Schultz v. Chen
Filing
18
OPINION re: 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Barbara Schultz. Plaintiff Barbara Schultz ("Schultz" or the "Plaintiff") has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment against Defendant Martin Chen ("Chen" or the "Defendant"). (As further set forth in this Order.) For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/20/2018) (cf)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------x
BARBARA SCHULTZ,
17 Civ. 8917
Plaintiff,
(RWS)
OPINION
-againstMARTIN CHEN,
Defendant.
-------------------------------------x .
APPEARANCES:
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BARRY McTIERNAN & MOORE LLC
2 Rector Street, 14 t h Floor
101 Greenwich Street
New York, New York 10006
By:
David H. Schultz, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
DeCICCO, GIBBONS & McNAMARA, P.C.
232 Madison Avenue, Suite 1409
New York, New York 10016
By: William A. Fitzgerald, Esq.
1
..,
......... .... ,,. . ......,
Sweet, D.J.
Plaintiff Barbara Schultz ("Schultz " or the
"Plaintiff") has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Ci vil
Procedure 56 for summary judgment against Defendant Martin Chen
("Chen" or the "Defendant"). Plaintiff seeks recovery for
personal injuries sustained as the result of a December 4, 2016
motor vehicle accident that occurred on Central Park West
between West 94 th Street and West 95 th Street in New York City.
Based on the facts and conclusions set forth below, Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.
Prior Proceedings
Plaintiff filed the complaint (the "Complaint") on
November 15, 2017 against Defendant, alleging claims of
negligence as a matter of law in violation of Vehicle and
Traffic Law§ 1129(a), and as a matter of common law .
(See Dkt.
No. 1.) On December 19, 2017 , Plaintiff moved for summary
judgment. The instant motion was heard and marked fully
submitted on February 15l 2018.
2
II.
The Facts
Th e fa ct s hav e been set f o rth in Plaintiff's and
Defendant's Sta t eme nts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5 6 .l (a ) , and
are not in dispute e x cept as noted below.
Defendant is the owner and operator o f a 2 013
Vo lkswagen bearing li c ense plate number GBC 6 98 9 (the "Chen
Ve hicle" ) .
( Chen Af f. ':II 3 1 .) On De c ember 4, 2016, at dusk, the
Chen Vehicle struck a motor vehi c l e operated b y Plaintiff's
husband (the "Schultz Vehicle"), o f which Plaintiff was a fr o nt
seat passenger.
( See B. Sc hultz Aff. ':II 4; P. Sc hultz Aff. ':II 4;
Chen Af f. ':II 3 . )
Pri o r to the accident, at appro x imat e l y 5:00 p.m., Mr.
Schultz had stopped the Sc hultz Vehicle in fr o nt o f 350 Central
Park West between West 94 th Street and W st 9 5 th Stre et to drop
e
Plaintiff o ff at a relati v e's apartment.
2
(See B. Sc hultz Aff. ':II
2; P. Sc hultz Aff. ':II 2.) Once Plaintiff left the vehicle, Mr.
Ci tations to " B. Schul t z Aff ." refer to the affidavit of Plaintiff
Barbara Schultz dated December 13 , 2017 , (Ex . C, Dkt . No . 7 ) , citat i ons to
"P . Schu l tz Aff ." r e fer to t he affidavit o f Pl aintif f' s husband , K. Paul
Schultz , dated December 13 , 2017 , (Ex . D, Dkt . No . . 7 ) , and citations t o " Chen
Af f." refer to the affidavit of Defendan t Chen , dated January 11 , 2018 , (Ex .
A, Dkt . No . 14) .
2
Central Park We s t between West 94 th Street and West 95 th Street i n New
York Ci ty is a two - way r oad with two lanes for trave l. (See B . Schultz Aff . 1
3 ; P . Schultz Aff . 1 3 . ) A third l ane i n each di r ect i on is dedicated
exclus ively to parking . (See P . Schultz Aff . 1 4 ; B. Schultz Aff . 1 4 . )
3
Schultz intended to either park the car in an open spot on a
side street or in a parking garage.
Schultz Aff.
~
(See B. Schultz Aff.
~
3; P.
3.) In light of the fact that there were vehicles
in the southbound parking lane in front of 350 Central Park
West, Mr. Schultz stopped the vehicle in the rightmost lane for
southbound travel.
(See B. Schultz Aff.
~
4; P. Schultz Aff.
~
4.)
Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Schultz activated the
vehicle's blinking rear lights as he approached the building,
and then brought the vehicle to a stop in fro~t of 350 Central
Park West.
(See B. Schultz Aff.
~
5; P. Schultz Aff.
~
5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Schultz did not turn off the
blinking rear lights.
~
(See B. Schultz Aff.
~
6; P. Schultz Aff.
6.) Defendant contests that the Schultz Vehicle's lights were
ever blinking.
(Chen Aff.
~
5.) The Schultz Vehicle remained in
this position for approximately one to two minutes while Mr.
