the credible evidence
standard may be construed not as a “higher burden,” but as an effort to obtain an
evidentiary analogue for a criminal conviction.

4

that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to arrest
Elliott, due to conflicting accounts of the underlying facts. (See id. at
Ex. A-24). The Columbus City Attorney’s Office then investigated the
allegations but declined to charge Elliott, citing “conflicting and inconsistent
information … resulting in concern regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the filing of criminal charges.” (Id. at Ex. A-40).
The NFL’s director of investigations, Kia Roberts, and the NFL’s Special
Counsel for Investigations, Lisa Friel, conducted a separate investigation into
the allegations, with Roberts conducting a majority of witness interviews over
the course of the investigation. (Kessler Decl., Ex. A-44, Ex. C at 261:8-16
(Aug. 30)). 3 This investigation resulted in a report that the NFL issued on June
6, 2017 (id. at Ex. A-44); the NFL then held a meeting on June 26, 2017,
during which Friel presented the findings of the report to Elliott, his agents,
and the NFLPA (id. at Ex. A-45). The Commissioner also ordered that an
advisory panel be present. (Id. at A-45, 7:14-23).
During this meeting, upon questioning by Mary Jo White, one of the
Commissioner’s advisors, Friel represented that only one of the alleged
instances of abuse leveled by Thompson had been found to be not credible.
(Kessler Decl., Ex. A-45 at 151:20-153:14). As the NFLPA points out in its
briefing, Roberts was not present at the meeting, and the report did not include

3

The NFLPA’s submissions are replete with references to intra-league conspiracies,
conflicts of interest, and inconsistent (if not false) statements on the part of certain NFL
personnel. The Court has found that the bulk of these intimations of nefarious conduct
are not borne out by the record.

5

any investigators’ conclusions drawn from the evidence. (Id. at 3; see, e.g.,
NFLPA Br. 5-6). The NFLPA responded to the report on July 17, 2017, pointing
to evidence in the NFL’s report undermining Thompson’s credibility and
offering alternative explanations for certain facts, including the bruises that
had been photographed on Thompson’s body. (See Kessler Decl., Ex. A-48).
3.

The NFL’s Discipline of Elliott Pursuant to the CBA

After the NFL’s June 2017 meeting, on August 11, 2017, the NFL notified
Elliott that the Commissioner was exercising his power under Article 46 of the
CBA to suspend Elliott without pay for the first six games of the 2017 NFL
regular season for using “physical force against a woman in the context of an
intimate relationship.” (Kessler Decl., Ex. A-49). Specifically, the
Commissioner found that Elliott had “used physical force against Ms.
Thompson resulting in her injury” on three out of the five alleged instances of
abuse during the week of July 16, 2016. (Id.). The Commissioner based this
finding “on a combination of photographic, medical, testimonial and other
evidence” that the Commissioner considered “sufficiently credible … to
establish the facts, even allowing for concerns … about [Thompson’s] credibility.”
(Id. (emphasis added)).
On August 15, 2017, the NFLPA appealed Elliott’s suspension pursuant
to Article 46 of the CBA. (Kessler Decl., Ex. A-50). The Commissioner
designated Harold Henderson to serve as arbitrator for Elliott’s appeal. (Compl.
¶ 11; Answer ¶ 32).

6

Before the arbitration, the NFLPA requested that the NFL (i) produce
documents related to the Thompson interviews, including investigative notes,
and (ii) compel Thompson, Friel, and Roberts to testify at the arbitration
hearing. (See Kessler Decl., Ex. A-51, A-53). The NFL rejected almost all of the
NFLPA’s requests, agreeing only to provide Friel’s testimony. (Id. at Ex. A-52,
A-54). After a telephonic hearing, Henderson denied the NFLPA’s request for
the production of documents and for Thompson’s testimony; acknowledged
that the NFL would make Friel available to testify; and further ordered the NFL
to make Roberts available to testify. (Id. at Ex. 55).
From August 29 through 31, 2017, Henderson held the arbitration
hearing. (See generally Kessler Decl., Ex. C). At the hearing, Roberts testified
that she “had concerns about [Thompson’s] Credibility” due to contradictory
statements by other witnesses, including Thompson’s friends. (Id. at
172:21-173:22). Significantly, however, she stated that “[a]ny concerns, any
inconsistencies were completely put into the [NFL’s] report,” and that she
shared her concerns with Friel and other NFL investigators, including her
superior, Cathy Lanier. (Id. at 163:11-165:16, 172:21-173:22, 174:7-11
(Aug. 29)).
Friel acknowledged during her testimony that Roberts had “express[ed]
the view internally that … there was not sufficient” corroborating evidence of
Thompson’s allegations. (Kessler Decl., Ex. C at 301:22-302:2 (Aug. 30)). Friel
also testified that before the Commissioner decided to impose discipline, Friel
informed him that she (Friel) found the evidence sufficient to impose discipline,
7

