Charles v. Seinfeld et al
Filing
106
OPINION & ORDER re: 89 LETTER MOTION for Oral Argument addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Orin Snyder dated November 9, 2018. filed by Jerry Seinfeld, Embassy Row, LLC, Netflix Inc., Sony Pictures Television Inc., Come dians in Cars, LLC, Columbus 81 Productions, Inc., 73 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. filed by Jerry Seinfeld, Embassy Row, LLC, Netflix Inc., Sony Pictures Television Inc., Comedians in Cars, LLC, Columbus 81 Productions, Inc. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss. The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice and the state law claims dismissed without prejudice. Because the Court resolves these motions on the paper s, Defendants' request for oral argument, Dkt. No. 89, is hereby DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Dkt. Nos. 73, 89 and to close this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 9/30/19) (yv) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.
Case 1:18-cv-01196-AJN-KHP Document 106 Filed 09/30/19 Page 1 of 9
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Christian Charles,
Plaintiff,
-v-
18-CV-1196 (AJN)
Jerry Seinfeld, et al.,
OPINION & ORDER
Defendants.
ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:
This litigation concerns allegations that Plaintiff is the author of intellectual property
related to the talk show Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee, produced and distributed by
Defendants. Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 73. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion. The copyright claims are time-barred,
and the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"),
Dkt. No. 70, Exhs. 3-4. Since the 1990s, Plaintiff Christian Charles, a writer and director, and
Defendant Jerry Seinfeld, a well-known comedian and actor, had worked together on various
projects. SAC ,r 18-26. During one of their collaborations, Charles allegedly suggested to
Seinfeld that he should create a television show based on the concept of two friends talking and
driving. Id.
,r 22.
Charles produced a treatment of the show, but Seinfeld ultimately decided not
to proceed with the project. Id.
,r 24. 1
Years later, in 2011, Seinfeld allegedly mentioned to
1
In this context, the term "treatment" commonly refers to "a brief outline, in prose, describing the actions of a
movie plot, indicating characters along the way with little or no dialogue ... run[ning] no more than 25 pages."
Richlin v. MGM Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 964 n. l (9th Cir. 2008). It can include a "mixture of story and
1
)I
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Charles that he was considering a talk show about "comedians driving in a car to a coffee place
and just 'chatting,'" as his next project. Id
,r 28.
Charles claims he immediately noted that this
was the same idea for which he earlier produced the treatment. Id. They then purportedly
agreed to work together on the project. Id
Charles then produced a new treatment which he claims captures the "look and feel" of
Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. Id.
,r 32.
Seinfeld liked the treatment, and Charles allegedly
created a "synopsis, camera shot list with description and visual camera angles, and script," all of
which he deems "the Script." Id
,r 36.
In October 2011, Charles and his production company,
mouseROAR, shot a pilot of the show with Seinfeld, settling on the name, Comedians in Cars
Getting Coffee. Id.
,r 36-44.
According to the SAC, despite some initial reservations, Seinfeld
decided he wanted to proceed with the project. Id.
,r 45-47.
In Charles's telling, this is the point at which things go sour. Charles allegedly had a
business understanding with Seinfeld that mouseROAR would provide all production services
and was concerned when Seinfeld brought in a subsidiary of Sony Pictures Television that also
did production work. Id.
,r 62.
In January and February of 2012, Charles claims that he
communicated his request "for compensation and backend involvement" with the show. Id.
,r 69.
According to the SAC, Seinfeld "expressed outrage at the notion that Charles would have more
than a 'work for hire' directing role." Id.
,r 70.
The SAC further states that Seinfeld
characterized Charles as "ungrateful" and told Charles that he "should expect to be compensated
through his directing fee." Id. They had another conversation along similar lines a few days
later. Id.
,r 73.
During these conversations, Charles alleges that "Seinfeld did not claim
authorship or ownership of the Pilot" even though "Charles had often reminded Seinfeld" that
staging." Id
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the idea for the show was Charles's. Id. Chares also contends that he never made any
agreements with any of the Defendants regarding a "work-for-hire" arrangement or his alleged
copyright interests. Id. 171-72.
Charles alleges that business partners and confidantes of Seinfeld assured Charles that he
would "remain involved" and that the spat with Seinfeld would "blow over." Id. 174. As late as
April of 2012, Charles claims that one Seinfeld representative left a voicemail stating that
Charles and Seinfeld could still work together. Id. 176. Later that month, the SAC states that
Seinfeld agreed to pay $107,734 for pre-production expenses that mouseROAR incurred.
