Rothermel v. General Motors LLC

Filing 100

OPINION AND ORDER re: (8049 in 1:14-md-02543-JMF) MOTION for Attorney Fees pursuant to Order Granting Motion to Enforce Charging Lien(Doc. 8028). filed by Jordon Rothermel, (8078 in 1:14-md-02543-JMF) MOTION for Attorney Fees Red acted as agreed upon with Counsel for GM. filed by Jordon Rothermel. The Court awards Zonas $3,052.50 in attorney's fees and zero in expenses. The Court acknowledges that that is a significant reduction from what Zonas sought. But gi ven the totality of the circumstances, Zonas should consider himself lucky to get anything. Moreover, contrary to Zonas's contentions, see Reply 3-5, the fact that Youngblood's representation of Rothermel also fell short does not call fo r a different result. To be sure, Youngblood's representation left much to be desired: He filed little on Rothermel's behalf, never took issue with the fact that Zonas was listed as attorney of record despite having been fired, and was g enerally poorly informed about the proceedings. But the Court will not reward one subpar lawyer merely because his client replaces him with another subpar lawyer.One final housekeeping matter remains. When Zonas initially filed his motion on July 1, 2020, he included documentation that appeared to contain confidential settlement information. See 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8049. Accordingly, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to restrict viewing access for the docket entry to counsel for New GM and Rothermel and directed the parties to confer and file proposed redactions on both 14-MD-2543 and 17-CV-9353. ECF No. 87. On July 31, 2020, Zonas filed a redacted copy of his motion (albeit only on 14-MD-2543, notwithstanding the Court's instruction) and did so under restricted viewing access (notwithstanding the redactions of confidential information). That same day, New GM filed its proposed redactions, ECF No. 88-1, noting that "counsel for New GM sent its proposed redactio ns to current and former counsel for Jordon Rothermel in an attempt to confer regarding the needed redactions, but received no response." ECF No. 88, at 1. In any event, the redactions included in Zonas's filing at 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 80 78 conform to those proposed by New GM at ECF No. 88-1. In light of the Second Circuit's recognition of the interest in preserving the confidentiality of settlement-related communications, see, e.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004), the Court approves the proposed limited redactions on a permanent basis. Accordingly, 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8078 (which contains redactions of the confidential information) should be unsealed. The Clerk of Court is directed to re move viewing restrictions on 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8078; to terminate 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8049 and 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8078; and to close 17-CV-9353. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 4/13/21) Filed In Associated Cases: 1:14-md-02543-JMF, 1:17-cv-09353-JMF (yv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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IN RE:
GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION
This Document Relates To:
Rothermel v. General Motors LLC, 17-CV-9353
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14-MD-2543 (JMF)
OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
The present case — brought by Plaintiff Jordon Rothermel — is part of multidistrict
litigation (“MDL”) proceedings against General Motors LLC (“New GM”), general familiarity with
which is assumed, relating to alleged defects in the ignition switches and other features of certain
General Motors vehicles. In 2020, Rothermel settled with New GM and dismissed his claims with
prejudice. See ECF No. 62.1 James Zonas, who had previously represented Rothermel, then moved
to reopen the case and to enforce an attorney’s lien. See ECF Nos. 63, 64. In an earlier
Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court granted those motions and directed Zonas to file an
accounting of his fees and expenses. See Rothermel v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Gen. Motors LLC
Ignition Switch Litig.), Nos. 14-MD-2543 (JMF) et al., 2020 WL 3640006 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2020)
(ECF No. 86). He now seeks $17,270.00 in fees and $4,646.97 in expenses. See 14-MD-2543,
ECF No. 8078 (“Motion”), at 4. For various reasons, however, the Court concludes that his request
is largely devoid of merit: It includes hours and expenses for which he has already been
compensated and work that he either did not perform or performed unreasonably; and it overlooks
his multiple violations of his ethical responsibilities to Rothermel. Given these reasons, the Court
would be on firm ground awarding Zonas nothing. Exercising its broad discretion, however, the
Court awards him $3,052.50.

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Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the docket in 17-CV-9353 (JMF).