but that she was unsure whether Roberts “met with the Commissioner to give
[her] views about the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Id. at 322:21-25,
338:23-339:5 (Aug. 30)). When asked whether she told the Commissioner
“specifically that Ms. Roberts had expressed the view that the corroborating
evidence was insufficient to proceed,” Friel replied that she could not “recall
whether it was stated in those words”; later, she clarified that “[t]he
Commissioner was told … that Kia Roberts did not think that we had enough
for a violation,” and that her earlier equivocation “had more to do with the
exact language of [‘]insufficient evidence[’].” (Id. at 324:8-13, 336:8-12, 338:817 (Aug. 30)). 4 Friel testified further that the NFL Report excluded any
investigator’s recommendation as to whether Elliott violated the PCP as the
result of a decision she reached “in conjunction with counsel”; the decision was
that, due to the voluminous report, she “thought the Commissioner would be
better served by … a report that laid out all that evidence.” (Id. at
265:10-266:17 (Aug. 30)).
Elliott testified at the hearing and denied any acts of abuse against
Thompson. (Kessler Decl., Ex. C at 86:4-10 (Aug. 30)). He also produced a
witness, Alvarez Jackson, who was present in Elliott’s apartment during the
relevant time period and testified that he did not see any signs of, nor hear any
complaints of, abuse by Thompson. (Id. at 220:16-221:25 (Aug. 30)). The

4

Having read the full transcript, the Court does not agree with the position of counsel for
the NFLPA that Friel’s testimony was so inconsistent as to (i) be incredible or
(ii) necessitate additional evidence at the arbitration in the form of testimony from
Thompson or the Commissioner.

8

NFLPA also presented expert evidence in an attempt to discredit photos of
Thompson’s alleged injuries. (Id. at 91-132 (Aug. 29)). During the hearing, the
NFLPA demanded, for the first time, that the arbitrator compel the
Commissioner to testify so that the arbitrator could determine whether he
should defer to the Commissioner’s factual findings, as the NFL argued he
should. (Id. at 348:1-17 (Aug. 30)). The arbitrator declined the request to
compel. (Id. at 348:18-349:15 (Aug. 30))
On September 5, 2017, the arbitrator issued an award affirming the
six-game suspension, finding “that the record contains sufficient credible
evidence to support” the Commissioner’s determinations. (Kessler Decl.,
Ex. H). The award’s analysis begins by noting that although both Friel and
Roberts “expressed surprise that they were not asked to make a
recommendation on discipline based on their investigation and report,” and
“Roberts could not explain why she was not invited to participate in the” June
2017 meeting, “their roles fit squarely into the process outlined” in the PCP.
(Id.). The award notes that despite the NFLPA’s claim that Friel’s and Roberts’s
testimony revealed “new evidence” regarding Thompson’s credibility that was
material to the Commissioner’s decision, “all the statements and
inconsistencies [undermining her credibility were] included in the Investigative
report and other materials provided to the Commissioner for his review.” (Id.).
Furthermore, Friel’s and Roberts’s “recommendations were not sought or
required at that point, pursuant to” the PCP. (Id.).