Schultz and the Plaintiff had a discussion concerning packages
they had brought to a relative.
Schultz Aff.
~
(See B. Schultz Aff.
~
7; P.
7.)
Defendant was traveling at a speed of 20 to 25 miles
per hour in the right lane of Central Park West when another car
that was directly in front of Defendant's vehicle, not the
4
Schultz Vehicle, swerved suddenly into the left lane.
(Chen Aff.
1 5.) Defendant applied his brakes immediately after observing
the Schultz Vehicle, but was unable to stop his vehicle before
it struck the rear bumper of the Schultz Vehicle.
(Chen Aff. 1
6.) According to the Plaintiff, the Schultz Vehicle was stopped
in traffic when it was struck in the rear by the Chen Vehicle.
(See B. Schultz Aff. 1 8; P. Schultz Aff. 1 8.)
Plaintiff suffered physical injuries as a result of
this collision.
at the scene.
(See id.) After the incident, the police arrived
(See B. Schultz Aff. 1 9; P. Schultz Aff. 1 9.)
III. The Applicable Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and .
. the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The relevant inquiry on application for summary judgment
is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. A
5
court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining
its truth, but with determining whether there is a genuine issue
for trial. Westinghouse Elec. Corp . v. N.Y.C.
F. Supp. 12 05 , 1212 (S .D.N. Y. 1990)
Transit Auth., 735
(quoting Anderson , 477 U.S.
at 249) . "The moving party is 'e ntitled to a judgment as a
matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett , 477 U.S. 317 , 323 ( 1 986). "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247 -4 8 (emphasis in origina l ) .
IV.
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted negligently
both because he violated Section 1129(a) of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law, and because, as a matter of common law, it is well
settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates
a presumption that the operator of the moving vehicle was
negligent, and Defendant has not proffered a non - negligent
explanation for the collision. Accordingly, and because there
6
are no material questions of fact,
Plaintiff argues that summary
judgment should be granted. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's
motion is premature because he has yet to be afforded an
opportunity to conduct discovery. Moreover, Defendant avers that
pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1202, a driver who
double parks bears responsibility for a collision arising from
such a violation.
"It is well established law that a rear-end collision
with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of
negligence on part of the driver of the second vehicle." Polonia
v. Dunphy, No. 11 Civ. 1563 (CM), 2012 WL 2376467, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012). This presumption arises both from
common law principles and from New York Vehicle and Traffi c Law.
Id. Moreover, "[t]his rule applies even in situations when the
front car has come to a stop after changing lanes." Id.
Cohen v. Terranella,
(c iting
112 A.D.2d 264, 491 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't
1985)). For rear-end collisions, "[a] defendant can overcome the
presumption of negligence by providing a non-negligent
explanation for the collision," see Krynski v. Chase , 707 F.
Supp. 2d 318, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), such as "mechanical failure,
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1129(a) provides that : "The driver
of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent , having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and
the traffic upon and the condition of the highway ." N. Y. Veh . & Traf. Law§
1129 (McKinney).
7
3
unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or a sudden stop of the
vehicle ahead," see Power v. Hupart,
260 A.D.2d 458, 688
N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (2d Dep't 1999); see also Pomerantsev v.
Kodinsky, 156 A.D.3d 656,
657, 64 N.Y.S.3d 567
(internal citation omitted)
(2d Dep't 2017)
("Evidence that a vehicle was struck
in the rear and propelled into the vehicle in front of it may
provide a sufficient non-negligent explanation."). However,
"[i]f the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to
rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be
awarded judgment as a matter of law." Barile v. Lazzarini, 222
A.D.2d 635, 635, N.Y.S.2d 694
(2d Dep't 1995).
Because Defendant rear-ended the Schultz Vehicle,
there is a rebuttable presumption that Defendant acted
negligently. See Polonia, 2012 WL 2376467, at *3. This
presumption may be overcome, but only by demonstrating a nonnegligent reason for the collision. See Kyrnski,
707 F. Supp. 2d
at 322. While there is no all-encompassing list of non-negligent
justifications sufficient to overcome this presumption,
Defendant has not provided such a non-negligent explanation for
the accident.
Here, Defendant testifies that he was driving in the
right lane of Central Park West when the vehicle directly in
8
front of his swerved suddenly into the left lane.
~
(See Chen Aff.
5.) At that point, Defendant spotted the Schultz Vehicle
double parked in the right lane, and was unable to stop before
striking it.
(See id.
~
6.)
In Silberman v. Surrey Cadillac Limousine Service,
Inc.,
109 A.D.2d 833, 833, 486 N.Y.S.2d 357
(2d Dep't 1985), the
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment for the plaintiff because the only explanation the
defendant driver provided for why he rear-ended the plaintiff
was that the plaintiff's vehicle "stopped suddenly and without
warning." The court held that the defendant was under a "duty to
maintain a safe distance between the two vehicles (see Vehicle
and Traffic Law§ 1129(a)) and his failure to do so, in the
absence of an adequate, non-negligent explanation, constituted
negligence as a matter of law." Id.