BACKGROUND
Rothermel alleges that he suffered injuries in connection with a single-vehicle accident in
April 2016. See ECF No. 4-2 (“Compl.”), ¶ 8. Shortly after his accident, Rothermel retained
Zonas, on a contingency basis, to represent him in an action against the driver of the vehicle. See
Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at *1. With Zonas’s aid, Rothermel settled his claims with the
driver. Id. Zonas was paid his share of Rothermel’s recovery, and he also withheld a portion of the
recovery in order to pay experts, as he and Rothermel had learned that Rothermel might also have a
viable claim against New GM on the basis of the alleged ignition switch defect. Id.; ECF No. 90-1
(“Jordon Rothermel Aff.”), ¶ 9; ECF No. 90-2 (“Chris Rothermel Aff.”), ¶ 14. Zonas did, in fact,
retain experts to examine the vehicle, and they prepared reports in or around May 2016. Rothermel,
2020 WL 3640006, at *1. Months passed with few updates on the case. In August 2017,
Rothermel discharged Zonas and retained a new attorney, T. Patton Youngblood. Id. at *1, 3.
After taking over the case, Youngblood made repeated requests to Zonas for information
and documents about the case. Zonas did not respond and neglected to advise Youngblood that he
had retained a medical expert. ECF No. 90 (“Opp’n”), ¶¶ 5, 12; see also ECF Nos. 90-3, 90-5, 907. On October 12, 2017, Youngblood and Zonas spoke by telephone, and Youngblood made clear
that he was “representing Rothermel in his claim against GM.” Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at
*1 (cleaned up). In an email that Youngblood sent to Zonas after their telephone call, Youngblood
asked Zonas to forward various documents from Zonas’s case file. Id. On the same date, and
despite his termination, Zonas filed, on Rothermel’s behalf, the instant action against New GM in
Florida state court. See Compl. Neither Rothermel nor Youngblood can explain when or how they
first became aware of the lawsuit, but they must have known of it by October 25, 2017, when
Youngblood “had a phone conversation with an attorney for GM.” Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006,
at *1 (cleaned up). Rothermel claims he was surprised when he learned that Zonas had filed claims
on his behalf. Id. On November 8, 2017, New GM removed Rothermel’s claims to federal court
2

and, on November 29, 2017, they were transferred to this Court and consolidated in the MDL. See
ECF Nos. 1, 9.
Bewilderingly, neither Rothermel nor Youngblood ever alerted the Court to the fact that an
attorney who no longer represented Rothermel had filed the claims on his behalf. Nor did they take
issue with the fact that Zonas was listed as attorney of record on the docket. In fact, following
transfer of the case to this Court, neither Youngblood nor Zonas filed much of anything at all.
Zonas never filed a motion to withdraw, but he did file a notice of charging lien on the MDL docket
on April 4, 2018, see 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 5324, and on Rothermel’s individual docket on
August 6, 2019, see ECF No. 53. Youngblood filed a motion to appear pro hac vice on the MDL
docket on June 13, 2019, see 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 6872, and he submitted a stipulation of
dismissal with prejudice of Rothermel’s claims, which the Court so-ordered on January 29, 2020,
see ECF No. 62. The next day, Zonas filed motions to reopen the case and to enforce the charging
lien. See ECF Nos. 63, 64.
By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on July 6, 2020, the Court granted Zonas’s
motion to enforce the charging lien and granted his motion to reopen the case for the sole purpose
of enforcing the lien. See Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at *3. But the Court held that the
charging lien was valid only for work performed before August 11, 2017, the date on which the
Court found Zonas had been fired by Rothermel. See id. The Court ordered Zonas to file a detailed
accounting of the hours he had spent on Rothermel’s case against New GM and to propose a
reasonable hourly fee. See id. The Court cautioned that Zonas’s accounting must “not include time
spent litigating any claims against other defendants.” Id.
Thereafter, Zonas filed the present “Motion to Determine Reasonableness of Attorney’s
Fees and Expenses.” He seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $17,270.00 and expenses in the
amount of $4,646.97. See Motion 4. Rothermel opposes the motion, at least in part, arguing that it
reflects work that did not actually occur, work in connection with litigation against defendants other
3