9

The arbitrator then set forth the standard he was to apply as the
Commissioner’s designated Hearing Officer: “[M]y responsibility is to determine
whether the Commissioner’s decision on discipline of Mr. Elliott is arbitrary
and capricious, meaning was it made on unreasonable grounds or without any
proper consideration of circumstances.” (Kessler Decl., Ex. H). The arbitrator
clarified further that his review was limited to “determin[ing] whether the player
was afforded adequate notice of his alleged violation, the right to
representation, opportunity to present evidence, and a decision which is fair
and consistent,” i.e., “whether the process and result were in compliance with
the terms of [NFL] policy.” (Id.). Finding that the record satisfied that
standard, the arbitrator affirmed the Commissioner’s determination and denied
the appeal. (Id.).
B.

Procedural History
Almost certainly as a result of the Brady II decision, the parties

commenced dueling lawsuits in different jurisdictions to address the arbitral
award. On August 31, 2017, five days before the arbitrator issued his decision,
the NFLPA filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas to vacate the forthcoming award and, the following day, moved for an
emergency temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. (See Answer
¶ 74). On September 5, 2017, the date on which the arbitrator issued his
decision, the NFLMC filed the instant suit in the Southern District of New York.
(See Dkt. #1).

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On September 8, 2017, a district judge in the Eastern District of Texas
granted the NFLPA’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Nat’l Football
League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, No. 4:17-CV-00615, 2017 WL
3940545, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2017). The NFLMC sought an emergency
stay of the injunction from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit on September 15, 2017, and the Fifth Circuit issued a ruling on
October 12, 2017, vacating the injunction and remanding the case to the
district court for dismissal, reasoning that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the NFLPA’s suit because it was filed before the arbitral
award issued. See Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League,
No. 17-40936, 2017 WL 4564713, at *1, 3-5 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2017) (per
curiam) (2-1). A day later, the Fifth Circuit issued the mandate, returning the
case to the district court in order to dismiss the action. (Answer ¶ 79). As of
the date of this decision, the NFLPA has not filed a petition for rehearing en
banc.
On October 16, 2017, the NFLPA answered the complaint in the instant
case, counterclaimed to vacate the arbitral award, and moved for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction barring the NFL’s enforcement of
the six-game suspension. (Dkt. #28, 32-35). On October 17, 2017, the NFLMC
filed opposing papers, and the Honorable Paul A. Crotty, sitting in Part I, heard
argument on the motion for injunctive relief and granted a temporary
restraining order until the earlier of either (i) October 30, 2017, or (ii) the
disposition of the preliminary injunction. (See Dkt. #31, 37). Judge Crotty
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also issued an order to show cause that set a hearing on the preliminary
injunction for today, October 30, 2017; directed the NFLPA to post a $100,000
bond; and requested answering papers from the NFLMC and reply papers from
the NFLPA prior to the hearing. (See Dkt. #30). The NFLMC elected to stand
on its initial opposition brief, and the NFLPA filed a brief in further support of
its motion for injunctive relief on October 25, 2017. (Dkt. # 45).
DISCUSSION
A.

Applicable Law
1.

Injunctive Relief

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy” that a
district court should grant only if “the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d
60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d
506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005)). This burden requires the movant to “establish
[i] irreparable harm; [ii] either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them
fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in
favor of the moving party; and [iii] that a preliminary injunction is in the public
interest.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d
Cir. 2015), (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oneida Nation of N.Y. v.
Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Where, as here, a movant seeks a preliminary injunction under the
“serious questions” standard, the movant “must not only show that there are
12

‘serious questions’ going to the merits, but must additionally establish that ‘the
balance of hardships tips decidedly’ in its favor,” and thus the “overall burden
is no lighter than the one it bears under the ‘likelihood of success’ standard.”
Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
2.

Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Labor
Management and Relations Act

In determining the existence vel non of a “substantial question going to
the merits,” the Court must acknowledge the legal framework within which it
reviews arbitral awards. The general principles applicable to judicial review of
an arbitral award under the Labor Management and Relations Act (the “LMRA”)
are well-settled in this Circuit, and last year’s Brady II decision only
crystallized the doctrine.
In Brady II, the Second Circuit, while reviewing an arbitration award that
affirmed the suspension of New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady,
rejected arguments similar to those here and ordered confirmation of the
arbitration award. See 820 F.3d at 532. More fundamentally, the Court
emphasized the “narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential” function that
courts play in reviewing labor arbitration awards under the LMRA:
Our review of an arbitration award under the LMRA
is … very limited. We are therefore not authorized to
review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or
misinterprets the parties’ agreement, but inquire only
as to whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of
his authority as defined by the collective bargaining
agreement. Because it is the arbitrator’s view of the
facts and the meaning of the contract for which the
13

parties bargained, courts are not permitted to
substitute their own. It is the arbitrator’s construction
of the contract and assessment of the facts that are
dispositive, however good, bad, or ugly. … . In short, it
is not our task to decide how we would have conducted
the arbitration proceedings, or how we would have
resolved the dispute.
Instead, our task is simply to ensure that the arbitrator
was even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the scope of his authority and did not
ignore the plain language of the contract. Even failure
to follow arbitral precedent is no reason to vacate an
award. As long as the award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement and is not merely the
arbitrator’s own brand of industrial justice, it must be
confirmed. If the arbitrator acts within the scope of this
authority, the remedy for a dissatisfied party is not
judicial intervention, but for the parties to draft their
agreement to reflect the scope of power they would like
their arbitrator to exercise.
Id. at 536-37 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
footnotes omitted). Viewed through this lens, the NFLPA’s burden in seeking a
preliminary injunction in this case is weighty.
B.

Analysis
The NFLPA’s argument for a preliminary injunction largely relies on the

proposition that the “fundamental fairness” standard found in the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies with equal force to judicial review of arbitral
awards under the LMRA. (See NFLPA Br. 18-25). The NFLPA argues that,
under this standard, it is entitled to a preliminary injunction because it is
likely to prevail on the merits or, alternatively, that it raises a serious question
going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips in its favor. (See id. at
18). Under scrutiny, neither of these conclusions holds water, and because the
14

NFLPA fails to establish a serious question going the merits, it follows a fortiori
that it cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits. The NFLPA
similarly fails to show that Elliott will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief or that the public interest favors an injunction. The Court
therefore declines to issue a preliminary injunction.
1.

The NFLPA Fails to Establish a Serious Question on the Merits
a.

The Fundamental Fairness Standard Should Not Apply to
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the LMRA

As an initial matter, the Court is skeptical that the FAA’s fundamental
fairness standard should apply to LMRA cases such as this one. The NFLMC
initiated this action under § 301 of the LMRA, which bestows federal
jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185. Section 301 “is a source of federal
substantive law” although it “contains no substantive provisions.” Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812 Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 242 F.3d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Second Circuit has held that the FAA’s body of law is
“analytically distinct from” that of § 301, and thus even though “the body of
law developed under [§] 301 will at times draw upon provisions of the FAA,” it
does so “by way of guidance alone.” Id. at 54-55.
The NFLPA urges the Court to import a standard from the FAA to vacate
the arbitral award at issue. Specifically, the FAA provides that a district court
may vacate an arbitration award “where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in … refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
15

controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). This standard allows vacatur of an arbitral
award “only if fundamental fairness is violated.” Brady II, 820 F.3d at 545
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The fundamental fairness
standard that the NFLPA argues for this setting would either be coextensive
with the standard contained in the FAA, or, more likely, would use that statute
as a point of departure for the development of a body of federal common law on
fundamental fairness.
Crucially, the Second Circuit “ha[s] never held that the requirement of
‘fundamental fairness’ applies to arbitration awards under the LMRA.” Brady
II, 820 F.3d at 553 n.13. To be sure, the Court has not ruled out its
applicability in this setting. That said, there are reasons for a court to be
hesitant. For starters, the very context of § 301’s jurisdictional grant over
cases involving “contracts between an employer and a labor organization,”
suggests that courts should not superimpose an extracontractual definition of
“fairness” in arbitrations beyond the actual standards and procedures for
which the parties bargained. As the Supreme Court has long held, courts
reviewing arbitral awards under the LMRA may not vacate an award even if the
arbitrator “committed serious errors.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
Moreover, this contextual difference suggests that courts should be more
deferential to arbitrators in the context of labor disputes than other commercial
disputes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that, “[i]n the commercial
case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the
16