Likewise, in Rue v. Stokes, 191 A.D.2d 245, 246, 594
N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't 1993), the court held that unrebutted
sworn testimony that a vehicle had been at a complete stop for
several seconds when it was struck in the rear by defendant's
vehicle was sufficient as a matter of law to place sole
responsibility for the accident on the defendant. Similarly, in
Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 272,
9
690 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1st
Dep't 1999), the court held that summary judgment for the
plaintiff was proper where "the unrebutted evidence was that the
car in which plaintiff was a passenger stopped for approximately
five seconds before it was struck in the rear by defendant's
vehicle."
The same reasoning applies to the present action.
Although Defendant claims that the Schultz Vehicle was
unlawfully stopped in the right lane, "summary judgment should
still be granted because of [Defendant's] failure to maintain a
safe distance between the two vehicles." See Polonia, 2012 WL
2376467, at *5. While Defendant argues that he cannot be in
violation of Section 1129(a) because "at no time prior to the
accident was the defendant 'following' the vehicle in which
plaintiff was a passenger," this is a misguided reading of the
statute.
( See Def.' s Br. 3.) Rather, Section 112 9 (a)
"imposes
the duty to be aware of traffic conditions, including other
vehicles suddenly stopping or slowing down." Matias v. Grose,
123 A.D.3d 485,
N.Y. Veh.
486,
999 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1st Dep't 2014)
(citing
& Traf. Law§ 1129).
Defendant avers that Section 1202(a) of the Vehicle
and Traffic law raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the
Schultz Vehicle was lawfully parked in front of 350 Central Park
10
West.
(See Def.'s Br. 3-5.) Section 1202(a) provides, in
relevant part, that "Except when necessary to avoid conflict
no
with other traffic, or when in compliance with law
[o]n
[s]top, stand or park a vehicle
person shall .
the roadway side of any vehicle stopped, standing or parked at
the edge or curb of a street." N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law§ 1202(a).
"It is well settled that owners of improperly parked vehicles
may be held liable to plaintiffs injured by negligent drivers of
other vehicles, depending on the determinations by the trier of
fact of the issues of foreseeability and proximate cause unique
to the particular cases." Boehm v.
672 N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1998)
Telfer, 2 50 A. D. 2d 97 5, 97 6,
(internal citatio.n and
alteration omitted).
Here, the parties do not contest that the Schultz
Vehicle was stopped in traffic in front of 350 Central Park
West.
(See B. Schultz Aff.
8; Chen Aff.
c_j[
5.)
c_j[c_j[
4,
6, 8; P. Schultz Aff.
c_j[c_j[
4,
6,
Defendant has proffered no evidence
supporting that the Schultz Vehicle was unlawfully or improperly
stopped at 350 Central Park West. Accordingly, no triable issue
of fact has been raised suggesting the Schultz Vehicle was
unlawfully parked, so Section 1202(a) does not apply. See also
Silberman, 109 A.D.2d 833, 833-34
(citing Kiernan v. Edwards,
A.D.2d 750, 468 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2d Dep't 1983))
11
97
("Nor is the right
of an innocent passenger to summary judgment in any way
restricted by questions of comparative negligence which may
exist as between appellants and the driver of the vehic l e in
front.").
Moreover, this situation is not one in which Defendant
may seek defense under the emergency doctrine. "The emergency
doctrine is an affirmative defense that can be used to cut off
liability for negligence." Polonia, 2012 WL 2376467, at *5. It
"recognizes that when an actor is faced with a sudden and
unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for
thought, deliberation or consideration .
. the action may not
be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in
the emergency context." Rivera v. New York City Transit Auth. ,
77 N.Y.2d 322 , 327 , 567 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2000) . This doctrine
"applies only to circumstances when an actor is confronted by a
sudden and unforeseen occurrence not of the actor's own making."
Jacobellis v. New York State Thruway Auth., 51 A.D.3d 976 . 977
(2d Dep't 2008); see also Ferrer v. Harris,
90, 449 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1982)
55 N.Y.2d 285 , 289-
(holding that emergency doctrine
applied in the instance where a four-year old child ran in front
of Defendant's vehicle because a child darting out into the
middle of the street is not an ordinary occurrence that is to be
reasonably anticipated by a driver). However, the emergency
12
doctrine does not apply to situations like the one here where
"the defendant driver should reasonably have anticipated and
been prepared to deal with the situation with which he was
confronted." Muye v. Liben, 282 A.D.2d 661, 662, 723 N.Y.S.2d
510 (2001)
(alteration omitted); see also Polonia, 2012 WL
2376467, at *6 (noting that the emergency doctrine is
inapplicable where the defendant "himself created the emergency
situation by failing to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed
and control over his vehicle and his failure to fully pay
attention to what was going on in his surroundings.").
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.
New York, NY
March /..t), 2018
U.S.D.J.
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