than New GM, hours that were not reasonably expended, and expenses for which Zonas was already
reimbursed. See Opp’n ¶¶ 4-12. New GM takes no position on the motion. ECF No. 89.
DISCUSSION
As the parties appear to agree, Florida law governs these requests. See Opp’n ¶ 11; 14-MD2543, ECF No. 8114 (“Reply”), ¶ 10; see also Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (noting that in multidistrict litigation, the transferee court “applies the substantive state
law . . . of the jurisdiction where the action was filed”). Under Florida law, the method used to
calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee varies depending on the kind of case involved. See Standard
Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828, 835 (Fla. 1990). In fee-shifting cases, for example,
Florida courts apply a “lodestar” method similar to the one frequently used under federal law. See,
e.g., Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1150-52 (Fla. 1985). But when, as here,
a court assesses attorney’s fees due to the attorney by his own client, Florida law mandates a
different approach. See Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Poletz, 652 So.2d
366, 368-69 (Fla. 1995). In such cases, courts look to “the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the professional relationship,” taking into account “the actual value of the services to the client.” Id.
at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).
More specifically, a court in such a case may consider “the time reasonably devoted to the
representation and a reasonable hourly rate,” as under the lodestar method. Id.; see Lackey v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 855 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A] trial court must
consider the amount of time the attorneys devoted to the representation and a reasonable hourly rate
as factors in computing an award, as well as the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
client/lawyer relationship in awarding fees.” (emphases added)). In doing so, the court may also
look to Florida’s professional conduct rules. See Searcy, 652 So.2d at 369. In addition, however, a
court is to consider any factors relevant to the professional relationship, including “the fee
agreement itself, the reason the attorney was discharged, actions taken by the attorney or client
4

before or after discharge, and the benefit actually conferred on the client.” Id.; see also Frank J.
Pepper, Inc. v. Vining, 783 So.2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam). The goal of
the inquiry is “to ensure that the award is fair to both the attorney and client.” Searcy, 652 So.2d at
369. “The determination as to which factors are relevant in a given case, the weight to be given
each factor and the ultimate determination as to the amount to be awarded are matters within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.; see Hallowes v. Bedard, 877 So.2d 953, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); Murphy ex rel. Murphy v. Centlivre, 850 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
Applying these standards here, the Court concludes that Zonas should be awarded only a
small fraction of what he seeks because he has already been reimbursed for his expenses, because
he seeks fees for work that was not reasonably done (or done at all) or for which he has already
received payment, and because he did little to aid his client’s cause.
A. Expenses
The Court begins with the request for expenses, as it can be swiftly rejected. Rothermel and
his father both swear under oath that they already paid for the claimed expenses from the funds
received in connection with the settlement of Rothermel’s claims against the driver. See Jordon
Rothermel Aff. ¶ 9; Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶ 14. Specifically, they assert that Zonas advised that he
was withholding $4,836.00 from the check he provided to them. Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶ 9; Chris
Rothermel Aff. ¶ 14; see Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at *1 (“Zonas was paid his share of
Rothermel’s recovery [from the settlement of his claims against the driver], and he also withheld a
portion of the recovery in order to pay experts . . . .” (emphasis added)).2 Zonas provides no

2

It is not clear on the existing record why there is an approximately $200 discrepancy
between Zonas’s claimed expenses and the amount that he deducted from the settlement funds. The
discrepancy could perhaps have been explained if Zonas had provided Rothermel with a statement
detailing the expert fees, as required by Florida law. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 41.5(f)(1) (“On conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer must provide the client with a
written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the
5

evidence to the contrary. That is enough to reject Zonas’s request, but two of the expenses for
which he seeks reimbursement raise even more significant concerns. First, Zonas seeks
reimbursement for a medical expert despite having never forwarded any of the relevant information
to Youngblood; in fact, Youngblood did not even know of this expert’s existence until seeing her
name on Zonas’s accounting. Opp’n ¶ 12. That raises doubts about whether Zonas incurred the
expense; and to the extent he did, it undermines any claim that Rothermel benefited from it.
Second, and even more troubling, Zonas is effectively seeking to triple-bill for the expert expenses
incurred for ORC International: Although he already received reimbursement for those expenses
from the first settlement, he apparently hasn’t even paid them himself; instead, he has instructed
ORC International to collect its fee from Youngblood. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The bottom line is that Zonas
is not entitled to any additional reimbursement for expenses.
B. Attorney’s Fees
Zonas’s request for attorney’s fees requires a bit more discussion, but it too is troubling in a
variety of ways. Zonas seeks to recover for 46.6 attorney hours and 12.0 law clerk hours. See
Motion 6; Motion, Ex. A (“Accounting”). But there is reason to doubt that he actually devoted
many of those hours to representation of Rothermel and, to the extent he did, many were
unreasonable. Moreover, contrary to the Court’s prior Order, Zonas’s accounting includes many
hours attributable to litigation against defendants other than New GM.3

remittance to the client and the method of its determination.”). But he did not. See Opp’n ¶ 11;
Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶ 9; Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶ 9.
The Court assumes without deciding that Zonas’s proposed hourly rates — $350 for him and
$80 for his law clerk — are reasonable. See Accounting. (Rothermel and Youngblood do “not take
issue with” Zonas’s proposed hourly rates. Opp’n ¶ 3. New GM takes no position on the matter.
See ECF No. 89.)
3