substitute for industrial strife.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). Thus, “the hostility evinced by courts
toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place” in reviewing
arbitrations under the LMRA. Id.
Commentators have also noted that in the context of judicial review of
arbitral awards under the LMRA, a more searching standard of review would
contravene the LMRA’s purpose of promoting efficient dispute resolution. See,
e.g., Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration As A Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 595 (1990) (“A more intrusive
standard of judicial review would have the deleterious consequence of inducing
arbitrators to prepare detailed and legalistic decisions to protect their awards
from judicial reversal.”). And, of potentially greater relevance to the issues in
this case, another commentator has noted that courts reviewing arbitral
awards have been more receptive to arguments raised by NFL players than
other unionized workers, thereby creating unequal access to justice among
workers who participate in arbitrations subject to the LMRA. See Michael Z.
Green & Kyle T. Carney, Can NFL Players Obtain Judicial Review of Arbitration
Decisions on the Merits When A Typical Hourly Union Worker Cannot Obtain This
Unusual Court Access?, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 442–43 (2017). An
enlarged scope of judicial review in LMRA cases would therefore have practical,
injurious effects for parties to collective bargaining agreements engaged in
arbitrations to resolve labor disputes.

17

b.

The NFLPA Fails to Establish That the Arbitrator’s
Decision Was Fundamentally Unfair

Assuming that fundamental fairness has a place in a court’s review of
arbitral awards under the LMRA, the Court concludes that the NFLPA has
failed to show that Elliott’s arbitration hearing fell below this standard. In
other words, even if the applicability of the fundamental fairness exception to
LMRA arbitrations were a “substantial question,” it is not a “substantial
question on the merits” in this action. The NFLPA claims three errors by the
arbitrator that rendered the proceeding unfair; whether considered individually
or collectively, the putative errors do not constitute — and do not raise a
substantial question concerning — the fundamental fairness of the challenged
arbitral proceedings.
First, the NFLPA claims that “[s]enior NFL executives corrupted the
proceedings by concealing” Roberts’s conclusion that Thompson’s allegations
did not warrant discipline. (NFLPA Br. 23). But as counsel for the NFLMC
observed at oral argument, this argument confuses Roberts’s views concerning
Thompson’s credibility, which were both sought by and communicated to the
Commissioner, with her views concerning the propriety of discipline, which
were not similarly sought. The arbitrator found that “all the statements and
inconsistencies” underlying any doubts that Roberts or Friel harbored about
Thompson’s allegations were “included in the Investigative report and other
materials provided to the Commissioner for his review.” (Kessler Decl., Ex. H).
Furthermore, counsel for the NFLPA examined Roberts at length about
Thompson’s credibility (Kessler Decl., Ex. C, at 172:21-235:16 (Aug. 29)), and
18

Roberts testified that she told Friel that she “had concerns about [Thompson’s]
credibility” (id. at 172:24 (Aug. 29)). And while Friel’s testimony on whether
Roberts’ view that the evidence was insufficient to discipline Elliott may have
appeared to equivocate, she clearly testified that the basis of Roberts’ contrary
view — Thompson’s credibility — was communicated to the Commissioner.
(See id. at 324:8-13, 336:8-12, 338:8-17 (Aug. 30)).
Second, the NFLPA argues that “it was fundamentally unfair to deprive
Elliott and the NFLPA of the right to confront and cross-examine the sole
accuser,” Thompson, given that “the Arbitrator assigned [the NFLPA] the
burden of proof on … whether the discipline was based on ‘credible evidence’ in
compliance with the PCP.” (NFLPA Br. 23). Even under fundamental fairness
review, however, arbitrators are not required to apply the normal rules of
evidence that might otherwise compel a right of confrontation. See TIG Ins. Co.
v. Glob. Int’l Reinsurance Co., Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The sole provision broaching the issue of evidentiary procedure in Article 46,
found in § 2(g)(i), provides that “the parties shall exchange copies of any
exhibits upon which they intend to rely” within three days of the hearing.
(Kessler Decl., Ex. A-58). The CBA thus provides no express authority for an
arbitrator to compel anyone, much less a non-NFL employee, to testify. And
given Thompson’s alleged abuse, coupled with the preexisting evidentiary
record containing Thompson’s statements and reports casting doubt on her

