Laser Kitten, LLC et al v. Marc Jacobs International, LLC

Filing 63

OPINION & ORDER re: 22 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Marc Jacobs International, LLC. For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to dismiss the second claim of the complaint is GRANTED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion docketed at ECF No. 22. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 10/4/2018) (anc)

Case 1:09-md-02013-PAC Document 57

Filed 09/30/10 Page 1 of 45

USDC SDNY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DOCUMENT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
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DOC #: _________________
LASER KITTEN, LLC, KATIE THIERJUNG,
:
DATE FILED: 10/04/2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
and WILDFLOWER + CO., INC.,
:
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
:
-----------------------------------------------------------x:
Plaintiffs,
In re FANNIE MAE 2008 SECURITIES
::
08 Civ. 7831 (PAC)
No. MD 2013 (PAC)
LITIGATION
::
09 17 Civ. 8613 (JFK)
-againstOPINION & ORDER
::
::
OPINION & ORDER
MARC JACOBS INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
-----------------------------------------------------------x:
Defendant.
:
:
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HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
APPEARANCES

FOR PLAINTIFFS LASER KITTEN, LLC, KATIE THIERJUNG, and
BACKGROUND1
WILDFLOWER + CO., INC.
Penelope Anne Fisher-Birch
Andrew The earlyGerber this decade saw a boom in home financing which was fueled, among
Isaac years of
KUSHNIRSKY GERBER PLLC
other things, by low interest rates and lax credit conditions. New lending instruments, such as
FOR DEFENDANT MARC JACOBS INTERNATIONAL, LLC
subprime mortgages (high credit risk loans) and Alt-A mortgages (low-documentation loans)
Michael Jay Zinna
Joel Avi Hankin
Kelli the boom going. Borrowers played a role too; they took on unmanageable risks on the
kept Danielle Ortega
KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP
assumption that the market would continue to rise and that refinancing options would always be
JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge:
available in the future. Lending discipline was lacking in the system. Mortgage originators did
Before the Court is a motion, under Federal Rule of Civil
not hold these high-risk mortgage loans. Rather than carry the rising risk on their books, the
Procedure 12(b)(6), by Defendant Marc Jacobs International, LLC
originators sold their loans into the secondary mortgage market, often as securitized packages
(“MJI” or “Defendant”) to dismiss the second claim of Laser
known as mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”). MBS markets grew almost exponentially.
Kitten, LLC, Katie Thierjung, and Wildflower + Co., Inc.’s
But then the housing bubble burst. In 2006, the demand for housing dropped abruptly
(collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) complaint which alleges MJI
and home prices began to fall. In light of the changing housing market, banks modified their
provided false copyright management information in violation of
lending practices and became unwilling to refinance home mortgages without refinancing.
17 U.S.C. § 1202(a). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s
motion 1is GRANTED.

Unless otherwise indicated, all references cited as “(¶ _)” or to the “Complaint” are to the Amended Complaint,
dated June 22, 2009. For purposes of this Motion, all allegations in the Amended Complaint are taken as true.

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I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts and allegations are taken from the
complaint unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff Laser Kitten, LLC

(“Laser Kitten”) is a limited liability company organized under
California law that does continuous and systematic business in
this district. (Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1 (filed Nov. 7, 2017).)
Plaintiff Katie Thierjung (“Thierjung”) is an individual
residing in California. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Wildflower + Co., Inc.

(“Wildflower”) is a corporation organized under the laws of New
York which does continuous and systematic business in this
district. (Id. ¶ 12.)

All Plaintiffs sell goods to consumers in

this district. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.)

Plaintiffs are independent

artists who create products, such as enamel pins and embroidered
patches, featuring their original artwork. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.)

They

sell these products through their own websites and various
third-party websites and retailers. (Id.)
Defendant MJI—a subsidiary of French conglomerate LVMH Moët
Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE—is a limited liability company
organized under Delaware law with principal place of business in
New York, New York. (Id. ¶ 13.)

MJI is a fashion brand which

sells clothing, jewelry, accessories, and other goods through
retail locations throughout the world, its own website, and
dozens of third-party luxury resellers. (Id. ¶ 1.)
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Plaintiffs allege that they are the authors and copyright
owners of designs on numerous pins and patches that MJI marketed
and sold, starting in June 2016, as part of their “Resort 2017”
collection. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 23.)

They further allege that MJI

sold and marketed these products without Plaintiffs’ consent,
permission, or authority. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.)