6

1. The Reasonableness of Zonas’s Claimed Hours
First, as Rothermel argues, some of the work Zonas alleges did not — indeed, could not
have — happened. Opp’n ¶¶ 6-7. For instance, Zonas claims 5.2 hours relating to the negotiation
and review of settlement offers with New GM. Accounting 1-2. Rothermel objects that these hours
could not have happened because the purported offers did not exist. Opp’n ¶¶ 6, 8-9. Rothermel
avers that he heard of only one offer from New GM when, in July 2017, Zonas mentioned it in
passing. See Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 5-6; see also Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 10-12. But he never
saw this (or any other offer) in writing, and he and Zonas had no other discussions of settlement
offers or demand letters. Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. Rothermel also presents emails from
various firms representing New GM, all of which state that no offers were made by New GM to
Zonas at all. See ECF Nos. 90-4, 90-6. Finally, he presents an April 2019 email from Youngblood
to Zonas asking for details about the one alleged offer that had been communicated to Rothermel
and claims that Zonas never responded to this email. See Opp’n ¶ 8; ECF No. 90-5. Zonas offers
no contradictory evidence.
Given this record, the Court finds that Zonas did not actually expend the hours that he
claims on Rothermel’s case. If Zonas spent so much time “[r]eview[ing]” New GM’s purported
offers and “[p]repar[ing]” his own counteroffers, as he claims, Accounting 1, one would assume he
could submit documentary proof; but he has not, see Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶ 6 (affirming that he
was not aware of any counteroffers made by Zonas to New GM); accord Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶ 12.
At best, Zonas violated his ethical duty to “promptly inform” Rothermel about the “substance” of
all settlement offers. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 4-1.4 cmt. (“[A] lawyer who
receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must promptly
inform the client of its substance . . . .”). If so, then the hours that Zonas claims were not reasonably
expended. See, e.g., Afrazeh v. Miami Elevator Co. of Am., 769 So.2d 399, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (per curiam) (noting that “the trial court may consider whether [an attorney] committed any
7

violations of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar in entering any order” calculating fees); cf.
Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A. v. Philip M. Gerson, P.A., 483 So.2d 775, 778 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to award attorney’s fees in quantum meruit where an attorney had
violated Florida’s solicitation statute because to award fees in such a situation “would be to
condemn unlawful conduct on the law side of the court and approve the same unlawful conduct on
the equity side of the court”); Jackson v. Griffith, 421 So.2d 677, 677-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(“Certainly, an attorney displaying conduct sufficient to void an agreement in law should not be
allowed to profit from his blatantly unprofessional conduct in equity.”).
Zonas also claims that he spent 9.6 hours inspecting the vehicle, reviewing the vehicle’s
recall notice, and meeting with Rothermel at Zonas’s office. See Accounting 1-3; see also Reply ¶
4. But Chris Rothermel affirms that he was present for the vehicle inspection and that Zonas was
not. See Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶ 5. Similarly, while Zonas claims 1.5 hours for a meeting he
allegedly had with Rothermel, Rothermel says no such meeting occurred. Compare Accounting 1,
with Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 4, 7. And finally, Zonas claims 3.6 hours for reviewing the vehicle
“recall notice and application.” Accounting 3. Chris Rothermel, however, explains that he
informed Zonas of the recall after doing his own research on the issue, which took only about ten to
fifteen minutes. See Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶ 7. Chris Rothermel also notes that he was never told
about any “application” and is not sure what application there could have been as “there was no
longer anything to repair — the vehicle was a total loss.” Id. Notably, as with the alleged
settlement negotiations, Zonas does not offer any evidence on this point beyond his accounting to
counter the Rothermels’ sworn statements. Given this lack of countervailing evidence, Zonas has
not met his burden of showing that these hours were reasonably expended working on the New GM
matter.
Next, the Court declines to credit Zonas’s entry for 6.5 attorney hours on November 10,
2016, which reads as follows: “Reviewed case and special damages. Discuss these with Client.
8