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credibility, the arbitrator could reasonably interpret the CBA to decline to
compel testimony that would be emotionally difficult and likely duplicative. 5
Third and finally, the NFLPA asserts that Henderson’s refusal to compel
the Commissioner to testify was fundamentally unfair. (NFLPA Br. 24-25). But
this argument fails for much the same reason as the last: The CBA does not
grant authority to, much less require, an arbitrator to compel the
Commissioner to testify. The Court also notes that the NFLPA made this
request during the hearing, and compelling the Commissioner’s testimony
could thus very well have thwarted the “twin goals of arbitration, namely,
settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.”
Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993).
c.

The NFLPA Fails to Establish a Balance of Harms That
Tips Decidedly in Its Favor

While it is a closer question, the Court finds that the NFLPA has also
failed to establish a balance of harms that tips decidedly in its favor. The
NFLPA’s arguments on this point echo its arguments for irreparable harm, and
the Court will focus on them here. It argues principally that if a preliminary
injunction does not issue, Elliott will suffer irreparable harm consisting of
missed games, which could lead to lost opportunity to attain individual awards
(such as Pro Bowl selection), and “significant monetary losses” that would be

5

Relatedly, the arbitrator acted within his authority in denying the NFLPA’s request for
the NFL’s investigator notes as nothing in the CBA required him to accede to that
demand. Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected an almost identical argument in Brady
II, where the NFLPA sought interview notes from outside investigators based on the slim
discovery provision in the CBA. See 820 F.3d at 546-47.

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unquantifiable “because of the snowball effect on Elliott’s reputation, earning
potential, and overall market value.” (NFLPA Br. 15). But these alleged
injuries are either speculative or deserving of a monetary award rather than an
injunction.
To support the notion that missed games constitute irreparable injury,
the NFLPA points out that an average career in the NFL is “short and
precarious.” (NFLPA Br. 15). Even so, just as in other professions, future
economic injuries such as lost profits are compensable through monetary
awards. See Buckingham Corp. v. Karp, 762 F.2d 257, 262 (2d Cir. 1985). And
any individual honors Elliott might attain absent suspension depend on
countless variables — such as the Cowboys’ overall offensive performance, his
opponents’ defensive performance, and Elliott’s health — that together render
this alleged harm far too speculative to justify injunctive relief. See Tom
Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1995).
As for damage to Elliott’s reputation, cases in this Circuit require a more
concrete economic impact than mere negative publicity to constitute
irreparable harm. Cf., e.g., Church of Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of the
Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that
unauthorized trademark use by “former licensee invariably threatens injury to
the economic value of the goodwill and reputation associated with a licensor’s
mark” and thus constitutes irreparable harm); Rex Med. L.P. v. Angiotech
Pharm. (US), Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (observing that
cases involving reputational harm such as “loss of goodwill or business
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relationships have involved situations where the dispute … leaves one party
unable to provide its product to its customers”). 6