Specifically, Laser

Kitten alleges it is the author and copyright owner of the “LK
City Pink Cop Car Pin”; Thierjung alleges that she is the author
and copyright of holder of the “Parrot Pin,” the “Highball Pin,”
and the “Margarita Pin”; and Wildflower alleges it is the author
and copyright owner of the “Rose Champagne Patch” (collectively,
the “Designs”). (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.)

The complaint contains

depictions of the Designs and their MJI equivalents. (Id. ¶¶ 1719, 22, Ex. B & C.)
On November 23, 2016, Plaintiff Laser Kitten sent MJI a
cease-and-desist letter asserting MJI’s infringement of several
designs including the “LK City Pink Cop Car Pin.” (Def.’s Mem.
of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 3 & Ex. 1, ECF No. 23
(filed Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter “Supp.”].)

On January 23,

2017, Plaintiffs Wildflower and Thierjung (through her brand
“The Uncommon Place”) sent MJI a cease-and-desist letter
asserting MJI’s infringement of the “Parrot Pin,” “Highball
Pun,” and the “Margarita Pin.” (Compl. ¶ 24; Supp. at 3 & Ex.
2.)

Nevertheless, MJI continued marketing and selling products
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infringing on the Designs in its “Resort 2017” and Spring 2017
collections. (Id. ¶ 24.)

As of the filing of this complaint,

MJI and other retailers continue to market, display, and sell
products infringing upon the Designs. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
B. Procedural History
On November 7, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging
that MJI had (1) committed copyright infringement in violation
of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 and (2) provided false copyright
management information (“CMI”) in violation of 17 U.S.C. §
1202(a). (Id. ¶¶ 32-45.)
On February 6, 2018, MJI filed this motion, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the second claim.
II. Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The Court’s charge

in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “is merely to assess the
legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of
the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” GVA
Market Neutral Master Ltd. v. Veras Capital Partners Offshore
Fund, Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 2d 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting

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Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of
N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)).
The Court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, “taking its factual allegations to
be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).

The

Court, however, is not required to credit “mere conclusory
statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A complaint that offers

such “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions” without
“further factual enhancement” will not survive a motion to
dismiss. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
III. Discussion
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) makes it
unlawful to knowingly, and with the intent to “induce, enable,
facilitate, or conceal infringement,” either “provide” or
“distribute” false CMI. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a).

Accordingly, to

plead a violation of § 1202(a), a plaintiff must plausibly
allege (1) “that defendant knowingly provided false [CMI]” and
(2) “that defendant did so with the intent to induce, enable,
facilitate, or conceal an infringement.” Krechmer v. Tantaros,
No. 14-4061-cv, 2018 WL 4044048, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2018)
(summary order). See also Aaberg v. Francesca’s Collections,
Inc., No. 17-cv-115 (AJN), 2018 WL 1583037, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
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27, 2018); Ward v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429,
449 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Kaplan, J.).
MJI argues that Plaintiffs did not adequately plead their §
1202(a) claim because (1) they failed to adequately allege that
MJI provided false CMI in connection with the accused products,
(2) even if it had, they failed to allege that MJI possessed the
knowledge that it was distributing false CMI, and (3) they
failed to allege that MJI placed its branding on the allegedly
infringing products with the intent “to induce, enable,
facilitate, or clean an infringement.” (Supp. at 5-11.)
A. Plaintiffs Fail to Adequately Allege MJI Provided
False CMI
MJI’s initial argument is that Plaintiffs failed to
adequately allege MJI provided false CMI under § 1202(a) in
connection with the Designs as none of the information
Plaintiffs allege MJI provided constitutes CMI under Section
1202(c). (Id. at 5-7.)
There appear to be few cases that analyze what constitutes
“false CMI” under § 1202(a). 1

District courts that have

1

Neither Defendant nor Plaintiffs provided any authority addressing how a
court determines “false CMI” under § 1202(a). Neither of the two cases
Defendant uses in its argument address (1) when CMI is false, (2) a
defendant’s use of CMI, or (3) a § 1202(a) claim. See IQ Grp. v. Wiesner
Publ’g Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597-98 (D.N.J. 2006) (addressing whether a
plaintiff’s information was actual CMI in a § 1202(b) case); Aardwolf
Industries, LLC v. Abaco Machines USA, Inc., No. CV 16-1968-GW(JEMx), 2016 WL
9275401, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (same). Similarly, the vast
majority of the Plaintiffs’ cited cases do not address what constitutes
“false CMI.” See Aaberg, 2018 WL 1583037, at *6-9; Mackenzie Architects, PC