Discussed value of case with JR, case valued at $500,000. Must be careful about Patton
Youngblood being a conflict of interes [sic].” Accounting 1. The reference to a conflict with
Patton Youngblood, Rothermel’s current counsel of record, is puzzling on its face. But making
matters (far) more puzzling, and worse, Rothermel (and, by extension, Zonas) did not even meet
Youngblood until nine months later, in August 2017. See Opp’n ¶ 6; Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶ 8.
Zonas asserts in his reply that this entry was meant to refer to James Patton, the driver of the
vehicle, not to Patton Youngblood, Rothermel’s current counsel. Reply ¶ 11. But that explanation
makes little sense and the Court is not prepared to credit it.
Finally, Zonas flagrantly failed to adhere to the Court’s direction in its July 6, 2020
Memorandum Opinion and Order to omit “time spent litigating any claims against” defendants
other than New GM. Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at *3. In particular, Zonas’s accounting
includes fourteen entries, totaling 10.6 hours, for activities such as sending letters to or
communicating by telephone with State Farm, one of the insurers involved in the claims against the
driver of the vehicle. See, e.g., Accounting 2 (“Telephone call with Cynthia Cook at State Farm
regarding JR claim.”); id. at 3 (“Review offer from State Farm with JR.”); see also Opp’n ¶ 4. Such
work is not compensable in this case as it provided no value to Rothermel in connection with his
claims against New GM. Moreover, Zonas was already compensated for it — through the
contingency fee award that he received in connection with the earlier settlement. In other words,
once again, Zonas is seeking to double-bill — to collect fees for work that has already been paid.
2. Other Relevant Circumstances
For these reasons, the Court declines to credit twenty-two of Zonas’s time entries, totaling
31.9 attorney hours. That leaves 14.7 attorney hours and 12.0 law clerk hours, which — assuming
Zonas’s proposed rates were reasonable — would yield a lodestar of $6,105.00. As Zonas
emphasizes, however, the determination of reasonable rates and reasonable hours is only the starting
point under Florida law in cases such as this. See Reply 4-5. Ultimately, the Court “must consider
9

‘the totality of the circumstances surrounding the professional relationship’ in computing the
reasonable value of the services rendered.” Morgan & Morgan P.A. v. Guardianship of McKean,
60 So.3d 575, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So.2d 1016, 1022
(Fla. 1982)). The problem for Zonas is that considering the totality of other relevant circumstances
does not strengthen his claim to fees; it weakens his claim considerably.
First, Zonas’s behavior both before and after his discharge by Rothermel counsels against a
fee award. See Searcy, 652 So.2d at 369 (noting the relevance of “actions taken by the attorney or
client before or after discharge” in the quantum meruit fee calculation). Before discharge, Zonas
failed to provide written statements of the breakdown of the settlement with the driver (which,
among other things, would have enabled Rothermel to evaluate whether and to what extent Zonas is
seeking to double-collect here) and he failed to keep his client abreast of developments in the case;
indeed, he appeared to take few actions to advance Rothermel’s case. See Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶¶
5-6; Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 10-12. Rothermel discharged Zonas based on the months that passed
between any updates on the case and based on Zonas’s pressure to settle for an amount that he felt
was far too low. See Jordon Rothermel Aff. ¶ 7; Chris Rothermel Aff. ¶¶ 12-13; Searcy, 652 So.2d
at 369 (noting the relevance of “the reason the attorney was discharged” in the quantum meruit fee
calculation). Even more disturbingly, Zonas filed this lawsuit against New GM after Rothermel had
discharged him — and making matters worse, neglected to even tell Rothermel about the filing.
Rothermel, 2020 WL 3640006, at *1-3. This is in direct violation of Florida’s rules of professional
conduct. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 4-1.6 (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client
or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . .
the lawyer is discharged.”); see also Afrazeh, 769 So.2d at 402-03 (considering violations of the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar in calculating a fee award).
Second, the record does not support Zonas’s assertions that he “did essentially all the work”
and that his efforts were “significant and crucial to the settlement” with New GM. Reply 5. Indeed,
10