6

The NFLPA’s argument relies on decisions by courts in other districts finding
irreparable harm in the form of actions taken against players by professional sporting
associations including the NFL. (See NFLPA Br. 15 & n.3). Even if those opinions
controlled the Court’s analysis, however, they would not alter the Court’s conclusion
that the NFLPA has failed to establish irreparable harm.
In Brady v. National Football League, for instance, the district court enjoined the NFL’s
member teams from engaging in a coordinated “lockout” of unionized players designed
to coerce those players to adopt a CBA that favored the NFL, and as a result, the
players voted to de-unionize and disband the NFLPA as its collective bargaining
representative. 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1004 (D. Minn.), vacated on other grounds, 644
F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). The court reasoned in part that the lockout could have
eliminated the players’ opportunity to play for an entire year, and the “players’ unique
abilities and circumstances compound[ed] the difficulty in determining the salary and
benefits that each player might have earned in a competitive market.” Id. at 1035. In
addition, a season-long lockout would deprive the players of the skill development that
they would enjoy over the course of a season. Id. at 1036. By contrast, this case
involves only one player and a suspension of only six games. The relative brevity of
Elliott’s suspension also distinguishes this case from Linseman v. World Hockey
Association, in which the court found irreparable harm based on the World Hockey
Association’s prohibiting persons under 20-years old from playing professional hockey,
thereby completely barring the 19-year-old plaintiff from playing hockey for a season
under a contract he had already entered with a professional hockey team. See 439 F.
Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (D. Conn. 1977)
In another case out of the District of Minnesota, the court considered the NFL’s fourgame suspension of certain players for taking an over-the-counter weight loss
supplement containing a substance that was prohibited under the NFL’s Policy on
Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 598 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (D. Minn. 2008). In entering a temporary
restraining order against the suspensions, the court found irreparable harm because
such a suspension resulted in a player being ineligible for post-season awards, at least
some of the suspended players were “central to their team’s chances of making the
playoffs,” and the case involved “substantial questions about the process used to
suspend the players” including the arbitrator’s partiality. Id. at 979-83. Here, the
NFLPA does not contend that Elliott will be ineligible for post-season awards, but only
that a suspension “could deprive [him] of the ability to achieve” those accolades.
(NFLPA Br. 15). And as discussed above, this case does not involve “substantial
questions” about the NFL’s disciplinary process. Finally, the Court declines to adopt
here a rationale that a lessened likelihood of a team’s success resulting from a player’s
suspension constitutes irreparable harm to that player; such an injury is principally
borne by the team and its fans and is thus not personalized to the player. See
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44 n.7, 46 n.13 (2d Cir.
1997) (refusing to find irreparable harm to plaintiff who failed to “demonstrate[] any
injury personal to him”), superseded on other grounds by Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi &
Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012).

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Any such harms, moreover, are counterbalanced by the harms identified
by the NFLMC in its papers and at oral argument. Having negotiated with the
NFLPA over the terms of a particular CBA, the NFL has an interest in obtaining
the benefit of its bargain — an interest that might well be eroded if courts such
as this one were permitted to micromanage the disciplinary decisions of the
Commissioner. What is more, the NFL has a critical interest in ensuring player
compliance with the PCP, particularly in the area of combating off-the-field
misconduct. Indeed, all parties to this litigation are keenly aware of recent
criticisms of the NFL’s efforts to redress and combat domestic abuse by NFL
players. Put simply, Elliott’s personal concerns, while not insubstantial, are
outweighed by the broader, league-wide concerns proffered by the NFLMC.
In sum, the NFLPA has not raised a serious question on the merits of
this case or a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in its favor.
2.

The NFLPA Fails to Establish Other Factors Warranting
Injunctive Relief

The Court will discuss more summarily the NFLPA’s deficiencies with
respect to the remaining factors. On the issue of irreparable harm, as noted in
the preceding section, the harms identified by the NFLPA are either speculative,
insufficient to warrant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, and/or
outweighed by the concerns identified by the NFLMC. Turning finally to the
issue of public interest, the Court finds that here, too, the NFLPA’s arguments
fail to carry the day.
The NFLPA argues that an injunction would be in the interest of the
public, including NFL players, Cowboys fans, the NFL, and “all persons subject
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to arbitration provisions,” because Elliott’s discipline resulted from “an unjust
and fundamentally unfair arbitration.” (NFLPA Br. 25). This position, however,
takes a one-sided view of the public interest. The pertinent terms of the CBA
reside at the crossroads of the public’s desire for the controlled carnage that is
the sport of football and the NFL’s ability to discipline players for off-the-field
violence. With this in mind, the Court finds that the public interest weighs in
favor of denying injunctive relief, as doing so furthers the LMRA’s purpose of
“promot[ing] industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining
agreement,” Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 578 — particularly where the
relevant CBA implicates the ability of those in positions of authority to address
an issue as dire as domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the NFLPA’s motion for a preliminary
injunction is DENIED. Enforcement of this Order is STAYED for 24 hours, to
afford the parties an opportunity to consider their appellate options.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

October 30, 2017
New York, New York

__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge

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