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considered the issue have implemented a two-step standard in
which they determine (1) whether information defendant provided
in connection with the allegedly infringing work is CMI under §
1202(c)’s definition and, if it is CMI, (2) whether that
information was false. SellPoolSuppliesOnline.com LLC v. Ugly
Pools Arizona, Inc., No. CV-15-01856-PHX-BSB, 2018 WL 4565901,
at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2018); see also Drauglis v. Kappa Map
Group, LLC, 128 F. Supp. 3d 46, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Because
the copyright notice to which plaintiff objects was not
‘conveyed in connection with’ the [infringed work], the Court
finds that it does not constitute [CMI] with regard to the
[infringed work], and plaintiff’s claim for falsification of CMI
therefore fails”); Watson v. Kappa Map Group, LLC, No. 1:14-cv100-TWT, 2015 WL 3932425, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2015)
(because information posted with an allegedly infringing photo
did not meet the definition of CMI under § 1202(c), it “cannot
be the basis for a claim for falsification of CMI under §
1202(a)”).

Accordingly, the first task for this Court is to

determine whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that MJI

v. VLG Real Estates Developers, LLC , 1:15-cv-1105, 2016 WL 4703736, at *11
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2016); Williams v. Cavalli S.p.A., No. CV 14-6659AB(JEMx), 2015 WL 1247065, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015) (deciding a §
1202(b) claim); Cable v. Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977, 979-81
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (deciding a § 1202(b) claim); Agence France Presse v. Morel,
769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Pauley, J.); Associated Press v.
All Headline News Corp. et al., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(Castel, J.) (deciding a § 1202(b) claim); Interplan Architect, Inc. v. C.L.
Thomas, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-3181, 2009 WL 6443117, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13,
2009).

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provided information that meets § 1202(c)’s CMI definition.

To

be CMI under § 1202(c), information must (1) be “conveyed in
connection with” copies or displays of a work and (2) be the
type of information detailed in § 1202(c)(1) to (8).
U.S.C. § 1202(c).

See 17

As relevant here, that CMI can be the name or

identifying information about the author or copyright owner of
the work in question or can be identifying numbers, symbols, or
links referring to such information. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2),
(3) & (7).
Here, as to Laser Kitten’s “LK City Pink Cop Car Pin” and
Thierjung’s “Parrot Pin,” Plaintiffs have alleged that MJI (1)
replaced Plaintiffs’ CMI with its own, (2) “placed its own
branding on the packaging” of products that infringe on these
designs, and (3) “conveyed new, false titles” in connection with
these designs. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 42.)

The first and last

allegations are conclusory as they make legal conclusions
without further factual enhancement.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Accordingly, the complaint lacks any facts that plausibly allege
that MJI’s “branding” is CMI under § 1202(c).

Thus, as to these

two designs, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged MJI provided
CMI and have failed to state a § 1202(a) falsity claim. See
Drauglis, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 61.
As to Thierjung’s “Highball Pin” and “Margarita Pin” and
Wildflower’s “Rose Champagne Patch,” Plaintiffs have made the
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same conclusory allegations that MJI replaced Plaintiff’s CMI
with its own and “conveyed new, false titles” in connection with
these designs along with the allegation that MJI “placed its own
branding on the packaging.” (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 42.)

However,

Plaintiffs have also provided photographs of what appear to be
pins and patches similar in appearance to these three designs
attached to packaging that reads “Marc Jacobs” in stylized
writing, but is otherwise blank. (Id. ¶ 22; Ex. B.)

Making

every favorable inference in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court
infers that the packaging and words “Marc Jacobs”—as depicted in
the photographs—are the “branding” and the CMI referenced in the
complaint and that Plaintiffs are alleging this “branding”
conveyed false title. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 42.)
Defendant argues that the inclusion of this branding—which
it describes as a trademark—on the packaging does not convey CMI
because trademarks do not provide information about copyright
ownership without something more, such as a copyright symbol.
(Supp. at 7 (citing IQ Grp., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Aardwolf,
2016 WL 9275401, at *10).)

As such, MJI argues, the information

provided fails to meet any of § 1202(c)’s definitions of CMI
and, therefore, the complaint fails to sufficiently plead a §
1202(a) claim.