the evidence suggests that whatever work Zonas did put into the matter was largely withheld from
Youngblood and played no direct role in the settlement with New GM. For example, when
Youngblood was preparing responses to discovery requests, he emailed Zonas asking for
Rothermel’s medical bills. See ECF No. 90-3; Opp’n ¶ 5. Zonas replied that he “may have to go[
]to storage” but never ultimately provided any medical bills. See ECF No. 90-3; Opp’n ¶ 5.
Similarly, as noted above, at least one expert report commissioned by Zonas was withheld from
Youngblood. See Opp’n ¶ 12; ECF Nos. 90-7, 90-8. In fact, Youngblood was not even aware of
the existence of relevant expert until seeing her name on Zonas’s accounting. Opp’n ¶ 12. And as
noted, although Zonas claims to have spent significant time negotiating settlement offers with New
GM, these offers either never actually occurred or were never adequately communicated to
Rothermel or Youngblood. These actions hindered, rather than helped, Rothermel’s cause. See,
e.g., Searcy, 652 So.2d at 369 n.5 (“[T]he trial court’s finding that [the original attorneys] refused to
give the [client’s] file to the successor firm may affect the value of the services rendered to the
client.”); see also, e.g., Law Offices of Theodore Goldberg v. Fazio, Dawson, DiSalvo, Cannon,
Abers & Podrecca, 659 So.2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]n fixing the quantum
meruit amount, the trial court should consider that some aspects of [counsel’s] handling of the case
may have actually disadvantaged the clients.”).
In light of these considerations, the Court would be on firm ground reducing Zonas’s fee
award to zero. See, e.g., Spence, 483 So.2d at 778 (refusing to grant quantum meruit recovery for
an attorney where the attorney had violated Florida’s solicitation statute); Jackson, 421 So.2d at
677-78 (denying a quantum meruit award on the ground that an attorney “should not be allowed to
profit from his blatantly unprofessional conduct” where the conduct would be sufficient to void an
agreement in law); see also Heller v. Emanuel (In re Emanuel), 450 B.R. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(upholding a fee calculation of zero dollars when the attorney “failed to prove that he had conferred
a benefit” on, and instead harmed, the client “by failing to turn over his files, which made the task
11

of successor counsel more difficult”), aff’d, 460 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order);
Murphy, 850 So.2d at 602-03 (admonishing a lower court for granting an excessive award by
focusing too much on the “results obtained” by the client and not enough on other considerations
like the attorney’s inadequate cooperation and failure to inform the client about settlement offers).
Nevertheless, as an exercise of its broad discretion, and in view of the fact that Zonas undoubtedly
provided some benefit to Rothermel — by providing some relevant documents and information and,
most notably, by locating and retaining the experts whose reports Zonas did provide to Youngblood,
see Opp’n ¶ 5 — the Court will grant Zonas half of the lodestar figure above, or $3,052.50.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Zonas $3,052.50 in attorney’s fees and zero in
expenses. The Court acknowledges that that is a significant reduction from what Zonas sought. But
given the totality of the circumstances, Zonas should consider himself lucky to get anything.
Moreover, contrary to Zonas’s contentions, see Reply 3-5, the fact that Youngblood’s representation
of Rothermel also fell short does not call for a different result. To be sure, Youngblood’s
representation left much to be desired: He filed little on Rothermel’s behalf, never took issue with
the fact that Zonas was listed as attorney of record despite having been fired, and was generally
poorly informed about the proceedings. But the Court will not reward one subpar lawyer merely
because his client replaces him with another subpar lawyer.
One final housekeeping matter remains. When Zonas initially filed his motion on July 1,
2020, he included documentation that appeared to contain confidential settlement information. See
14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8049. Accordingly, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to restrict viewing
access for the docket entry to counsel for New GM and Rothermel and directed the parties to confer
and file proposed redactions on both 14-MD-2543 and 17-CV-9353. ECF No. 87. On July 31,
2020, Zonas filed a redacted copy of his motion (albeit only on 14-MD-2543, notwithstanding the
Court’s instruction) and did so under restricted viewing access (notwithstanding the redactions of
12

confidential information). That same day, New GM filed its proposed redactions, ECF No. 88-1,
noting that “counsel for New GM sent its proposed redactions to current and former counsel for
Jordon Rothermel in an attempt to confer regarding the needed redactions, but received no
response.” ECF No. 88, at 1. In any event, the redactions included in Zonas’s filing at 14-MD2543, ECF No. 8078 conform to those proposed by New GM at ECF No. 88-1. In light of the
Second Circuit’s recognition of the interest in preserving the confidentiality of settlement-related
communications, see, e.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004), the
Court approves the proposed limited redactions on a permanent basis. Accordingly, 14-MD-2543,
ECF No. 8078 (which contains redactions of the confidential information) should be unsealed.
The Clerk of Court is directed to remove viewing restrictions on 14-MD-2543, ECF No.
8078; to terminate 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8049 and 14-MD-2543, ECF No. 8078; and to close 17CV-9353.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 13, 2021
New York, New York

__________________________________
JESSE M. FURMAN
United States District Judge

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