Id.11
77-79. Charles also alleges that he and his representatives were engaged in discussions with the
Sony subsidiary, regarding a potential deal and "backend compensation" as the show's
"writer/director." Id. 180. Despite these conversations, Charles had no further involvement in
the project, which became a successful web series that continues to produce new episodes. Id. 11
81, 96.
From 2012 to 2014, Charles claims that he "maintained a reasonable and good faith
belief' that "Seinfeld would eventually acknowledge Charles's authorship and ownership and
bring him in" on the show. Id. 186. By September of 2016, the SAC states that "Charles
concluded that Seinfeld never intended to include Charles in the Project." Id. 191. That month
Charles registered his treatment with the Copyright Office. Id. 192. In 2017, Netflix inked a
lucrative new deal for the show to join their platform, leading Charles to contact Seinfeld. Id.
1
96-97. Seinfeld's lawyer responded, stating that Seinfeld was the creator and owner of the show.
Id. 198. While Charles concedes that Seinfeld had previously claimed to be the "creator" of the
show in the press, this was the first time that "Seinfeld or a representative of Seinfeld had
directly made this claim to Charles." Id. In February of 2018, Charles filed this lawsuit against
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Defendants, all of whom are involved in the production or distribution of Comedians in Cars
Getting Coffee. Id.
,r,r 1-3, 99.
He brings claims for copyright infringement of the treatment,
script, and pilot, as well as claims for joint authorship, injunctive relief, and several state law
causes of action. Id.
II.
,r,r 100-71.
LEGALSTANDARD
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A plaintiff is not required to provide "detailed factual allegations" in the complaint but
must assert "more than labels and conclusions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Ultimately, the
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
The Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences
in the non-movant's favor. ATS! Communs, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.
2007).
While "the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense that must be raised in
the answer" it may nevertheless "be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the defense appears on
the face of the complaint." Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 798 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2014). When evaluating 12(b)(6) motions based on the statute oflimitations, the Court must
continue to "assume [Plaintiffs] factual allegations are true" and apply the plausibility standard
announced in Twombly and Iqbal. Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Shiboleth LLP, Case No. 16-cv-3179,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128060, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs copyright claims are time-barred. The Court agrees.
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Civil actions under the Copyright Act have a three-year statute of limitations. See 17
U.S.C. § 507(b). To successfully sue for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show "(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original." Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224,229 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Feist Pub! 'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,361 (1991)). The Second Circuit has held that when
"ownership is the dispositive issue" in an infringement claim and the "ownership claim is timebarred," then the infringement claim itself is time-barred, even if there had been infringing
activity in the three years preceding the lawsuit. Kwan, 634 F.3d at 230; see also Simmons v.
Stanberry, 810 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) ("Where the plaintiffs claims were
rooted in her contested assertion of an ownership interest in the copyright, and that claim of
ownership interest was time-barred because of the plaintiffs delay in suing, the plaintiff could
not resuscitate the untimely claim by relying on claims against the defendants' continuing course
of infringing publication after the plaintiffs ownership claim became time-barred.").
Plaintiffs infringement claim is squarely "rooted in [his] contested assertion of an
ownership interest in the copyright." Id. The principle issue in this case is not the "nature,
extent or scope, of copying." Kwan, 634 F.3d at 229. Rather, it is whether Charles's alleged
"contributions ... qualify [him] as the author and therefore owner" of the copyrights in
Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. Id
Plaintiff does not truly dispute any of this. See Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 85, at 1 ("Resolution of this case depends upon the
answer to one simple question: who it the author of the [Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee]
Pilot.") (emphasis in original). Instead, Plaintiff makes unavailing attempts to distinguish
Second Circuit precedent on this issue. First, he contends that his lawsuit is about "authorship,"
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which is somehow different than "ownership." However, authorship is merely one path to
ownership of a copyright, and Kwan itself dealt with an authorship dispute. 634 F .3d at 229.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Kwan and Simmons involved disputes over the plaintiffs status as
an owner but not defendant's status. This is not a material distinction, because a non-owner
defendant can prevail in an infringement suit so long as the plaintiff is also not the owner.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Kwan claimed that she, and not the defendant, was the sole author,
even though the defendant had been listed as the author on the work in question. Id. at 227; see
also id. at 229 ("[Plaintiff] cannot recover unless she was the sole author"). This set of facts
largely mirrors the present case.
Having determined that "ownership forms the backbone of the 'infringement' claim," the
relevant inquiry is whether it is evident from the face of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint
that his ownership claim is time-barred. Id. at 229. The ownership claim "accrues only once,
when 'a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have been put on inquiry as to the existence of a
right."' Id. at 228 (quoting Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Furthermore, "any number of events can trigger the accrual of an ownership claim, including an
express assertion of sole authorship or ownership." Kwan, 634 F.3d at 228. For several reasons,
the SAC describes assertions made over three years before this lawsuit was filed that were
sufficiently express as to put a reasonably diligent plaintiff on inquiry.