Plaintiffs respond that the branding is

sufficient as (1) “trademark information may constitute CMI if
it is used to signal authorship of a copyrighted work, as it is
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here” (Pls.’ Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 24
(filed Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter “Opp.”] (quoting GC2 Inc. v.
Int’l Game Tech. PLC, 255 F. Supp. 3d 812, 822 (N.D. Ill.
2017))); (2) the Marc Jacobs name qualifies as CMI as it conveys
“identifying information about” an author or copyright owner and
is an identifying symbol referring to copyright information
(Opp. at 4 (citing § 1202(c)(2),(3) & (7)); and (3) Defendant’s
allegations that a trademark on packaging alone without
something more is incorrect as a matter of law. (Id. at 4-5
(collecting cases).)
In Aaberg, which the Plaintiffs described in a postbriefing letter to this Court as a decision that “denies a
motion to dismiss nearly identical claims under 17 U.S.C. §
1202(a)” (ECF No. 30 (filed Feb. 28, 2018)), a court in this
district found that including “some combination of a trade or
brand name, a logo, and a website address” with a pin was
“[c]ollectively . . . sufficient to identify the copyright
owning” plaintiff and thus that information qualified as CMI
under either § 1202(c)(3) or § 1202(c)(7). 2018 WL 1583037, at
*7 (citations omitted).

A close reading of the paragraphs of

the complaint which Judge Nathan cited in this holding reveals
that, at a minimum, the plaintiffs included at least two of the
following on the pin itself or its packaging (or both):

the

copyright holder’s name, trade name, or brand name; logo; and
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website or social media handle. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 36
to 46, Aaberg et al. v. Francesca’s Collections, Inc. et al.,
No. 17 Civ. 115 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018), ECF No. 43.)
Additionally, in all cases, the plaintiffs pleaded that this
information “serves to identify [an individual plaintiff] as the
author and copyright owner of [the relevant pin].” (Id.)
Additionally, the GC2 court held that a trademark is CMI when it
is used to signal authorship of a copyrighted work which, the
court found, was the case because the plaintiff included a
trademark logo on its artwork and both parties had “agreed to
this designation.” 255 F. Supp. 3d at 822.
Here, the complaint fails to provide factual allegations
detailing what the “branding” was and the pictures only show the
stylized words “Marc Jacobs” with nothing more.

This falls far

below what the Aaberg court found was sufficient to plead CMI.
Further, there are no allegations that MJI’s “branding” signaled
authorship or copyright ownership over the Plaintiffs’ works,
other than the complaint’s allegation that Defendant’s “conveyed
new, false titles in connection” with these designs. (Compl. ¶
42.)

This allegation is conclusory—and thus the Court need not

take notice of it—as Plaintiffs have offered no facts as to how
MJI conveyed this false title. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The

lack of allegations that MJI’s branding signaled authorship or
copyright ownership is particularly fatal to an attempt to
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allege CMI because the “point of CMI is to inform the public
that something is copyrighted” (Aaberg, 2018 WL 1583037, at *7
(quoting Pers. Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, No.
11-cv-5177, 2012 WL 414803, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012)) and
because all three of the § 1202(c) subsections Plaintiffs cite
require the information be about the author or copyright holder
of a work. See § 1202(c)(2),(3) & (7). See also Tomelleri v.
Zazzle, Inc., No. 13-cv-2576-EFM-TJJ, 2015 WL 8375083, at *12
(D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2015) (finding no false CMI under § 1202(a)
where plaintiff’s failed to allege facts from which the court
could infer a claim of ownership or authorship).

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded that MJI’s “branding”
conveyed with Thierjung’s “Highball Pin” and “Margarita Pin” and
Wildflower’s “Rose Champagne Patch” was CMI and thus their §
1202(a) claim must fail.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that MJI conveyed false CMI with any of the
Designs, it does not need to analyze MJI’s remaining grounds for
dismissal.
B. Leave to Amend
Though Plaintiffs do not appear to have requested leave to
amend their complaint, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure instructs courts to “freely give leave” to amend “when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
12

Amendment is

not warranted, however, "absent some indication as to what [a
plaintiff] might add to [its] complaint in order to make it
viable." Shemian v. Research In Motion Ltd., 570 F. App'x 32, 37
(2d:Cir. 2014)

(quoting Horoshko v. Citibank, N.A., 373 F.3d

248, 249 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' second claim is dismissed without
Should Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint,

prejudice.

they must demonstrate how they will cure the deficiencies in
these claims and that justice requires granting leave to amend.
Such demonstration shall be filed within 30 days of the date of
this Opinion.
Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to dismiss
the second claim of the complaint is GRANTED without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate
the motion docketed at ECF No. 22.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

New York, New York
October'(. , 2018
United States District Judge

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