First, the SAC alleges that in 2011 Seinfeld twice rejected Charles's request for backend
compensation and made it clear that Charles's only involvement was to be on a "work-for-hire"
basis. In Wilson v. Dynatone Publising Co., the Second Circuit explained that a defendant who,
in a copyright registration, "assert[ed] ownership as a work for hire would effectively repudiate
Plaintiffs' claim" of copyright ownership, if the plaintiffs were put on notice of the registration.
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892 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). Likewise, Seinfeld restricting Charles
to a "work-for-hire" directing role necessarily contradicted any idea that Charles was the owner
of intellectual property in the show. Even if all inferences are drawn in favor of Charles, a
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have understood that Seinfeld was repudiating any claim of
ownership that Charles may have. That Seinfeld did not expressly claim ownership for himself
during these conversations does not matter. It is sufficient that Charles's claim was rejected. See
Mahan v. ROC Nation, LLC, 634 F. App'x 329,331 (2d Cir. 2016) (statute oflimitations barred
copyright infringement claim when defendant "had long ago expressly repudiated [plaintiff's]
ownership claims"); Simmons, 810 F .3d at 116 (copyright infringement claim was time-barred
when "more than three years prior to [plaintiff's] filing of his suit, [defendant] had made clear to
[plaintiff] that he rejected [plaintiff's] assertion of an interest in the copyright").
Charles claims that statements made by associates of Seinfeld in the aftermath of the two
phone calls diluted or muddled the repudiation. However, as the SAC makes explicit, these
statements relate only to whether Charles "would remain involved in the Project." SAC ,r 74; see
also id
,r 76 ("It's not over; Christian and Jerry can still work together").
Even drawing all
inferences in favor of Charles, these remarks do not plausibly contradict Seinfeld's statements
that Charles would not be "involved" on more than a work-for-hire basis.
Second, Seinfeld and other Defendants went on to produce and distribute the show
without giving any credit to Charles. In Kwan, the fact that the book in question was published
without crediting Plaintiff as an author was enough to put her on notice that her claim of
authorship was repudiated. 634 F.3d at 227,229. The SAC states that from 2012 to 2014,
Charles believed that "Seinfeld would eventually acknowledge Charles's authorship and
ownership and bring him in on the Project." SAC ,r 86. Even interpreting the SAC most
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favorably to Charles, it clearly alleges he was aware that the show was being produced and that
he was not being credited on it.
Because Charles was on notice that his ownership claim had been repudiated since at
least 2012, his infringement claim is time-barred. His joint authorship claim is also time-barred
for the same reasons. And his request for an injunction fails, because it was premised on
Charles' assertion that he is the sole owner. Because Charles has had multiple opportunities to
amend his complaint in the face of Defendants' timeliness arguments and has not made any
further amendment requests, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. See Gallop v. Cheney,
642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) ("While leave to amend under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is 'freely granted,' see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), no court can be said to have erred in
failing to grant a request that was not made."); De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 72
(2d Cir. 1996) (dismissal with prejudice is proper when "a party has been given ample prior
opportunity to allege a claim"); see also Individual Rule 3.F ("Non-moving parties are on notice
that declining to amend their pleadings to timely respond to a fully briefed argument in the
motion to dismiss may well constitute a waiver of their right to use the amendment process to
cure any defects that have been made apparent by the briefing.").
The Court further declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
See In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (noting
that "when the federal claims are dismissed the 'state claims should be dismissed as well"')
(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)); see also Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (explaining that "in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity-will point
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toward declining jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims").
The Court finds no reason to deviate from that normal practice here. Because "the Court
has not yet invested resources necessary to resolve [these] claims," and because "[t]he extensive
discovery already taken is likely sufficient to enable [these] claims to be evaluated in state court
without any additional discovery," the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs state law claims. Vuona v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 2d 359, 393-94
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). They are dismissed without prejudice. 2
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.
The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice and the state law claims dismissed without
prejudice. Because the Court resolves these motions on the papers, Defendants' request for oral
argument, Dkt. No. 89, is hereby DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to
terminate Dkt. Nos. 73, 89 and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September~ 2019
New York, New York
2
After submitting briefing on this motion, the parties became engaged in a dispute regarding the proper procedural
vehicle for Defendants to challenge Plaintiffs attachment of various declarations and affidavits to his opposition
memorandum. See Dkt. Nos. 91, 92. Because these declarations and affidavits would not affect the Court's analysis
if they were considered, the Court declines to address the parties' procedural arguments.
9
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